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This thesis will seek to explain the development of the Angolan political system after 
independence; in particular, it will attempt to assess the extent to which the country's 
political evolution is distinct in Africa, and if so, why? 
The issues raised in this thesis are centred around Weber's principal theories regarding 
the expression and dynamics of internal rationality within an existing social system as 
embodied by the State. 
There is a broad consensus within African Studies on post-colonial societies in Africa. 
After independence, these systems were subjected to specific social and political dynamics, 
the rationality of which has been identified as being patrimonial. Ties of distributive 
interdependence are forged between social actors in general and between rulers and ruled in 
particular. This will be referred to in this thesis as `modern patrimonialism'. 
However, the Angolan experience - and maybe that of other countries such as the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Nigeria - is one where a 
distinct patrimonial social organisation is to be found. The ties of distributive 
interdependence between rulers and ruled are not so much forged as diluted, and the 
patrimonial system undergoes different dynamics. This brings a new dimension to the 
notion of patrimonialism as a socio-political system and will be termed `post-modern 
patrimonialism'. The creation, construction and development of this distinct form of 
patrimonialism occurred in Angola long before the so-called transition to multiparty system 
and market economy, which began in 1987. 
This thesis argues that, in Angola, the different socio-political dynamics of a post- 
modem patrimonial system are due to three phenomena. Firstly, there was a process of 
insularity and autonomy characterising the economic and political power of the ruling 
elites, which led to the extreme dependence and lack of economic and political power of 
the ruled masses. Secondly, there was a cumulative movement that deepened and 
reinforced the principles, foundations and expressions of patrimonial social organisation, 
through the dilution of distributive interdependence between rulers and ruled. Thirdly, there 
was the civil war with increased ethnic overtones, which promoted micro-identity political 
alignments and economic scarcity, thus favouring the further strengthening of this new 
form of unaccountable patrimonialism. 
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General Introduction 
This work aims to explain the Angolan post-independence political system 
through the analysis of the relationships established between rulers and ruled. It 
proposes an analytical framework which goes beyond that, based on a Weberian 
approach, developed in the complementary works of Jean-Francois Medard, 
Jean-Francois Bayart, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz - here termed 
modern patrimonialism. 
The point here is to show that their approach does not apply well to the 
concrete case of Angola (and possibly other cases as well) and to propose a way 
forward through a reformulated analytical and interpretative framework - here 
termed post-modem patrimonialism - able to account for the realities 
observed in Angola. It is not my intention to create a whole new analytical 
framework, but to make a profitable, although critical, use of that provided by 
those authors, making it clear where and how it fails to account for the Angolan 
case. 
According to those authors, in post-independence African countries 
(sub-Saharan African countries excluding South Africa)' there is a specific 
logic (i. e., coherent relation) between the internal dominant rationality of the 
social actors and the kind of interdependent relationships that become 
established between them, especially between rulers and ruled. As we will see, 
these emerging frameworks of relationship established at several levels (socio- 
cultural identification, political, economic, ethical) are essentially patrimonial 
distributive in nature, but should not be confused with `traditional' (pre- 
colonial) forms of patrimonialism, giving rise to a specific `modern' (post- 
independence) form of patrimonialism as a system of socio-political 
The authors mentioned here have a high degree of generalisation in their works, referring 
indiscriminately to African countries (sub-Saharan African countries, excluding South-Africa), which 
might be seen as a potential weakness of their works as discussed in sub-chapter 1.4. 
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organisation. Terms such as `traditional' and `modern' used in here to 
characterise forms of patrimonialism are simply employed as chronological 
references, `traditional' referring to pre-colonial forms of patrimonialism, 
closer to those patrimonial characteristics described by Weber and `modern' 
referring to post-independence forms of patrimonialism, such as those 
described by these authors. 
In contrast to that analytical and interpretative framework, it is here 
argued that in such countries as Angola (and possibly others such as the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria), 
patrimonialism underwent a different dynamic and led to a different socio- 
political organisation. Contrary to what was supposed to happen with `modern 
patrimonialism', the ties of patrimonial distributive interdependence between 
rulers and ruled did not settle and solidify; instead they weakened and loosened. 
Nevertheless, the system did not enter self-destruction, but rather a cumulative 
and self-reinforcing process that deepened its patrimonial organisational 
characteristics, leading to a new and extreme dimension of patrimonialism as a 
political system - `post-modern patrimonialism' - which is quantitatively and 
qualitatively different from `modern patrimonialism'. 
The emerging central question is therefore to discover the reasons 
underlying such different patrimonial dynamics. Why is the Angolan political 
system characterised by the dilution of distributive interdependence ties 
between rulers and ruled ? Why did the dilution of those ties, which were 
supposed to be the basis of the patrimonial system, lead not to its destruction 
but to a more extreme form of its development instead ? 
The answer to these questions, which this thesis will substantiate is that, 
in the case of Angola, such different patrimonial dynamics and organisation can 
be explained through a triple phenomenon. Firstly, there was a process of 
growing insularity and autonomy of the economic and political power of the 
`ruling elites', which led to the extreme fragility and loss of economic and 
political power of the `ruled masses'. Secondly, there was a cumulative and 
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reinforcing dynamic that deepened the organisational characteristics of 
patrimonialism through the dilution of distributive interdependence ties 
between rulers and ruled. Thirdly, there was the civil war with increasing ethnic 
overtones, which served as a powerful support of the cumulative and 
reinforcing patrimonial dynamics: promoting economic scarcity and social 
fragmentation. All these processes, concepts and notions will be defined and 
developed below. 
In a systematic form, this study develops the Angolan case only. All the 
other references (secondary or complementary) made to other countries as 
possible cases proximate to the Angolan, are presented with the purpose that 
they may open up future lines of research and possible comparative studies, but 
it is beyond the scope of this work to examine them in more systematic 
comparative terms with Angola. 
The time frame of the analysis 
The discussion of `modern' and `post-modem patrimonialism' turns on the 
nature of the State emerging after independence and particularly the type of 
relationship between rulers and ruled within it (at an economic, political and 
ethical level). Consequently, this work is necessarily centred on the post- 
independence period, when such relationships came to be established. 
However, as will be seen, as the basis of post-independence patrimonialism (be 
it modern or post-modern) are ties of preferential solidarity usually based on 
socio-cultural identification cleavages, sometimes rooted in the pre- 
independence period. Thus, there is also a need to discuss any perceptible 
socio-cultural identification cleavages before independence. I will analyse in 
particular their political implications during the anti-colonial struggle (1961- 
1974) and the first civil war (1975-1976), showing that they are relevant to the 
understanding of the post-independence patrimonial dynamic. 
The frontier between periods cannot be established with precision and 
must be understood more as an area of transition from one period to the 
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subsequent. Therefore, - in the main subject discussed in this thesis (the 
establishment of relationships between rulers and ruled in the new independent 
country) the 11th of November 1975 (date of independence) can not be taken as 
the precise frontier between the pre-independence period (when those relations 
did not exist) and the post-independence period (when those relations came to 
be established). 
There is a transition period stretching from the end of 1974 to 1976, 
encompassing the beginning of free political activity by the nationalist 
movements (summer of 1974), the war between them (started in March 1975), 
the official independence (11 November 1975) and the military victory of the 
MPLA (in the first months of 1976). This period might be seen at the same time 
as the matrix from which the relationships between rulers and ruled in the 
newly independent country started to evolve and also as a period when those 
relationships could not be effectively established due to the civil war that was 
going on for the control of the government and the State. For this reason the 
analysis of the pre-independence period contains references to events taking 
place until 1976 and the post-independence period includes references to events 
prior to independence. 
This said, the time frame for the analysis of the post-independence 
period (the main focus of this work) ranges from 1974/76 to 1985/87, and the 
reasons for this limit are threefold. 
Firstly, because 1985/87 marks the end of the Socialist Marxist-Leninist 
phase and the beginning of the so-called transition to a market economy and a 
multiparty system. Officially, the Socialist-Marxist one-party model existed 
since the MPLA's Central Committee plenary in October 1976 until the Third 
Congress of the party in 1990. However, a non-official criterion has been 
chosen for this work, based on the observed reality that, for practical purposes, 
Socialism-Marxism ends in 1987, the year when several changes (that could be 
already perceived at the II Congress in December 1985) were implemented at 
the economic and political levels, expressed mainly through the Economic and 
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Financial Clean-up Programme (SEF or Programa de Saneamento Econömico 
e Financeiro) and the negotiations with South Africa, the USA and Cuba. These 
led rapidly to the change to a market economy and to a multiparty system, 
which although officially sanctioned only in 1990, was already discernible by 
1985/87 - as has been recognised by other authors as we112. 
Secondly, although interesting, the period after 1987 can not be included 
(at least for now) within the scope of the analytical perspective here in 
discussion (patrimonialism as a system of socio-political organisation) because 
it implies too many new variables (inherent to a new formal political and 
economic model) whose political impact on that system can not possibly be 
ascertained with any reliability, for the simple reason that such transition is still 
taking place. Moreover, no one knows what will happen in 2002 with the 
promised presidential and legislative elections - especially now that Jonas 
Savimbi has been killed. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, because the essentials of a post-modem 
patrimonial dynamic occurs before 1987 and consequently, before the 
beginning of the so-called transition to a market economy and to a multiparty 
system. 
Structure 
This thesis is composed of two parts. Part I is concerned with the theoretical 
and analytical discussion of the differences between `modern patrimonialism' 
and `post-modern patrimonialism'. Part II is dedicated to the Angolan case 
study, and in its turn is divided into three sections. Section A deals with 
perceptible socio-cultural identification cleavages in the pre-independence 
period, their origins and political implications during the anti-colonial struggle 
and the first civil war. Section B analyses the patrimonial dynamics and 
2 See Messiant, Christine, `A propos des "transitions democratiques", notes comparatives et prealables ä 
l'analyse du cas Angolais', in Africana Studia, 2 (2000), pp. 61-95; also in the same sense is Hodges, 
Tony, Angola from Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism (London: James Currey, 2001). 
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organisation of the Angolan political system during the presidency of 
Agostinho Neto (1975-1979). Section C discusses the patrimonial dynamics 
and organisation of the Angolan political system during the Marxist phase of 
Eduardo dos Santos' presidency (1979-1985/87). 
Research and sources 
The research for this thesis was undertaken in two phases: the first, between 
September 1996 and December 1997, consisted of bibliographical research in 
Lisbon and London, mainly in the library of SOAS (School of Oriental and 
African Studies); the second, concerned field-research, and was undertaken in 
Angola, between the months of January and July 1998. The sources used in 
Angola were two: semi-structured interviews and documentary research. 
a) Interviews: Targeted Interviewees and Presentation 
- Targeted Interviewees 
Interviews were undertaken with persons from a wide social and professional 
range; they had either played significant political, economic or social roles 
during the times and events under study, or had an interest on the subject matter 
being researched and were thought to be helpful to the research. 
The list of all the persons interviewed is to be found in the bibliography. 
It bears witness to the array of social and professional backgrounds of the 
people selected and includes `historical' figures of the MPLA, UNITA and the 
FNLA; government members, from ministers to national executives, from both 
the MPLA and the other parties involved in government; leaders of the MPLA, 
from Central Committee and Politburo members to mere militants from central 
and provincial structures; presidential aides and councillors; members of all 
parties with parliamentary seats, namely party leaders and other deputies of the 
17 
parliamentary groups; the main Catholic, Baptist and Methodist religious 
leaders; members of FAPLA, from generals to commanders; reporters from the 
world of radio, television and the press, both State and private; academics; 
trade-union leaders; managers and workers of national and international NGOs. 
- Interviews 'Presentation 
Although the majority of the interviews are not used explicitly in this work (i. e., 
quoted in the text, for reasons related to the existing problems in Angola and 
the necessity to safeguard the security of the interviewees), I have listed them in 
the bibliography. 3 
Transcription of the whole or part of these interviews, to be inserted as 
annex (even the most `significant' ones) was not possible due to two reasons: 
Firstly, most of the interviewees requested that the material not be made 
public and some made it a condition for being recorded4. 
Secondly, these interviews are all (the most influential to this work) very 
extensive with a duration of two hours on average and several of three to four 
hours; sometimes two interviews of three to four hours with the same 
interviewee (taken as a whole, the interviews for this work approximately 
account for 6000 minutes/100 hours or 67 tapes of 90 minutes each). Thus, 
even if allowed, it would have been unmanageable to transcribe these 
interviews. 
3I refer here to formal and taped interviews and not to private conversations with key informants or 
with people who did not want to give formal interviews for security reasons and whose names do not 
appear on the list, as per their request. All the taped interviews referred in the bibliography (in my 
possession in Lisbon) can be consulted by other scholars (institutional document required) as long as 
they comply (by means of a written statement) with the request established by the interviewees at the 
time of the interview and following previous notice to the interviewee. I can be contacted through the 
department of Portuguese and Brazilian Studies at King's College. 
4 Some of my interviewees (mainly politicians) allowed the usage of short quotes in the middle of the 
text, but not very extensive transcriptions. According to them, short quotes, even if controversial and 
`dangerous' for its authors, might leave them some room to defend themselves in case of accusations 
made by others using those statements. In such cases they would counter argue with the `usual formula', 
saying that those were `quotations whose meaning was distorted because they were taken out of the 
context of a larger and deeper interview and therefore what was written was not exactly what they 
meant to say' and so on and so forth. Long transcriptions left no such 'emergency exit'. 
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An explanation on the specific strategy used in these interviews, its 
structure and the form they have taken, can be found in the bibliography. 
b) Documentary Research: Angolan Research Institutions; Party 
Documents and Presidential and Governmental Legislation 
- Angolan Research Institutions 
In Angola, documentary research took place mainly, but not only, in the 
following institutions: the Centre for Documentation and Information of the 
MPLA and the secretariat of the Central Committee for Information and 
Documentations; the National Library6; the National History Archive7; the 
National Institute of Statistics8; the Library of the Ministry of Public 
Administration Employment and Social Security (MAPESS)9; the Cabinet of 
Studies of the Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration (MINARS) and 
5 In these two party institutions access was granted mainly to party documents, pamphlets, brochures, 
reports, the party publication -- Boletim do Militante (bulletin of the party militant) -- and some Diaries 
of the Republic. 
6 Here access was granted to the vast collection of Diaries of the Republic, from 1975 to 1991. 7 This institution was mainly used for research on other students' thesis working on Angola all over the 
world. According to the rules of this institution, all students allowed to do research there, are required 
(by a written statement signed by the student himself) to send their works to the National History 
Archive when finished, thus providing the Archive with a significant and useful collection of such 
works. 
a In this institute access was granted to a few studies containing economic statistical data on very recent 
periods (early nineties) and mainly to the Luanda area; the organisation and publication of several of 
these studies became possible only after the transition to a multiparty system and benefited from the 
support of several NGOs working in Angola and the commitment of the Institute's Director, Mario 
Adalta. Even though these studies were not directly used in this thesis (because they deal with very 
recent subjects, beyond the time frame of this work's analysis) and thus are not part of the bibliography, 
they were nevertheless useful to the understanding of the recent development of the economic situation 
of lower social strata (mainly in Luanda), providing some necessary background information for field 
research and the interviews programme. 
9 In this ministry, access was mainly granted to recent (post-1995) reports, studies and publications of 
the Ministry, such as its internal Boletim Informativo (Information Bulletin) and its magazine Merito, 
specialised in public administration affairs (these two publications started only in 1997, dealing with 
recent subjects). Even though these periodicals and other researched studies and reports of the Ministry 
were not directly used in this thesis and are not part of the bibliography for the same reasons sustained 
for the National Institute of Statistics, they were nevertheless useful to construct a background 
knowledge of the actual situation and problems of public administration, providing some necessary 
information to understand the living conditions and needs of civil servants and other workers of the 
State sector that were interviewed in this work. 
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the Unity for the Studies on Population of the Ministry of Planning1°; the 
Centre of Documentation of Action for Rural Development and Environment 
(ADRA)"; the Office of Studies and Research of the National Institute for 
Religious Affairs 12; the Centre for Documentation of the United Nations in 
Angola and the Centre of Documentation of the European Union in Angola13. 
Access was also granted to a few privately owned archives 14. 
- Special Attention Given to Party Documents and Presidential 
and Governmental Legislation 
As I was told by some key informants15 and also by some of my interviewees 
(especially those working near the president and with an interest in academic 
research), for those who know how the `system really works', the most solid 
and simple evidence (although not easy to access, read or understand in its full 
10 Access was granted to studies, reports and projects on population migration movements and 
displaced people throughout the country produced by those two ministries with the collaboration of 
several NGOs, the UN and other institutions. These documents are based on very recent periods 
(nineties; beyond the time frame of analysis of this work), but still helpful to an overall understanding 
of the main problems of an important part of the population (displaced and rural, in part living in the 
outskirts of the cities and unable to return to their places of origin). 
This is a very organised and relatively well supplied documentation centre, containing a very useful 
collection of non-published reports, studies and papers of conferences that occurred in Angola in recent 
years (after 1991) under a myriad of themes ranging from economic development, public 
administration, gender and development, poverty, nationhood and so on. It also contains an interesting 
collection of international periodicals (i. e. published in other countries) containing articles on Angola. 
12 In this governmental office access was granted to register of churches and religious sects, its brief 
characterisation (according to official register), location, the name of its leaders, their addresses, the 
places where ceremonies take place and the approximate number of members. Access was also granted 
to a few studies on recent religious activities and an enquiry on the development of the number of 
members of the main churches acting in Angola, produced under the guidance of the Director of the 
office, Fatima Viegas (herself a scholar researcher over these issues). The research on this office was 
very important as an information background to the private interviews with religious leaders of the main 
churches in Angola. 
13 In these institutions access was mainly granted to recent official reports on activities of UN 
organisations and EU in Angola, essentially in terms of Humanitarian aid programmes and 
collaboration with governmental organs. Even if this information is very recent (beyond the time frame 
of analysis of this work) it provided some important information to support the interviews with several 
NGOs workers. 
14 Access was granted to privately owned archives of Antonio Henriques (director of the National 
Institute for Foreign Investment and ex-minister of finances), Alfredo Teixeira (consultant for the 
United Nations Development Programme), Conceicäo Neto (historian). 
15 Key informants were persons with whom I had (and still have) close relationships of friendship for 
some years now (some of them occupying offices in the Angolan State structure) with privileged access 
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meaning and contents) -lies in presidential and governmental legislation and 
also in party documents, especially those produced for the various Congresses. 
These documents are usually looked at with contempt and neglected by 
most people (researchers in particular) as official rubber-stamp documents 
essentially serving politically cosmetic purposes with limited research value. 
However, for those who know how to `read them' (i. e., those who know how 
they are produced - the type of techniques used in writing, d the purposes 
they are meant to achieve in the political context of a given period; those who 
are able to identify and separate its several components and the message they 
intend to pass or safeguard at the moment they are produced or for future 
moments), these documents contain the most precise and accurate information 
to interpret and understand the basis of the working logic, structure and 
management strategy of the whole political system of a given period. 
Such documents are crucial to the top leadership as the Angolan case is not 
just another example of ordinary presidentialism in Africa, where the ruler 
reaches a point where he simply ignores all institutional procedures and starts 
governing the whole system through a myriad of presidential decrees16 
Probably due to a Portuguese tradition of an `obsession' with bureaucracy and 
written laws and decrees of all kind, and probably also due to the importance of 
establishing complex power structures to balance a multiplicity of interests and 
divisions within the MPLA itself (historically made of a constantly 
reformulated equilibrium of forces), there was in Angola a need to support 
every political procedure (even the most `obscure') in terms of legislation 
(especially, sometimes exclusively, at the highest level of the State, as we will 
see). 
to non-public information on the functioning of the Angolan political system. For security reasons these 
people did not want their names revealed. 
16 For a characterisation of cases where concentration of power reaches the level of `presidential 
decree' type of government see, Jackson, Robert & Rosberg, Carl, Personal Rule in Black Africa: 
Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982). 
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Thus, a careful reading of such documents, often with the help of those 
who participated in their preparation, is of crucial importance for political 
analysis. The main difficulties for the analysis of these documents are two: 
The first is to contextualise them within the socio-economic and political 
period when they were produced and within the management strategy and 
objectives of the President at that specific period (i. e., the major political 
concerns and objectives in which they are rooted) - particularly important in 
terms of presidential and governmental legislation. 
The second is to distinguish and separate all its components, that are 
purposely garbled (politically important information with useless information 
usually of an ideological nature) - especially relevant for Congress 
documents. For example, the paradigmatic Central Committee's reports to the 
Congress (the most important of Congress' documents), mangle in the most 
confusing way three main components: 
Firstly, there is the ideological component, with all the jargon and 
traditional Marxist ideological discourse, focusing on internal and external 
messages: internally, this kind of discourse usually contained a few political 
messages to certain groups involved in internal power struggles, but, as we will 
see, the terms used, such as `petite bourgeoisie', do not always mean the same 
in Angola as in `classic' Marxist regimes; externally, it focused on the major 
themes and issues of concern at that given moment, be it international or 
regional such as the World Capitalist System, Apartheid or the independence of 
Namibia, among others. The main problem with this component is that besides 
these relatively short messages, the ideological discourse overwhelmed the 
whole document, from top to bottom. 
Secondly, there is a component made of the political objectives and 
strategy of the ruler (i. e., president) as the main power manager of the whole 
system, who imprinted the main guidelines and arrangements according to his 
management needs and purposes (reflecting the past or present concerns and 
planning the future re-arrangements). These guidelines had to be included in 
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order to ensure that future policies and measures to be taken according to the 
President's strategy were consigned in the most important Party document and 
approved by the most important Party organ (i. e., no one could later accuse the 
President of deviation from the party's guidelines). However, such strategic 
guidelines could not be explicitly stated and clearly understood through the 
reading of the document at the time it was presented, especially if they were to 
generate strong internal opposition. The anticipated knowledge of the main 
guidelines of future presidential management strategies would obviously 
generate reactions that might defuse its aims. Usually, these guidelines can only 
be understood several years later, carefully re-reading these documents, re- 
examining the policies and measures taken in the years after the Congress and 
contextualizing them within the ensuing legislation dispersed through the 
following years and the socio-economic and political course. 
Thirdly, there is a component made of `traditional' internal criticism that 
seems to be rooted in a Marxist mechanism denominated in Angola critica e 
auto-critica (criticism and self-criticism) that became very common within the 
MPLA by the end of the anti-colonial struggle -- suggested by some students 
returning from China and influenced by the movement of Lin Piao'7. Such 
mechanism became official in a larger process called Movimento de Re- 
Ajustamento das Frentes Politico-Militares Leste e Norte (Readjustment 
Movement to the Eastern and Northern Political and Military Fronts), designed 
to solve the serious division that threatened the movement with disintegration 
in the very last years of the anti-colonial struggle (1973-1974) 18. At least some 
of the spirit of that mechanism seems to have survived after independence but 
17 Students such as Xietu, Kito, Dino Matross, Boling6, Mundo Real, Kavunga, among others as 
referred by Daniel Chipenda in an interview to the Radio Nacional de Angola (17 June 1995). 
18 For the most deep analysis of this movement including the referred influences from China, see 
Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences et pouvoir d'Etat.: le MPLA face a lui-meine (1962-1977) 
(Paris: Universite Paris VII), These de Doctorat, chapters 3 and 4; a (shorter) Portuguese version of this 
work was recently published in Angola, Mabeko-Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidencias e poder de Estado: o 
MPLA perante si pröprio (1962-1974), 2 volumes (Luanda: editorial N'Zila, 2001). Interesting 
references to the critica and auto-critica mechanism taken from lived experiences in the Mayombe 
forest during the anti-colonial struggle can also be found in Pepetela, Mayombe (Lisboa: Dom Quixote, 
1980), p. 198 
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emerging only in particular periods of major discussions within the party's life 
- the Congress, where internal criticism (sometimes of great magnitude) is 
permitted and is clearly and officially expressed. Today as yesterday (during the 
anti-colonial struggle), the mechanism seems to serve a threefold purpose: I- 
to serve as an escape valve to free some of the internal pressure derived from 
internal division and power conflicts; 2- to keep the President informed of the 
internal feelings and criticism towards the regime; 3- to allow the President to 
use that criticism as if it was his own and find scapegoats to put the blame on. 
As I was told and could later confirm (not only through research on 
previous Congresses, but also witnessing the preparations for the IV Congress 
to be held in December 1998 and accompanying the process of producing party 
documents for that congress, including the interviewing of some of its authors), 
the process through which the internal criticism was integrated in Congress 
documents was designed to be reliable and effective, being essentially based on 
two procedures. 
On the one hand, there were large preparatory meetings to the Congress, in 
as many provinces as possible (rural and urban areas), occurring during the 
whole year before the Congress. In such meetings, delegates to the Congress 
and a lot of other people from the provinces (from the most diverse socio- 
professional occupations) discussed and expressed a wide range of major 
concerns, problems and criticisms (socio-economic, Party's functioning, and so 
on) in front of the party cadres promoting those meetings, who encouraged such 
censure. Such criticism did not involve the so-called `UNITA problem' or the 
person of the President; normally, there were well-known (informal) limits but 
there was sharpness to the spirit of critica e auto-critica (this is one of the main 
reasons why the most accurate and damaging criticism has always come from 
within the party ever since the anti-colonial struggle, as it is commonly 
recognised in Angola and outside19). 
19 In Angola such recognition was made by countless of my interviewees such as Fernando Pacheco (23 
April 1998); Ldcio Lara (1 May 1998); Paulo Jorge (26 June 1998) to name but a few; out of Angola 
that is also the public opinion of Christine Messiant as referred in a Lisbon conference where I have 
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On the other hand, there were several technical/political preparatory 
meetings between the party bodies and the presidential supporting services or 
`technical entourage'. Sometimes these meetings took place in parallel with 
Political Bureau or Central Committee's meetings. Such meetings were the 
place to express two types of internal criticisms: one from the party bases (as 
manifested through provincial meetings), the other from top party members 
(usually evidenced by the critiques of those who had a high party profile and/or 
an `historical' aura). 
This usually caustic internal criticism would be integrated into the Central 
Committee's report presented by the President himself who would then appear 
as the main critic of what was considered to be hampering the `road to 
development' and the general well-being of the country, usually finding several 
scapegoats, which varied in each presidency (during the Neto presidency it was 
the so-called `petit bourgeoisie', the `apartheid puppets'/IJNITA', imperialism 
and international capitalism; during Eduardo dos Santos Marxist phase, besides 
all those of the Neto period, it was usually the government as identified by 
those ministers that were sacked, thus removing direct responsibility from 
Presidential hands). 
As this criticism could not be presented as a whole and had to be dispersed 
through the document for politically cosmetic reasons (i. e., the internal and 
external image of the regime), it would appear garbled with the other two main 
components of these documents (i. e., ideological Marxist discourse and jargon; 
and the presidential management strategy). The final mixture would mainly be 
the responsibility of the President and his technical entourage (i. e., powerful 
supporting services). 
Because of this it is difficult to find, separate and analyse the main aspects 
of these documents and the importance of their contents; overwhelmed by 
ideological and political jargon from top to bottom, bringing exhaustion to 
also participated: `Angola em 1999 - Jornada de Debate', organised by Professor Franz-Wilhem 
Heimer and the Centre of African Studies of ISCTE in Lisbon (19th June 1999). 
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those who read it. The main objective of this has nothing to do with ideological 
or revolutionary fervour but simply with the necessity to conceal and disguise 
the President's strategy that must be present but not clearly understood; and the 
necessity to include the internal criticism dispersed and partially justified. 
Given the major importance of these two sources of documents to the 
understanding of the structure and functioning of the political and 
administrative system; given the fact that this kind of extensive and all 
encompassing research of political/administrative legislation and party 
documents (Congresses) has never been done, a decision was made to give a 
prime (although not exclusive) attention to these two major sources of 
information and documentation for the post-independence period under study. 
An attempt was made to articulate the political, economic and social context of 
the periods under analysis with a careful research of these documents and 
crosschecking interviews (complemented by journalistic material mainly from 
the UK, US, France and Portugal). 
The decision to give especial attention to those documents implied, 
amongst other difficulties: to go through countless party documents 
surrounding Congresses (mainly the Ist Congress of 1977; Ist extraordinary 
Congress of 1980; II Congress of 1985; III Congress of 1990); to examine 
patiently each and every page of a dusty collection of around 20.000 pages of 
Diario da Repüblica20. That work was made even more difficult because of the 
lack of copy facilities in the National Library and the need to hand copy all the 
important information contained there (resulting in 770 hand written pages). 
Although important support was given by the Centre for Documentation and 
Information of the MPLA and the secretariat of the Central Committee for 
20 This is the official publication of all the legislation of State organs and is divided in three series: the 
Ist comprises general rules affecting all citizens (the most important legislation of State organs); lind, 
comprises administrative and technical rules, mainly concerning public servants of specific ministries; 
IIIrd, comprises announcements that according to the law must be public such as organisational statutes 
of companies, public contests to fulfil positions (lower rank) in public administration and so on. 
According to the above stated objectives, research for this work involved to go through circa 20 
volumes of the Ist series, from 1975 to 1991 (comprising the governmental and Presidential legislation 
necessary to this work's objectives) ranging from 900 to 1000 pages each volume (depending on the 
year). 
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Information and Documentation (providing access to several missing issues or 
previously considered `restricted information', and facilitating copies of the 
most extensive legislative texts), this kind of job took seven months of daily 
work running in parallel with an intense interviews' programme and research in 
other institutions as well, and was only made possible by the help of a number 
of colleagues. 
Other `more usual' problems encountered during this research can well be 
imagined, ranging from atrocious working and living conditions in Angola - 
lack of regular water and electricity supply, shortage of food, widespread 
disease - to the scarcity of statistical and quantitative data on the sociological 
and economic realities in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
- The Possibility of Using Fiction as a Source for African Political 
Studies 
There are difficulties as well as advantages about using fiction as a source. The 
difficulties are obviously related to the fictional (non-real) character of the story 
taken as a whole, even if several characters and facts might be real or taken 
from living experiences. Nevertheless, it has been commonly noticed by 
political scientists working on Africa, that in many circumstances, African 
novelists have extremely accurate perceptions of the political reality of their 
countries and have been capable of transmitting those perceptions in a 
singularly simple, clear and sensitive way21. This is especially true in countries 
where political regimes or the existing circumstances do not allow effective 
freedom of expression, political participation and open publication. In such 
cases, fictional literature with figurative characters and situations is the safest 
solution found by these authors to express their political opinions and criticism. 
21 See for instance the use of A Kourouma's novels by Bayart and the noticed advantages of using 
fictional literature in political studies by Chabal and Daloz; In Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in 
Africa, the politics of the belly (London: Longman, 1989), pp. 62,235; Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, 
Jean-Pascal, Africa Works (London: James Currey, 1999), p. 65. 
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Angola is without doubt one of such cases and the use of fictional 
literature as a source for political studies is particularly important for the period 
of the anti-colonial struggle. After independence a curtain of smoke descended 
over the convoluted life of the three nationalist movements during the anti- 
colonial struggle. Their history as political movements became a source of 
political legitimisation or delegitimisation and part of the war of arguments 
between them, thus silencing the report of the major political and military 
protagonists of that period. 
In this case the work of one author - Pepetela - was the exception to that 
silence and although fictional, his works have become commonly recognised 
source of important information for the understanding of that period (and also 
for the post-independence period)22. This is not the case o ovelist with scant 
or no experience of the reality he is talking about, but the case of an ex- 
guerrilla, who lived and fought with the MPLA guerrillas during the anti- 
colonial struggle. He was a guerrilla who became an important member of the 
independent government (Secretary of State for Education) and then gave up 
his post to become a full time novelist. The importance of the use of his 
literature to this work was consistently mentioned by several academics and 
interviewees, be it in London, Portugal or Angola (among others, Helder 
Macedo, Patrick Chabal, Franz Heimer, Christine Messiant, Mabeko Tali, 
Conceicäo Neto). After several private conversations and an interview with the 
writer himself, an assurance was given that the passages of two of his books 
that were meant to be used as evidence (about the anti-colonial and post- 
independence periods) and the arguments they were supposed to support 
22 See for instance, Bittencourt, Marcelo, `A Histöria Contemporänea de Angola: seus achados e suas 
armadilhas', In Construindo o Passado Angolano: as fontes ea sua interpretagdo, Actas do II 
Seminärio Internacional sobre Histöria de Angola, realizado em Luanda de 4a9 de Agosto de 1997, 
(Lisboa: CNCDP, 1997), especially pp. 170-171 Also referring to a Pepetela novel to illustrate the 
existence of a significant white population in Benguela in 1940's and 1950's is Birmingham, David, 
Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique (London: James Currey, 1992), p. 101. 
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corresponded to an effectively lived experience and to the perception of the 
author23. 
23 From several private conversations with Pepetela in Lisbon and Luanda between December 1997 and 
July 1998; also from private interview (7 July 1998). The books used are: Pepetela, Mayombe ... op. cit.; 
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1- Modem Patrimonialism 
A recent but influential framework of political analysis based on a Weberian 
approach has been developed in African Studies, mainly through the works of 
Jean-Francois Medard, Jean-Francois Bayart, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal 
Daloz. 24 The aim of this chapter is to explore the structure of this analytical 
framework. 
1.1 Weber's Influence on African Studies 
In the work of those authors, firstly, an attempt is made to understand, interpret 
and explain the social organisation that has emerged in post-independence 
African countries through the experience and perception of its main 
protagonists (rulers and ruled). This presupposes an understanding of the 
world-vision and internal rationality prevalent within these societies. 
According to Weber, historical and social existence is affirmed, essentially, 
through the creation and establishing of values, beliefs, principles and norms or 
what can be here simply termed as organisational principles. These values, 
norms and principles which each one of us believes in, and/or adheres to, are 
both an individual and a collective creation; it is both a social and historical 
process, the end result of our conscious response to our surroundings or to 
specific situations. Weber demonstrated that human behaviour in different 
societies could only be understood according to the general idea that men have 
of their own existence or the prevailing Weltanschauung within a given society. 
These would arise from a process of social and cultural identification (notions 
24 Reference is made mainly to the following works: Medard, Jean-Francois, `The Underdeveloped 
State in `Tropical Africa: Political Clientelism or Neo-Patrimonialism? ', in Clapham, C., ed., Private 
Patronage and Public Power (London: Frances Pinter, 1982), pp. 162-192.; Medard, Jean-Francois, 
`L'Etat neo-patrimonial en Afrique noire' in Medard, Jean-Francois (ed. ) Etats d'Afrique noire (Paris: 
Karthala, 1991), pp. 323-353; Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa, ... op. cit.; Bayart, Jean- 
Francois et al., The Criminalization of the State in Africa (London: James Currey, 1998); Chabal, 
Patrick, Power in Africa (London: Macmillan Press, 1994); Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, 
... op. cit. 
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of `me', `him', `us', `others' and all that surrounds us), which provides us with 
a mental framework for self-understanding and understanding of the 
surrounding reality serving as the basis for a rational and intelligible social 
action. For Weber, the prevalent rationality within a given social group is 
expressed through general social practices and existing social organisations 
25, 
which can be said to be organisational expressions of what I call the 
organisational principles. In these terms, what is meant by rationality, 
is essentially what we can identify as the reasons which impel or 
convince people to think and behave as they do - what, in other 
words, provides an analytically coherent explanation for a given 
political conduct in a given historical context. 26 
Consequently and secondly, following Weber's ideas, for these authors there is 
a need to analyse the specific social dynamics, whereby the prevailing 
rationality (and its contained organisational principles) are expressed within 
existing social organisations (its organisational expressions), where co- 
operation and confrontation between social beings in general and between 
rulers and ruled in particular, help to determine the general framework of social 
relationships, in terms of socio-cultural references to identity, economy, politics 
and ethics. 
According to Weber, societies are made up of conflict and agreement, and 
both are pillars of social activity. The process of integrating social actors 
through social relationships (soziale Beziehungen) and conflict (Kampf) can 
give rise either to society (Gesellschaft) or to community (Gemeinschaft). 
When the process of integration results in a community (Vergemeinschaftung), 
the group is based on a feeling of belonging common to all actors, who are 
motivated either by affective or 'traditional' reasons. If the process of 
integration gives rise to a society (Vergesellschaftung), this is due to the fact 
that motivation for social acts is based on personal interest, giving rise to a 
concert of interests. The process of social and communitarian integration brings 
25 See Weber, Max, Essais sur- la theorie de la science, (Paris: Plon, 1965); Weber, Max, L'Ethique 
Protestante et 1'esprit du capitalisme (Paris: Plon, 1964). 
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about groups (Verband) that form the administrative organs (Verwaltungstab) of 
societies and communities and consolidate a practice which results in a 
framework of interdependent political, economic and ethical relationships 
between social actors in general and rulers and ruled in particular. Reflecting a 
specific Weltanschauung and rationality, these frameworks of interdependence 
relationship are the coherent ties that form the working logic of social 
organisation 27 (i. e., the internal coherent relationship between organisational 
principles and organisational expressions). 
Finally and thirdly, following Weber in a more or less explicit manner, the 
political organisation in post-independence African countries is characterised 
by these authors according to the prevalent type of political domination and the 
nature of legitimacy. 
In Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Economy and Society), Weber looks at 
political sociology in two ways. In the first instance, he expounds on the 
typology of forms of domination (Typen der Herrschaft); in the second 
instance, and mainly in the last two chapters (Politische Gemeinschaften and 
Sociologie der Herrschaft), he describes in greater detail the differences 
between political regimes throughout history, using the typology he developed 
in the first part. Depending on the nature of legitimacy - be it traditional, 
charismatic or legal-rational - he determines the nature of domination as 
traditional, charismatic or legal-rational28. 
From then on, he demonstrates how it is possible to move from a 
simplified definition of one kind of domination, to the infinite diversity of 
historically established political regimes. Starting with the idea of traditional 
domination, he follows its differentiation, from patriarchal to patrimonial and 
feudal. The patriarchal domination is based upon kinship, respecting lineage 
and being a `domestic' power. The patrimonial domination takes the patriarchal 
logic of power beyond kinship, emerging as soon as the political authority 
26 In Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal,... op. cit. p. 152. 
27 See Weber, Max, Economie et Societe (Paris: Plon, 1971); also Weber, Max, L'Ethique ... op. cit. 28 Weber, Max, Economie ... op, cit. 
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becomes differentiated from the 'domestic' authority, supported not only by kith 
and kin but also by the ruler's loyalists, clients and patrimonial servants, and 
develops an administrative apparatus. The feudal domination, just like 
patrimonialism, rests upon a system of personal loyalty relating the lord and the 
servant; both can be considered patrimonial chiefs and their mutual obligations 
are almost of a contractual nature, turning feudalism into some kind of an 
institutionalised clientelism of a military type. 
In all these regimes authority is based upon traditional and personal 
criteria; in all of them the ruler's authority is exerted in a patrimonial way, 
whereby all the political, administrative, judicial and economic affairs are 
treated as personal affairs. In the most elaborated of those forms 
(patrimonialism and feudalism) administrative `offices' are distributed among 
the closest clients and loyalists (kin or not, but still having at their heart primary 
solidarity and feelings of personal loyalty). The governmental powers and the 
privileges they confer are treated as privately acquired rights to serve the 
personal interests of the office holders and the administrative apparatus can not 
be distinguished from patrimonial relationships29. 
At the opposite end of those traditional forms of domination we find the 
legal-rational authority, which relies on a rationally-established judicial and 
normative system, a set of laws, supported by bureaucratic and administrative 
mechanisms detached from the person who holds office and exerts power at any 
given period of time. Governmental powers are not to be treated as or confused 
with personal private affairs. In its most elaborate form, such type of 
domination constitutes the modem State. 30 
At this level, Weber's influences over the analysis of these authors can be 
found in their description of the political practice, authority and legitimacy of 
rule in post-independence African countries. As we will see, these authors' 
works clearly characterises those countries as cases where administrative 
29 Ibid., especially pp. 3 52-3 53. 
30 Ibid.; see also Weber, Max, Le Savant et la politique (Paris: Plon, 1959). 
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offices are distributed by the rulers among their closest clients and loyalists (kin 
or not but still following primary solidarity) and governmental powers are 
treated as privately acquired rights and property to serve the personal interests 
of the office holders. The administrative apparatus and exercise of power can 
hardly be distinguished from the office holders' search for private and personal 
interests. 
In these terms, the political practice, authority and legitimacy of rule 
analysed by all these authors which have occurred in post-independence 
African countries are essentially patrimonial. Bayart's caution as to the use of 
the notion of patrimonialism (preferring that of politique du ventre instead), can 
not be taken as an objection to the main logic of patrimonialism (as 
characterised above)31. As Medard, with whom I agree at this point, says 
La politique du ventre, qu'il [Bayart] definit comme la tendance ä 
1'enrichissement ou plutöt ä l'accumulation primitive par tous les 
moyens, renvoie tres largement [... ] au patrimonialisme. La 
difference et c'est d'une part la polysemie du terme qui va jusqu'ä 
englober la sorcellerie, et, d'autre part, son enracinement dans la 
societe et non simplement dans ]'Etat. [... ] Le patrimonialisme 
constitue le commun denominateur de pratiques diverses si 
caracteristiques de la vie politique africaine, ä savoir le nepotisme, 
le clanisme, le `tribalisme', le regionalisme, le clientelisme, le 
`copinage', le patronage, le `prebendalisme', la corruption, la 
predation, le factionnalisme, etc., qu'elles soient fondees sur 
l'echange social ('parochial corruption') ou sur 1'echange 
economique ('market corruption'). [... ] 11 [le concept de 
patrimonialisme] a le merite de permettre simplement de rendre 
compte de la logique commune ä ]'ensemble de ces pratiques, sans 
s'enfermer dans un seul type de societe. Chaque societe africaine 
particuliere se caracterise par la predominance eventuelle d'une de 
ces pratiques par rapport aux autres, ou par une combinaison 
specifique de ces pratiques. 32 
This said, there is an important remark to be made about all these authors' 
works: although the main logic of patrimonialism can be found in post- 
independence African countries the patrimonialism arising post-independence 
is quite specific; it is essentially rooted in pre-colonial times, but distinguishes 
'1 On Bayart's caution with the use of `patrimonial' see Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa 
... op. cit. p. 74; but for this same author's acceptance of the use of that notion see in the same work p. 82. 32 In Medard, Jean-Francois, `L'Etat neo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. p. 
329. 
35 
itself from `traditional' (pre-colonial) forms of patrimonialism mainly through a 
sui generis historical, cultural and social process, which is the outcome of 
colonisation and decolonisation. The emerging political system draws from a 
singular combination of `traditional' patrimonial legitimacy and `modem' 
political structures such as the State and all its ancillary organisations, leading 
to a new, `modern' form of patrimonialism. 
Although this `modern' form of patrimonialism is not given a common 
designation by these writers, it will henceforth be termed `modern 
patrimonialism'. Such designation (discussed in detail in the following sub- 
chapters) must not be taken as identical to Medard's neo patrimonialisme, 
because that would imply that the other authors' work could be simply 
subsumed into his, which is obviously not true. Even though the relevant point 
for discussion here is to stress what is common to those authors, I can not 
ignore that there are differences between them. Therefore, the designation of 
`modern patrimonialism' is what I take to be common to these authors' 
analytical framework. 
There now follows a more detailed description of the perspective 
common to Medard, Bayart, Chabal and Daloz and a critical evaluation of these 
authors' analytical stance. It will be developed in the next three sub-chapters: 
the first, concerned with the framework for socio-cultural identification, 
economic, political and ethical interdependence between rulers and ruled (1.2); 
the second, concerned with the State that effectively ensued in terms of 
working logic and management strategy (1.3); the third, dedicated to evaluating 
the strengths and weaknesses of the 'modern patrimonial' analysis. 
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1.2 Patrimonialism in Post-Independence African Countries 
1.2.1 The New Framework for Socio-Cultural Identification 
The specificity of post-independence patrimonialism (or `modern 
patrimonialism') was very much the result of countless strong external 
influences or `traumatic events'33, such as colonisation, independence, 
socialism and capitalism34. These influences hindered the evolution of mainly 
endogenous processes of social identification amongst peoples living in the 
interior of a territory, whom colonial powers had artificially united. Generally 
speaking, the artificial division of African territories was not overcome, and the 
new independent States amalgamated, without blending, the existing identities 
of a sub-national dimension35. The non-assimilation, to any significant extent, 
of the macro-community identity of the new nation-State36, hindered the rise of 
a national feeling and strong collective consciousness37 in respect of notions 
such as `national or public interest'. 
Although `traditional' political societies were imbued with patrimonial 
characteristics (such as vertical, sectarian, preferential and primordial 
solidarities; the lack of differentiation between the public and private realms; 
the claiming of rights inherent to political `offices' for personal gain; the 
personalisation of political power), they also possessed strong feelings of group 
belonging and macro-community identification, which arose from an 
endogenous process of socio-cultural identification, including the primacy of 
the group as a whole over its components and a significant sense of what can be 
considered a `public' or collective consciousness. Those who wielded power 
were expected to defend the well being and survival of the whole community, 
33 See Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. p. 56. 34 See Medard, Jean-Francois, `L'Etat neo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. p. 335. 35 See Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. pp. 42-50. 36 Here and henceforward this term is used to refer the macro-community ideal and idea implied in the 
Eastern or Western based `modern State' of Weberian type that is present in all these authors. 
37 See Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. pp. 81-82. 
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to whom they were accountable and `could lose their head if, for instance, it did 
not rain'. 38 
After independence, because there was little sense of nationhood and a 
weak consciousness or identification with the `nation-State', this paved the way 
for the growing dominance of sectarian, personalised and particularistic 
interests over the collective, or public, dimension. Ties of preferential solidarity 
based on several sub-national references to identity prevailed. These supplanted 
the solidarities of a universal nature (citizenship) and horizontal type (socio- 
economic groups of interest such as classes39), that were supposed to have 
emerged within the Western or Eastern based `modern nation-State' of the 
Weberian kind. According to Chabal and Daloz, 
In the cities [African], high population densities, the mingling of 
professions should all favour more individualised social 
conditioning [a citizenship consciousness]. Yet what occurs is 
usually the reverse: urban dwellers appear to replicate the type of 
informal and personalised social rapport which is the hallmark of 
"traditional" African life. City quarters tend to mirror regional or 
ethnic divisions. 40 
Medard states that, 
The importance of kinship relationships in African social life is 
obvious: it is what strikes the foreign observer the most when he 
compares Africa with his own society [... ] Sociologists have 
described how these family relations survive in cities, while 
continuous exchanges develop between the villages and the cities4' 
For these authors, sub-national references to identity at the centre of post- 
independence patrimonialism can be defined as `dynamic multi-faceted and 
interactive clusters of changeable self-validated attributes of individual-cum- 
collective references', resulting from processes of social identification or `ways 
of defining oneself and others in accordance with a set of beliefs, values and 
subjective perceptions which are both eminently malleable and susceptible to 
38 Chabal, Patrick, Power in ... op. cit. p. 
56. 
39 See Medard, Jean-Francois, `The Underdeveloped State ... op. cit. p. 
174; also Chabal, Patrick and 
Daloz, Jean-Pascal, 
... op. cit. p. 
40; also Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. p. 56. 40 In Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal,... op. cit. p. 30. 
41 In Medard, Jean-Francois, `The Underdeveloped State ... op. cit. p. 
172; also according to Bayart, the 
existence, even the primacy of ethnic consciousness can not be denied, in Bayart, Jean-Francois, The 
State in Africa 
... op. cit. p. 42. 
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change over time'42. These references can include family, ethnicity, sub- 
ethnicity, region, sub-region, religion or even race, involving 'traditional' values 
and affective sentiments supporting preferential and primordial solidarities 
among its members (which is the characteristic at the heart of 'modem 
patrimonial' networks of dependence, as will be explained below). Under 
different circumstances and at different periods of time, one or several of these 
possible forms of collective identification can, `and indeed do, become 
politically more prominent' than the others43. These forms of social 
identification will henceforth be termed micro-identity references. 
The supremacy of these references over those of a universal nature 
(citizenship) and horizontal type (such as classes) leads us to an important point 
that has to be made about the very broad and general operative analytical 
categories used by these authors concerning the central problem discussed in 
their works - the relationship between rulers and ruled, lower and upper social 
strata within the new independent State. 
Here, on the one hand, all these writers regularly resort to the term 
`elites' to designate the rulers and single them from the rest of the populationaa 
Although there is no specific definition or discussion of such concept in their 
works, it can be deduced from their use, that `elites' are meant to designate 
those who have privileged or primary access to the State's top offices and in 
consequence to State's resources i. e., those at the top of the patrimonial system, 
regardless of the political regime (civil or military) and regardless of the 
political model (capitalist or socialist). Although such use of the concept might 
be debatable, it must be seen as a broad, flexible and instrumental analytical 
category, not so much concerned with theoretical discussions but with the 
42 Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal,... op. cit. p. 56 
a' Ibid. p. 58; see also in the same sense p. 27, the example of the case of Nigeria. 
44 For the use of the term `elites', see for instance Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. pp. 2,6,8,10 and chapter 3, among several other pages and chapters; also Medard, Jean-Francois, `The 
Underdeveloped State ... op. cit. p. 167; also 
Medard, Jean-Francois, 'L'Etat neo-patrimonial en ... op. 
cit. p. 346; also Bayart, Jean-Francois, L'Etat au Cameroun (Paris: FNSP, 1979), pp. 19-20 containing 
an explanation to `esquive avec superbe les debats essentiel qui portent sur quelque-uns des notions 
clefs - [... ] d'assimilation reciproque des differents segments d'elite'; also Bayart, Jean-Francois, The 
State in Africa 
... op. cit. especially chapter 
6. 
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purpose of making sense of the realities observed. As stated by Chabal and 
Daloz, 
There is frequently a temptation to wallow in tendentious and rather 
sterile discussions about ill-defined notions instead of studying 
political realities [... ] A more concrete approach centred on the 
actual behaviour of leaders and other political actors in relation to 
rest of the population is in our view far more convincing and far 
al 
more likely to make sense of what is occurring on the continent 
On the other hand, in the work of those authors, the `elites' are usually 
contrasted with those who have not such privileged or primary access to the 
State's offices or to ruling positions, being at the bottom rungs of the 
patrimonial distributive hierarchy. Therefore, the main difference between 
rulers and ruled and the distinguishing characteristic of the elites, is the type of 
relationship established with the State. As stressed by Medard, quoting in part 
Bayart, 
"en Afrique [... ] 1'Etat est un lieu primordial d'engendrement de 
1'inegalites46. [... ] "c'est effectivement la relation ä 1'Etat qui, au 
premier chef, confere aux acteurs la capacite de s'enrichir et de 
dominer le champ social. 9A7 [... ] L'emergence des systemes 
d'inegalite, de domination et aussi d'exploitation est etroitement 
He ä 1'emergence de l'Etat 48 
In order to simplify the reference to these operative analytical categories and to 
clearly distinguish both, I will use in this work the term `ruling elites' 
(borrowed from Chabal49; to refer to the upper layers of the patrimonial 
distributive hierarchy) and `ruled masses' to designate those at the margins or 
bottom of the patrimonial distributive hierarchy. This last term was chosen for a 
double reason: 
Firstly, because `ruled' emphasises the fact that these people have not 
access to positions of power, allowing privileged access to State's resources; 
45 In Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p. 
31. See also Medard, Jean-Francois, `L'Etat 
neo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. p. 
323. 
46 Quoting Bayart, J-F, L'Etat en Afrique (Paris: Fayard, 1989), p. 87; French version of The State in 
Africa used in this thesis. 
47 Quoting Bayart, J-F, L'Etat en Afrique (Paris: Fayard, 1989), p. 119. 
48 Medard, Jean-Francois, `L'Etat neo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. pp. 344-345. 49 The term `ruling elites' can be found in Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p. 6 
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and `masses' to stress -their non-elite character for being at the bottom of 
patrimonial distributive system and inherently at the bottom of any social 
hierarchy. Secondly because this was and still is a very commonly heard term 
in Angola, used to designate the lower social strata (the underprivileged 
according to socio-economic, educational and socio-professional criteria). 50 
Nevertheless, as we will see, such designations do not in anyway imply 
coherence, cohesion or hegemony within those categories. There are strong 
divisions and rivalries within both (that is why they are always used in the 
plural as `elites' and `masses'), rendering the stability of power very precarious. 
It is essentially for this reason that these categories can not be seen as proper 
classes ('classes for themselves'), being closer to the notion of `classes in 
itself'. As explained by Medard, `classes for themselves' presuppose a self- 
consciously constituted group, organised to defend its economic interests and to 
assert those interests against other similar groups (it would therefore imply 
solidarity among elites, which is usually not the case in post-independence 
African countries where divisions and rivalries among elites can be very deep 
and lead to fierce disputes). On the other hand, `classes in themselves' does not 
presuppose such consciousness and it is essentially a category created from the 
outside (external analysis) as a flexible analytical instruments' 
1.2.2 The New Framework for Economic Interdependence 
As in the new framework of socio-cultural identification, the emerging 
framework of post-independence economic relationships was different from the 
economic relationships of `traditional' patrimonialism. 
so As I was told by some of my interviewees: this appears to be a legacy from the Socialist period, but it 
is being progressively replaced (especially in the political speech) by the term 'people', after the so- 
called transition to multipartyism; from private interviews with Paulo de Carvalho (11 March 1998); 
Alfredo Teixeira (18 March 1998); Filomeno Vieira Lopes (24 March 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 
April 1998), among others. 
51 On this subject see, Medard, Jean-Francois, `The Underdeveloped State ... op. cit. pp. 170-171; also 
Medard, Jean-Francois, `L'Etat neo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. p. 345; also Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, 
Jean-Pascal, 
... op. cit. pp. 40-41; also Bayart, 
Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. pp. 68-69, 
210-211. 
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In the post-independence era, the emerging framework of economic 
relationship was influenced, on the one hand, by the modem mercantile logic 
introduced by colonial trade52, and on the other hand, by post-independence 
patrimonialism, dominated by the aforementioned preferential solidarity based 
on prevailing socio-cultural references to identity (micro). In general, such 
mixed influences were expressed through the practice of personal or private 
appropriation and the use of the State's resources (usually called by these 
authors predation53 or manducation54) to benefit, unofficially (informally), 
oneself and one's original communities; thus, patrimonial distributive networks 
of benefits and goods were formed. 
The main difference between these practices and those of `traditional' 
patrimonialism lies in the fact that pre-colonial relationships of production, 
distribution and consumption, however marked by strong patrimonial traits, and 
however merciless and exploitative they may have been, operated within the 
reasonably-well delineated limits of a recognised and legitimate `morality' of 
political economy. It obeyed long-established normative principles for the 
maintenance of a given socio-economic equilibrium and contained specific 
mechanisms of accountability within the political community, with its strong 
collective or `public' consciousness. 55 
52 Although most areas of pre-colonial Africa were involved to a certain extent with long-distance trade, 
their production was not capitalistic. The methods of pre-colonial production, as opposed to capitalistic 
methods of production, did not see accumulation as the means of achieving greater accumulation still. 
The integration of colonial economics into metropolitan and worldwide markets involved a deep-seated 
rupture in African moral and economic politics. See Chabal, Patrick, Power in ... op. cit. pp. 98-113. 53 See Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. p. 
76,238-239; also Chabal, Patrick and 
Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p. 
41, p. 99; also Medard, Jean-Francois, `L'Etat neo-patrimonial en ... op. 
cit. p. 326,342,346,349; for the Angolan case the term `predatory' is also used by Messiant, Christine, 
'Apropos des..., op. cit. p. 84. 
54 See Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. p. 
268; also Bayart, Jean-Francois et al., Le 
politique par le bas en Afrique noire, (Paris: 
Editions Karthala, 1992), p. 265. 
55 Chabal, Patrick, Power in ... op. cit. pp. 
54-67; pp. 98-113. This line of argument seems to be also 
developed by Hyden, stressing that African societies should be understood as being pre-capitalist and 
centred on an `economy of affection' that provides support, communication and informal interaction for 
peasants who operate in an environment characterised by a rudimentary division of labour and a high 
level of household autonomy. Some positive features of this economy include its function as a means of 
basic survival (e. g. by providing a safety net for refugees); its role in social maintenance; its facilitation 
of economic development (e. g providing various informal loan arrangements). However, its limitations 
must not be overlooked because of the encouragement given to `locale-specific' outlook, tribalism and 
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The new economic framework that emerged after independence saw the 
loss of the previous `public' dimension and its normative principles of 
collective consciousness, which was in turn replaced by particularistic and 
sectarian concerns. In this case, the objective of the social actors was to attain 
the highest ranks within the existing system of patrimonialism in order to 
become the `head of a network' (i. e., the top leader of distributive network or 
chain) and increase their power and wealth to better both themselves and their 
kin (dependants and supporters). Significant proportions of the available public 
resources were thus used to feed and expand the network of dependants from 
which arose the status and representativeness of the individual `head of 
network' 56 
In this manner, a change occurred in the ties of economic interdependence, 
between rulers and ruled. Production in the `modem' sense of the word (i. e., 
investment, saving, re-investment in order to increase levels of production and 
productivity) was secondary, and in its place, a predatory and distributive 
preferential interdependence was allowed to thrive; predation became 
generalised, everyone wanted to be the `predator' and not the `prey'. After 
independence, the agriculture sector seem to have been the first and main 
victim of this attitude, suffering from the action of marketing boards with 
unfavourable terms of trade between agricultural and industrial products and 
overvalued foreign exchange rates for the national currency, which ended up 
diverting the surplus of agricultural exports into the State's pockets (or its 
rulers), as explained by Bayart 57 and Medard58. The criteria for socio-economic 
nepotism; see Hyden, Goran No Shortcuts to Progress (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1983), especially pp. 6-8; also Hyden, Goran Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania (London: Heinemann, 1980). 
56 `the strategies of heads of networks resemble the capture, accumulation and partial distribution of 
wealth'; in Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. p. 
228; also in the same sense is 
Medard, Jean-Francois, `L'Etat neo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. p. 
338,343,349. 
57 `The State in Africa - no matter what the political experience - has diverted the surplus and the rent 
of agricultural exports into its own pockets. The principal agencies of this diversion have been 
marketing boards, overvalued national currencies and the allocation of public expenditure. The extent 
of these processes, their institutional modalities and the social groups who benefit from them may all 
have differed from one country to another. Very few regimes however have been exceptions to the 
rule'; in Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. p. 63, see also p. 
87. 
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success were not those of meritocracy or productive effort, but preferentialism 
and favouritism according to micro-identity solidarity ties. This brought about a 
mentality qualified as rentiere, whereby favours, goods and profits were 
expected in exchange for support along micro-identity lines59. 
Economic practices, besides being predatory, distributive and rentiere, 
were also subjected to cultural values deeply rooted in tradition, which 
generally associated prestige and social acceptance with ostentation and 
expenditure - the most efficient means of luring supporters within a modem 
patrimonial logic, as clearly expressed in Bayart's idea of `politics of the 
belly'60. Generally speaking, accumulated capital was not reinvested in the 
productive manner of a modem socialist or capitalist economy, which would 
have involved saving and investment, according to a process of accumulation, 
characterised by frugal behaviour. Instead, accumulated capital was utilised 
according to modem patrimonial logic, which led to ostentation and the 
`feeding' and enlargement of support networks, 
In Africa [... ] it is expected that those who occupy prestigious and 
highly remunerative positions will contribute to the collective 
prestige of their community. Above and beyond the immediate 
family, for which they have direct responsibility, the wealthy are 
meant to contribute to the up keep of the extended network of blood 
relatives [... ] the maintenance of the wider circle of their entourage 
and, beyond, of unrelated clients, is the next priority. Rank, prestige 
and, above all, legitimacy will be proportional to the extension of 
the clientelistic circle. [... ] Little is re-invested productively at the 
local or national level. Wealth is spent primarily on luxury or 
prestige goods [... ] As for the most sizeable African fortunes, they 
are usually put safely away in European or North American 
investment banks, a logical move, given the suspicion shown 
58 Also in a sense close to Bayart, talking of `L'Etat rentier agraire' is Medard, Jean-Francois, 
`Conclusion', in Medard, Jean-Francois (ed. ) Etats d'Afrique noire (Paris: Karthala, 1991), pp. 362- 
363. 
59 On the rentiere (rent seeking) practices, behaviour and `mode de production' see Chabal, Patrick and 
Daloz, Jean-Pascal, 
... op. cit. p. 129; also the previously quoted Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa 
... op. cit. p. 63; also Medard, Jean-Francois, `Conclusion, ... op. cit. p. 362-363. For a more `classic' approach on the subject see, Krueger, A, `The political economy of the rent-seeking society', 
in The American Economic Review, 64 (1974), pp. 291-303. 
60 See Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. pp. 228-259. 
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towards local financial institutions. In other words, they are of 
remarkably little use to African economies. 
61 
1.2.3 The New Framework for Political Interdependence 
The new post-independence framework of political relationship between social 
actors in general, and between rulers and ruled in particular (i. e., political 
accountability6) , reflected, logically, the new socio-cultural identification 
framework and the new economic framework of relationship mentioned above. 
When the micro-identity `constituent' bases essentially claimed from 
their heads of network the fulfilment of distributive obligations, the notion of 
political representation became connected with the bettering of conditions 
within the group to which one belonged - defence of the interests of the 
micro-group. In these terms, loss of political legitimacy occurred when rulers, 
who represented sectarian interests, stopped fulfilling their obligations and 
thereby stopped having the interests of their supporters at heart, rather than 
when they ceased to work for the public interest, or public good, of the macro- 
community ('nation-State )63 
What happened politically, therefore was the personalisation and 
informalisation of political power, the non-emancipation of the State in relation 
to society and the increasing straddling of the public and private spheres. In 
places where such logic dominated, all offices in political administration were, 
generally speaking, distributed and occupied according to a personalised, 
informal and infra-institutional management (i. e., processed outside 
institutional channels and rules). The autonomous bureaucratic and 
61 Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p. 
107. 
62 `Political accountability is a relation of reciprocity and inequality between rulers and ruled: kings and 
subjects, chiefs and villagers, colonial administrators and indigenes, party leaders and followers, 
revolutionaries and peasants. '; in Chabal, Patrick, Power in ... op. cit. pp. 
54-55. 
63 'it is imperative for ordinary people to maintain links with those who have power (albeit limited) by 
playing on ties of primordial solidarity (nepotism) or of clientelism (since all patrons need followers). 
That is why the legitimacy of the "big man", which rests on his capacity to redistribute resources to his 
clients, is only questioned when he fails as a patron'; in Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. 
cit. p. 28; also in the same sense see Medard, Jean-Francois, `L'Etat neo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. 
p. 333,349. 
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administrative institutionalisation of the State would, of course, have hindered 
this kind of logic64. According to Medard, 
On the political level, family solidarity outweighs any abstract duty 
toward the State. This explains why nepotism is normal, upsetting 
the functioning of the administration and sometimes placing 
important civil servants and political leaders in an uncomfortable 
position. Their first duty is towards their family: it is an obligation, 
which they neither dare nor care to neglect. The higher the position 
you hold, the more demands are made on you, and official revenues 
can never cover the needs of the family [... ] Family pressure works 
65 
at every level of the administration, not only at the top. 
Thus, the new framework of political relationships between rulers and ruled 
differed not only from `traditional' patrimonial forms of political accountability 
where political leaders were (at least in part) accountable for looking after a 
collective or public good but also from the political accountability of the 
Eastern or Western based `modern State' of the Weberian type66 
The personalisation, informalisation and infra-institutionalisation of 
political relationships, are opposed to the characteristic institutionalisation of 
the `modern State'. It implies the utilisation of public resources for the sectarian 
and patrimonial goals of feeding the networks, mixing the private and public 
spheres, as opposed to the separation of these two dimensions in the modem 
State. The legitimacy of patrimonial political power depends on the fulfilment 
of distributive expectations according to preferential micro-identity references, 
as opposed to the legal and institutional legitimacy of political and public 
power in the `modern State'. Particularistic, sectarian and micro-identity 
interests are privileged in relation to the national, macro-social public interest 
or good that prevails in the `modem State'. The preferential, vertical and 
64 See Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p. 14. 65 In Medard, Jean-Francois, `The Underdeveloped State ... op. cit. pp. 
172-173; see also in a proximate 
sense Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. pp. 
4-8; also Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in 
Africa 
... op. cit. p. 246. 66 Here and henceforward, the term `modem State' is used to refer to the Eastern or Western based 
model of Weberfan type, that is implicitly or explicitly present in all these authors' work; see Bayart, 
Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. p263; 
Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. 
pp. 5-8; Medard, Jean-Francois, 'L'Etat neo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. pp. 
331-336. 
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sectarian organisation of power goes against the egalitarian, horizontal and 
universal organisation of individuals, or citizens, in the `modem State'. 
1.2.4The New Framework for Ethical Interdependence 
The dynamics of post-independence patrimonialism, as expressed through the 
new frameworks of socio-cultural identification, economic and political 
interdependence between social actors, imply the foundation of an ethos, a 
`moral' framework of principles that regulate social practices and social 
organisation in terms of normative rights and duties, right and wrong, `moral 
legitimacy'. Reflecting what has been expounded above, the ethics 
accompanying post-independence patrimonialism was essentially distributive, 
following ties of preferential solidarity. All the authors clearly identify such 
ethics. Bayart sees it in terms of `manducatory' rules, whereby everyone `eats' 
in proportion to their size and according to the management policy of resource 
distribution.: 
The expression `politics of the belly' must be understood in the 
totality of its meaning. It refers not just to the `belly' but also to 
`politics'. This `African way of politics' furthermore suggests an 
ethic which is more complicated than that of lucre. A man of power 
who is able to amass and redistribute wealth becomes a `man of 
honour' (My Bold) 67 
[The expression `politics of the belly'] denotes at the same time the 
accumulation of wealth through tenure of political power (implied 
in the proverb `the goat grazes wherever it is tied'), the symbolic 
reference to family lineage and to witchcraft, and the physical 
corpulence which is felt to be appropriate in `big' men or powerful 
women. '68 
To say, `the goat eats where it is tethered' also implies that it should 
not eat beyond this area. 
69 
Medard offers his own definition of this normative framework, as balanced 
satisfaction of the appetites of the different groups vying for power or preying 
on the State: 
67 In Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. p. 
242. 
68 In Bayart, Jean-Francois et al., The Criminalization ... op. cit. p. 
8. 
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A skilful leader has to learn how to reconcile his own search for 
booty and spoils with the redistribution of those resources 
necessary to get political support and strengthen his position. 
Through patronage, the leader can co-opt his potential opponents 
and regulate the recruitment of the ruling class70. 
The whole art of politics here consists in satisfying lavishly your 
own ethnic group and region, while rewarding the leaders of other 
ethnic groups sufficiently for them to have an interest in 
maintaining the status quo 
71 [... ]The State is a pie that every one 
greedily wants to eat. 
72 
Chabal and Daloz refer to this normative framework as the obligation of 
`sharing the spoils [amidst] a moral economy of disorder. '73 
The story is similar in Madagascar, where popular wisdom has it 
that `a crocodile which has already eaten is no longer dangerous. ' In 
other words, well-endowed politicians are more likely than others 
to pay attention to the obligations of generosity which they are 
expected to discharge, and to ensure that those who support them 
also `will eat properly. ' The notion of political legitimacy is thus 
based on the expectation of the `sharing of the spoils' which is at 
the heart of the paradigm we propose. 
74 
The ethics that is subjacent to these principles of post-independence social 
organisation are thus essentially distributive: ethics of regulated manducation, 
as in Bayart; ethics of balanced predation, as in Medard; and ethics of `sharing 
the spoils', as in Chabal and Daloz. 
As the specific processes and practices described above are common to 
all the social layers that formed the new community, the new ethical and 
normative framework was also shared by the different layers of the population, 
from the `ruling elites' to the `ruled masses'75. 
69Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. p. ix. 70 In Medard, Jean-Francois, `The Underdeveloped State 
... op. cit. p. 167. 71 Ibid. p. 175. 
72 Ibid. p. 1ß2. 
73 Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p. xx. `See 
here the range of African proverbs 
pointing to the ephemeral nature of power and the need to take full advantage of its tenure, but always 
with the caveat that it must be shared with one's "dependants". One of many: "whoever does not rob the 
state robs his kith and kin"'; ibid. p. 107 footnote 14. 
74 Ibid. p. 36. 
75 `this mindset is shared by all layers of the population and it would be deceptive as well as 
hypocritical to argue that it does not apply to the elites. We reject, therefore, those interpretations 
favouring the view that such cultural beliefs are manipulated for ideological motives, and argue instead 
that there is a shared `heritage' valid for all and which all can aspire to use instrumentally. '; Ibid. p. 132. 
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Being generally -shared in this manner, this new ethical framework 
supported and legitimised the set of general practices and consequently the 
working logic of this modern form of patrimonialism, linking the elites with the 
rest of the population. 
In this sense, for Bayart, 
the social struggles which make up the quest for hegemony and the 
reproduction of the State bear the hallmarks of the rush for spoils in 
which all actors - rich and poor - participate in the world of 
networks [... ] Contrary to the popular image of innocent masses, 
corruption and predatoriness are not found exclusively amongst the 
powerful. Rather, they are modes of social and political behaviour 
shared by a plurality of actors on a more or less great scale. 
76 
[distributive networks] link the `lowest of the low' with the highest 
of the high [... ] the integration of African societies is all the more 
effective because, as we know, their populations are small [... ] 
access to the `boss' even if he is a minister is much easier than in 
Western industrial societies. With representations of witchcraft a 
factor, a notable cannot evade with impunity, the `courtesy visits' of 
his clients and his `country' and deny them access to his veranda. " 
For Chabal and Daloz, 
it is clear that the business of politics is more usually conducted 
along informal vertical channels of relations (patron-client 
networks, communal organisations, etc. ) linking the elites with the 
rest of the population. Socio-political rivalries in Africa are rarely 
the result of a clear-cut public and communal contest. Nor is there 
evidence that the government's economic orientation or the nature 
of the regime in place makes much difference to relations between 
State and society. 78 
What matters above all are the vertical and personalised ties which 
link `high' and `low' politics, the legitimacy of which is accepted 
by all whether at the top or the bottom. 79 
For Medard, 
Clientelism is instrumental as a way of articulating the centre and 
the periphery. Political patronage relayed by patron-client networks 
rooted in the periphery creates links between centres and 
peripheries, while economising the costs of coercion. [... ) if the 
76 Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. pp. 235,238. 77 Ibid. p. 219. 
78 Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. pp. 21-22. This point of view (the non influence of 
the economic model or regime over the relations between State and society) is also shared by Callaghy, 
T. M., `Civil Society, Democracy and Economic Change in Africa: a Dissenting Opinion about 
Resurgent Societies, ' in Harbeson, J., Rothschild, D., and Chazan, N., eds., Civil Society and the State 
of Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994). 
79 Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p. 28. 
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definition of class is made on the objective basis of exploitation 
relations, one can analyse class relations in Africa as elsewhere. 
But these classes are `classes in themselves' and not `classes for 
themselves. ' These classes do not usually function in Africa as units 
of political action. This is not a question of principle but one of 
empirical observation. 
80 
According to the analytical framework that is being presented, the effective 
principles for deciding between right and wrong, good and bad, legitimate and 
illegitimate, licit and illicit, depended very much on the fulfilment of specific 
ethical principles regarding the `sharing of the spoils', or the effective 
distribution by the `heads of network' to their dependants. Although this 
normative framework was not expressed officially through the existing juridical 
order, it nevertheless gave direction to the existing social order. In post- 
independence African countries, as opposed to the West, the ethical and 
normative order was not confused in practice, nor should it be confused in 
theory, with the legal order. In the `modern State' (Eastern or Western), the 
evolution of juridical order maintains an organic relationship with the ethical 
order; this does not happen in Africa, where the juridical order is perhaps the 
most `foreign' and exogenous structure. 
It is in this sense that many practices considered illegal by the juridical 
order in African countries are considered quite legitimate by the ethical and 
normative standards of the populations of the countries in which these practices 
occur, in outright contempt of the law. Thus, concepts such as crime and 
corruption, which originate from a `modern' juridical structure inherited from 
colonialism, became partially void of meaning after independence. In these 
terms, Medard argues that `what is corruption from the point of view of 
imported public norms is not corruption by private norms. 181 
According to Chabal and Daloz, 
In Africa the realm of clientelism and the world of crime overlap 
[... ] Where patrons nourish their clientelistic networks, the manner 
in which they have managed to obtain resources will very largely be 
B0 Medard, Jean-Francois, `The Underdeveloped State ... op. cit. pp. 169-171. 81 Ibid. cit. p. 180. 
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taken to be legitimate, even if it is illicit. [... ]There has always 
existed in Africa a wide range of activities (such as corruption) 
which, although illicit from a strictly constitutional or legal point of 
view, have been regarded as patrimonially legitimate by the bulk of 
the population [... ] There are in African societies well-understood, 
if not always well-defined, rules of conduct which mark clear 
boundaries between the informal sector and the criminal world. 
82 
In the same line of argument, Bayart says that: 
The rise in Africa of activities officially classed as criminal is aided 
by the existence of moral and political codes of behaviour, 
especially those of ethnicity, kinship and even religion and cultural 
representation, notably of the invisible, of trickery as a social value, 
of certain prestigious styles of life, even of an aesthetic, whose 
capacity to legitimise certain types of behaviour is considerable 
83 
In sum, the new frameworks of socio-cultural identification, economic and 
political interdependence, were coherently structured and legitimised by an 
emerging normative or ethical framework. Basically, the new ethics meant the 
triumph of one kind of solidarity over another: the vertical over the horizontal; 
the particularistic over the universal; the personal over the institutional; micro- 
world visions over macro-world visions; the short term over the long term; 
immediacy over deferment; the multiple micro-community dimensions over the 
united macro-community dimension of the nation-State; the sectarian interests 
82 Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p. 
79-81. As an example, the diamond trade in 
Angola was at first legally forbidden after independence, then it was legalised with the arrival of 
multipartyism and then once again forbidden; whatever the legal rulings, it is considered completely 
legitimate by the overwhelming majority of the population and is a practice undertaken by all who can. 
This refers not only to trade in the interior of Angola and Zaire, but also to trade with the outside world. 
Above all, clandestine diamond mining and trading are considered as a sacred right for the Lunda 
people, in the same way as agriculture or cattle raising is to other people of Angola. During the first 
years of independence, at the height of revolutionary fervour and of the implementation of `the Law', 
this conflict within the system led to complex dilemmas and confrontation between the legal system and 
prevalent moral ethics. The author Arlindo Barbeitos has often broached these dilemmas, as they 
occurred within his own family, of Mbundu origin, between a member of DISA (the State security) and 
a family member who was a Kamanguista (a diamond trader and trafficker). The problem arises from a 
widespread judicial process in early eighties brought about by the State against the Kamanguistas, 
during which the DISA relative would have to arrest the Kamanguista relative, in so doing, the DISA 
man would be strongly condemned by the prevailing morals and ethics, which places defence of the 
family above all else. During a family council of elders, it is decided that there was nothing condemning 
in the Kamanguista's activities as the diamonds were on land that belonged to the forefathers and that 
many generations had indulged in similar activities. Because of the position the DISA relative was in, in 
having to comply with the orders that he was given, a solution is found whereby the Kamanguista is 
made to escape to Portugal with DISA's collaboration, and to stay there until the situation settled down 
again and things got back to normal. 83 Bayart, Jean-Francois et at., The Criminalization ... op. cit. P. 
15. 
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of micro-groups over the `public interest' and `public good' of the macro- 
community. 
The new normative framework was shared by all social layers, linking 
vertically the bottom and top ranks of society or the `ruling elites' and `ruled 
masses'. Although such a framework was not reflected in the existing juridical 
order, it nevertheless provided a clear set of norms. These norms were coherent 
and legitimate from the point of view of the dominating internal rationality, 
common to most of the social actors involved, who followed such norms in 
their practices and in the emerging State. 
1.3 The New `Modern Patrimonial' State 
1.3.1 The relationship between the dominant working logic and 
structure of the new State 
According to these authors, as a rule, the administrative structure of post- 
independence African States, was based on that of the Colonial State. The new 
rulers did not have the political desire nor the actual means with which to 
overturn the preceding colonial machine, for two main reasons. 
Firstly, due to the crushing domination of the State during colonial rule, the 
nationalists saw the first objective of independence as being the conquest of the 
Colonial State. To the nationalists, radicals or otherwise, capturing the State 
meant acquiring the means of moulding a new political community that fitted in 
with their objectives. Colonial rule had clearly shown how economic power 
depended on the acquisition of political power at the centre of the State; more 
concretely, it showed how the privileged social and economic status of colonial 
African elites arose directly from their privileged status in the administration of 
the Colonial State. 84 
84 As a rule, once colonisation had started, the economic success of the `African colonial elite' arose 
mainly from privileged statuses in colonial administrative bureaucracy; as such, socio-economic status 
was determined bureaucratically and politically, rather than the other way round. Under colonial rule, 
the acquiring and maintaining of economic power was intimately linked to the politics of power. The 
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Secondly, at the level of international relations, the norms of Public 
International Law of Western origin had long since acquired a `universalising' 
status. Participation in International Organisations (with all the inherent rights 
and duties) was restricted to States, whose existence usually depended on two 
types of criteria: factual - the effective existence of a governing structure 
exerting sovereign power over land and people; juridical - official recognition 
of its existence by a significant number of other States85. 
Thus, there was neither the will, nor the reason, to discard an 
administrative superstructure typical of a `modern State'. In these terms, the 
new post-independence political system had to invent its own modus operandi 
combining two distinctive working logics - one, endogenous, patrimonial and 
`traditional' in origin; the other, exogenous, inherited from the colonisers and 
then altered by socialist or capitalist programmes, but following the external 
rationality of a Eastern or Western based `modern State'. As a rule, the dilemma 
concerning these two objectively contradictory logics was overcome through a 
more or less successful subordination of the modern political structure to a 
patrimonial working logic. 
In spite of the differences that can be found amongst the four authors 
regarding the conception of the post-independence State, they seem to be in 
agreement about the existence of two distinctive working logics, one 
endogenous, and the other exogenous. 
According to Medard, 
The political systems of the new third-world countries should be 
considered as a particular type, distinct from both the modem and 
economic elites were aware of the need to gain access to the post-independence State, as the central 
administrative mechanism for the control of economic power, which would enable them to maintain 
their privileged and elitist status. In this way, contrary to what usually happened in Europe, it was the 
power of the State that determined class, and political hegemony that allowed economic hegemony for 
those elites who succeeded in capturing the power of the State after independence. Thus, the post- 
colonial State in Africa, is not so much the political super-structure of an economic order, but rather the 
political infrastructure that allows economic hegemony. In Chabal, Patrick, Power in ... op. cit. pp. 68- 
81. Also in the same sense see Medard, Jean-Francois, `L'Etat neo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. p. 343. 85 See Medard, Jean-Francois, `Conclusion, ... op. cit. especially p. 
358. 
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the traditional States, but drawing from both. These States function 
in a specific way and follow, to a large extent, a common logic. 
86 
Les societes africaines et leurs systemes politiques sont 
fondamentalment hybrides, comme nous le rapelle J. F. Bayart . 
87 Il 
me faut insister sur cette hybridation [... ] dans laquelle la logique 
patrimoniale se combine et se melange avec d'autres logiques. 88 
[these political systems resulted from] a contradictory combination 
of bureaucratic and patrimonial norms [... ] Unlike the patrimonial 
regime the neo-patrimonial regime hides behind a public facade 
which is complex and differentiated. It dissimulates the private 
while simulating the public. 
89 
For Bayart, 
The State in Africa rests upon autochthonous foundations and a 
process of re-appropriation of institutions of colonial origin which 
give it its own historicity; it can no longer be taken as a purely 
exogenous structure [... ] It functions as a rhizome of personal 
networks and ensures the centralisation of power through the 
agencies of family, alliance and friendship, in the manner of ancient 
kingdoms, which possessed the principal attributes of a State within 
a lineage matrix, thereby reconciling two types of political 
organisation wrongly thought to be incompatible. 90 
For Chabal and Daloz, 
We are thus led to conclude that, in most African countries, the 
State is no more than a decor, a pseudo-Western fagade masking the 
realities of deeply personalised political relations. " 
The State is both vacuous and ineffectual. It is vacuous in that it did 
not consolidate, as was once expected, on the foundations of the 
colonial legacy, but instead rapidly disintegrated and fell prey to 
particularistic and factional struggles. It became an empty shell. 92 
Africa's political modernity is characterised by a combination of 
attitudes and habits which draw from a singular fusion of `modern' 
and `traditional' rationalities. 93 
Thus, for all these authors, the `modern patrimonial' State is an operative and 
coherent blend (according to the dominant internal rationality) of a `modern' 
86 In Medard, Jean-Francois, `The Underdeveloped State ... op. cit., p. 162. 97 Medard is here referring to Bayart, Jean-Francois `L'invention du politique en Afrique et en Asie, 
avant-propos', in Revue Francaise de Science Politique, vol. XXXIX, 8 (December 1989), p. 790. 
88 In Medard, Jean-Francois, `L'Etat neo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. pp. 332-334. 89 In Medard, Jean-Francois, `The Underdeveloped State ... op. cit. pp. 180-81. 90 In Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. pp. 260-61. '' In Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p. 16 92 Ibid. p. 14. 
93 Ibid. p. 146. 
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form or structure and a `modern patrimonial' working logic as expounded 
above (distinct from traditional patrimonialism). 
1.3.2 The Management Strategy of the new State 
Taking into account the dominant working logic and the new frameworks of 
relationships discussed above, the new State became the bone of contention 
between all groups clamouring for political leadership and consequent 
economic privilege. The State was seen as the main mechanism for the 
allocation of all forms of income, such as from natural resources, the control of 
production, taxes, permits, loans, the allocation of governmental offices and all 
kinds of other public jobs94. Thus, after the State had been conquered by a 
given group or leading alliance of groups, the main task consisted in the 
creation of a distributive system for these resources that allowed the leading 
group or alliance to remain in power and to satisfy potential rivals - through 
co-option - in order to control their ambitions and obtain their support or 
consent. This type of management strategy renders precarious the equilibrium 
of political forces and the nature of power, under permanent pressure 
(demands). As stated by Medard, 
If stability exists, it is more the stability of a leader than of 
institutions. It is above all maintained by the political ability of a 
leader and by his capacity to create and head a coalition around 
himself 95 
Many African governments have fallen apart because the ethnic 
group in power could not control its greed. In such cases the 
President narrowed his public support rather than enlarging it, 
leading to his own downfall. 
96 
The vulnerability of such a system varies from one case to another, but 
regardless of the regime (civil or military) or political model (Socialist or 
94 See Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. pp. 
74-83. 
95 In Medard, Jean-Francois, `The Underdeveloped State ... op. cit. p. 
163. 
96 Ibid. p. 175. 
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Capitalist), they all have in common a strategy for concentrating political power 
and centralising administration of strategic areas (those providing primary 
access to State's resources) in a pyramidal structure; consequently 
concentrating and centralising the general distribution of benefits and privileges 
through vertically organised chains of interdependence within that same 
pyramid. This strategy is crucial because if the main foundation of power in this 
kind of organisation (i. e., the distributive system) is politically scattered and 
administratively dispersed, the whole system goes into disruption, as the 
necessary economic privileges can still be obtained, but without having to 
depend on hierarchical distribution. 97 
Regardless of regime or political model, the head of State is at the top of a 
distributive centralised pyramidal system and, depending on the existing 
conditions, will usually follow one of two courses: either centralise the 
patrimonial system to a maximum in order to prevent the formation of factions, 
or tolerate a certain degree of decentralisation of patrimonialism, playing one 
faction against the other; in this case, the head of State remains in power as 
arbitrator and will not allow any faction or group to acquire enough muscle to 
threaten his own superior power. 98 
Within such a strategy of concentration and centralisation, the role of the 
party in African post-independence patrimonial systems is singularly different 
from the patrimonialism studied by political science in American cities during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century and also from the patrimonialism 
studied in South-east Asia in the mid-twentieth century99. Notwithstanding the 
97 '1'Etat qu'on cherche ä implanter presque partout est un Etat centralise de type jacobin, et non un Etat 
federal ou d6centralise. Le cas du Nigeria est lä encore atypique'; in Medard, Jean-Francois, 
`Conclusion, 
... op. cit. p. 
360. 
98 In Medard, Jean-Francois, `The Underdeveloped State ... op. cit. p. 
169; see also Medard, Jean- 
Francois, `L'Etat neo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. p. 
339. On the `powerful centralisation of State 
structures' see also Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. pp. 
261-262. 
99 An excellent anthology of studies on patrimonialism and clientelism including political and 
anthropological science writings is Schmidt, Steffen W. et al, eds., A Reader in Political Clientelism 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); see also Eisenstadt, S. N. and Lemarchand, R., 
Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981); see also Nelson, Joan 
M., Access to Power: Politics, and the Urban Poor in Developing Nations, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1979); Scott, James C., 'Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change', in 
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regime or political model involved, African post-independence patrimonialism 
started off by being partisan in nature, soon to become presidential, thus 
relegating the party to a secondary position in the patrimonial system. In most 
stable patrimonial regimes, patrimonialism is firstly presidential, secondly 
bureaucratic, and thirdly partisan'oo The Party as a mechanism for the 
centralisation of distribution was an excellent mechanism for the control and 
integration of bureaucracy, which would then facilitate Presidential control over 
the same bureaucratic and administrative elites, as long as the President then 
assumed the control over the Party'°' 
Partisan patrimonialism meant that all parties were clientelist, yet faced 
with the growing centralisation of administration and concentration of political 
power, it did not disappear completely, but lost its mass component and faded 
away. To a certain extent, patrimonialism became `elitist' and the masses lost a 
good part of their initial slice of the cake, especially in cases where they lost the 
ability to exchange votes for favours (one party systems). Although this `elitist' 
development might have aggravated the natural `manducatory' or `predatory' 
unbalance between the ruling elites and the ruled masses1°2, vertical, 
preferential and sectarian micro-identity solidarities linking rulers and ruled, 
survived, according to established, informal mechanisms and sanctions as 
stated by Bayart, 
It is certainly not unheard of for a `big man, ' influenced by the 
ethos of munificence, to make a point of honour of doing so 
[redistribution of sinecures and other benefits of power]. However, 
it is more common for it to be imposed upon him by meetings of 
American Political Science Review, 63 (1963), pp. 1142-58; Scott, James C., `Patron-Client Politics 
and Political Change in Southeast Asia', in American Political Science Review, 66 (1972), pp. 91-113. 
'°° See Medard, Jean-Francois, 'The Underdeveloped State ... op. cit. p. 
167. 
101 Such was the case in the Ivory Coast, when during the party's seventh Congress, President 
Houphouet-Boigny reasserted his control over the party and the regime by removing from office the 
general secretary Philippe Yace, who had turned the PDCI into a kind of machine controlled by 
himself; in Medard, Jean-Francois, `Aines et cadets en Cote d'Ivoire: le VIIe1 c congres du PDCI', in 
Politique Africaine, I (1981), pp. 102-113. See also over this issue, Bayart, Jean-Francois, L'Etat au 
Cameroun 
... op. cit. 102 `The personal relationship on which redistribution is supposed to depend is by definition highly 
inegalitarian and hierarchical [... ] "I chop you chop" was the promise of a Nigerian party. Whilst one 
cannot deny this, one has to stress that not everybody "eats" equally. ' In Bayart, Jean-Francois, The 
State in Africa 
... op. cit. pp. 233-235. Also in the same sense 
is Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, 
... op. cit. p. 28. 
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collective savings societies in his home town or village and by the 
continuous stream of beggars, masters either of the language of 
kinship and flattery or, more disturbingly, of the accusation of 
witchcraft: a man who manages `to make good' without ensuring 
that his network shares in his prosperity brings `shame' upon 
himself and acquires the reputation of `eating' others in the 
invisible world: social disapproval and ostracism and, in extreme 
cases, a death sentence may in time be his reward. 
1 03 
Also in the same line of argument, Medard says that, 
[primordial solidarity] is maintained by sentimental ties and 
endorsed by sanctions: often the refusal to oblige the family is 
sanctioned by witchcraft. It is within the family that the use of 
poison is the most widespread'. 104 
Chabal and Daloz support the same, 
Although there are strong inequalities within clientelistic relations, 
it is well to remember that patrons suffer considerable constraints. 
The maintenance of their status is entirely dependent on their 
ability to meet the expectations of their clients [... ] the acuteness of 
apparent inequalities is reduced by the imperative to be seen to 
redistribute on a scale appropriate to one's standing. '°5 
Those who fail to redistribute or are perceived to redistribute too 
little, run the risk of facing hostility and suspicion. They will not 
receive recognition and deference 106 
This said, it is important to stress that insofar as the main logic of modern 
patrimonialism or its management strategy is concerned it is misleading to 
distinguish between civil or military regimes, capitalist or socialist political 
models. In the analysis of specific cases, however it might be useful to see if 
for instance military coups have in anyway changed the status quo of dominant 
privileged groups and elites. According to Bayart, 
Political ruptures [such as military coups] sometimes open up the 
way to re-compositions and associations of new interests which 
upset the status quo. Military regimes generally operate in this way. 
By reinforcing the high levels of the civil service, they brought 
back politicians who had been ostracised, and rehabilitated the role 
of chief, to fill the political void which they had created by coming 
to power. 
107 
103 Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. p. 
233. 
1°4In Medard, Jean-Francois, `The Underdeveloped State ... op. cit. p. 
172. 
105 In Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p. 
28. 
106 Ibid. p. 107. 
107 In Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. p. 
168. 
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As we will see, this was not the case in Angola, where what I call the 
Creole/M'Bundu alliance has managed to keep a privileged position (in the 
closely inter-related administrative and military structures) since the colonial 
period, controlling State power since independence (even if there have been 
permanent rivalries, disputes, challenges and power re-arrangements among the 
myriad of sub-groups composing this motley and always changing 
Creole/M'Bundu alliance throughout the years). 
To conclude this first chapter, it has to be said that apart from certain 
differences in matters of secondary importance (at least as concerns what 
matters for this thesis), there is in the works of Africanists such as Medard, 
Bayart, Chabal and Daloz an analytical framework clearly rooted in a Weberian 
approach. 
This analytical framework claims, firstly, that there is a logic (i. e., 
coherence) between the internal dominant rationality of the social actors and 
the kind of interdependent relationships that become established between them, 
especially between rulers and ruled - along given socio-cultural identity, 
political, economic and ethical lines. Secondly, the emerging frameworks of 
interdependence relationship between rulers and ruled are essentially 
patrimonial in nature, but should not be confused with `traditional' forms of 
patrimonialism, since they give rise to a new and specific form of 
patrimonialism - that of `modern patrimonialism', underpinned by a clear and 
generally accepted set of norms (although informal or not legal) regulating the 
organisation of African political systems. 
Thirdly, by looking at modern patrimonial relations of interdependence 
from the perspective of the dominant internal rationality, the organisational 
characteristics of African States can be understood; such as, for instance, the 
needs that lie behind the modus operandi of the State, combining two distinct 
logics, a modem one in terms of official structure and a patrimonial one in 
terms of effectively dominant working logic; the fierce competition that turns 
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the State into a arena of contention for all groups aspiring to political leadership 
and economic privilege; the reasons preventing an effective institutionalisation 
of the State; the grounds for the common practice of concentrating power and 
centralising administration in strategic areas. 
In sum, we are presented with an insight into the coherent operation of 
African political systems supported by a clear albeit informal set of norms and 
rules. What is seen from a Western point of view as disorder or `chaos' is 
merely a different order representing a creative combination of 'modernity' and 
'tradition', containing a clear form of political accountability (patrimonial 
distributive in nature), 
The paradigm we have developed shows that what is distinct in 
Africa is the creative manner in which this overlap of modernity 
and tradition combines to create a form of political accountability 
[... ]. By providing a coherent framework for what might otherwise 
appear merely as a chaos or anarchy we establish the foundations 
for an analytical interpretation of politics in Africa which is 
congruent with classical Weberian approaches. 'os 
What we mean is that the disorder of which we speak is in fact a 
different `order', the outcome of different rationalities and 
causalities. It appears as a disorder only because most paradigms 
are based on a notion of a form of social, economic and therefore, 
political development which reflects the experience of Western 
societies [... ] Our approach is an attempt to explain how apparent 
disorder can in fact have its own logic [... ]. Once it is accepted that 
there are in Africa well-recognised norms of political practice 
which do not conform to those we find elsewhere, it becomes 
imperative to predicate our analysis on an interpretative framework 
which makes sense of those norms. 
109 
1.4 Strengths and Weaknesses of a Modem Patrimonial Analytical and 
Interpretative Framework 
The work of the above mentioned authors had the enormous merit of 
approaching directly and courageously several sensitive issues in African 
studies such as the political influence of cultural aspects and the possibility of a 
108 Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p. 147. 109 Ibid. p. 155. 
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mainly endogenous working logic of political systems - an important stance 
given the long and strong tradition of external scapegoats to explain and justify 
the post-independence political course in Africa (e. g., neo-colonialism, 
imperialism, the `debt trap', structural adjustment programmes, etc. ). Moreover, 
those works attempted to provide an analytical framework more influenced by 
the reality they observed than by any pre-conceived notions or 
`academically/politically correct approaches" 10. 
There are, however, four possible weaknesses in their approach. The first 
two can be immediately addressed referring to the authors' own works and 
within a Weberian approach; the third and fourth can only be addressed by 
means of a case-study that does not conform to such an analytical framework. 
This will lead me to propose the `post-modern patrimonial' analytical and 
interpretative framework. 
The first potential weakness of the modern patrimonial analysis lies in 
the fact that it identifies a dominant rationality, deriving from the prevailing 
Weltanschauung, which is inevitably a cultural specificity, leaving it open to the 
critique made of `cultural determinism'. Such criticism can be discarded within 
a Weberian based argument according to which, the cultural specificity does not 
imply cultural determinism but simply takes cultural factors into account. Max 
Weber did not propose a cultural or even ethical interpretation but rather 
demonstrated that economic activity can be oriented by the belief system as 
much as the belief system can, in a given historical period, be influenced by the 
economic system. Both are possible at specific historical moments' 11; 
The second potential weakness of modern patrimonialism is linked with 
the application of a Weberian rooted framework of analysis (which is in itself 
mainly based on European history) to an African context. Objections made on 
110 On this issue see Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p. 
129; see also Medard, Jean- 
Francois, `L'Etat neo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. p. 323. 111 See especially, Weber, Max, L'Ethique ... op. cit. pp. 248-249. 
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these terms can be countered by the argument that the modern patrimonial 
approach only uses Weberian concepts and analytical influences selectively. 
The Weberian approach to the emergence of the modern State, for instance, is 
used less in terms of the celebrated notion of the monopoly of legitimate 
violence (derived from the European experience of State formation) than from 
the thesis which its author develops on why the overcoming of patrimonialism 
is a prerequisite to the successful emergence of the modem state1'. In the same 
way, what concerns all these authors, is not so much the identification of a 
certain form of relationship between social actors (patrimonial in nature) in any 
given organisational form like the Weberian ideal-type of patrimonialism or 
modern State, but rather the ways in which those specific forms of relationship 
can be articulated and embodied in new structural organisational forms (i. e., 
`the State in Africa" 13, `the contemporary African State' 114, `the 
underdeveloped State in tropical Africa'115 essentially operating according to 
what was here defined as `modern patrimonialism'). 
The third potential weakness has to do with the vision implied in the 
model, that is that of a relatively coherent and operative system, with an 
internal and specific working logic based on a dominant rationality shared and 
practised by all layers of society with a clear and established set of rules. Such 
interpretation can be accused of stressing the normative and balancing 
capacities of patrimonialism, not allowing much room for conflict, disruption, 
anti-systemic courses of action, incoherence and the change of normative 
values and principles over time. 
The fourth and final weakness lies with the high level of generalisation 
implied in the `modern patrimonial' analytical framework. All of the authors 
112 See Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. pp. 3-4 " Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit.. 14 Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p. 6. .. S Medard, Jean-Francois, `The Underdeveloped State 
... op. cit. 
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mentioned here generalise, referring indiscriminately to African countries (sub- 
Saharan African countries, excluding South-Africa), resorting to examples from 
a multiplicity of countries and clearly aiming to find a common analytical and 
interpretative framework that maybe applied to the great majority of theme 16 
Although these authors show some awareness of these two last 
weaknesses, their high level of generalisation has not made it possible to 
demonstrate concretely how such issues can be addressed and overcome in their 
own framework of analysis. Such demonstration could only be possible with 
the application of the propounded analytical framework to specific country 
studies that might not conform to such interpretation and analysis. The present 
work on Angola seeks to use the basic analytical structure proposed by those 
authors, but faced with a reality that did not fit the model, attempts to develop a 
reformulated approach. 
As has long been noticed, `nowhere is the rate of casualty among new 
concepts higher than in the social sciences. Few survived the scrutiny of critical 
discourse, and many more end up prematurely fossilised in the pages of esoteric 
journalsi117. Survival `is not mainly a function of etymological precision or 
even clarity of reference [... ] but of how much fruitful research a new concept 
116 Medard refers to the `underdeveloped state in tropical Africa' and `even though our field research 
has been limited to Cameroon and Ivory Coast, we have reason to believe that the conditions we 
describe can be generalised elsewhere on the continent'; in Medard, Jean-Francois, `The 
Underdeveloped State 
... op. cit. footnote 13; Bayart refers generally to the State in sub-Saharan Africa, 
and although he assumes the obvious impossibility of a synthesis of everything to do with politics and 
the State in Africa, his clear aim is to construct a general mode of analysis and interpretation of 
`African politics' and expounds the workings and logic of an `African way of politics'; see Bayart, 
Jean-Francois, The State in Africa 
... op. cit. especially p. viii and p. 
8; Chabal and Daloz assume their 
generalisation aim and possible criticisms in these terms, ' This book is an attempt to make sense of 
what is happening in Africa today. Simple as this may appear to be, it is in fact fiendishly challenging 
for reasons having to do with both the diversity of the continent and the complexity of the events 
currently taking place there. [... ] Is our undertaking over-ambitious? Should it even be attempted? 
Would the level of generalisation required to account for such intricate and diverse experiences reduce 
the validity of any of the observations we might make? We would argue, however, that it is the depth 
and seriousness of the present African crisis which make our enterprise necessary. ', In Chabal, Patrick 
and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p. xv. 117 Lemarchand, Rene, `Comparative Political Clientelism: Structure, Process and Optic', in Eisenstadt, 
S. N. and Lemarchand, R., Political Clientelism ... op. cit. p. 7. 
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generates. Most concepts new or old are killed not by attack but by neglect' 118. 
Thus, the point here is not so much to create or introduce new analytical 
concepts but to use the analytical framework provided by the authors before it 
is prematurely buried by criticism and neglect without generating any 
research19. Such use exposes some of the inadequacies of `modern 
patrimonialism', but the aim here is to propose a way of overcoming them 
through a reformulated analytical and interpretative framework, in order to 
comprehend the reality observed in Angola (and possibly in other countries as 
well) which is somehow different from the one expounded in `modern 
patrimonialism'. 
118 Goode, J., `Homan' and Merton's Structural Approach', in Blau, Peter (ed), Approaches to the 
study of social structure (New York: Free Press, 1975), pp. 66-75; cit. in Lemarchand, Rene, 
`Comparative Political Clientelism: Structure, Process and Optic', in Eisenstadt, S. N. and Lemarchand, 
R., Political Clientelism,... op. cit. p. 7. 
119 That seems to be the case, especially with the temporary draw back of Bayart to the more 
fashionable approach of the Le politique par le bas en Afrique noire, something that he soon 
abandoned, returning to his initial route with The criminalization of the State in Africa. Such draw 
back, although temporary, is elucidating of the referred possibility of a premature bury. See Bayart, 
Jean-Francois, The State in Africa 
... op. cit.; 
Bayart, Jean-Francois, Le politique par le bas ... op. cit.; 
Bayart, Jean-Francois et al., The Criminalization ... op. cit.. 
See also comments on this issue in Chabal, 
Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. pp. 28-29. 
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2- Post-Modern Patrimonialism 
In Angola (and possibly other countries such as the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria), patrimonialism underwent different 
dynamics and led to a different socio-political organisation. Contrary to what 
was supposed to happen with `modem patrimonialism', the ties of distributive 
interdependence between rulers and ruled did not settle and solidify; instead 
they weakened and loosened, amidst a context of deep social fragmentation and 
increasing economic scarcity, leading to a new dimension of patrimonialism as 
a political system, which is quantitatively and qualitatively different from 
`modem patrimonialism'. The next two sub-chapters attempt, firstly, to discuss 
the differences between `modern patrimonialism' and this new form of 
patrimonialism (2.1), secondly, to explain those differences (2.2). 
2.1 Dilution of Ties of Distributive Interdependence 
2.1.1 Dilution of the Ties of Economic Interdependence 
Modem patrimonial dynamics imply that the whole social system is based on 
predatory and distributive practices that support vertical, sectarian and 
preferential, micro-identity solidarities throughout extensive patrimonial 
networks of dependants and `heads of network'. 
In Angola (and possibly other countries) the ties of economic distributive 
interdependence that would have been the foundations of patrimonial networks 
and of the whole system of socio-political organisation, did not consolidate but 
were instead loosened. From the end of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, 
the distribution of resources went down drastically and the existing networks 
shrank and became fragmented, with the bottom rungs being the first to be 
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neglected. Such reality followed a generalised tendency that has generally been 
explained by the economic crisis in Africa. '20 
However, it must be said that there was in countries such as Angola a 
growing tendency to `withhold resources at source' and to divert ever-greater 
sums of money as one went up the networks, by those with privileged or 
primary access to the State's top offices and resources (here called `ruling 
elites'). At this level, predatory practices were less and less `altruistic' (i. e., 
aimed at feeding extensive networks of dependants and supporters) and more 
and more `selfish' (i. e., feeding oneself and ever more restricted networks). 
This showed that the distributive obligations of those ruling elites were not 
being fulfilled, not so much because of the general `crisis' in resources, but 
essentially because of the deliberate neglect of patrimonial obligations. The 
ruling elites enriched themselves whilst neglecting their dependants. 
As we will see, since independence, many oil wells have been discovered 
in Angola and revenues from oil have increased hugely, partly as a result of a 
rise in international oil prices. Many other sources of increased income have 
appeared over the years, such as humanitarian aid and development assistance. 
And yet, this has had no impact whatsoever on the continued shrinkage of the 
networks, diminution of resources distributed and deterioration of services 
provided by the State (such as education, health and so on). Apart from Angola, 
the case of Zaire also seems to support this argument with the often mentioned 
situations of ever growing sums of money being diverted by the holders of the 
top offices of State into private foreign bank accounts. 
120 `Africa's crisis is the combined outcome of the weakening of its patrimonial system and of the 
dereliction of political accountability. And the weakening of the patrimonial system is entirely due to 
the diminution in the internal and external resources to feed it. Of the two, the internal is the more 
dramatic, making the need for increased foreign aid and investment (or precisely, increased 
dependence) all the more vital. '; In Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p. 118; also 
talking about the linkage between the economic crisis and the crisis of patrimonialism is Medard, Jean- 
Francois, 'L'Etat neo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. p. 
351. Although in a different context and writing in a 
different period but also approaching the issue of the relation between patrimonial effectiveness and 
resources availability, see, Scott, James C., `Corruption ... op. cit. pp. 
1142-58; Scott, James C., 
`Patron-Client 
... op. cit. pp. 
91-113. 
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Contrary to the expectations of modem patrimonialism, the extensive 
patrimonial networks that linked members of very different socio-economic 
status gave way to the very restricted patrimonial networks of ruling elites and 
their entourage, with a similar socio-economic status. This reinforced an 
increasing distributive neglect (i. e. non-fulfilment of distributive `obligations') 
by the `ruling elites' towards a growing number of people marginalised at the 
bottom of the system, representing an extreme imbalance of distributive 
relations - an accentuated `elitism' of patrimonialism. 
The ruling elites and their entourage were growing fat, literally and 
figuratively, whilst the populace grew so thin that their actual survival was put 
at risk. According to a modern patrimonial analytical framework, the problem 
with such attitudes and practices among the ruling elites was that they would be 
destroying the basis of their own power. However, even at a political level, 
countries such as Angola seem to exhibit a different reality from the one 
presented by modern patrimonialism. 
2.1.2 Dilution of Res of Political Interdependence 
According to a modern patrimonial analytical framework, the notions of 
political accountability, political legitimacy and political representation are 
based on redistributive principles ('sharing the spoils') and related to the 
betterment of conditions of one's own community. If the feeding of the 
networks decreases drastically, along with the number of recipients (supporters, 
dependants, `constituents'), then the political legitimacy of rulers also 
decreases, with an accompanying increase of claims against their rule and the 
growing precariousness of their power. The whole patrimonial power system is 
endangered. 
Again, the reality in Angola (and possibly other countries) does not 
conform to such modem patrimonial dynamics, revealing instead a scenario of 
the progressive neglect of extensive economic and distributive obligations, 
without any profound changes in the political landscape or to the basic 
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patrimonial organisational principles that guide the whole socio-political 
organisation. 
On the one hand, when looking at the background of those groups that 
have had privileged access to the resources of the State since independence it 
can be seen that, apart from permanent rivalries, disputes and power re- 
arrangements among the myriad of sub-groups comprising the motley and ever 
changing Creole/M'Bundu alliance, those groups have kept their privileged 
socio-economic status from independence to the present day. 121 
On the other hand, regardless of the change of leadership (from Neto to 
Eduardo dos Santos), the organisational principles of patrimonialism 
(preferentialism, sectarianism and micro-identity solidarities) and 
organisational expressions (predatory and rentiere economic practices; 
personalisation of political power) did not disappear. Instead they were 
reinforced throughout the years that followed independence. This seems to be 
also the case of former Zaire, simply illustrated by the substitution of Mobutu 
by Kabila and the substitution of Kabila by his son Joseph, which as is known, 
in no way changed the working logic of the socio-political system in Zaire, 
especially at the level of power relationships between ruling elites and ruled 
masses. 
Along with the weakening of economic interdependence ties (i. e., the 
contraction of distribution), there was also in Angola (and possibly other 
mentioned cases) a weakening of the political interdependence ties between 
121 As we will see, the privileged condition of the Creole/M'Bundu in Angola go back to the pre- 
colonial era, before 1885. They came to dominate the State after the independence and consolidated 
their socio-economic and political dominion through the presidencies of Agostinho Neto and Eduardo 
dos Santos. This seems to be also the case in Liberia where the Americo-Liberian aristocracy or 
`assimilated elite' never lost their privileged access to resources under the rule of Tolbert, Doe and 
Taylor (not even after the executions on the Monrovia beach ordered by Doe). It is the case of the elite 
descendants of slaves 'repatriated' in Sierra Leone, under the rule of different men such as Stevens, 
Momoh, Strasser, Bio, Kabah, and Koroma during a period stretching from 1968 to the present day. It 
is the obvious case of Zaire under Mobutu or Kabila, where the `ethnic' and `regional elites' are still 
privileged in a system of co-option. It is the complex case of ethnic and regional elites in Nigeria with 
predominance given to the Haussa of the North, who, since 1960, are still traditionally the political and 
financial elite, having survived many presidents, such as Azikiwe, Gowon, Murtala, Obasanjo, Shagari, 
Babangida, and Abacha. On the case of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Zaire and Nigeria see Reno, William, 
Warlord Politics and African States (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998). 
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rulers and ruled. Relational notions such as political accountability lost a great 
part of their meaning: they became diluted and the informal sanction 
mechanisms lost effectiveness. Objectively, the political participation and 
intervention (formal or informal) of the populace was considerably diminished. 
The best designation for this attitude of political and economic neglect of 
the `ruling elites' vis-ä-vis the `masses' (especially those furthest away from the 
central and primary rungs of distributive hierarchy) and their subsequent loss of 
political and economic power is that of 1'Afrique inutile (as used by Reno to 
cases of Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia and former Zaire). This comprises 
`regions and peoples that are best governed lightly, if at all, rather than waste 
scarce revenues in attempts to control them. ' 122 
2.1.3 Dilution of the Res of Ethic and Normative Interdependence 
According to a modem patrimonial analysis, the construction of a framework of 
economic and political relationships is usually accompanied by the foundation 
of a clear, albeit informal, ethical and normative framework. Such principles 
would coherently legitimise and regulate the extensive patrimonial networks of 
appropriation (predation) and distribution of resources. Instead of this, what 
happened in countries such as Angola was the dilution of the ethical norms that 
regulated the patrimonial practices. 
The ethical and economic obligations of extensive distribution were not 
fulfilled by the ruling elites, and their attitude was blatantly one of `selfish 
predation' on a growing share of the resources. Faced with this breakdown of 
`patrimonial compromise', a distinct ethical and normative framework began to 
emerge, which was both pragmatic and realistic, according to which the ends - 
survival for the majority, enrichment of the minority -justified, or legitimised, 
122 `Regime efforts to control resources recall some compromises made by colonial States, which were 
forced to choose between Afrique utile (areas that produced revenues sufficient to pay for 
administration) and Afrique inutile (areas abandoned by the State as too costly to administer). Whereas 
the contemporary version of Afrique utile is delineated in terms of controlling salable resources rather 
than of colonial concerns with labour [sic], its inutile counterpart still denotes regions and people that 
are best governed lightly, if at all, rather than waste scarce revenues in attempts to control them. ', in 
Reno, William, Warlord Politics ... op. cit. p. 
35. 
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the means. This gave rise to a kind of `free-for-all' in all layers of society, in 
which all became involved in unrestrained practices of `total assault' on all 
available State resources: unregulated predation. 
Within a pragmatic moral framework in which the ends justify the means, 
the boundaries between what is considered as morally legitimate and morally 
illegitimate become blurred, and practices prevail that were considered morally 
unacceptable by the `public morals' of the recent past, ranging from drug 
trafficking, gun-running, the trade in endangered species, petty theft and 
organised crime, to downright theft from the State coffers 123. Although within a 
different approach than the one mentioned here, Bayart has noticed the same 
phenomenon in former Zaire, 
In fact, the person who struggles daily to survive and who, using 
the energy and the spirit of survival called by the citizens of 
Kinshasa debrouillardise, the local name for metis, supplies the city 
with food and distributes fuel to the provinces is no different in 
essence from the diamond digger or the cocaine courier. In the 
name of the same ethos of personal savoir-faire and initiative, he 
passes from one activity to another. 
124 
In countries such as Angola, the modem-patrimonial ethics did not consolidate. 
Contrary to Medard's arguments, the predators did not share their prey nor the 
left-over food with their dependants in accordance with the norms of balanced 
predation; contrary to the arguments of Chabal and Daloz, the crocodiles did 
not reach the point of being satisfied enough to feed their dependants 
afterwards in accordance with the ethics of `sharing the spoils'; contrary to 
Bayart's arguments, the `goats' did not respect the boundaries of their pastures 
in accordance with the norms of regulated manducation. 
123 Those who deviate - or steal - supposedly `public' funds into private accounts abroad are 
indulging in a practice which, according to the modern patrimonial ethical system, is highly 
condemnable as it is distributatively `selfish' rather than `altruistic'. Yet they are less condemned by 
`public morals' now than during the first years of independence, because it would be difficult to find 
anyone else who would not do the same were they in the same position. Everyone strives for the 
opportunity of accessing the main resources and when the opportunity presents itself, one has to make 
the most in the shortest time available because munificence from the Minister, the Director, the 
connection, could end any time. This reinforces the popular Angolan maxim, `aproveita enquanto 0 
Braga e tesoureiro e näo to preocupes porque ninguem pode atirar a primeira pedra' ('make the most of 
it while Braga is treasurer and do not worry because no one can cast the first stone. ') 124Bayart, Jean-Francois et al., The Criminalization ... op. cit. pp. 
38-39. 
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What did happen in countries such as Angola was that Bayart's `goats' 
began to eat more and more of what was in front of them, in more and more 
places. The proverb that says that `the goat grazes wherever it is tied and not 
beyond that point' did not apply, rather it should have been rephrased as `the 
goat is no longer tied' and grazes everywhere and everything. Instead of 
Medard's elitist banquet of regulated and proportionally distributive predation 
over the cake that is the State, there was a `banquet for cannibals', where 
everyone ate as much as they could, without worrying about feeding third 
parties. 125 Finally, the crocodiles from Chabal and Daloz turned out to be 
insatiable: the more they ate, the hungrier they became, the less they fed their 
dependants and the more dangerous they became. 
Faced with this situation of a pragmatic and flexible `free for all' type of 
morals, the civil juridical order was completely derided and ridiculed by the 
greater part of the population that saw it merely as a possible source of 
exploitation. As a rule, the law represented a possible source of income for all 
those who were in a position to `sell' the non-fulfilment of legal obligations, 
and a source of expenditure to all those who needed not fulfil them. 
2.2 The Effectively Created State 
In a framework where there is a marked dereliction of economic, political and 
ethical interdependence between rulers and ruled, the existing socio-political 
organisation and the State will of course differ from those analysed by modern 
125 This was an expression used by the vice-governor of Malange, Mr. Vieira, to describe the practices 
that led to an almost complete destruction of the industrial infrastructure in Malange; practices starting 
within the top positions of management hierarchy and finishing within the workers and general 
population at the bottom rungs of society; from private interview with Mr Vieira Vice-Governor of 
Malange for the economy (7 September 1995). The same expression is used in a novel by Pepetela to 
describe precisely the same phenomenon. In the words of a former guerrilla of the MPLA who did not 
want to assume power after independence, `it's strange, but nowadays no one understands my lack of 
appetite. And they condemn me because I threw it all up in the air, I don't want cars or houses or many 
wives like they have, with their voracious and insatiable appetite. I made them uncomfortable - at a 
banquet for cannibals I would only have taken a pastry and been happy with that. '; in Pepetela, A 
Geragdo... op. cit. p. 202-203. 
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patrimonialism, both in terms of the relationship between the dominant working 
logic and the State's structure and in terms of the State's management strategy. 
2.2.1 The Relationship Between the Dominant Working Logic and the 
Structure of the State 
According to a modem patrimonial interpretation, the effective State would find a 
modus operandi able to combine in an operative manner the structural form of a 
modem polity (i. e., the existence of a minimally institutionalised administration, 
bureaucracy and government exerting some sovereign authority over land and 
population; a minimal 'public' dimension and prosecution of public objectives) 
with the working logic of patrimonialism. Important internal and external 
motives would ensure the survival of a minimal level of the structural expressions 
of a modem polity: internally, the usefulness of the bureaucratic and 
administrative State as an effective and central mechanism for the appropriation 
and distribution of resources; externally, the benefits arising from the legitimacy 
of the State, recognised by Public International Law and by the international 
community. 
Contrary to that view, in countries such as Angola, the dilution of the 
extensive ties of distributive interdependence between rulers and ruled made it 
increasingly difficult for the socio-political system to combine the structural 
expressions of a modern polity with the working logic of patrimonialism. There 
was an extreme growth of the organisational influence of the latter and, 
consequently, an extreme atrophy of the former. 
The effective reality in Angola (which seems to be paralleled by the 
experience of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Nigeria) was the growing distance between political practices and the action of a 
modern State. 
The exercise of sovereignty by several of these governments (except perhaps 
Nigeria) is confined to the capital city, and to the main provincial towns - as is 
the case with Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. There is no 
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effective border control, - nor is there adequate control over the territory or over 
part of the population. In more radical cases, resources are for a significant part 
beyond government control - as in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. 
The pursuit of private, sectarian, interests reaches extreme heights and there 
is almost complete disregard for public welfare and for territories and populations 
belonging to 1 'Afrique inutile'26. 
The generalisation of a pragmatic and flexible normative framework, with 
unregulated free-for-all `assault' on resources, facilitated above all the destruction 
of the State's bureaucratic and administrative system -a process started by the 
huge `army' of civil servants forgotten on the edges of the distributive system. In 
Angola, the exception was a nucleus of presidential services and State security 
services 127, which were still indispensable to the functioning of the central 
government in order to ensure the minimal outward appearance of a modern State 
(vital for maintaining the State's international legitimacy and privileges) 128. 
2.2.2 The Management Strategy of the Effectively Created State 
According to a modem patrimonial analytical framework, independently from the 
regime (civil or military) or political model (capitalism or socialism), the ruling 
elites would follow a calculated strategy of concentration of power and 
centralisation of the administrative system up to a certain level (varying in each 
case) - thus centralising the distribution of resources, benefits and privileges. 
Such strategy started off by being extensively one of partisan patrimonialism but 
soon became `elitist' - the masses were no longer able to exchange votes for 
126 This is what happens in Angola as we will see and it seems to be what happens in other cases as 
well. As stated by Reno: `That the pursuit of power in Africa's worst-off states is essentially a matter of 
private gain becomes clear in my examination of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo (formerly Zaire), and 
Nigeria'; in Reno, William, Warlord Politics ... op. cit. p. xi. 127 The same seems to happen in former Zaire; according to a Zairian: `If, in spite of the economic 
crisis, there is one thing which works well in Zaire it is our intelligence services'; cit. in Bayart, Jean- 
Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. p. 
246. 
128 Such privileges coming out of the international legitimacy are clearly demonstrated in Reno, 
William, Warlord Politics ... op. cit. and will 
be later discussed in this work. 
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favours. Personal and vertical solidarities relating rulers and ruled, however, 
survived according to established informal mechanisms and sanctions. 
Contrary to that interpretation, in the case of Angola, the process of power 
concentration and administrative centralisation did not reach any point of 
operative stabilisation but continued unabated, thus restricting further the primary 
channels to access resources. The patrimonialism that was supposed to become 
partially `elitist' became extremely concentrated in the hands of a few and led to 
the near-total neglect and marginalisation of the population at large. 
2.3 The Proposed Framework of Analysis: a Different Patrimonial Dynamics or 
Post-Modem Patrimonialism 
The argument of this thesis is that Angola (and possibly other cases), experienced 
a different patrimonial dynamics, evolving a new dimension of patrimonialism as 
a form of socio-political organisation, beyond modern patrimonialism. 
On the one hand, the dynamics of patrimonialism did not bring about the 
construction of economic, political and ethical ties of patrimonial distributive 
interdependence between `ruling elites' and `masses'. Instead, it brought about 
the dilution of those ties, though the fragmented nature of the type of dominant 
socio-cultural references to identity remained the same. On the other hand, there 
was a gradual increase in the influence of the working logic of patrimonialism 
which went on to develop in direct proportion to the atrophy of the structural 
expressions of a modem polity. 
The central question is therefore to discover the reasons underlying such 
different patrimonial dynamics. To be more specific, this central question can 
be broken down into two parts. Firstly, why did the same patrimonial 
organisational principles as analysed by the tenants of modem patrimonialism 
(vertical, preferential and sectarian solidarity ties according to dominant micro- 
identity criteria), generate in Angola a different kind of patrimonial dynamics 
characterised by the dilution of distributive interdependence ties between rulers 
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and ruled? Secondly, why did the dilution of those ties, which were supposed to 
be the basis of the patrimonial system, lead not to its destruction but to an 
extreme form of its development instead? 
The answer to these questions, which forms the core of this thesis, is that 
in the case of Angola such different patrimonial dynamics can be explained by 
three main factors. 
1) Economic and political 'insularisation' 
This first phenomenon basically consists in the growing insularity and 
autonomy of the economic and political power of the ruling elites and, 
conversely, the extreme dependence and loss of economic and political power 
of the masses. It comprises two elements: 
a) On the one hand there was a progressive monopolisation of the main 
sources of income by the `ruling elites', which severely restricted access to 
them; this enabled them to achieve almost total economic independence in 
relation to the productive effort of the population. 
In the case of Angola, the main sources of revenue progressively reduced 
to income from exportation of internationally valuable raw materials (such as 
oil, whose exploitation was usually entrusted to foreign companies, paying tax 
in dollars to the State - `rent', accounting for almost 80% of State revenues in 
the early eighties) and to the economic benefits derived from international 
political and diplomatic alignments with the USSR (access to loans, credit, 
arms and so on). The `external' nature of this kind of income facilitated its 
autonomous and insular management (cash accounts restricted to the top of the 
apparatus, mostly kept in foreign banks). The same seems to be also applicable 
to other `enclave economies' such as Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone. ' 29 
129 In the case of Liberia, the country was highly dependent on the exploitation of wood and diamonds, 
being a political and diplomatic client of the USA. In Sierra Leone, there was high-dependency on 
diamonds, gold and other minerals, being a political and diplomatic client of various `patrons'. Former 
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For the ruling elites, such insularity gave them economic independence 
and allowed them to ignore practices of `work exploitation' or surplus 
extraction from the productive effort of the general population (i. e., mise au 
travail practices130) This contributed to the ever-increasing generalisation of a 
rentiere mentality and predatory practices, which contributed to the drastic drop 
in internal production and productivity. 
For the masses, this meant in the medium term, an extreme economic 
fragility due to two main reasons. Firstly, predatory practices are anti- 
productive in the `modern' sense and there is increasing restriction in terms of 
quantity and access to resources for those who are not at the top of the system. 
Secondly, the informal economic sector (which starts to develop as an 
alternative to the formal sector, as we will see) does not provide sufficient 
socio-economic support such as welfare policies, thereby aggravating the 
economic fragility of the population. Thus, the economic negotiation power 
('bargain') of the masses fell drastically, as their economic importance 
decreased within the patrimonial system. 
b) On the other hand, the phenomenon also included the process of 
closing off the formal political system. 
Given the personalisation and concentration of political power, the 
extreme centralisation of political administration and the increasing elitism of 
patrimonialism; the political institutional system became insulated from any 
effective influence on the part of the population, whose political participation 
was limited to personal and informal mechanisms. However, such informal 
mechanisms became practically ineffective because the population lacked any 
Zaire was economically dependent on copper, diamonds, cobalt and uranium, among others, and the 
traditional `client' of the USA, Belgium, and even France in Mobutu's heyday. Nigeria was dependent 
on oil, being the main producer in sub-Saharan Africa and the political and diplomatic `client' of 
several Western countries during the Cold War. According to Reno these countries, `can reap 
alternative resources that are outside the reach of the general population. In Nigeria, oil helps the 
regime to create an elite accommodation. A near-total popular exit from the formal economy in Congo 
has not seriously disturbed the rival elite groups' grip on power and on major resources of foreign 
exchange. '; in Reno, William, Warlord Politics ... op. cit. p. 
34. 
10 On the so-called mise au travail practices see Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. 
p. 110; also Bayart, Jean-Francois, L'Etat au Cameroun ... op. cit. 
introduction and Chapter 1. 
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economic and political importance within the patrimonial system. Economically 
they were not a source of income, politically they had no votes to exchange for 
benefits. 
2) The reinforcing and cumulative dynamics of patrimonialism in Angola. 
Given the progressive loss of negotiating power of the masses at a political and 
economic level, given the general economic crisis and the growing retention of 
resources at source by the ruling elites, the ties of distributive interdependence 
became sharply diluted. This led to a process of cumulative reinforcement of 
the working logic of patrimonialism at the economic, political and ethical 
levels. 
- At an economic level, the growing neglect of distributive obligations 
promoted a more intense recourse to the vertical, preferential, sectarian and 
predatory solutions. This phenomenon is easily understandable because, in 
cases where the distributed resources diminish and patrimonial networks 
contract, the predatory devices and the vertical, preferential and sectarian ties of 
each individual gain in importance when seeking privileged access to scarce 
resources (through connections, protectors or benefactors). Therefore, a context 
of growing scarcity of resources favours the reinforcement of the patrimonial 
working logic. 131 
- At a political level, contrary to what might be expected, the ruling elites' 
neglect of their distributive obligations did not awaken any form of class 
consciousness within the population. On the contrary, what divided them 
became accentuated and what objectively united them was ignored. This made 
it impossible for them politically to mobilise and organise in-groups that could 
"' Although in a different context, situations of intensifying patrimonial systems with growing scarcity 
of resources had already been noticed in a study on patrimonialism in Italy (Naples and Palermo); see 
Chubb, Judith, Patronage, Power and Poverty in Southern Italy (Cambridge, CUP, 1982). 
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identify themselves horizontally according to socio-economic criteria such as 
classes. 
This phenomenon can also be easily understood because, in a society 
dominated by the informalisation and personalisation of all social relationships 
(where nothing is solved by institutional means without a personal influential 
contact) there emerges a feeling of collective helplessness. In the face of 
growing living difficulties such feeling brings about an increasing resort to the 
same old vertical, preferential, sectarian and micro-identity channels and to the 
same old political practices of informalisation, personalisation and infra- 
institutionalisation. This inhibits the appearance of an alternative logic that 
would be universal (where concept of citizenship dominates) and horizontal 
(where groups are organised along socio-economic criteria forming social 
classes). Thus, a context of growing social fragmentation favours the 
reinforcement of the patrimonial working logic. 
The growing inability to feel, think and act in durable universalistic and 
horizontal terms, is what impedes the emergence of alternative working logic 
for political, social and economic action. It is essentially for these reasons that 
when I refer here to such a primary social categorisation as `ruling elites' and 
`ruled masses', I am not referring to notions of class. 
- At an ethical level, the non-fulfilment of extensive distributive 
obligations, stimulated the dilution of norms that were supposed to regulate the 
patrimonial system; thus bringing about `free for all' pragmatic and flexible 
morals. This directly contributed to the intensifying of the working logic of 
patrimonialism because it reinforced social fragmentation and economic 
scarcity. 
a) On the one hand, by legitimising a general assault on the available 
resources using all possible means (informal, illegal or criminal), in a 
framework of free-for-all, the system created, mainly for the urban population, 
the illusion of actually having opportunities (my schemes, my protectors, my 
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connections) in spite of the objective drop in distribution. This sustained and 
reinforced the individual belief, or illusion, in the effectiveness of vertical, 
preferential relationships and sectarian alignments. From a micro, individual, 
perspective, the freedom to seek solutions to problems through the `right' 
connections and `by all possible means' creates the impression that 'the 
opportunity is around the corner' and `everything is possible', that `it's all a 
matter of playing by the (informal) rules and a bit of luck' 132. This spreads a 
culture of expedience, of the schemer, which ultimately means nothing more 
than the massive, uncontrolled increment of short-term individualised solutions, 
leading to more sectarianism and preferentialism according to micro-identity 
criteria. As a result, the social tissue becomes more fragmented, the population 
more divided, vulnerable, fragile and marginalised from the processes of 
political decision and actual power. Also, in the medium and long-term, the 
macro-social, or public, dimension is almost completely destroyed. The same 
type of dynamic seems to have occurred in the former Zaire: 
Indeed, to alleviate the poverty which affected all levels of society 
it was necessary for everybody to find a solution by exploiting their 
profession in their workplace and thereby inadvertently bringing 
about the ruin of the nation [searching] for an improvement in the 
harsh conditions of life imposed on them by the ruling minority. 
'33 
Thus, the dilution of ethical distributive principles between rulers and ruled 
reinforces the primacy of the particularistic and sectarian over the 
universalistic, the personal and informal over the institutional, the vertical over 
horizontal solidarities, the micro-communities over the macro-community of 
the `nation-State', leading to extreme social fragmentation and weakening of 
collective consciousness. 
132 Expressions commonly heard in the Angolan urban milieu among those who survive or live through 
expedience and schemes beyond the primary rungs of patrimonial distributive hierarchy, using all 
possible contacts and means of earning money. 
133 Anonymous, La Vie Bans les forces aeriennes Zatroises (n. p.: n. p., n. d. ) cited in Bayart, Jean- 
Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. pp. 
235-237. This is an excellent description, simply told by 
someone on the inside, of predation on the resources and public services in the vital area of the Zairian 
Air Forces which was demolished to the point of there being no operational planes left whatsoever, 
apart from Mobutu's own C-130. 
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b) On the other hand, in objective economic terms, the freedom afforded 
by vertical, preferential, personal and sectarian solutions by all available means 
is an obvious illusion; indeed, for the overwhelming majority of the population, 
the activities allowed through this kind of freedom were merely a way of 
miserable survival. Both individually and collectively, the material benefits to 
which people had access decreased dramatically, as did living standards right 
after independence. As an example, the thousands of small traders 
(informal/illegal) in Luanda and in provincial main towns, whom the IMF and 
the World Bank wanted to see as the genesis of an entrepreneurial class, are in 
reality no more than a mass of people living in extreme misery by any 
standards, fighting desperately for physical survival and able only to provide, in 
most cases, a single daily meal for their families, highly unlikely to survive any 
form of epidemic for lack of means of access to the required treatments. 134 
Their ability to save money is almost nil and there is minimal reinvestment, 
barely enough to ensure a residual stock for resale. In cases of rapid inflation, 
when prices can go up daily, the time between the sale of existent stock and the 
arrival of new supplies can be vital: the income from the sale, even at a profit, 
can be insufficient to buy the same replacement supplies 135 . 
In this way, by legitimising and endorsing generalised predation of all 
available resources by all possible means, the new ethics and normative 
framework did not solve the problems of scarcity and growing economic 
fragility of the overwhelming majority of the population; indeed, it merely 
made them worse. 
134 From previous research on `business in Luanda' (August-September 1994), non-published. Even 
with informal, or illegal, activities that shift thousands of dollars daily such as diamond trafficking in 
the Lundas, the living conditions of the traffickers are much worse than in the muceques (shanty towns) 
of Luanda. The veritable fortunes that pass through their hands daily are diluted daily throughout the 
Lunda societies, a kind of `Far West' situation; the cost of products and basic services is astronomically 
high, there is much ill-health, health services are almost non-existent, there are all sorts of 
intermediaries, gangs, prostitution, attacks by UNITA or private armies on business concessions, and so 
on and so forth. See for instance, the newspaper article `No mundo de "cäo come cäo" ('in the World of 
"dog eat dog"), in Publico (14th December 1998). 
US From previous research on `business in Luanda' (August-September 1994), non-published. 
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3) The war as a powerful support of the cumulative and reinforcing 
patrimonial dynamics 
In a system where ties of preferential solidarity based on micro identity criteria 
prevailed, where the State was the arena for rival groups vying for patrimonial 
appropriation of the available resources, the existence of a civil war reinforced 
all the previously expounded dynamics through economic scarcity and social 
fragmentation. 
It promoted, justified and legitimised situations of economic scarcity and 
the neglect of distribution, specially regarding the State's public socio- 
economic obligations (such as social services, health, education). It intensified 
social fragmentation through micro-identity political alignment with the two 
contenders. 
As will be shown, the case of Angola is paradigmatic of the way in 
which war can reinforce the patrimonial dynamics under discussion. It might be 
also the case of the wars raging in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. 
In sum, we are presented with a cumulative and reinforcing patrimonial 
dynamics according to which the economic and political insularity and 
autonomy of the ruling elites allowed a sharp dereliction of distributive 
interdependence relationships between rulers and ruled. This in turn generated 
an extreme intensification of the working logic of patrimonialism within a 
framework of grave economic scarcity and social fragmentation. This dynamic 
was fuelled in turn by the civil war. The more the distributive relationships 
diluted, the more the working logic of patrimonialism developed and the more 
the scarcity and social fragmentation increased thus further diluting the 
interdependence distributive ties. 
This cumulative and self-reinforcing process led to a new dimension of 
patrimonialism. It differs from `modem patrimonialism' not only in quantitative 
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terms (extreme development of patrimonial characteristics) but also in 
qualitative terms (near-total breakdown of political, economic or ethical 
interdependence ties between rulers and ruled), representing an unaccountable 
form of patrimonialism - post-modem patrimonialism. 
2.3.1 Post-Modern Patrimonialism 
Such new dimension of patrimonialism will be here designated as post-modem 
patrimonialism due to two main reasons: 
Firstly, because there is a need to distinguish this reality from `modem 
patrimonialism' (post, simply meaning `coming after'); 
Secondly, because of the similarity that exists between the working logic 
of socio-political organisation in countries such as Angola and post-modem 
currents of thought. 
Although there is no actual post-modern theory or `school', rather a 
collection of remarks that have been classified as such, it is still possible to 
provide a very general definition of the post-modern intellectual movement 
mostly according to its aim to critically destroy the entire modem 
epistemological and scientific framework (that has been built up since the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries from Descartes through the 18th century to 
Comte's social theory and even Marx) together with several organisational 
structures implied in the modem `nation-State' model. 
In these terms, post-modern currents of thought support the abandoning of 
modernist assumptions of a rational unified subject in favour of a social subject 
who is culturally plural and fragmented in identity; the relativism of truth and 
knowledge according to context along with the plurality of interpretations and 
plurality of meanings; the break from macro-interpretations of society (so- 
called grand narratives) and from unifying and simplifying macro-structural 
entities such as the modem `nation-State' and its legal-bureaucratic rationality; 
the move away from any macro-intelligible structures and projects such as the 
modern notions of development and progress, which are taken to be relative 
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and subjective (conditioned by specific cultural environments), always 
including forms of domination and restriction. 136 
In these terms, the similarities between the working logic of 
patrimonialism in countries such as Angola (as has been expounded throughout 
the whole of chapter 2) and post-modern currents of thought become clear. 
They are as follows. 
1. Identity is based on affective relationships. This operates to the detriment of 
more encompassing notions of nationhood. This is in accordance with the 
post-modern idea of the individual as culturally plural and fragmented in 
identity. 
2. There is a set of economic relationships, which are fragmented, vertical and 
selective. This resonates with the post-modem idea of dissociation with 
large structure entities such as the modern nation-State with its implicit idea 
of national socio-economic solidarity. 
3. There is a progressive decline in political representation and accountability. 
This is related to the post-modern idea which rejects notions of political 
representation, which (in a view of Lyotard and Foucault) are repressive 137. 
4. The weakness and flexibility of ethical and normative principles associated 
with patrimonialism are close to the post-modern idea of relativism 
according to context, which involves a plurality of interpretations and 
meanings. 
5. The State, which has emerged in countries such as Angola, does not fulfil 
the normally accepted criteria applied to the `Westphalian' State, which is 
regarded as the fundamental unit of the international political system. 
136 For a comprehensive approach to post-modernism, see Best, Steven and Kellner, Douglas, Post- 
Modern Theory (London: Macmillan Press, 1991); Bauman, Zygmunt, Legislators and Interpreters: on 
Modernity, Post-modernity and Intellectuals (London: CUP, 1987); Foucault, Michel, Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977); Griffin, David Ray, The Re- 
Enchantment of Science: Post-modern Proposals (Albany: State University of New York, 1988); 
Lyotard, Jean-Francois, The Post-modern Condition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1984); Prigogine, Ilya and Stengers, Isabele, Order out of Chaos: Man 's New Dialogue with Nature, 
(New York: Bantam, 1984); also Laclau, Ernesto & Mouffe, Chantal, Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy: Toward a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso Books, 1985). 
137 See Lyotard, Jean-Francois, The Post-modern ... op. cit.; 
Foucault, Michel, Language ... op. cit.; 
see also Laclau, Ernesto & Mouffe, Chantal, Hegemony... op. cit. 
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Thus, the use of post-modem current of thought might be illustratively useful to 
support my designation of this new dimension of patrimonialism. Obviously, it 
is not my intention to develop here the discussion of the philosophical, 
theoretical or analytical questions that might arise from such use of post- 




ANGOLA, A CASE OF POST-MODERN PATRIMONIALISM 
Analytical Structure and Methodology 
This study will test the proposed framework of post-modern patrimonialism 
against the case of Angola. As stated in the introduction, the complementary 
references made to other countries as possible cases similar to the Angolan 
such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Nigeria 
may open up future lines of research and possible comparative studies, but it is 
beyond the scope of this work to examine them in more systematic comparative 
terms. 
It is here argued that after independence, the Angolan political system 
more or less followed a modern patrimonial working logic during the 
presidency of Agostinho Neto, but exhausted that logic by the end of his 
presidency in 1979, evolving towards a post-modem patrimonialism essentially 
throughout the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos' presidency until 1987. 
The case study will be divided into three main sections: SECTION A is 
concerned with socio-cultural identity cleavages in the pre-independence 
period, their origins and political implications during the anti-colonial struggle 
and the first civil war. The purpose is to provide an understanding of the origins 
of preferential solidarity ties in the post-independence period. 
Section A will inevitably concentrate its attention on the MPLA for two 
sorts of reasons: 
Firstly, because this section aims to make clear the historical basis for 
the development of preferential solidarity ties in the new independent State 
(especially between rulers and ruled). Thus, insofar as the MPLA was the 
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movement of liberation that has been in power since independence, it is logical 
to give more attention to its historical and sociological background. Secondly, 
because historical research on the sociological basis, formation and 
development of the other two movements is still in its early stages. If that 
research is usually said to be very insufficient in the case of the MPLA (the 
most studied of the three) we can well imagine the work that has still to be done 
in the case of the other movements. As Messiant said in 1997, in a seminar on 
the history of Angola, 
We are just at the beginning of that work - not only in relation to 
the MPLA, but specially in relation to the FNLA and UNITA, not to 
mention the initiatives and organisations that did not `survive. 
138 
Thus, the issue in this section is not to provide an analysis of the genesis of the 
processes of social identity in Angola (which would require a separate study) 
nor to provide a history of `Angolan nationalism' (which in any case would not 
be feasible here139) or even less of the 1975-1976 civil war; but basically to 
discuss the main literature and argumentation on pre-independence identity 
cleavages, their origins (with special attention to the MPLA's sociological 
basis) and their political consequences during the anti-colonial struggle (1961- 
1974) and the first civil war. This discussion will allow me to define my 
standing point in respect of it. From there I move on to the analysis of the post- 
independence period and especially to the relationships between rulers and 
ruled within the new State (the main focus of this work). 
Closely following the theoretical discussion presented in the first two 
chapters of this work, SECTIONS B and C, aim to understand the existing 
working logic of the post-independence socio-political system and the 
effectively emerging State. These sections analyse the dynamics through which 
138 In Messiant, Christine, `Entre nos ate o passado e imprevisivel. A experiencia de uma investigacäo 
sobre o nacionalismo Angolano e, em particular, o MPLA: fontes, critica, necessidades actuais da 
investigacäo', in Construindo o Passado Angolano: as fontes ea sua interpretacdo, Actas do II 
Seminärio Internacional sobre Histöria de Angola, realizado em Luanda de 4a9 de Agosto de 1997, 
(Lisboa: CNCDP, 1997), p. 859. Also stressing a lot of work that still needs to be done is Bittencourt, 
Marcelo, `A Histöria contemporänea... op. cit. p. 185. 
139 According to Messiant this is a work to be done by several researchers given the magnitude of the 
job; in Messiant, Christine, `Entre nos ... op. cit. p. 858, footnote 88, 
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the interdependent relationships (political, economic, ethical) between rulers 
and ruled were formed and how they evolved through two subsequent periods 
of time and two presidencies: presidency of Agostinho Neto (1975-1979) and 
the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos presidency (1979-1985/87). 
In the end, the purpose of the analysis and comparison of these periods is 
to demonstrate the shift from a modern patrimonial working logic (political and 
normative coherence in the operation of a patrimonial system ensuring social 
integration through distribution -- linking rulers and ruled) to a post-modern 
patrimonial working logic (extreme development of patrimonial organisational 
principles and expressions, breaking the interdependence ties between rulers 
and ruled). The only way to show such `patrimonial' differences is to apply 
exactly the same analytical structure and analytical indicators to those two 
subsequent periods of time and subsequent administrations in order to 
`measure' intensity and quality variations of patrimonial working logic between 
them. Thus, each of these sections follows a similar outline, containing five 
chapters each: the 1st dedicated to the context of socio-political events of each 
administration, relevant to the understanding of the ensuing analysis; the 2nd, 
3rd and 4th concerned with the political, economic and ethical framework of 
interdependence relationships respectively; the 5th, related with the effectively 
emerging State. Other than the first chapter of each section, the remaining four 
follow a rigid analytical structure based on pre-defined indicators constructed 
to be as generalised and objective as possible 
- The analysis of Angola's post-independence political framework (second 
chapter of each section) attempts on the whole to describe and analyse the 
relationships between rulers and ruled, and is structured around three main 
indicators: 1) the Party, due to the importance of its role in most post- 
independence African patrimonial systems; 2) the exercise of executive and 
legislative power, because it allows one to gauge the internal power- 
relationships and their location within the political and administrative system 
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- which is critical when it comes to access to and use of resources in a 
patrimonial system; 3) judicial power, as it is essential to measure the level of 
its dependence in relation to the executive and legislative powers in order to 
obtain a picture of its role in the regulation of socio-political relationships, and 
to assess the level of separation of powers that exist within the political system. 
- The analysis of economic relationships (3rd chapter of each section) 
attempts to describe and analyse the relations of production, distribution and 
consumption, being structured around five main indicators: 1) the working of 
the public administration, since it is important within post-independence 
patrimonial systems as one of the main channels of access to the distribution of 
the State's resources; 2) agricultural and industrial production, in order to gauge 
the degree of impact of so-called predatory practices and rentiere mentality on 
internal production, characteristic of patrimonial economic relationships in the 
post-independence era; 3) the informal sector, because of the importance it 
assumes in the economic life of the population in most independent African 
countries, diverting and absorbing goods produced on the official market; 4) the 
economic and political impact of the war, in order to estimate the kind of 
influence it had on the patrimonial working logic, be it structural or disruptive; 
5) social policies, inasmuch as they are objective indicators for gauging 
`collective' or `public' consciousness. 
- The analysis of ethical and normative principles (4th chapter of each 
section) looks at the organisational ethos of the emerging political and 
economic framework of relationships. To this effect, the analysis will be 
structured around two main indicators: 1), the principles that guide the 
economic and political management of power used by the leader at the top of 
the system, which is important when measuring the criteria that influence the 
exercise of power; 2), the normative principles and criteria underlying and 
guiding the economic and social practices of the greater part of the population. 
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- Finally, based on all the information provided by the preceding indicators 
and chapters, it will be possible to dedicate the last chapter of each section to a 
conclusion on the characterisation of the effectively existing State in terms of 
assessing its modern or post-modern patrimonial working logic. 
Two last points must be made: one, on the fact that this thesis does not 
analyse UNITA; two, on the fact that this thesis stresses the internal dimension 
rather than the external one (such as the Cold War, the Cuban and Soviet 
presence). I discuss these two issues in turn. 
(1) Firstly, as previously explained, the discussion about modem or post- 
modem patrimonial working logic concerns the relationship between rulers and 
ruled within the State and, therefore, UNITA can not be included since it is a 
guerrilla movement, operating through `hit and run' operations, without a fixed 
territory over which it can be said to have exerted an administration with a 
minimally stable relationship with a settled population through established 
institutions and with an internationally recognised government. As stressed by 
Messiant 
UNITA eile n'a jamais ete un autre "Etat", mais seulement un 
ordre, un pouvoir, arme n'ayant ni les memes fonctionnements 
internes ni les memes "relations internationales" qu'un Etat140 
Secondly, due to its nature as a guerrilla movement, UNITA is a very 
insufficiently studied movement, where research is extremely difficult or 
biased. As also stressed by Messiant, 
On peut aussi noter qu'il n'y a pas eu jusqu'ici d'analyses 
independantes de l'Unita (meme par des "chercheurs 
sympathisants") non seulement me semble-t-il du fait qu'une teile 
recherche independante est toujours plus difficile dans une guerrilla 
que dans un Etat oü des marges de liberte existent obligatoirement, 
mais aussi en raison du genre particulier de celle de l'Unita, et 
ta 
notamment de son caractere totalitaire et despotiquet 
140 In Messiant, Christine, `A propos des..., op. cit. p. 72, footnote 21. 
141 Ibid. p. 72, footnote 21. 
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(2) As for the need to- privilege the internal explanatory variables over the 
external ones, it has to do with the analytical perspective at the centre of this 
thesis. As previously discussed, the post-independence political systems had to 
invent their own modus operandi combining two distinctive working logics - 
one, endogenous, patrimonial and `traditional' in origin; the other, exogenous, 
inherited from the colonisers and then altered by socialist or capitalist 
programmes, but following the external rationality of a Eastern or Western 
based `modern State'. As a rule, the dilemma concerning these two objectively 
contradictory logics was overcome through a more or less successful 
subordination of the modern political structure (essentially exogenous) to a 
patrimonial working logic (essentially endogenous). 
Therefore, this thesis and its analytical perspective stresses the internal 
or mainly endogenous factors and not the commonly cited external influences, 
such as the Cold War, the Cuban and Soviet presence, South Africa, etc. These 
will be mentioned as relevant but they are not taken to be explanatory variables. 
No credible causal relationship can be established between the workings 
of a modem patrimonial logic and the presence of foreign troops, military 
advisors or cooperantes142. On the contrary, the key question is the manner in 
which the patrimonial logic was able to subordinate the formal political model 
(Socialist-Marxist) despite the presence of all the foreign experts and advisers, 
ostensibly helping to develop such a model. In other words, what needs to be 
explained is why it was possible for post-modem patrimonialism to develop 
despite the supposed foreign influences. 
142 For a reference on the presence of these foreigners in Angola see Hodges, Tony Angola to the 
1990's, the potential for recovery (London: EIU, 1987), special report n°1079, pp. 17-18 
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CASE STUDY, SECTION -A: THE MAIN SOCIO-CULTURAL 
IDENTIFICATION CLEAVAGES, ORIGINS AND POLITICAL 
SIGNIFICANCE BEFORE THE INDEPENDENCE 
This section discusses the pre-independence identity cleavages, their origins (with 
special attention to the MPLA's sociological basis) and their political implications 
during the anti-colonial struggle and the first civil war. Within my analytical 
perspective the main purpose of this part of the thesis is to provide the context 
within which it becomes possible to understand preferential solidarity ties in 
post-independence (dealt in sections B and Q. Accordingly, this section will be 
divided into two chapters. The first reviews the main arguments on the subject 
(chapter 3). The second develops an assessment of that literature, stressing the issues 
that might be politically relevant to the analysis of the post-independence 
patrimonial political system (chapter 4). 
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3- The Analysis of the Main Literature on Socio-Cultural Identification 
Cleavages and Its Political Significance 
There are two major lines of interpretation according to which the authors can 
be divided143 The fact that some of these authors wrote in different periods of 
time helps to explain (at least in part) some of the differences that can be found 
in their attempt to make sense of the changing nature of the nationalist 
movements over time. 
The first, and also the earliest analysis, claims that ethnic cleavages were 
paramount in Angola and found direct expression in the three nationalist 
movements that emerged in the 1950s and 1960's - thus impinging on the 
kind of conflict that arose between them in 1975-1976, namely the civil war. In 
general terms, these authors stand for an ethnic explanation, identifying the 
sociological support of the three movements within the three major ethno- 
linguistic groups as defined during colonialism, approximately encompassing 
75% of the Angolan population - the Ovimbundu from the central plateaux, 
gathered around UNITA and comprising around 36% of the population; the 
M'Bundu from the Luanda-Catete-Malange corridor, gathered around the 
MPLA and comprising around 27%; the Bakongo from the North, in the 
provinces of Zaire, Uige and Cabinda, gathered around the UPA/FNLA and 
comprising around 12%. These percentages are usually based on 1960 
population census of indigenous population of Angola, the last one comprising 
ethnic identities as defined by the colonial authorities (see figure 3.1). 
143 The intention here is not to be exhaustive and all encompassing on the presentation of that literature 
but rather to expound on the development of major lines of argumentation over that theme in order to 
define our standing point within it (cf. infra chapter 4). 
Figure 3.1: Indigenous Population of Angola - 1960 Census (Populagdo 
AutOctone de Angola, Recenseamento de 1960) 
Ethnolinguistic Group Census Y. 
Bakongo 479 818 12,0 
M'Bundu 1 083 321 27,2 
Lunda-Tchokwe 357 693 9,0 
Ovimbumdu 1 443 742 36,2 
BANTU N'Ganguela 328 277 8,0 
Nhaneca-Humbe 1 91 861 5,0 
Herero 25 184 0,6 
Ambb 62 141 1,6 
Xindonga 4 505 0,1 
NON-BANTU Koisan 7 049 0,2 
PRE-B V ätua 5 895 0,1 
TOTAL 13 989 486 ' 110O, O 
TOTAL POPULATION (Populacäo Total da Provincia) -4 830 449 PERCENTAGE OF INDIGENOUS POPULATION - 86.6 
After Serrano, Carlos Moreira Henriques, Angola: nasce uma napc7o; um estudo sobre a 
construpäo da Identidade Nacional (Sao Paulo: Universidade de Sao Paulo, 1988), PhD Thesis, 
p. 123. 
93 
Authors such as- John Marcum, Rene Pelissier, Douglas Wheeler and 
Lawrence Henderson can be included in this category 144 Their interpretation, 
because it was the `first' and had significant influence, can be considered 
`classical' and it is still today recognised as crucial in tracing the origins of each 
movement145 
The second line of analysis represents a second wave of academic 
interpretation of Angolan reality. It rejects the emphasis on the ethnic factor, 
favouring instead a more encompassing approach including class analysis and 
several other factors such as: specificity due to colonialism; insertion into the 
world-system; the existence of dependency structures between urban centres 
and peripheral rural societies; international influences like the `cold war' and 
apartheid; ideological disputes. 
This second line of analysis can be divided into two: 
a), first there is a sub-group, clearly influenced by the ideological and 
political issues of that time, very much marked by the stigma of `redfeet', a 
term which was made known by Chabal146 and used by Tom Young to expose 
some deficiencies in the literature on Angola and Mozambique produced for 
many years before and after independence. 147 Authors such as Basil Davidson, 
144 See Pelissier, Rene, La Colonie du Minotaure (Paris: Editions Pelissier, 1978); Marcum, John, The 
Angolan Revolution, Volume I, The anatomy of an explosion (1950-1962) (Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press, 
1969); Marcum, John, The Angolan Revolution, Volume 11, Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare 
(1962-1976) (Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press, 1978); Wheeler, D. and Pelissier, Rene, Angola (London: 
Pall Mall Press, 1970); Henderson, Lawrence, Angola, Five Centuries of Conflict (London: Cornell 
University Press, 1979). More recent `echoes' of this type of approach can be found in Mohanty, 
Susama, Political Development and Ethnic Identity in Africa, a study of Angola since 1960 (London: 
Sangara Books, 1992). 
145 As referred, for instance, by Guimaräes, Fernando Andresen, The origins of the Angolan civil war: 
foreign intervention and domestic political conflict, (London: MacMillan Press, 1998), p. 33. 
'46 Patrick Chabal reports this term being used by peasants in Guinea-Bissau for sympathisers with 
`revolution'; see, Chabal, Patrick, `People's War, State Formation and Revolution in Africa: a 
comparative analysis of Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Angola', in Journal of Commonwealth and 
Comparative Politics, 21 (1983) pp. 104-125. 
147 `It has recently been pointed out how little is known about many aspects of post-independence 
Angola and Mozambique [... ] An additional complication is that for a long time after independence 
much of the literature on Angola and Mozambique was produced by `redfeet'. This literature, like that 
produced by previous generations of redfeet though often useful, has to be assessed cautiously and 
critically', in Young, Tom, `The politics of development in Angola and Mozambique', in African 
Affairs, 87 (1989), p. 165. 
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Fola Soremekun, Claude Gabriel, Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, and 
Keith Somerville can be included in this category. 
' Basil Davidson is a staunch supporter of the truly revolutionary impact 
of the `people's wars' as exposed in the legitimating speeches of leaders such as 
Amilcar Cabral and Agostinho Neto; these wars would lead to `real' revolution 
(after the failures of the first wave of independence in African countries), 
thereby destroying the ethnic identification imposed by colonialism on the 
population. 
For this kind of war [liberation war or people's war] the working 
masses and in particular, the peasants, who are usually illiterate and 
have never moved beyond the boundaries of their village or region, 
lose in their contact with other groups the complexes which 
constrained them in relation to other ethnic or social groups. They 
rise above the `tribalism' that is pressed on them by colonial rule. 
The argument here is not about utopia: the argument is about the 
possible means of building a new society. 
148 
Claude Gabriel is a Trotskyite, a self-nominated anti-imperialist militant; 
he sees the Angolan conflict as a class struggle between the masses and 
nationalist leadership. After independence, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie in 
power achieved advantage in that struggle against the masses, especially after 
the 1977 attempted coup, benefiting from the demobilisation of the proletariat 
and the continued integration of Angola in the world-system. 
Tout cela nous interpelle en tant que militants anti-imperialistes 
[... ] Nous ne devons epargner aucun effort pour montrer la 
contradiction entre la volonte d'emancipation des masses et 
1'impasse programmatique des directions petites-bourgeoises [... ] 
L'independance du mouvement de masses, la bataille pour les droits 
democratiques les plus larges sont partie integrante, selon nous, de 
la lutte d'emancipation. Et cette bataille se mene contre les 
directions nationalistes [... ] C'est un premier essai qui aborde, ä 
travers le sujet particulier qu'est l'Angola, la question des luttes de 
classes en Afrique noire. 
149 
148 In Davidson, Basil, In the Eye of the Storm, Angola's People (London: Longman, 1972), pp. 316- 
317. 
149 In Gabriel, Claude, Angola: le tournant africain? (Paris: Editions La Breche, 1978), pp. 11-12. 
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Fola Soremekun-admits that 1. JNITA benefited from the sympathies of 
the Ovimbundu people, in the same way as the FNLA benefited from the 
sympathies of the Bakongo and the MPLA from the Mbundu, but only in the 
earlier years. For him, the subsequent conflict between the three parties was 
based on political and ideological disputes, added to which were the pitiful 
nature of Portuguese colonisation and the ineptitude of the Portuguese 
government during decolonisation. 
The party [UNITA] had the sympathy of the Ovimbundo people the 
same way the FNLA had the Bakongo and the MPLA the 
KiMbundu-speaking peoples in the earlier years. 
150 
The struggle for power [between movements] was inevitable. This 
was so because it was basically a struggle of opposing political 
philosophies. It was a struggle between what could be called the 
forces of "genuine independence" for Angola [the MPLA] against 
those of "neo-colonialism". In this respect therefore, it was no 
surprise that the contest was bloody and brutal among Angolan 
brothers, like a war of religion. [... ] The long and dismal history of 
Portugal in Angola and the equal ineptitude of the Portuguese 
government during the decolonisation process would seem to have 
presaged that inevitability. 
151 
Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol argue that, after 1974, the conflict 
was fired not by popular support (which they claim only the MPLA had before 
1974), but by the counter-revolution created by the forces of imperialism, 
sustaining that ethnicity was a phenomenon deliberately fostered by colonial 
authorities. 
So what kept three rival Angolan "liberation movements" alive for 
the conflict that followed the Armed Forces' movement coup in 
1974 was not mass popular support. Before 1974 this had been 
reserved for the MPLA alone. It was counter-revolution that 
provided for FNLA and UNITA and that physically kept them 
going. And the counter-revolution was being waged by the United 
States, Portugal, Britain and France against the MPLA. 152 
All the major Western powers were deeply involved with FNLA 
and UNITA. [... ) Yet MPLA defeated the imperialist military 
intervention'53 
150 In Soremekun, Fola, Angola: the Road to Independence (Nigeria: University of He Press, 1983), 
p. 7. 
151 Ibid. p. 212. 
152 In Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, Angola in the Frontline (London: Zed Press, 1983), p-4- 
153 Ibid. p. 8. 
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Tribalism had been deliberately fostered by colonial authorities. '54 
Keith Somerville sees the ethnic divisions as being on par with other 
social divisions that usually characterise rural and urban dichotomy, created by 
colonisation; he argues that although ethnic identities had a profound impact on 
the construction of nationalist movements, the MPLA had made a real effort to 
overcome ethnic barriers and acquire a national dimension. It was the only one 
of the three movements that, during and after the anti-colonial struggle, pursued 
true national politics, rather than the ethnic and regional politics characteristic 
of the other two movements. 
The ethnic pattern within Angola was to have a profound effect on 
the make-up of the liberation movements [... ] Only the MPLA 
made any real attempt to transcend ethnic barriers and to appeal to 
the nation as a whole. [... ] The destruction of traditional African 
systems, the inhibition of African economic advancement and the 
denial of education to all but a tiny minority of Africans meant that 
at independence Angolan society was in a state of fragmentation 
and enforced backwardness. Apart from those nationalists 
organised within the other movements, there was little sense of 
nationhood [... ] The other main social divisions that were inherited 
by the new Angolan State were those associated with the urban- 
rural dichotomy. 155 
The remaining analysis is centred on the institutional and typological aspects of 
the post-independence State in Angola, and the legitimating discourses of the 
MPLA government; he believed in the MPLA's sincere commitment to the 
construction of Socialism and its ability to change society even against South 
African destabilisation 156. There remained the need to adapt Marxism-Leninism 
to the country's specific circumstances S7. ' 
s4 Ibid. p. 140. 
155 In Somerville, Keith, Angola: Politics, Economics and Society, (London: Frances Pinter, 1986), 
pr. 71-73. 
º6 `It is my view that the MPLA-PT is sincere in its commitment to Marxism-Leninism and that its 
policies have reflected this. The failure to make any headway in implementing socialist policies have 
been brought about by the policy of destabilisation pursued by the Botha regime in South Africa. ' Ibid. 
p. 13. 
157 `For Angola, what now remains is to ensure that the form of Marxism-Leninism it applies to its own 
situation accords rather than conflicts with circumstances. ' Ibid. p. 196. 
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b), second, there is a sub-group of academic researchers who eschew 
simple political/ideological or ethnic interpretations. This category includes 
authors such as Franz Heimer, Gervase Clarence-Smith, David Birmingham 
and Christine Messiant. 
' Franz Heimer sees the Angolan nationalist division and the conflict 
between the movements as a complex struggle between models of 
decolonisation - between capitalist and non-capitalist options. According to 
him, it was a struggle brought about by the kind of social formation created 
during colonialism with profound social identity cleavages that determined 
where the support for each of the movements would come from 158. The author 
tried to articulate class and ethnicity as explanatory variables. 
On the one hand, the kind of social formation that emerged during 
colonialism is explained by Heimer in terms of a structure of central capitalist 
societies and peripheral, or tributary, pre-capitalist societies, in the style of the 
classic perspective of dependency theories: metropolis and satellites; 
dominating bourgeoisie and dependent rural peripheral societies. Using a 
dependency perspective, Heimer explains that although peripheral societies 
appeared to be beyond the reach of the process of class formation, they were in 
fact affected by them when integrated into the dependency system; central 
societies would extract from them cheap commodities and labour on a regular 
basis, whilst gradually expanding at the expense of the peripheral societies by 
an absorption of land and population159; 
158 `Developing gradually out of an extremely complex situation, the conflict over the initial choice of a 
decolonization model for Angola was resolved through `conventional' warfare between two camps 
which, in grossly simplified terms, stood for a capitalist and a non-capitalist option respectively [... ] A 
consensual political solution among the three independence movements proved impossible. Deep, and 
partly cross-cutting social cleavages assigned clearly defined constituencies to each of them [... ] The 
rationale behind the behaviour of the MPLA was predominantly ideological, i. e., determined by the 
kind of decolonization model it stood for or against. ' In Heimer, F. W., The Decolonization Conflict in 
Angola: an essay in political sociology (Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes 
Internationales, 1979), pp. 81-82. This book is a shorter and English version of Heimer, Franz-Wilhem, 
Der Entkolonisierungskonflikt in Angola (Munique: Weltforum Verlag, 1979). See also in the same line 
of argument, Reimer, F. W. `Formation Sociale, Developpement Economique et Option Socialiste en 
Angola', in Geneve-Afrigue, XVIII (1980), pp. 31-43. 
159 Heimer, F. W., The Decolonization 
... op. cit. especially chapter 1. 
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On the other hand, - when taking into account his many years of field 
research in Angola, the author acknowledged the poor development of class 
consciousness amongst the workers and the tendency of the ethnic component 
of identity to remain strong, especially in peripheral societies - about 80% at 
that time - that were less affected by class formation. 
160 
Articulating ethnicity and class, Heimer argued that within the existing 
social formations, social identity was made of several components determining 
several cleavages, namely, ethnic, racial, cultural and class. Such components 
or dimensions of social identity were alternatives that each individual resorted 
to according to specific circumstances16' With the `electoral campaign' before 
independence and the conflicts between the three movements, a combination of 
those components started to delineate a pattern that had been foreseeable since 
the end of 1974, by which the possible outcome of elections to be held in 1975 
`was thus almost exclusively a function of the relative demographic weight of 
162 the different population segments'. 
The FNLA, counting mainly on the Bakongo and on part of the 
whites, would certainly not have obtained more than 20% of the 
votes, and probably substantially less. The MPLA, having the 
support of the Ambundu [Mbundu] and of the majority of the 
urbanised non-whites as well of the eastern tributary societies, 
might have got 35 to 40%. The sheer number of the Ovimbundu, 
plus part of the whites, of the southern/southern-eastern tributary 
societies, and of the Cabindans, would have guaranteed UNITA a 
relative majority of 40 to 45% 
163 
' Gervase Clarence-Smith was probably one of the firmest defenders of a 
class analysis, rejecting the relevance of the ethnic dimension of the conflict. 
He claims that underneath an appearance of ethnicity, the Angolan conflict 
concealed a class structure and a class struggle'TM, and that all the liberation 
160 In this sense see Heimer, F. W. Educagäo e sociedade nas areas rurais de Angola: resultados de um 
inquerito. Apresentacdo do inquerito, estatIsticas descritivas, I (Luanda: MissAo de Inqueritos 
Agricolas de Angola, 1972). 
161 See Heimer, F. W., The Decolonization 
... op. cit. pp. 
61-65. 
162 Ibid. p. 64. 
63 Ibid. p. 64. 
'64 The Angolan civil war has often been presented as a primitive tribal conflict, and the purpose of this 
review article is to reveal the class structure and class struggles which underlie apparently tribal or 
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movements in Angola were conspiracies of class and regional interests that 
varied over time and had limited ethnic appeal. 165 The impossibility of bringing 
about unity between the MPLA and the FNLA was due to the manoeuvres of 
neighbouring States, and UNITA was the outcome of the FNLA's project in the 
1960s for `a multi-ethnic alliance of Angola's peripheral rural societies. ' 166 
What happened in Angola contradicted such an argument and towards the end 
of the 1980s, this author did admit to the force of ethnic identities, but still 
maintained that contrary to the opinion of Heimer, ethnicity derived from class 
structures, and that the reinforcement of ethnic identities was accompanied by 
the equal reinforcement of national sentiment. 
C'est un des paradoxes de la situation africaine que les conflits de 
classe ont contribue ä creer des identites sociales de type ethnique. 
On dit souvent que le tribalisme est invente par les elites pour saisir 
le pouvoir ou pour le garder. Je pense que l'inverse est plus vrai: 
1'ethnicite est le dernier refuge du pauvre [... ]La formation de 
classes a provoque la creation de 1'ethnicite en Afrique [... ] Les 
regions les moins touchees par le processus de formation de classes 
sont les regions les moins ethniques. C'est exactement l'inverse de 
ce qu'enseignent les `marxistes' vulgaires [referring specifically to 
Heimer] 167 
On ne peut pas nier la force du sentiment ethnique en Angola, mais 
le fait meme que l'ethnie soit utilisee pour la conquete de la nation 
montre ä quel point identite ethnique et identite nationale existent 
dans un rapport dialectique. [... ] Qui plus est, le sentiment national 
s'est probablement renforce pendant ces sombres annees de guerre 
civile malgre les formes ethniques prises par les conflits. 168 
David Birmingham's analysis of the Angolan nationalist division 
between three movements along with their inability to form a single movement, 
also stresses social cleavages articulated around several social identity 
regional conflicts'. In Clarence-Smith, Gervase, `Class structure and class struggles in Angola in the 
1970s', in Journal of Southern African Studies, 7 (1980), p. 109. 
165 'It is argued here that the Angolan liberation movements were all coalitions of class and regional 
interests which tended to vary over time and which used ethnic ideological appeals only to a limited 
extent. '; Ibid. p. 119. 
166 'However, it is clear that UNITA was not simply an Ovimbundo replica of the FNLA, as it is often 
alleged. UNITA was rather the realization of the FNLA project of the early 1960s that is a multi-ethnic 
alliance of Angola's peripheral rural societies [... ] UNITA successfully created a wide populist multi- 
class and multi-ethnic alliance. '; Ibid. pp. 119-120. 
167 In Clarence-Smith, Gervase, `Le probleme ethnique en Angola', in Chretien, J. P. and Pruner, G., 
eds., Les Ethnies ont une histoire (Paris: Karmale-AECT, 1989), pp. 406-407. 168 Ibid. pp. 411-412. 
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dimensions (close to Heimer's argument) such as historical, cultural, ethno- 
linguistic, racial, religious, regional, sub-regional, urban/rural and socio- 
economic. Such cleavages resulted mainly from the nature of Portuguese 
colonisation, based on three poles of opportunity; differing from the 
conventional colonial States, where the political, social and economic life 
focussed on a single capital city. 
Luanda was but one of three poles of opportunity that had attracted 
colonial subjects throughout the course of the twentieth century. 
Luanda and its hinterland along the corridor to Malange was 
unified by a river, by a line-of-rail, by the KiMbundu language, by 
the Methodist network of schools and chapels, by a sad history of 
Iberian conquistadores and slavers, by the rise of the black Creole 
elite in the nineteenth century. But it was not closely linked to 
North Angola or South Angola. These regions had their own 
metropolitan centres in the Belgian colonial city of Leopoldville, 
now Kinshasa, and the British railhead of Lobito, commanding the 
Benguela railway to the Copperbelt. It was therefore no accident 
that Angola, instead of developing a single political bandwagon 
onto which everyone jumped when the liberation movement began 
to roll, initially developed three political movements with three 
urban focal points, three missionary traditions, three vernacular 
languages and three rival sets of sub-national leaders. 
169 
The author's interpretation of the Angolan conflict after independence was 
presented according to the tension between town and country paralleled by an 
ideological tension between right and left, between entrepreneurial and 
bureaucratic-the town, bureaucracy and the left being represented by the 
MPLA; the country, the entrepreneurial and the right being represented by 
UNITA, though at the beginning of the conflict, they were represented by the 
FNLA. 170 The whole political and military conflict in independent Angola until 
1991 was read in these terms. '71. 
169 In Birmingham, David, `Angola revisited', in Journal of Southern African Studies, 15 (1988), p. 1. 
10 `The roots of the Angolan "civil" war are in part ideological. In the last years of the colonial war the 
Portuguese deliberately encouraged the growth of a black capitalist peasantry in the coffee industry [... ] 
The black provincial entrepreneurs, predominately members of the Baptist Churches, were supporters 
of the right-wing FNLA rather than the left-wing, city-oriented MPLA. After independence the rural 
sector and the entrepreneurs were severely neglected. Peasant incomes dropped, opportunities for 
marketing farm produce declined, the city fed itself on imported produce paid from oil revenue. The 
tension between town and country paralleled the ideological tension between entrepreneurial and 
bureaucratic, between right and left. By the 1980s this tension had become a key feature of the "civil 
101 
  Christine Messiant developed further the previous argument about social 
cleavages resulting from a peculiar type of colonisation and reflecting several 
of the socio-cultural identification dimensions stressed by Heimer and 
Birmingham (socio-economic, race, religion, region, sub-region, ethno- 
linguistic, historical, cultural, urban/rural). The author initiates her analysis at 
the level of the elites or elite fractions that could be identified in colonial 
history, especially towards the end of the nineteenth century and during the first 
half of the twentieth. In her analysis, the concept of elite and elite fractions is 
implicitly defined as social groups privileged in socio-economic, socio- 
professional and educational terms12. Such analysis provides an explanation 
for the Angolan nationalist division and the ensuing conflict between 
movements. 
In these terms, the author claims that the nationalist movement in 
Angola was formed in the 1950s within a polarised framework, around two 
geographically separated elites, to which a third one was later added173: 
1st) There is a fraction of the elite that Messiant calls the `ancient 
assimilados'; they came from the multiracial colonial bourgeoisie that existed 
until the twentieth century, comprising mainly mulattos but also including 
war". [... ] By 1987 the conflict between town and countryside had spread to the entire nation. ' Ibid. 
p. 13. See also Birmingham, David, `Carnival at Luanda', in Journal of African History, 29 (1988), 
pp. 93-103. 
`Although the leaders of the rural rebellion of 1976 to 1991 abandoned their military headquarters at 
Jamba and followed Savimbi to the city to begin campaigning for the anticipated general election of 
1992, there was a real risk of the great cultural gulf reopening between town and country, between 
Lusophones and non-Lusophones, between coast and highland. ' In Birmingham, David, Frontline 
Nationalism... op. cit. pp. 114-115. 
172 See Cahen, Michel and Messiant, Christine, `Luttes politiques, tensions sociales et cultures 
ethniques: Luanda, de la lutte anti-portugaise aux agressions sud-Africaines. Introduction', in Cahen, 
Michel, ed., Bourgs et villes en Afrique Lusophone (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1989), p. 122; Messiant, 
Christine, 1961 - L'Angola coloniale, histoire et societe. Les premisses du mouvement nationaliste 
(Pans: EHESS, 1983), these de doctorat en sociologie. Also, Messiant, Christine `Luanda (1945-1961): 
colonises, societe coloniale et engagement nationaliste', in Cahen, Michel, ed., Bourgs et villes en 
Afrique Lusophone (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1989), pp. 125-199. 
173 See especially: Messiant, Christine, 1961 - L'Angola... op. cit. Also, Messiant, Christine 'Luanda 
(1945-1961)... op. cit. pp. 125-199; Messiant, Christine, `Angola, les voies de 1'ethnisation et de la 
decomposition -I- de la guerre ä la paix (1975-1991): le conflit arme, les interventions 
internationales et le peuple angolais', in Lusotopie, 1 (1994) pp. 155-210; Messiant, Christine, `Angola 
les voies de 1'ethnisation et de la decomposition - II - Transition ä la democratie ou marche ä la 
guerre? L'epanouissement des deux'partis armes' (Mai 1991-Septembre 1992)' in Lusotopie, 3 (1995) 
pp. 181-221. 
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blacks. They sided with the whites in the structures of colonial society, adopting 
the Portuguese language and the catholic religion. The arrival of whites in the 
first decades of the twentieth century (increasing the competition for jobs 
within the colonial administration) together with the increased racial 
stratification of colonial society brought about their social demotion. It is from 
this group that emerged those who were to form the MPLA, who were to give it 
shape, its discourse and its ideology. Emerging politically in urban centres of 
Europe and Angola, because of their privileged status as educated elites, these 
militants denounced the racial domination of colonisation and the failure of 
assimilation; they adopted nationalism supported by values that were Creole, 
universalistic, national, multiracial, Christian humanistic but also Socialist. 
2nd) There is another fraction of elite that the author calls `Bakongo 
evolues', because of their having emerged from the numerous Bakongo 
emigrants to the Belgian Congo, especially in Leopoldville, where the elites 
were known as evolues. Following the example of the Congolese elites, this 
particular Angolan elite challenged colonialism, exalting the black race and the 
Congo people's pride. They were the founders of UPNA (Uniäo dos Povos do 
Norte de Angola/Union of Peoples of Northern Angola) then transformed into 
UPA (Uniäo dos Povos de Angola/Union of Peoples of Angola) and finally 
(1962) in the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertacäo de Angola/National 
Liberation Front of Angola). Therefore, the FNLA was first of all an ethno- 
nationalist movement, whose leaders belonged to protestant families and the 
aristocracy of the kingdom of the Congo. Their ideology was liberal- 
nationalistic, but radically African, being very much opposed not only to 
colonialism but also to any Portuguese cultural influence. Towards the end of 
the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, there was an extreme contrast 
between the elites that had not been significantly marked by Portuguese 
colonisation and those influenced by that colonisation; both sides mutually and 
strongly rejected each other. 
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3rd) Finally, along with those two fiercely opposed poles, another elite 
fraction appeared, with other Angolan nationalists and other assimilados that 
Messiant refers to as the `new assimilados'. These did not issue from the old 
colonial bourgeoisie, but from indigenous African society, to whom they 
belonged and in which they lived; they were black and their mother tongue was 
African. They were assimilated only in the twentieth century and in growing 
numbers after World War II, thanks to the missionary education they received in 
indigenous milieus (mainly protestant and foreigner, non-Portuguese). 
However, assimilation did not open for them the doors to social promotion 
because of the rigidity of racial stratification derived from white immigration, 
and because of the stronger competition of the `old assimilados', most of whom 
were Catholic. Aware of the social and racial barriers that distinguished them 
from the `old assimilados', they were a subordinated elite during colonisation, 
and were to value their cultural and racial differences, taking pride in those 
differences in relation to the `old assimilados'. 
Faced with two camps polarised between the MPLA and the FNLA, the 
`new assimilados', belonging to three different religions and emerging within 
specific communities whose limits were ethno-linguistic (Bakongo from the 
Baptist missions, Mbundu from the Methodist missions, and the Ovimbundu 
from the Congregational missions of the central plateaux), placed themselves 
according to their complex experience and social relationships. Contrary to the 
nationalist `old assimilados' and the Bakongo evolues, who organised 
themselves into political groups based on their social and cultural positions, the 
`new assimilados' joined one or other of the two camps, according to the 
specific fracture lines of their religious, ethnic or regional group. 
In the old centres of colonisation (i. e. Luanda and its hinterland and also in 
the small area of Lobito-Benguela), because of historically specific and 
proximate social relationships between the two fractions of assimilados (new 
and old), between Catholics and Protestants and between blacks and mesticos, 
most of the `new assimilados' joined the MPLA. Away from those old centres 
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of colonisation, however, where those quite specific historical relationship ties 
did not exist, the tendency towards conflict was greater than the tendency 
towards an alliance, especially for the Protestant segment of `new assimilados', 
for whom regional colonial society was less accessible. Confronted with the 
polarisation between the FNLA and the MPLA, most of the other `new 
assimilados' chose the FNLA in the early sixties, in spite of its ethnic 
nationalism - as happened to the assimilated nationalists of the central 
plateaux, such as Savimbi, who later abandoned the FNLA because of ethnic 
bias in favour of the Bakongo and left to form their own movement, UNITA, 
which after independence will be increasingly related to and identified with the 
ethno-linguistic group of the Ovimbundu. 
It is useful to remember that Messiant's concept of assimilado should not 
be restricted to the legal statutory colonial condition with the same designation, 
meaning an effective (socio-cultural) situation (resulting from the type of 
colonisation in Angola) and not a legal situation. The group she so designates 
was far larger than the one encompassed by the legal condition174. 
In sum, according to Messiant, the division of Angolan nationalism in 
three movements is the result of a competition between rival elites for power; a 
rivalry firstly exercised during the anti-colonial struggle and founded on socio- 
cultural cleavages (elite fractions, race, religion, region, ethno-linguistic) 
resulting from an unequal historical and geographic development of Portuguese 
colonisation in Angola. 
Bien plus que comme un produit d'oppositions ethniques, la 
division du nationalisme angolais doit titre analysee comme 
traduisant la competition entre diverses elites pour le pouvoir, qui 
va s'exercer d'abord Bans le mouvement nationaliste. Cette rivalite 
174 According to Newitt there were only 30.000 official assimilados as late as 1950; In Newitt, Malyn, 
Portugal in Africa (London: C Hurst, 1981), p. 138. Also supporting the same number is MacQueen, 
Norne, A descolonizacäo da Africa portuguesa, a revolucäo metropolitana ea dissolucdo do imperio 
(Lisboa: Editorial Inquerito, 1997), p. 31. The legal statute was hard to attain, sometimes was not even 
desired due to a tax increase and depended on several subjective criteria and conditions as extensively 
analysed in Bittencourt, Marcelo, As linhas que tecem o `erne'; um estudo sobre a criagdo do MPLA 
(Sao Paulo: Universidade de Sao Paulo, 1996), Masters' Thesis, chapter V; a summary of this thesis 
was recently published, Bittencourt, Marcelo, Dos Jornais as Armas. Trajectörias da Contestagdo 
Angolana (Lisboa: Vega, 1999). 
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se fonde essentiellement sur les differences sociales et culturelles 
dues au developpement historiquement et spatialement inegal de la 
colonisation portugaise. 175 
Being the foundations of nationalist division (a unique phenomenon in 
Portuguese colonial Africa) these differences and consequent cleavages were 
obviously strong. But they can not be reduced to an ethno-linguistic dimension, 
which is only one of several components of a complex cluster of socio-cultural 
references to identity. That is why Messiant argues that the Angolan nationalist 
division, and the ensuing civil war, cannot be seen as an inevitable product of 
primary ethnic differences: `il n'y avait en effet nulle fatalite ethnique que les 
elites Bakongo et Mbundu s'alignent derriere des partis differents: en lui seul, 
le fait ethno-regional est incapable d'expliquer la stabilisation de courants 
rivaux. ' 16. 
Finally, an important remark needs to be made about Messiant's work in 
order to stress the differences between the new assimilados in the old centres of 
colonisation (M'Bundu from the Methodist missions) and the other new 
assimilados from other areas (Bakongo from the Baptist missions and 
Ovimbundu from the Congregational missions of the high plateaux). 
Given the fact that the alliance between old and new assimilados within 
the old centres of colonisation and within the MPLA became a major 
characteristic of the Angolan nationalism that will be singled out throughout 
the next chapters, it might be useful to find a designation that expresses the 
distinct character of the elite fractions of those areas, favouring their alliance. 
The most accurate designation to those elite fractions is probably that of 
`Creoles' because `creolisation' as an historical and socio-cultural phenomenon 
intimately combining two different socio-cultural registers (that will be 
analysed and defined in more detail in the next chapter) can only be argued to 
exist in the old centres of colonisation 177. 
175 Messiant, Christine, `Angola, les voies ... 
I, op. cit. p. 161. 
176 In Cahen, Michel and Messiant, Christine, `Luttes politiques ... op. cit. pp. 121-122. 177 Messiant always thought that `Creoles' was the most adequate designation for these elite fractions in 
the old centres of colonisation and the only reason why She did not use it was because `Ce terme pose 
cependant probleme car il est desormais "passe dans la langue" de certain groupes en Angola pour 
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Therefore, throughout this work, I will resort to the designation of new 
and old Creoles to refer to Messiant's new and old assimilados in the old 
centres of colonisation (respectively) 178 . 
Concluding chapter 3, it can be said that the major contribution of this second 
sub-group of authors was: on the one hand, to deny the explanatory value of the 
ethnic factor in itself (isolated from other factors) which was at the base of the 
interpretation provided by the `classic' authors of the `ethnic tripolarity' 
argument; and on the other hand, to produce a less ideological/political 
passionate analysis, which characterised the first sub-group of authors. 
Alternatively, it proposed a more encompassing and flexible analysis, stressing: 
a), the power struggle between elites; b), the strong socio-cultural 
cleavages between those elites resulting from the historical and geographic 
unequal development of Portuguese colonisation; c) that such cleavages were 
based on several and variously combined differences such as socio-economic, 
racial, religious, regional, sub-regional, ethno-linguistic, historical, cultural, 
urban/rural; d), that the major socio-cultural cleavage arising was between the 
elites that had not been significantly marked by Portuguese colonisation and the 
elites extremely influenced by the Portuguese colonisation. 
After the presentation of the major arguments, it is now time to define 
my standing point in this discussion. 
designer des categories differentes (soit plus restreinte, et non culturelle mais "raciale", les metis, soit 
plus large), et il fest notamment dans la lutte politique actuelle oü les mots sont aussi des stigmates. 
Aussi en parlerai-je ici [... ] comme des "anciens assimiles"; in Messiant, Christine, `Angola, les voies 
... I, op. cit. p. 162. Nevertheless, within the analytical framework and discussion provided in this work 
that possible problem stressed by Messiant does not represent an effective problem and those terms are 
still very useful. Also supporting the usefulness of those terms to specify the main characteristics of the 
elite fractions in the old centres of colonisation is Bittencourt, Marcelo, As linhas que ... op. cit. 
chapter V. 
178 Although Birmingham also uses the terms new and old Creoles, he uses them in a different sense, 
which does not seem to be in agreement with Messiant, whose work is here taken as the main reference 
for the analysis of these phenomena. For Birmingham's use of those terms see Birmingham, David, 
`Angola revisited' ... op. cit. pp. 
1-14. 
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4- An Assessment of the Arguments 
My analysis follows most closely Messiant's line of argument. As stressed by 
Messiant, the historical and geographic unequal development of Portuguese 
colonialism produced a major socio-cultural cleavage between the elites that 
had not been significantly marked by Portuguese colonisation and those that 
had. Historically specific ties between new and old assimilados in the old 
centres of colonisation (i. e., Luanda and its hinterland and the small area of 
Lobito-Benguela) favoured their alliance within the MPLA. These historically 
specific ties made the alliance of blacks and mesticos, Catholics and 
Protestants a lot easier. 
Bearing in mind the analytical perspective at the centre of this work and 
the issues that might be politically important to the understanding of post- 
independence patrimonial working logic, the relevant questions to explore are: 
1), what kind of socio-cultural and socio-economic processes are behind those 
historically specific ties (between new and old assimilados in the old centres of 
colonisation-here called new and old Creoles respectively) representing a 
major cleavage within the Angolan elites and Angolan nationalism ?; 2), what 
political implications can be drawn from such major socio-cultural cleavage in 
terms of nationalist divisions and the competition between movements towards 
independence ? The answer to these questions will be provided in the next two 
sub-chapters respectively. 
4.1 Creolisation and Clientelistic Social Organisation Including Kinship 
The answer to the first question goes back to the end of the 16th century when 
a process of `Creolisation' started179, closely accompanied until the mid 19th 
179 By `Creolisation' is meant the process by which emerged a socio-cultural category - the Creoles, 
encompassing a broad scope of heterogeneous elements such as the descendants of locally bom 
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century by the genesis of a complex clientelist social organisation including 
extended kinship ties. This kind of clientelistic organisation supported by 
kinship ties is usually seen as the traditional prelude to `modem 
patrimonialism', as indicated by Medard180. Although it is obviously not my 
intention to provide an in-depth historical discussion of this period, it is 
important to the argument to stress the historical specificity of the region and 
population of Luanda and its hinterland, having specific socio-cultural and 
socio-economic traits which are the foundation of major identification 
cleavages. 
In these terms, the onset of Creolisation can be located at the end of the 
16th century, when Portugal began favouring the North-central area (Luanda 
and its hinterland) to the detriment of the North (S. Salvador of Congo), 
following a new commercial and military strategy of incursion into the interior. 
Such incursion was mainly supported by the presidios (fortresses) and the 
guerra preta ('black army') that favoured the process of Creolisation. 
The presidio was a small fortress headed by a military officer, a judge and 
a chaplain. A market was usually held within its walls in order to encourage 
trade. The first presidios took a long time to spread from the coast along the 
valley of the river Kwanza. Nevertheless, their slow yet relentless advance 
constituted an important vector for the conquest of the Angolan interior. 181 
Europeans (whites and mesticos), `detribalised' Africans more or less adapted to the European culture 
(so-called `civilised' or `assimilated' in the Portuguese colonial terminology), all of which formed an 
intermediate group between the Europeans from the metropolis and the majority of black rural non- 
acculturated population. This definition is borrowed from Dias, Jill, `Uma questäo de identidade; 
respostas intelectuais is transformag6es econömicas no seio da elite crioula de Angola Portuguesa entre 
1870 e 1930', in Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos, 1 (1984), p. 61 footnote 1. See also 
Bittencourt, Marcelo, As linhas que ... op. cit. especially pp. 
45-70; also, Bittencourt, Marcelo, 
'Revisitando a crise Angolana', in Revista Internacional de Histöria de Africa, 11 (1996), especially 
pp. 148-149; also Bittencourt, Marcelo, `A Histöria contemporänea... op. cit. especially pp. 177-184. 
Also supporting the same use and definition of Creolisation and Creoles is Mateus, Dalila Cabrita, A 
Luta pela independencia, a formacdo das elites fundadoras da FRELIMO, MPLA e PAIGC (Lisboa: 
Inquerito, 1999) chapter II; The same type of definition stressing the socio-cultural factor is supported 
by Messiant, Christine, `Angola: entre guerre et paix', in Marchal, Roland and Messiant, Christine, Les 
chemins de la guerre et la paix: fins de conflit en Afrique orientale et australe (Paris: Karthala, 1997), 
p. 163, footnote 6. 
180 See Medard, Jean-Francois, `The Underdeveloped State 
... op. cit. especially pp. 165-181. 18' The commander of the presidio was expected to ensure the greatest possible number of alliances 
with the African chiefs in the surrounding area. This involved a system of vassalage which determined 
109 
The black army consisted of African troops at the service of Portugal. By 
the 17th century these armies were fully institutionalised. This entailed the 
regimentation of African troops according to `traditional' chiefdoms, who 
would then join the Portuguese campaigns. 182 
With the new dynamics created by the conquest of the interior of Luanda, 
the presidios and the fairs along the rivers Kwanza, Dande, Bengo and Lukala 
attracted traders and farmers. With their families, they made up communities 
that were distinct from the rest of the populace under the jurisdiction of the 
traditional chiefdoms. 
The backgrounds of the people who made up these communities were also 
different, being the descendants of. a) African women and the first Portuguese 
to arrive in Angola; b) freed slaves and free Africans who had placed 
themselves under the protection of the colonialists in exchange for diverse 
favours (military or other), often fleeing their original communities. This first 
nucleus was gradually increased by the more or less constant influx of white 
colonialists and black people of various backgrounds, attracted to the 
Portuguese fortifications as slaves or slave-traders. These communities were 
therefore composed mainly of blacks, with some mesticos and a minority of 
whites183. 
Because of the relatively high levels of wealth and education that 
members of these communities had access to, they were an elite in comparison 
the rights and obligations of each party, and very early on (since the 1600s) included the payment of 
taxes to the Portuguese in slaves, ivory, the use of bearers and, much later, in coinage; In Wheeler, D. 
and Pelissier, Rene, Angola... op. cit. pp36-37; in mid 19th century the colonial administration was 
based in nine presidios; in Alexandre, Valentim & Dias, Jill (coord. ) 0 Imperio Africano, 1825-1890, 
in Serräo, Joel & Marques, AH de Oliveira (dir. ) Nova Histöria da Expansäo Portuguesa, Vol. X 
(Lisboa: Estampa, 1998), pp. 359-360; see also Duffy, James, Portuguese Africa (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1959), specially pp. 54-56. On the conquest of the interior see also Birmingham, 
David, The Portuguese Conquest of Angola (Oxford: OUP, 1965). 
182 In the beginning, the black army was somewhat rudimentary; there were no regular salaries, little 
structure and poor leadership. Nevertheless, these contingents were crucial for the survival of the 
Portuguese, the gradual subjugation of the various kingdoms and the conquest of the interior. In 
Cadornega, Antonio de Oliveira, Histöria das Guerras Angolanas (1680-1681), Vol. I (Lisbon: 
Agencia Geral do Ultramar, 1940-1942, reedigAo 1972), p. 589. A Portuguese law dating from 1648 
stated that there would be no distinctions between whites, mesticos and free blacks within the Angolan 
army; merit was to be the only acceptable criterion for promotion. See Boxer, Charles Ralph, Race 
Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire 1415-1825 (Oxford: OUP, 1963). 
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with the rest of the surrounding population. Their main capital and commercial 
asset lay in the exploitation of a double register - European and African - 
which gave them great advantage in their role as intermediaries 184. As for their 
social status, although their African traits dominated their Portuguese the 
influence of Portuguese culture was notorious, and members of these 
communities were given a special status by the Portuguese administration, who 
referred to them as `natives' or `sons of the land' as opposed to the rest of the 
population, designated as `pagans' or `gentiles' (uncivilised Africans). 185 
As their commercial activity increased, the members of these communities 
realised the need to establish stronger, more regular ties, or alliances, with 
families of similar communities and with families belonging to the chiefdoms, 
and so they entered relationships of kinship, namely marriages. These 
relationships established a network of commercial and financial (credit) 
support between chiefdoms from the interior, traders from the interior and 
traders from Luanda. Here were located the main white-owned trading houses, 
many of which already had ties of kinship through relationships with black 
women. Thus a network grew, establishing channels for the circulation of 
credit, goods, protection and other services. According to Jill Dias, although 
these networks were essentially directed to commercial aims, their nature was 
clearly clientelistic, working through relationships of personal dependency 
based on extended preferential solidarity ties with a kinship support' 86 . 
The status, power and the socio-economic prestige of these alliances 
amongst elites became more entrenched between the 17th and 18th centuries, 
and were based mainly on the almost total control of the slave trade in the 
183 In Dias, Jill, `Uma questäo ... op. cit. p. 
63. 
164 In Dias, Jill `Relag6es Econömicas e de Poder no Interior de Luanda ca. 1850-1875'; in Actas da 1° 
Reuniäo Internacional de Histöria de Africa (Lisboa: IICT, 1989), p. 245. 
185 In Dias, Jill, `Uma questAo ... op. cit. p. 63. In the first half of the 19th century, blacks freed 
from the 
chiefdoms' collective tutelage, mesticos and whites living in the interior were designated as moradores 
by the colonial sources; in Alexandre, Valentim & Dias, Jill (coord. ) 0 Imperio ... op. cit. pp. 
359-360. 
186 In Dias, Jill `Relag6es Econömicas 
... op. cit. p. 245. The author explicitly defines the relationships 
referred as clientelist and kinship not only in the mentioned article and page but also in Dias, Jill, 'Uma 
questäo ... op. cit. p. 
64. 
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interior (to a much lesser extent on agriculture) 187. The policy of commercial 
alliances reinforced with ties of kinship and the adoption of Portuguese 
inheritance law enabled several families to amass great wealth over several 
generations188. 
The extension of these elite networks (from the coast to the interior) did 
not imply its homogeneity, but rather its diversity, encompassing important 
socio-economic sub-divisions and internal rivalries. In the mid-nineteenth 
century, there could be clearly identified two main nuclei (one on the coast and 
the other in the interior) and three surrounding or dependent groups 189: 
Firstly, there was in the coastal region a relatively westernised central 
nucleus based in Luanda (here designated as A), composed of a tiny 
`aristocracy' made up of a dozen families. '90 They occupied prestigious posts 
in the colonial institutions, such as the administration, the military, the church 
and local government. From these activities they gained an added legitimacy in 
their commercial activities and their clientelistic networks. These families tried 
to remain as white as possible, preferentially marrying their daughters off to 
high-ranking army and navy officers from both Brazil and Portugal. This 
reinforced their commercial and political ties with these countries and allowed 
187 In the mid-eighteenth century, very few Europeans were involved in the slave-trade in the interior of 
the territory, be it northern or southern. There were laws and decrees that forbade the incursion of 
Portuguese traders into the interior beyond specified points such as Pungo Andongo. Besides that, the 
traders themselves knew that the tributary costs incurred by crossing the lands of non-subdued 
chiefdoms, as well as the price of slaves, went up drastically in the presence of a European. From 1700, 
the Portuguese used mainly the services of Africans and mestigos, other local traders and 
intermediaries, and merchants, who acted as agents for the trading houses along the coast. In 1800, 
most of the intermediaries, agents and dealers in the interior were non-European. See Henriques, Isabel 
Castro, Percursos da modernidade em Angola (Lisbon: IICT, 1997), pp. 115-123. Also over the same 
issue of the primacy of African and mestico traders in the interior see Dias, Jill `Relag6es Econömicas 
... op. cit. pp. 
241-258.; Also Dias, Jill `Mudancas nos Padröes de Poder no Hinterland de Luanda, o 
impacto da colonizacäo sobre os M'Bundu (c. 1845-1920)', in Penelope, n°14 (1994), pp. 43-9 1. 
'" In Dias, Jill `Relaröes Econömicas 
... op. cit. p. 
243. 
189 Reference to these subdivisions is essentially based in Dias, Jill, `Uma questäo ... op. cit. pp. 
65-66. 
190 The most powerful families dated from the 17th century, such as the Matoso de Andrade, the 
Pinheiro Falcäo, the Velasco Galiano and the Van Dunem; in Dias, Jill, `Uma questäo ... op. cit. p. 
65; 
By the end of the 19th century to these famillies others should be added such as Matoso da Camara, 
Amaral Gurgel, Beca, Furtado Antas, Castro Francina, Ribeiro Castelbranco, Vieira Lopes, Pinto de 
Andrade, Regadas, Franconi, Escörcio, Rangel, Nascimento, Mata, Maia Ferreira; in Freudenthal, Aida, 
`A utopia Angolense (1880-1915)'; in Actas da III Reunido Internacional de Histdria de Africa 
(Lisboa: IICT, 2000), p. 562, footnote 5. 
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them to accumulate a -significant patrimony in terms of land and slaves, 
especially around Luanda, and in the districts of Bengo and Dande. 
Secondly, in the interior, there was a main nucleus in the centres of trade 
and colonial administration east of Luanda (designated as B). Given that 
Europeans were fewer in the interior, this nucleus was composed of oligarchies 
whose ancestry was mainly black. They were characterised not only by a 
darker skin, but also by a greater degree of Africanisation and the maintenance 
of closer ties of relationship (through more frequent marriages) with the ruling 
African elites of the chiefdoms from the interior. The more eminent of these 
families also made alliances through marriages with members from the lighter- 
skinned families from the coast. This connected the chiefdoms and the 
`aristocracy' of the interior with the 'aristocracy' of the coast. Yet their 
commercial and social rivalry remained strong. 
Thirdly, around the main nucleus on the coast (i. e. around - A) gathered 
a sub-group (that can be designated as Al) that issued from the marriage of 
some of the `aristocracy' with families of more recent origin - mulattos, 
children of white fathers (traders or colonial civil servants) and black women 
(usually slaves or concubines). 
Fourthly, around the `aristocracy' of the interior, there was a sub-group 
(that can be designated as B1) made up of so-called `civilised' Africans, who 
were freed from the chiefdoms' collective tutelage by their personal wealth, 
amassed from the slave-trade and agriculture. This legally exempted them 
from forced labour as bearers and other colonial manual work. 
Fifthly, there was a third type of sub-group that could be found around the 
edges of the first layer of dependants of the aristocratic nuclei of the coast (i. e. 
around Al, representing a second layer of dependants on the central nuclei, 
something like a A1.1). It was made up of thousands of craftsmen and 
specialist workers who were there mainly to satisfy colonial needs, such as 
tailors, shoemakers, masons and carpenters. Many of them were freed slaves. 
They wanted to be socially integrated within the Creole elite, to access 
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education, adopt Portuguese manners and codes of behaviour, dress in a 
European style and wear shoes - `the shod blacks' - in order to derive some 
socio-economic advantages in their relationship with whites as well as with 
Africans. They distinguished themselves socially from the mass of other 
Africans who considered them white in spite of their colour. ' 91 
Despite the important socio-economic differences and rivalries between 
the groups that made these clientelistic networks, the ties that linked them soon 
overcame the purely commercial, kinship and clientelist type of relationships, 
and developed singular or very specific common socio-cultural traits. The 
specificity of all these groups consisted in the `art' of combining (not without 
internal contradictions) a double inherited register, African and European: an 
European register acquired from the particularly strong influence and impact 
of the Portuguese in Luanda and its hinterland; an African register acquired 
from the `original' inhabitants of that area that for a long time had been 
defined by the Portuguese as Ambundu (M'Bundu peoples), speaking 
KiMbundu and inhabiting the territories between the Dande and Kwanza 
rivers' 92. 
In this intense mixture of double inheritance lies the essence of the Creole 
as a socio-cultural phenomenon (and which can never be reduced to the 
question of skin colour) whose boundaries as a socio-cultural group are very 
imprecise given its hybrid character, being lighter skinned in the coast and 
darker skinned towards the interior. 
This process of creolisation accompanied by complex clientelist social 
organisation including extended kinship ties, suffered a major setback in mid- 
nineteenth century due to the important transformations which then occurred in 
the Angolan colonial economy (replacement of the slave-trade by `legitimate 
trade' such as sugar, coffee, cotton; and the growing economic competition at 
191 On this lower sub-group see also Alexandre, Valentim & Dias, Jill (coord. ) 0 Imperio ... op. Cit. pp. 359-360. 
192 Neighbouring in the North with the Kongo kingdom, in the West with the Luba empire and in the 
South-East with the Bantu pastoralists [Ovimbundu in the colonial terminology]. See Birmingham, 
David, Trade and Conflict in Angola (Oxford: OUP, 1966), p. 17. 
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all levels from the increased arrival of white Portuguese 193). Such setback also 
led to a progressive economic and political downgrading of the Creole elites, 
generating their first cultural/political reaction between 1870 and 1930, 
sometimes called proto-nationalism to distinguish it from a subsequent so- 
called modem nationalism-developing in the 1950's within the Creole elites 
and from which the MPLA will emerge as the organisation with the most 
clearly defined political project' 94 . 
Beyond the specificity and intricacies of the Angolan nationalism, the 
important issue to stress in this study is that such process of creolisation 
remained the main distinctive socio-cultural feature of the Luanda-Malange 
corridor elites towards the 20th century. It represented a common heritage of 
all the `Creole elites' in the old centres of colonisation from the coast to the 
interior; all of them touched in a more or less intense degree by that process, 
be it old or new Creoles -- beyond the above mentioned rivalries and the 
specificity of the latter in relation to the former. 
Such common heritage is at the core of the MPLA's formation, facilitating 
the subsequent alliance between those two fractions of the Creole elite within 
that movement. It is also at the origin of the major socio-cultural cleavage 
between elites of the various Angolan regions as stressed by Messiant, i. e., 
between those elites strongly influenced by the Portuguese colonisation and 
those elites who were not. 
193 On this subject see Dias, Jill `Relacöes Econömicas ... op. cit. pp. 
241-258; Dias, Jill `O Kabuku 
Kambilo (c. 1850-1900): Uma identidade politica ambigua', in Actas do Seminärio Encontro de Povos 
e Culturas em Angola (Lisboa: CNCDP, 1995), pp. 14-53; Dias, Jill `Mudangas nos ... op. cit. pp. 
43- 
91. 
194 For an accurate discussion on these issues see, amongst others: Messiant, Christine, 1961 - 
L'Angola... op. cit.; Pelissier, Rene, La Colonie ... op. cit.; Marcum, 
John, The Angolan Revolution, 
Vol.! 
... op. cit.; 
Bittencourt, Marcelo, As linhas que ... op. cit.; also 
Guimaräes, Fernando Andresen, 
The origins ... op. cit.; Freudenthal, Aida, `A utopia ... op. cit. pp. 561-572; Messiant, 
Christine 
`Luanda (1945-1961)... op. cit. pp. 125-199 ; Dias, Jill, `Uma questAo ... op. cit. pp. 61-93; 
Coelho, 
Antonieta Rupture and Continuity: the State, Law and the Economy in Angola, 1974-1989 (Warwick: 
University of Warwick, 1994) especially pp. 62-80. 
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4.2 The Political Implications of the Major Socio-Cultural Cleavages During 
the Anti-Colonial Struggle 
During the anti-colonial struggle and the beginning of the civil war (broadly 
encompassing the period between the armed uprising of 15 March 1961 and the 
1975/1976 civil war), there are three main political issues that derive from the 
above discussion: firstly, the nationalist division or the lack of a common front 
against colonialism; secondly, the emergence of centripetal forces generating 
what will be here termed a great and diversified Creole/M'Bundu alliance; 
thirdly, and closely connected with the previous two, there can be seen a 
dynamic of increasing ethnic overtones to the conflict between the different 
nationalist movements. I discuss these three main points in the following three 
sections. 
4.2.1 Nationalist Division 
In terms of Angolan nationalism, the major socio-cultural cleavages between 
elites had four political consequences, as has been noted by Messiant. 
Firstly, the original partition of Angolan nationalism between the MPLA 
and the UPA/FNLA based on mutually exclusive socio-cultural distinctions 
between two groups such as `old Creoles' (miscegenated and acculturated) and 
Bakongo evolues (neither miscegenated nor acculturated with the Portuguese). 
As Guimaräes writes, 
Pointing to the FNLA's characterisation of it as a movement 
dominated by mesticos, the MPLA in turn accused Roberto's front 
of being racist. The MPLA would focus on the Bakongo origins of 
the UPA and charge that it was an uni-racialist and, therefore, 
unrepresentative movement. 
195 
Secondly, the emergence of an alliance within the old centres of colonisation 
between old and new Creoles in the MPLA is critical. Thirdly, there is an 
'95 In Guimaräes, Fernando Andresen, The origins ... op. cit. p. 63; For an accurate FNLA's image of 
the MPLA as a movement of civilizados and assimilados see Guimaräes, ibid. pp. 25-26. 
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alliance of the other new assimilados out of the old centres of colonisation 
('Ovimbundu' from the Congregationalist missions and `Bakongo' from the 
Baptist missions) with the `Bakongo evolues' within the UPA/FNLA. Finally, 
there is the three-way division of Angolan nationalism in the mid-sixties after 
the departure of Savimbi and his followers from the UPA/FNLA -- accusing the 
movement of favouring the `Bakongo'196, but still finding the MPLA too 
Creole, assimilated and mestico to be joined by them -- forming instead their 
own movement - UNITA197. 
In these terms, such major socio-cultural cleavages represented a strong 
impediment to the unification of the nationalist movements against colonialism. 
Instead, these different movements fought amongst themselves for the 
hegemonic leadership of Angolan nationalism, to such an extent that the anti- 
colonial struggle often took second place. Such conflict for nationalist 
hegemony became evident from the very beginning of the movements' 
formation with the dispute over their respective foundation dates. Both the 
MPLA and UPA/FNLA wanted to claim for themselves the status of founder of 
nationalism. There was also the no less controversial subject of who effectively 
started the anti-colonial armed struggle 198; soon followed by effective military 
confrontation between guerrilla groups of the MPLA and UPA/FNLA along the 
196 See `Letter to the Missionaries of the United Church Board for World Ministries in New York, ' 
dated 21 September 1966, cited in Marcum, John, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II... op. cit., pp. 165- 
166. 
197 'It was very difficult at that time for blacks to understand why mestigos should be leading a 
liberation movement to fight the Portuguese. It was not clear to us that mesticos were suffering in 
Angola; they were privileged people'; Savimbi's statement in Bridgeland, Fred, Jonas Savimbi: a key 
to Africa (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1986), pp. 45-46. Reaffirming the above mentioned clevages, 
two of UNITA's leaders, Lusaka Sangumba and Tony da Costa Fernandes, together expressed 
UNITA's eagerness to unite with its rivals but unwilling to accept MPLA's multiracialism because it 
would mean domination by mulatos and assimilados. Whites would be `accepted as visitors - never 
more as leaders'; In a June 28,1974, interview with executive editor Hoyt W. Fuller of Black World 
(Oct. 1974, pp. 56-79) in Lusaka; cited in Marcum, John, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II... op. cit. 
p. 429, footnote 59. 
18 These two mentioned disputes involve mainly the MPLA and the UPA/FNLA; UNITA's later 
appearance (1966) partially excludes her from those disputes. For an accurate discussion on these 
issues see among others: Messiant, Christine, 1961 - L'Angola... op. cit.; Pelissier, Rene, La Colonie 
... op. cit.; Marcum, John, The Angolan Revolution, Vol.! ... op. cit.; Mabeko Tali, 
Jean-Michel, 
Dissidences 
... op. cit.; Bittencourt, Marcelo, As linhas que ... op. cit.; Serrano, Carlos 
Moreira 
Henriques, Angola: nasce uma nagdo; um estudo sobre a construc o da Identidade Nacional (Sao 
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Northern frontier of Angola that lasted from the months immediately after the 
15 March 1961 uprising until the end of the anti-colonial struggle. As remarked 
by Rene Pelissier, 
[The UPA leadership] had to defend their pre-eminence in the 
nationalist [anti-colonial] struggle by preventing soldiers sent by 
their rivals, the MPLA, from reaching the Dembos where it seems 
that from late 1961 if not earlier, rivalry between partisan leaders 
led to inter-guerrilla massacres [... ] UPA's policy [was] of 
intercepting and destroying reinforcements sent by the MPLA to the 
Mbundu who were asking for help from Nambuangongo and the 
Dembos [resulting in a] fratricidal warfare. 
199 
The first major accusation (i. e. first of a long list of regular and constant 
accusations) of UPA/FNLA tribalism and attacks on MPLA guerrillas on the 
Northern frontier came at the beginning of March 1962 from its own dissident 
head of military forces, Commander Marcos Kassanga (a member of the 
N'Ganguela ethno-linguistic group). He accused Holden Roberto and its 
leadership of being responsible for the death of 8000 non-Bakongo Angolans, 
mainly M'Bundu, assimilados and mesticos during the months following the 
March uprising. He also accused them of being responsible for the 
assassination in October of a group of 21 or 23 MPLA guerrillas led by Tomas 
Ferreira who were intercepted near a UPA base while attempting to reach the 
Dembos area and responsible for having ordered the assassination of a 
`Cuanhama' (Southern pastorals ethno-linguistic group) Commander of UPA, 
Joao Batista Tavares Pereira killed in February 1962 near Bembe. 200 Although 
we can cast some doubt on the 8000 deaths and the specificity of the 
accusations made by a dissident, the important is to stress the regularity of these 
accusations throughout the whole anti-colonial struggle and from the most 
2°1 diverse sources, several of these already proven 
Paulo: Universidade de Sao Paulo, 1988), PhD Thesis; Guimaräes, Fernando Andresen, The origins ... 
op. cit. pp. 37-57. 
199 Text of Rene Pelissier in Wheeler, D. and Pelissier, Rene, Angola... op. cit. p. 203. 200 Ibid. pp. 204-205; also referred in Marcum, John, The Angolan Revolution, Vol.! ... op. cit., p. 
218; 
also in Guimaräes, Fernando Andresen, The origins ... op. cit. pp. 64-65. 201 See for instance Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences... op. cit. especially p. 156, footnote 3. 
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According to Guimaräes (an author that follows a line of argument close 
to that of Messiant in terms of socio-cultural divisions between elites and 
movements), it could be argued that the Angolan civil war of 1975 began in 
Leopoldville in 1962 when the MPLA's leadership officially installed itself in 
that city; direct fighting between the MPLA and the UPA units became common 
and `it was increasingly clear that a rivalry was emerging in Angolan 
nationalism, one that would dominate the anti-colonial war and beyond'. Soon 
. `their political rivalry developed into overt aggression'202 
The same kind of military confrontation occurred in the East in the late 
sixties, but this time between MPLA and UNITA guerrillas. The late 
appearance of UNITA in relation to the UPA/FNLA and the MPLA, its 
inexperience and many political and military errors brought the new 
organisation to the brink of dissolution 203. Such difficulties `pushed' Savimbi to 
take a pragmatic option, to the detriment of any ideological or moral principles, 
by negotiating an agreement with Portugal in which he agreed to fight the 
MPLA's forces in the East in exchange for armaments and the survival of 
UNITA in the region; an agreement that some argue to have started in 1972 and 
lasted until early 1974204 and others to have started much earlier and lasted until 
1972/73 205 
In the end, the net result of these rivalries was the loss of effectiveness 
of Angolan nationalism, as stressed by Hodges: 
202 In Guimaräes, Fernando Andresen, The origins ... op. cit. pp. 
64; 57-58. 
203 On these errors see text of Rene Pelissier in Wheeler, D. and Pelissier, Rene, Angola... op. cit. 
225. 
204 See Correia, Pezarat Descolonizacäo de Angola (Lisboa: Inquerito, 1991), pp. 37-40. Also following 
Pezarat is MacQueen, Norrie, A descolonizagdo ... op. cit. p. 
56. Correspondence allegedly changed 
between Savimbi and Portuguese authorities confirming the agreement was first published in the 
magazine Afrique-Asie, 61 (8 July, 1974) under the title `La longue trahison de 1'UNITA`. This 
collaboration has been recently reconfirmed by the present President of the Portuguese Assembly, 
Almeida Santos (who was one of the representatives for Portugal in the Alvor agreement) during 
statements made on the radio programme Angola, 25 anos depois, broadcast by the Portuguese TSF, on 
10 November 2000. 
205 According to Heimer such agreement between UNITA and the Portuguese army was unilateraly 
suspended by the portuguese Comander-in-Chief, General Luz Cunha; in Heimer, Franz-Wilhem, Der 
Entkolonisierungskonflikt 
... op. cit. p. 111. In private conversation Heimer told me that during his 
research trips in Angola in the seventies he was able to identify and talk to the Catholic missionary that 
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Even while they were fighting a common enemy, the three 
movements never collaborated, despite attempts to promote unity 
by the OAU. [... ] movements fought each other [FNLA and MPLA 
in the northwest, MPLA and UNITA in the east]. This internecine 
conflict weakened the nationalist movement as a whole 
206 
4.2.2 The Great Creole/M'Bundu Alliance 
The second main political implication here stressed is a centripetal force that 
seems to have developed essentially after the 15 March 1961 UPA uprising. 
During the following six months of attacks and reprisals before the Portuguese 
re-established their military control of the North, a significant (although 
uncertain) number of assimilados and mesticos were killed along with whites. 
This demonstrated feelings of resentment towards those who, whatever the 
colour of their skin, had a closer relationship with the Portuguese culture from 
which they had derived certain benefits during colonialism. As remarked by 
Rene Pelissier, 
From the beginning of the revolt, there were massacres not only of 
whites but also of mesticos, assimilados and some of the 
Ovimbundu contract workers on the coffee plantations. Portuguese 
propaganda immediately seized on this error, which can only be 
accounted for by basic tribalism, group resentment against the 
African elite and hatred of colonial institutions. The rebellion not 
only rejected the white overlord but also the heritage of 
colonisation: the mestico, and the `assimilated' (and hence 
educated) African. [... ] It rejected the Portuguese, and also 
considered the Ovimbundu a friend of the white man, and therefore 
the UPA's enemy. Of course, not all contract workers, assimilados 
and mesticos caught in the north were killed, but the number of 
those assassinated was sufficient to show Angola, and especially 
the townsfolk, that although the Bakongo had risen for 
independence -a goal approved by many Africans - it entailed 
the possibility of the elimination of other Angolans by the UPA. 207 
served as intermediary between the Portuguese and UNITA, who stopped his work with the arrival of 
Luz Cunha. At the presentation of Pezarat's book Heimer alerted him to the fact. 
206 Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. p. 7 207 Text of Rene Pelissier in Wheeler, D. and Pelissier, Rene, Angola... op. cit. p. 178. On the 
Portuguese military/political account and perspective of the 15 March events see Afonso, Aniceto & 
Gomes, Carlos de Matos, Guerra colonial (Lisboa: Editorial Noticias, 2000), pp. 24-52. 
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Those events (in a period stretching from 15 March to September 1961) and 
the subsequent recurrent military attacks launched by UPA soldiers on MPLA's 
guerrillas (which continued until 1974), further supported the MPLA's 
previous accusations of UPA's racism and `tribalism'. Pictured and largely seen 
in these terms within the old centres of colonisation, those events had an 
important double impact. 
Firstly, they gradually reinforced the awareness of commonly shared 
socio-cultural identification traits by the great variety of sub-divisions of the 
Creole elites, acting as a centripetal force that progressively brought together 
the majority into the same political project: the MPLA. This alliance of several 
sub-divisions of the Creole elites in the MPLA is an illustration of the above- 
mentioned alliance between old and new Creoles. As explained by Messiant, 
old and new assimilados are analytical categories that do not ignore the more 
specific internal sub-divisions contained in each of them and their changing 
character over time 208 . 
The socio-economic and political relevance of the sub-divisions of the so- 
called `Creole elites' and the type of rivalries and compromises established 
between them varied through the years and during different historical periods. 
As a short illustration of the richness and changeability of these internal 
divisions before independence (that can not be developed here in greater 
detai1209), I should like to stress: 
- until the end of the 19th century the internal divisions within the 
`Creole elites' were mainly, on the one hand, between those of the old 
`aristocratic' Creole families of Luanda and those of the `aristocratic' 
families of the interior; and, on the other, between those of the 
208 As explained by Christine Messiant to the author during a private interview in January 1998 (tape 
recorded), a few days before the field research trip to Angola and also in several other conversations 
and occasions after the research trip. See also her article, Messiant, Christine, `Entre nos ... op. cit. 
especially p. 812, footnote 14 and p. 813. 
209 For reasons already explained, these divisions cannot be developed in here: firstly, because they are 
not central to this work's main discussion; secondly, because there is a need for deeper historical 
research on these issues. 
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`aristocratic families' and those at the margins of the clientelist 
21 networks, between lighter and darker skinned o; 
- during the first decades of the 20th century, and at a more `popular' 
level, there is special relevance in the divisions between those from 
the baixa de Luanda (city centre) and those from the muceques de 
Luanda (poorer suburbs), between assimilados and indigenas. At the 
more elitist level, the differences were mainly represented in the bi- 
polarisation of the assimilado associations in Luanda, divided between 
the African Society, founded in 1914, which attracted mainly lighter 
skinned mesticos and a few whites born in Angola, and the Angolan 
League, founded in 1912, attracting mainly black, darker-skinned 
mesticos and a large proportion of town-dwellers from the interior 
(namely, Malange, Dondo and Catete). Its members had on the whole 
a lower socio-economic status than the members of the African 
Society. After these associations had been made illegal in 1922, they 
were reborn in 1930 - the Angolan League became the National 
African League, and the African Association became the Association 
of Native Angolans (ANANGOLA) - but maintaining the socio- 
economic, regional and racial distinctions of its predecessors2"; 
- during the anti-colonial struggle there were several differences such as 
between those from Luanda and those from the interior, Protestants 
and Catholics, those from Catete and those from 
Nambuangongo/Dembos (both can be considered within the new 
assimilados category), between mesticos and negroes, intellectuals and 
non-intellectuals, `famille de Cabinda', `famille de la Premiere 
2 Region', 'famille de la clandestinite', `famille de FEW and so forth 212 
210 On these differences see Dias, Jill, `Uma questäo ... op. cit. pp. 61-93; also 
Dias, Jill `Relacdes 
Econömicas 
... op. cit. pp. 
241-258. 
211 On these differences see Messiant, Christine, 1961 - L'Angola... op. cit.; Messiant, Christine 
`Luanda (1945-1961)... op. cit. pp. 125-199; Messiant, Christine, `Entre nos ... op. cit. especially 
p. 812, footnote 14 and p. 838, footnote 56. 
212 On these differences see Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ... op. cit. with special relevance to 
chapter VI, pp. 172-197 
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Even if short, these illustrative examples are sufficient to explain: on the one 
hand, that broad and more encompassing analytical categories such as new and 
old Creoles do not ignore other sub-divisions; on the other hand, the reasons 
underlying the necessary flexibility (adaptability) of concepts of social 
classification to the Angolan case as `elite and elite fractions' (used by 
Christine Messiant), integrating in their definition several criteria (as 
previously defined) in order to better understand a constantly changing and 
complex reality, especially in terms of political alignments. The analysis of the 
post-independence period (the main focus of this work) will stress the most 
politically relevant internal divisions and rivalries that emerged throughout the 
administrations of Agostinho Neto and Eduardo dos Santos. 
Secondly, the effective or imagined threat (essentially born out of the 15 
March 1961 uprising) against all those whose minimum common denominator 
was their relatively stronger historical contact with the Portuguese culture 
along the old centres of colonisation, came to be felt not only by the several 
sub-groups forming the diversified network of Creole elites, but also by the 
general population along the Luanda-Malange corridor. This feeling became 
accentuated with the open warfare between the three movements during the 
1975-1976 civil war. As stressed by Jill Dias, beyond the Creole elites, the 
Portuguese `conquest' of the interior of Luanda had a strong impact on all the 
peoples inhabiting that region213. Thus when the open and total warfare 
between these movements broke out, massively involving the whole 
population, the relatively stronger and longer (commercial, military, colonial) 
impact of the Portuguese in this region naturally led these rural populations to 
213 `From the 16th century onwards, all the African societies involved with the European trade in the 
interior of Luanda, experienced a long process of desintegration, re-grouping and re-definition. In the 
nineteenth century, the various social and political groups of the same region are still involved in a 
constant process of formation and transformation mainly influenced by commercial contacts. In fact, at 
the same time that it reveals the process of interdependency developed through the centuries between 
African and European structures in Angola, the colonial documentation also stresses the contradictions 
and paradoxes characterizing that process'; In Dias, Jill `Relag6es Econömicas ... op. cit. p. 
241. 
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feel closer to the Creole elites and `their' most significant, effective and 
encompassing political project - the MPLA214. 
In these terms, that effective or imagined threat began progressively to 
represent the main cement of a great and diversified Creole/Mbundu alliance 
not only of elites but also encompassing a significant component of the general 
rural population of that area. The fear represented was embodied during the 
anti-colonial struggle by the UPA/FNLA, which was seen as an ethnic 
movement representing the Bakongo (even if that does not seem to be the most 
accurate analysis215) and, after the independence by 1. KITA, gradually 
identified with the Ovimbundu, based more and more on the affirmation of 
their specific identity (rural, African, black, subjugated) as opposed to the 
Creole/Mbundu alliance (seen as assimilated, acculturated, mestico, urban, 
privileged) 216. 
The centripetal force at the basis of a large and diverse Creole/M'Bundu 
alliance is, thus, the second significant political implication of the major socio- 
cultural cleavages that has been outlined. 
4.2.3 The Increased Ethnic Overtones of the Conflict 
The third main political factor to be stressed within the scope of this work's 
perspective is linked to the previous two and concerns the dynamics set by the 
214 As explained by Heimer, for instance, `Most important seem to have been the traditional assimilado 
[creole] alignment with the MPLA and hostility to the "alien" FNLA, as well as the ethnic identification 
of the Akwambundu [Mbundu] with the MPLA, and ethnic hostility to the FNLA south of the Bakongo 
area'; in Heimer, F. W., The Decolonization ... op. cit. p. 
64. 
215 In fact, there are some references to socio-economic, religious, regional and ethnic sub-divisions 
within the so-called Bakongo ethno-linguistic group with political implications during the anti-colonial 
struggle such as, for instance, divisions between protestants and Catholics, those from Matadi and those 
from Kinshasa; Baxicongo, Bazombo and Cabinda; however, that is not relevant to the way in which 
the Creole/M'Bundu saw UPA/FNLA (the important point to our discussion) and besides, as previously 
explained, such divisions and political implications during the anti-colonial struggle are very 
insufficiently studied (the same happens to the `Ovimbundu') and this is not the place or the occasion to 
explore them. During my interviews programme some of the interviewees provided in a complementary 
way a few statements containing informations that might be explored by those interested in developing 
such research. As said, that information (scarce) will be at their disposal. Over this subject some 
references can be found in Marcum, John, The Angolan Revolution, Vol.! ... op. cit. chapter two; also the text of Rene Pelissier in Wheeler, D. and Pelissier, Rene, Angola... op. cit. especially pp. 166-172. 216 See Messiant, Christine, `Angola, les voies ... 
I, op. cit. pp. 155-210; also Messiant, Christine, 
`Angola: entre guerre et paix' ... op. cit. p. 169. 
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conflicts between movements, degenerating into open warfare in the summer of 
1975 and leading to civil war. The war soon reinforced `ethnic solidarity', as 
explained by Birmingham217, and gave an increased ethnic overtone to the 
conflict. As noticed by Messiant, two main reasons seem to be at the basis of 
these dynamics: 
- on the one hand, there was strong instrumental use of social and 
cultural differences by the elites leading the nationalist movements in order to 
legitimise their political division, autonomous existence and quest for the 
hegemonic leadership of Angolan nationalism; 
- on the other hand, the dynamics of a civil war massively involving the 
population and the Cold War alignments (often instrumentalised by the 
nationalist movements218) contributed to a strong exacerbation and 
politicisation of the differences between peoples, hardening the opposition 
between movements, giving another dimension to the conflict, not only in terms 
of ideological alignment, but also in terms of ethnicity. 
C'est principalement la rivalite entre nationalistes appartenant aux 
diverses elites produite par la colonisation portugaise, et 
notamment Popposition entre d'une part I'elite historique, 
multiraciale, creole et de l'autre, deux types d'elites subalternes 
(assimilees, provinciales ou Bakongo emigres) qui les a amenees ä 
se valoriser les unes contre les autres, dans un champ politique 
alors polarise, leurs capitaux propres pour pouvoir mener une lutte 
armee rendue necessaire par la situation coloniale et pour legitimer 
leur difference et leur existence. 
Il ya eu tres precocement exacerbation et politisation des 
differences et aussi fixation des oppositions entre les trois 
organisations par les alignments de la guerre froide. Mais c'est la 
guerre qui chevauche l'independance qui change la dimension et la 
nature du conflit, ses implications pour la societe. Cette guerre a ete 
la premiere forme d'engagement massif des Angolais pour ou dans 
des champs alors en guerre totale. Elle aä la fois, etant donne les 
implications exterieures, ideologise les ralliements et, sur la base 
217 See Birmingham, David, Frontline Nationalism... op. cit. p. 88. 
Zia On this subject (i. e., internal instrumentalisation of external allies) the most developed study is 
probably Guimaräes, Fernando Andresen, The origins ... op. cit.; the author 
basically sustains the 
argument that `the Angolan civil war was a domestic conflict for power which was deliberately 
internationalised by the rival movements'; ibid. p. 199. 
125 
des identites, inaputees aux trois mouvements ou sur lesquelles eux- 
memes jouent, ethnicise les soutiens et les camps. 
219 
As explained, it is not my intention to analyse the transition process according 
to the intricacies of the 1975-1976 civil war and the complexities of the effects 
of external involvement. I want mainly to understand the development and 
expression of socio-cultural identity cleavages during that period. Therefore, 
the following paragraphs should be seen as providing the necessary context to 
the understanding of the increasing political expression of those cleavages220. 
In terms of socio-cultural cleavages, the violent rivalry between these 
movements during the anti-colonial struggle did not augur well for the 
transition towards independence. After the signing of cease-fire agreements 
between Portugal the MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA (summer of 1974), a 
process began for the transfer of power, which culminated in the signing of a 
quadripartite agreement between Portugal and those three movements in Alvor, 
Portugal, on 15 January 1975. It made provisions for a transitional and coalition 
government, whereby ministries were allocated to all three movements, which 
was to exercise its functions until the general elections and independence 
proper on 11 November 1975. The tripartite government rapidly fell apart 
because of direct-armed confrontation between them, which started in March 
1975. From then on the conflict developed into civil war. Despite several 
219 In Messiant, Christine, `MPLA et UNITA, processus de paix et logique de guerre', in Politique 
Africaine, 57 (1995), p. 44. Over the same issue of `Les voies de 1'ethnisation', see Messiant, Christine, 
`Angola, les voies ... 
I, op. cit. pp. 155-210; Messiant, Christine, `Angola, les voies ... 
II, op. cit. 
pp. 181-212. 
220 For a detailed account of the political and military events of the 1974-1976 period towards the civil 
war and the increasing ethnic overtones of the conflict see among others: Marcum, John, The Angolan 
Revolution, Vol. II... op. cit. chapter VI; Heimer, F. W., The Decolonization ... op. cit. especially 
chapter 6 and 7; Guimaräes, Fernando Andresen, The origins ... op. cit. especially chapters 
4-7; also 
Heywood, Lynda, Contested Power in Angola, 1840's to the Present (New York: University of 
Rochester Press, 2000), especially chapters 6-7; Correia, Pezarat Descolonizacdo ... op. cit.; 
Cardoso, 
Silva Angola, anatomia de uma tragedia (Lisboa : Oficina do Livro, 2000), especially Part II ; For a 
good synthesis of the decolonization process of Angola relating the internal (Angolan) events with 
those occuring in Portugal and also mentioning the ethnic factor see MacQueen, Norrie, A 
descolonizacäo 
... op. cit. chapter 
6; For a good chronology of the events on this period see Simpkins, 
Gregory B Angola :a chronology of Major Political Developments February 1961 - September 1996. 
(Alexandria VA: Institute for Democratic Strategies, 1996) pp. 11-17 ;a good chronology can also be 
found in `Dix-neuf mois d'affrontements' in Le Monde (12 November 1975). 
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international attempts to-save the transition process221, by July 1975 the fighting 
had spiralled out of control. 
Following directly on the escalating of the conflict, there was an 
increase in the intensity of foreign involvement that went back to the anti- 
colonial struggle. The FNLA had the support of regular Zairean army units 
fighting alongside its armed forces, and had also received covert aid from the 
USA since January 1975. The MPLA, which had been military weakened by the 
loss of Soviet arms deliveries in 1973-1974222, negotiated a resumption of 
Soviet supplies in March 1975223 alongside with Cuban aid (including a few 
hundreds military advisers). As Soviet and Cuban aid for the MPLA escalated, 
from March onwards, covert US aid to the FNLA was increased and extended 
to UNITA. Foreseeing the possibility of a hostile `internationalist' MPLA 
government coming to power on Namibia's northern frontier, the South African 
Defence Force invaded Angolan territory in August, placing itself on the side 
of the FNLA and UNITA's (who joined forces against the MPLA). The invasion 
triggered an immediate response from the USSR, which increased its military 
support for the MPLA and Cuba, which sent thousands of troops, thus turning 
the tide of the war. In face of this the US halted its support to the opposite side. 
The stigma of association with South Africa's apartheid regime and the post- 
Vietnam mood provoked strong domestic opposition to US support for the 
FNLA/UNITA/South Africa side and on 19 December 1975 the Senate adopted 
the Clark amendment, which barred all aid to the Angolan factions. 
From July 1975 the country began to divide up into zones controlled by 
rival party armies based on their respective socio-cultural strongholds. During 
that month, the FNLA pushed the MPLA out of the 'Bakongo' provinces of 
221 There was a re-run of the Alvor agreement in May 1975, under the auspices of Portugal, pressured 
by the UN and one month latter, in June, the three movements met again in Nakuru under the auspices 
of Kenyatta and the OUA in order to set their divergences. 
222 As will be seen in the next chapter, by then the USSR decided to support the Chipenda faction 
('Eastern Revolt') disputing the MPLA's leadership with Agostinho Neto's faction and the Active 
Revolt faction. 
223 At this point the `Eastern revolt' had definitely lost the fight for the movement's leadership, being 
expelled from Luanda by Neto and having integrated the FNLA. We will return to this subject in the 
next chapter. 
127 
Uige and Zaire, while the MPLA expelled the FNLA and UNITA from Luanda 
and then consolidated its military control in the Luanda-Catete-Malange 
corridor. UNITA moved to control its 'Ovimbundu' bastions of Huambo and 
M. 
When independence came on 11 November 1975, two declarations were 
made: one in Luanda, where the MPLA announced the formation of the 
People's Republic of Angola with Agostinho Neto as president; the other, 
proclaimed by Holden Roberto and Savimbi, announced the formation of the 
Democratic Republic of Angola, which was to be governed by a UNITA- 
FNLA coalition with its headquarters in Huambo. The coalition soon 
disintegrated as the FNLA stopped UNITA from operating in its northern 
regions, and UNITA responded in kind in the south, starting a war between the 
two where UNITA prevailed, thus expelling Holden's movement from the main 
towns in the highlands. Benefiting from ever-growing Soviet and Cuban 
assistance, the MPLA defeated in February 1976 the forces of the FNLA to the 
North and the forces of UNITA to the South. Left isolated by the US and 
having to face an increasing number of well-armed Cuban troops, the South 
Africans withdrew back to Namibia in March 1976. 
Despite an increasing ethnic overtone, the struggle between nationalist 
movements can not be said to have been transformed into a mere ethnic 
conflict. That is in large part due to the MPLA's relatively greater flexibility 
and capacity for integration, or selective co-option, of members from other 
regions and ethno-linguistic groups - thus broadening the scope of the 
Creole/Mbundu alliance in a way not paralleled by the other two movements224. 
Such a singular feature was most probably related to the practice of internal 
compromise within the Creole/Mbundu elites and buttressed by an initially 
strong universalist discourse, sustaining principles that were essentially 
224 This co-option and integration was not without significant internal conflicts, be it at the leadership 
level or at the level of the guerrilla fighters as clearly exposed by Pepetela from lived guerrilla 
experiences in the Mayombe forest and the eastern military front; in Pepetela, Mayombe... op. cit.; 
Pepetela, A Geragdo... op. cit.; also in Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ... op. cit. 
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Christian humanistic and Socialist (with some impact at least on the part of the 
leadership, as we will see below), criticising any form of division based on 
socio-cultural references to identity. 
The fact is that Agostinho Neto's movement, although clearly dominated 
by the `Creole elites' was capable, throughout the anti-colonial struggle and 
towards independence, of integrating members from the `Bakongo' ethno- 
linguistic group, or members from Eastern groups ('Lunda-Tchokwe'; 
`Mbunda', `Luchaze')225, or from the extreme South ('Herero', `Cuvale')226. 
The integration of members from the central plateaux (of the Ovimbundu 
ethno-linguistic groups) was much more difficult and remained that way after 
independence 227. 
Concluding section A and bearing in mind its purpose, it can be said that on the 
whole, the pre-independence period was marked by three main characteristics: 
1. The most privileged elites (in economic, political and educational 
terms) were those with more proximate historical relationship with 
the Portuguese culture and colonial structures (commercial, military, 
administrative) - the Creole/M'Bundu elites of the Luanda- 
Malange corridor; 
2. Those elites were `traditionally' marked by clientelistic relationships 
of preferential solidarity including extensive kinship ties (usually 
seen as the prelude to `modem patrimonialism'228); 
3. The existing socio-cultural cleavages became deeper and assumed 
stronger ethnic overtones during the anti-colonial struggle. 
225 On the integration of `Bakongo' and people from the Eastern groups in the MPLA see Mabeko-Tali, 
J. M., "`Tribalisme", "regionalisme" et lutte de liberation nationale: la question tribale" et "ethnico- 
regionale" dans la dissidence au sein du MPLA dans 1'Est Angolais en 1969-1974', in Annie Africaine 
(1992-1993), pp. 463-486; also Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ... op. cit. 226 On the specificities of the integration of people from the extreme South in the MPLA see Carvalho, 
Ruy Duarte de, Aviso a navegacäo (Luanda: INALD, 1997). 
227 On the difficult relationship between the Ovimbundu and the post-colonial state between 1974-1992 
see Heywood, Lynda, Contested ... op. cit. chapter 7. 228 See Medard, Jean-Francois, `The Underdeveloped State 
... op. cit. especially pp. 165-181. 
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Bearing in mind such context, the bi-partition and then tri-partition of the 
nationalist movement, brought about a hegemonic power struggle for control of 
the State and the management of its resources. The State was seen in the 
colonial period as a mechanism for control of administrative, military and 
economic structures and in this way it controlled social and economic success 
or faillure. In these terms, it seems logical that the struggle for power in the 
future State (especially acute during the 1975-1976 open warfare between 
movements) had taken on a vital importance (`bloody and brutal [... ] like a war 
of religion'229), and had become a `zero-sum struggle t230 where the winner 
would take the `lion's' share and for an indefinite period of time, while the 
losers would have to count on the winner's co-option but would always come 
second in any political, economic hierarchy. 
Accordingly, the conflict surrounding independence (1975-1976) is 
officially described by the MPLA as a `struggle for the hegemony and 
exclusivity of power'231. On the FNLA's side the conflict was seen in the same 
way, `convinced that its military strength would in the end permit it to "grab 
the whole cake s232. And for UNITA, the expected electoral victory or even a 
possible federalist political arrangement was seen as the most desirable way `to 
get the biggest share' and the leading role in the new political system233 
Nevertheless, the military confrontation for the hegemony of power was taken 
as the most realistic scenario and led Savimbi's movement to a strong 
reinforcement of its military forces234 
Moreover, as stressed to the author by Jaka Jamba, the Alvor agreement 
signed with Portugal in January 1975 (establishing the political and 
229 In Soremekun, Fola, Angola ... op. cit. p. 212. 230 Term used by Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. p. 8. 231 In MPLA, 40 anos por Angola (Luanda: MPLA, 1996), p. 51; also referring the MPLA's hegemonic 
ambitions is Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences... op. cit. p. 187. 
232 In Heimer, F. W., The Decolonization 
... op. cit. p. 65. The same point of view was assumed 
by 
Lucas N'Gonda member of the FNLA's Politburo in private interview (19 March 1998). 
233 In Heimer, F. W., The Decolonization 
... op. cit. p. 
65. 
234 This hegemonic intention and perspective on UNITA's side was confirmed to the author by Jaka 
Jamba, member of the transitional government in 1975, who is still today a member of UNITA and 
always trusted by Savimbi; in private interview (7 June 1998). 
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institutional process towards independence) and especially the provisional 
government composed by the three parties, was basically seen by all of them as 
a way to assess each other's strength and prepare for the decisive battle in 
order to find a `winner' in the struggle for exclusive hegemony235. Also 
confirming this perspective, Almeida Santos, member of the Portuguese 
government, revealed recently that on the eve of signing the agreement, he 
tried to persuade the leaders of the three movements to alter the wording in 
order to allow for a rotation of power between the three because according to 
him, he was quite convinced that the model of elections with one winner 
would not work. Whoever got into power would not be willing to share it and 
whoever was left outside would not accept exclusion. At a first meeting, all the 
leaders accepted the new agreement, but the next morning it was rejected and 
236 the old accord was signed 
Beyond all the intricacies of that process, the most important point to 
stress here is that the MPLA came to win that struggle for the State's 
hegemony after the open military confrontation between the three movements, 
also winning thereby the leadership and dominance of the patrimonial system 
that was soon implemented. The new (independent) Angolan political system 
then is here said to have initially followed a `modern patrimonial' dynamics 
(during the presidency of Agostinho Neto), then evolving towards a post- 
modern patrimonial dynamics (through the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos 
Santos' presidency, until 1987) 237. This evolution will be analysed in detail in 
the remainder of this thesis. 
235 From private interview with Jaka Jamba (7 June 1998). 
236 In public interview of Almeida Santos to the radio programme Angola, 25 years on, on the 
Portuguese TSF radio news (10 November 2000). Also sustaining the ineffectiveness of the Alvor 
agreement due to the `real conflict' for power fought between movements is MacQueen, Norrie, A 
descolonizacdo 
... op. cit. p. 219. 237 Although there are a few references to patrimonialism and clientelism in one of the most recent texts 
of Christine Messiant, such themes are treated for the post 1987 period and under a different analytical 
perspective and different conceptualization that should not be confused with the ones that will be 
presented here. See, Messiant, Christine, `A propos des..., op. cit. pp. 61-95. 
131 
CASE STUDY, SECTION -B: THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
NEW POST INDEPENDENCE SYSTEM OR PARTISAN 
MODERN PATRIMONIALISM (1975-1979) 
Section B seeks to understand the working logic of the post-independence socio- 
political system and of the State during the presidency of Agostinho Neto (1975- 
1979). In order to achieve that aim I will analyse the dynamics through which the 
framework of relationships (political, economic, ethical) between rulers and ruled 
developed during that period. 
In the end, the main purpose of this section (as well as that of section C) is to 
explain the modem or post-modem nature of the existing patrimonial working order. 
Modem patrimonialism is about political and normative coherence in the operation of 
a patrimonial system, ensuring social integration through distribution (linking the 
higher and the lower social strata, the rulers and the ruled). Post-modern 
patrimonialism is about the extreme development of patrimonial organisational 
principles and expressions breaking the interdependence ties between rulers and ruled. 
The analysis in this section (as well as in section C) will be structured in five 
chapters. The first is dedicated providing the historical context, discussing the main 
socio-political events of each administration which are relevant to the 
understanding of the ensuing chapters and to the main discussion at the centre of 
this thesis. The second, third, and fourth, respectively are concerned with the 
political, economic and ethical framework of interdependence relationships. The 
section concludes with a characterisation of the effectively existing State in terms of 
assessing its modern or post-modem patrimonial working logic. 
Therefore, the following chapters are not intended to give an account of the 
country profile on economy, politics, and normative procedures during Neto's 
presidency, but an assessment of the nature of the patrimonial logic which operated 
and gave the political system its character. 
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5- Context of Socio-Political Events: Nitismo and the Attempted Coup 
in 1977 
Agostinho Neto's presidency (1975-1979) hinged from the start on a new 
political and sociological phenomenon at the core of the great and diverse 
`Creole/Mbundu alliance' -- a political activism pro-MPLA, which went out of 
control and climaxed with the attempted coup d'etat on 27th May 1977, led by 
Nito Alves. The specificity of such phenomenon here designated as Nitismo238 
influenced in many ways the ensuing formal political model, the State and 
framework of relationship between rulers and ruled. 
Accordingly, in order to better understand the following chapters it is 
important to analyse Nitismo in terms of its socio-political and economic 
background (sub-chapter 5.1), its strategy to conquest power (5.2) and the 
reaction it provoked in the MPLA's leadership (5.3). The present chapter does 
not aim to be an overall `historical introduction' to the presidency of Agostinho 
Neto, but rather a selected analysis and contextualisation according to the needs 
of the analytical perspective here in discussion. 
Given the fact that this is one of the most insufficiently studied themes 
on contemporary Angolan politics and sociology; given its importance to the 
subsequent development and understanding of this work; this chapter will 
necessarily go into some considerable detail. 
5.1 Sociological, Political and Economic Background of Nitismo 
Taking advantage of the unexpected freedom of association and expression 
brought by the 25th April 1974 (the Portuguese revolution) and the agitated 
period derived from the war between the competing nationalist movements 
238 `Nito-ism' or `Nito-ist'; a term denoting the socio-political phenomenon behind the attempted coup 
d'etat led by Nito Alves, but going beyond the person of Nito himself and the concrete event of the 
attempted coup. 
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(1975-1976), which did-not allow the MPLA to enforce internal discipline, old 
and new power disputes within the MPLA gained in strength and challenged 
Agostinho Neto's leadership. 
On the one side there could be identified the remaining political echoes 
of an old fraction of elite, essentially representing the coastal Creole/M'Bundu 
'aristocracy' within the Old Creoles category, whose influence had been 
decreasing since 1962, when Agostinho Neto assumed the movement's 
presidency. Led by members such as Gentil Viana, Mario and Joaquim Pinto de 
Andrade, linked to the origins of modem nationalism and the MPLA itself in 
the late fifties, they formed a political faction in May 1974 -- the so-called 
Active Revolt, essentially based in Brazzaville, fighting to regain the leadership 
of the movement during the Lusaka congress in August 1974. At this Congress, 
besides the Active Revolt, two other factions were disputing the movement's 
leadership: the so-called presidentialist faction (led by Agostinho Neto and 
Lücio Lara) and the Eastern Revolt (which had emerged in 1972/73, led by 
Daniel Chipenda; essentially based on the Eastern military front near the 
frontier with Zambia). After insurmountable disagreements and fearing a 
political defeat the presidential faction abandoned the Congress and arranged a 
new `congress' in September 1974, in Moxico, Eastern Angola (Conferencia 
Inter-Regional de Militantes; Inter Regional Militants Conference) where the 
totality of delegates and military commanders were pro-Neto, thus ensuring his 
re-election as President239. From the three factions present in Lusaka, the 
Active Revolt was the smallest in number of delegates and several of its 
members abandoned the project soon after that congress, returning to Luanda 
where they tried to be re-integrated within Neto's MPLA (a group of members 
led by Joaquim Pinto de Andrade and Dr Eduardo dos Santos); while other 
239 On all the intricacies of this process which cannot be analysed in detail here, see Mabeko Tali, Jean- 
Michel, Dissidences 
... op. cit. especially chapter 
6. 
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members continued to fight Neto (such as Gentil Viana, Manuel Videira and 
Fernando Paiva among others) 240 
On the other side, benefiting from the same post-25th April 1974 
freedom, there emerged dozens of new autonomous political micro-groups 
(committees), principally led by a young generation that had grown up during 
the last phase of colonialism and were supportive of Neto's MPLA (emerging 
mainly in Luanda but soon spreading to other cities along the Luanda-Malange 
corridor and also along the Lobito-Benguela axis - i. e. the old centres of 
colonisation). They included the `Amilcar Cabral Committees' (close to the 
Portuguese extreme left, defending an Albanian Marxism based on the writings 
of Enver Hodja); the `Hojy-ya-Henda Committees' (also related to the 
Portuguese extreme left but supporting Maoism); the Cita Vales' groups of 
thought (close to the Portuguese Communist Party and consequently supporting 
a pro-Soviet route); the `Talahadi Committees' (from the very beginning 
surrounding Nito Alves and with an initial pan-African, racist and Maoist 
discourse); other less significant groups such as `N'Zinga Committees' and 
`Joseph Stalin Committees', among several dozens of others241. 
For Neto's leadership, the remaining echoes of the `old' factionalist 
disputes (the survivors of the Active Revolt) were not too much of a problem. 
He had been dealing with their criticism since becoming President in 1962 and 
had always managed to defeat it. In spite of the ability and credibility of its 
leaders, its potential sociological and political `constituency' (the heirs of the 
Creole 'aristocracy') was too damaged by its relatively privileged status within 
240 From private interviews with Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16 and 20 April 1998); The Eastern Revolt 
allied itself to the FNLA and progressively disappeared along with that movement's military defeat. For 
the most detailed and accurate study on these factions, its genesis and development before and after 
independence see Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ... op. cit. chapters 
3 to 6. 
241 On these committees see Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ... op. cit. especially chapter 
10. 
Although there is a lot of historical research to be done on the important role of these committees, this 
generation and their political dynamism, this study is the most complete reference. Its author's 'kinship' 
links with Lücio Lara (some kind of an adoptive son, living with Lara's family in Luanda since 1976, 
but with close relationship with that family since the early seventies in Brazzaville, during the anti- 
colonial struggle) allowed him to be the only researcher (absolutely without any other exception), to 
have a relatively free access to Lücio Lara's private archives (a real treasure to the researcher over this 
period). 
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the colonial system. It was demoralised and shamed by the massive running 
back to Portugal of the whites and some of its own members who, fearing 
reprisals, chose to pursue their careers in Portugal. The option for the great 
majority of this elite was to integrate themselves quietly into the new political 
disposition, whilst trying to maintain their socio-economic status by obtaining 
posts in public administration; using to this end their wide experience and 
relatively high education. Besides, those few elements still insisting on the 
Active Revolt were strongly repudiated by the majority of youth committees, 
especially by the ones close to Nito Alves who, as minister of the interior 
pushed for their arrest in April 1976.242 
The real threat to the movement's leadership came progressively and 
increasingly from these youth committees due to three main reasons that will 
now be developed: 1) they were the representatives of a new sociological and 
political phenomenon within the Creole/Mbundu elites; 2) they became 
gradually disillusioned and frustrated with the movement's leadership and its 
ideological, political and economic course; 3) they began to have significant 
power derived from their ability to link their activity to that of the lower social 
strata organisations. 
5.1.1 A New Sociological and Political Phenomenon 
The majority of members composing the youth committees were from a 
generation unknown to the MPLA's leadership (itself composed of an older 
generation or nationalist generation) who had never had to deal with them. 
They were aged circa 17-27 and as a general rule had not taken part in the 
struggle for liberation; their activism mainly consisted of clandestine political 
group discussions and pamphleteering propaganda within colonial society. They 
had grown up during the last phase of colonialism, in an Angola different to the 
242 When the arrests pushed by Nito Alves took place, negotiations were going on between Neto and 
members of the Active Revolt through Joaquim Pinto de Andrade; Neto was insisting on the usual 
`criticism and self-criticism' to re-integrate those members, something that was not being accepted 
easily by them. From private interviews with Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16th and 20th April 1998). 
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one the nationalists had known and from which they had been kept away for 
twenty years, since the late fifties. It was a generation that had benefited from 
the democratisation and development of the colonial educational system from 
the 1960s onwards243, which in general terms provided them with a relatively 
high level of education and preparation, making them potential competitors to 
most of the MPLA's political and administrative cadres. It was also a generation 
that experienced the accentuated economic growth of Angola (1961-1973)244 
and became dominated by the passionate, `romantic', political-ideological 
discussions typical of that day and age (the sixties). 
During a period of rapid social transformation and rapid economic 
growth (sixties and early seventies) followed by an abrupt and agitated political 
transformation (1974-1976) the `traditional' socio-economic, regional and 
racial sub-divisions of the Creole/M'Bundu elites cut across this younger 
generation. They had a heterogeneous socio-economic, racial and regional 
background (mixing for instance, so-called progressive whites with educated 
blacks and mesticos; youngsters mainly from the city centre of Luanda, but also 
some from the muceques; mainly from the coast but also from the interior). 
What they had in common was in fact their relatively high education their 
243 This development within the educational system was part of a number of changes undertaken by 
colonial politics during the sixties in order to counter the international criticism and reproof against the 
violence and shortcomings of the Portuguese colonial system at war with the nationalist movements. As 
stressed by Heimer, `The overall picture changed to a significant extent as a consequence of a new 
colonial policy that began to emerge in the late fifties, and was officially adopted and applied in 
response to the 1961 uprisings and the ensuing guerrilla war. The rationale behind this new line [... ] 
could be characterised by the ideological keywords "development" and "integration". ' In Heimer, F. W., 
The Decolonization 
... op. cit. p. 12. `1'expansion presque brutale de 1'enseignement surtout ä partir de 1964 [... ] reussit ä quintupler les effectifs scolaires en quinze ans. L'objectif declare en fut 1'integration 
culturelle. ' In Heimer, Franz-Wilhelm, 'Formation sociale ... op. cit. p. 
37. Primary education grew 
400% from 1960/61 to 1972/1973. Secondary education grew 500% within the same period and 
superior education was open in Angola in 1963 with the foundation of the Luanda University. For a 
deeper account of educational colonial policy between 1926 and 1974 see Marques da Silva, Elisete 0 
papel societal do sistema de ensino na Angola colonial (1926-1974) (Bissau: II Colbquio Internacional 
em Ciencias Sociais sobre a Africa de Lingua Oficial Portuguesa, Novembro 1991). This work contains 
a lot of references to important although unpublished research produced by Heimer in colonial Angola. 
244 An accentuated economic growth of all economic sectors with special significance to the industrial 
sector occurred in Angola mainly between 1961-1973; on this issue see Neto, Ana Maria A 
Industrializacäo de Angola 1961-1975 (Lisboa: Escher, 1991); also Zenha Rela, Jose Manuel Angola 
entre o presente eo futuro (Lisboa: Escher, 1992), especially Part I and II; also Bhagavan, M R, 
Angola's political economy 1975-85 (Motala: Swedish International Development Authority, 1986), 
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young age and their extreme political-ideological positions centred on Marxist 
theories245. 
Thus, although in several specific cases there were close or distant 
kinship relationships between members of this generation and members of the 
`nationalist generation' (those that could be clearly identified and classified 
within the `traditional' elite segments according to the existing sub-divisions as 
expounded above), these young people represented a new sociological and 
political phenomenon; they could not be simply classified within the 
`traditional' segments of the Creole/M'Bundu elites according to the 
`traditional' criteria mainly because their political alignment and procedure did 
not fit those criteria. 
5.1.2 The Youth's Disillusion With The MPLAs Leadership 
The increasing disillusion and frustration of the youth committees with the 
MPLA's leadership was ideological, political and economic. 
Ideologically, their disillusion came as soon as some of their members 
had their first contact with the movement's leadership during the Lusaka 
Congress (August 1974). They went there as delegates from Luanda and talked 
with Agostinho Neto, expounding their commitment and enthusiasm for 
Marxist theories and the Socialist mode of production, but were struck by 
Neto's answer that it was too soon to talk about such issues and that the MPLA 
had the intention to establish its own model of Socialism246. During that 
p. 7; also MacQueen, Norrie, A descolonizacäo ... op. cit. pp. 
72-73; also Hodges, Tony Angola to the 
1990's 
... op. cit. pp. 29-30. 245 Also talking about a conflict of generations behind the Nitista phenomenon is Carreira, Iko, 0 
Pensamento estrategico de Agostinho Neto (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 1996), pp. 147-148. 
246 From private interview with Jaime Cohen (member of that delegation) conceded to Mabeko-Tali, cit. 
in Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences 
... op. cit. p. 
305. Also stressing Neto's pragmatic approach 
towards Socialism is his personal friend, Davidson, Basil L'Afrique au XXe Siecle - L'eveil et les 
combats du nationalisme africain (Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique, 1980), p. 284. Neto always wanted to 
ensure some autonomy and by then had very fresh in his mind that the USSR stopped supporting him 
since 1973, favouring instead the Eastern Revolt faction, overtly standing for Chipenda during the 
Lusaka congress, then resuming its aid after Neto's arrival in Luanda and the magnificent (legitimising) 
reception he had there in February 1975; from private interviews with Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16 
April 1998); Pepetela (7 July 1998). 
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Congress and the subsequent Inter Regional Militants Conference (September 
1974), these young delegates constructed a negative ideological judgement over 
the MPLA's leadership. 
Its ne comprennent pas les hesitations et les silences, voire 
1'irritation de presque tous les dirigeants du mouvement face ä leur 
discours "marxiste". Qui plus est, face ä desorganisation dans 
laquelle se trouve le mouvement, toute l'idealisation qu'ils avaient 




c'est la rencontre du romantisme revolutionnaire candidement 
universaliste avec la direction politique d'un movement de 
liberation qui avait une experience desabusee dans ses relations 
avec les allies exterieurs (USSR, Chine en particulier) au sein des 
divers camps ideologiques248. 
The only palliatives to such disillusion were the ideologically aggressive 
speeches of the young political commissar of the MPLA's Ist military region 
(Dembos forest) Nito Alves, to whom the young delegates coming from Luanda 
felt increasingly attracted. Later on, in November 1974, when a first major 
delegation of the MPLA arrived in Luanda led by Lücio Lara, a proposal was 
made to these committees in order to simply integrate them into the existing 
structures of the movement, but such a proposal was strongly refused by the 
bulk of them, opting to maintain their organisational autonomy in the face of 
the movement's ideological vagueness249. It is worth to note that as late as 
August 1975, Agostinho Neto was wisely stating that, 
The MPLA is not a Marxist-Leninist organisation. Nor is our 
leadership Marxist-Leninist. [... ] We are a large organisation with 
various shades of opinion and different types of groups. [... ] As a 
heterogeneous organisation, it contains both Marxist and other 
points of view2so 
247 Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences 
... op. cit. p. 
178. 
248 Ibid. p. 304. 
249 Ibid. p. 282. 
250 In Afriscope, August 1975, cited in Africa Contemporary Record -- ACR, 8 (1976), p. B423. The 
MPLA had always remained an ecletic front as stressed by Marcum and most accurately analysed by 
Mabeko-Tali; some ideas expressed at Dolisie, Congo-Brazzaville, at the 'Ist Regional Assembly of the 
Ist and IInd political and military regions' in February 1968, according to which the movement should 
convert itself into a revolutionary vanguard party ideologically well defined, were deferred until such 
time as study groups could produce a solid nucleus of ideologically prepared cadres, something that 
never happened until 1977 when such vanguard party was effectively formed as we will see below. On 
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Several years later Chipenda re-stated the same, 
As a whole, as a synthesis, the MPLA [as a nationalist movement] 
was not a communist movement. That does not mean that there 
were not within the movement several elements that were 
communist. 25' 
Equally, the first version of the constitution (11 November 1975) does not have 
any reference to the construction of Socialism252; something that deepened the 
youth committees disappointment in ideological terms. 
Politically the major disillusion and frustration for these youngsters 
came with the non-fulfilment of the expectations they nurtured for themselves 
in terms of the role they intended to play within the new socio-political system 
and State. In a country short of cadres, especially after the exodus of the 
Portuguese, the relatively high level of schooling of this politically active and 
ideologically fervent generation gave its members great hopes of playing 
leading roles (politically relevant) in the construction of the new socio-political 
project. But it did not take long for them to realise that the leading political jobs 
of the top echelons of the new State were the prerogative of the earlier 
nationalist generation who had effectively been fighting the colonial system 
(from outside), regardless of academic preparation 253 
Economically, a major disillusion came when members of this younger 
generation experienced a sharp drop in their living standards (in a country 
which they had known during a phase of accentuated economic growth - 
1961-1973), accompanied by increased corruption, especially at the top 
echelons of the movement and of the State onto which they projected so many 
ideological candid principles and projects. According to one of these young 
people at the time: 
this `Regional Assembly' sometimes mistakenly called conference see Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, 
Dissidences... op. cit. pp. 80-82; also Marcum, John, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II... op. cit. p. 199. 
251 In Public interview of Daniel Chipenda to the National Radio of Angola, programme Foi hä vinte 
anos, (17th June 1995). 
252 See Constitutional Law of 1975, Diary of the Republic--DR, Ist series, n° 1 (11 November). 
253 From private interviews with Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Joao Melo (17 April 1998); JM 
Mabeko-Tali (27 April 1998); Vicente Pinto de Andrade (11 May 1998). 
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[In 1975-1976}, there was unbridled corruption in the cities and 
we, the young ones, we could not accept this corruption. We had 
our sights set on independence and we agreed with the Marxist- 
Leninist theory and if it was socialism that the MPLA wanted, there 
must have been something wrong. Corruption was not going to lead 
us to any kind of Socialism. [... ] We knew that we were worse off 
than during colonialism. As young men not from the peasantry but 
middle class, from petite and middle bourgeoisie, we knew we were 
worse off, with many problems, and yet the leaders had all they 
could possibly want, assuming a deplorable attitude of ostentation 
and display of wealth, the worst of them being Iko Carreira 
[Minister of Defence], who was known to be a diamond 
trafficker. 254 
Supporting the same idea of a drop in living standards and increased corruption 
at the top of the governmental hierarchy generating increasing criticism, 
Mabeko-Tali states that, 
La deterioration de la vie socio-economique de la population dans 
son ensemble, et 1'installation de la corruption dans les moeurs des 
governants de la jeune Republique viennent au secours de cette 
'ZS5 activite [jeune et contestataire] 
Also stressing the increasing corruption right before the attempted coup is 
Fauvet, 
Corruption was rampant (... ) Public Supplies Enterprise had to be 
dissolved because of the gross corruption within it, with the failure 
of goods to arrive at their destination, mysterious destruction of 
documents by the fire, etc. 256 
5.1.3 The Increased Autonomous Power of The Youth Committees 
In face of such ideological, political and economic disillusionment and given 
their inability to reach immediately the top structures of the movement, the 
youth committees tried to construct an autonomous base for their power within 
the new socio-political system. To this end their aim was twofold. 
254 Private interview with Luis dos Passos (13th May 1998); he is one of the only two surviving leaders 
of the attempted coup d'etat of 27 May 1977. His statement on the traffic activity of Iko Carreira was 
very common within the Nitistas and even expounded by Nito Alves to the plenary of the Central 
Committee on the 20th May 1976 as we will see. 
255 Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences 
... op. cit. p. 423. 256 Fauvet, Paul, `Angola: the Rise and Fall of Nito Alves', in Review of African Political Economy, 9 
(1978), p. 94. 
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On the one hand, -they started to develop their revolutionary theories and 
political projects (beyond ideological nuances) around the issue of poder 
popular (popular power), generally supporting a flexible interpretation of 
Marxist `democratic centralism' in favour of a political system where the power 
is effectively, actively and permanently exerted by the bottom layers of society 
(the so-called `people') whose organisational structures these committees 
wanted to control with exclusivity and autonomy vis ä vis the movement's 
leadership257. 
On the other hand, and fulfilling such projects, they became deeply 
involved with the lower social strata organisations, be it in terms of 
neighbourhood para-military self-defence organisations or workers' strike 
movements and independent unions, to whom they lent a political discourse, 
orientation and structured organisation. 
In terms of para-military organisations, some of the youth committees 
became increasingly related to spontaneously emergent self-defence 
neighbourhood commissions where they promoted a democratically elected 
structure, with direct elections being held as soon as November 1974. 
Although these commissions considered themselves pro-MPLA, all the 
democratic processes took place without any relationship with the MPLA's 
formal structures258. Such independent and direct democratic processes led 
those commissions to comprise the most diverse elements, from marginals, 
through workers, to political activists of each neighbourhood 259, forming 
Comissöes de Bairro/Neighbourhood Commissions and Comissöes Populares 
de Bairro/Neighbourhood Popular Commissions, later articulated (in part) with 
257 See Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ... op. cit. especially chapter 10. 258 Neighbourhood Popular Commissions became democratically elected by informal neighbourhood 
assemblies (November 1974) and also democratically co-ordinated by a Co-ordination Organ elected 
by the Neighbourhood Commissions; see Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ... op. cit. especially 
chapter 10. 
259 On the marginal component of several members of these commissions see, for instance, Fauvet, 
Paul, `Angola 
... op. cit. p. 
91. 
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the ODP-Organizagdo- de Defesa Popular/People's Defence Organisation26o 
Their para-military activity was crucial in helping the MPLA to defeat and 
expel from the cities (especially Luanda) the other two movements (UNITA and 
FNLA) during the 1975-1976 confrontation 261. Because of this crucial help, the 
MPLA's leadership adopted at first a paternalistic and condescending attitude 
towards their autonomous and parallel activities. 
In terms of labour strike movements, the dynamics, organisational 
experience, political and ideological support provided by the youth committees 
in Neighbourhood Commissions and Popular Neighbourhood Commissions 
was transposed into workplaces, especially factories, in the form of 
autonomous Workers Commissions and micro independent unions. Benefiting 
from such support offered by those committees (in the form of courses, lessons, 
pamphlets, direction of assemblies etc. ) the anarchical wave of workers 
protesting for an improvement in their living conditions (which started 
spontaneously after 25th April 1974) soon became a true, politically and 
economically worrying strike movement; as reported by David Ottaway in May 
1976, 
Workers no longer necessarily accept orders from their would-be 
bosses (be they state or private leaders) and sometimes hold 
meetings to decide whether to obey or to refuse. Conflict between 
workers and managers even in recently nationalised factories has 
become of such concern to the government that party and labour 
union leaders are now going from factory to factory to explain why 
discipline and production must be the order of the day. 262 
The increasing articulation between youth committees and the organisations of 
the lower social strata does not mean that the latter were simply manipulated by 
the former and indirectly by the former's disillusions and ambitions. People 
from the lower social strata (in general) had their own sound and specific 
26° The ODP was set up by the MPLA in September 1975 to complement the FAPLA (armed forces), 
representing an attempt to integrate, organise and control the spontaneously emergent self-defence 
neighbourhood commissions. 
261 On the `military' help provided by these commissions to the MPLA see Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, 
Dissidences... op. cit. especially chapter 10. 
262 See article of David Ottaway in Herald Tribune (18 May 1976). 
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reasons to contest the evolution of the new socio-political system; reasons that 
derived from their frustrated economic expectations with the independent State. 
As stressed by David Birmingham in relation to the attempted coup, 
`The workers in the capital had discovered that their expectations had been 
pitched too high and independence was not all golden'263. Essentially, their 
expectation towards independence seemed to be distributive, basically meaning 
a massive distribution of material benefits and privileges by the leadership in 
terms of compensation for the colonial exploitation; a rent coming from the 
riches of Angola (natural resources previously `stolen' by the colonialists). At 
least in part, this kind of expectation is thought to have been nurtured by some 
in the nationalist movements during the anti-colonial struggle, as expounded by 
Iko Carreira, Daniel Chipenda and others. According to Iko Carreira (trying to 
explain popular support of Nitismo), 
A great part of the population had a very different idea of 
independence. For some, the simple change from the Portuguese to 
an Angolan leadership would bring richness and rest [riqueza e 
descanso]. Several, touched by the propaganda of the nationalist 
organisations constantly stressing the Portuguese theft on Angola, 
seemed to believe that it would not be necessary to work anymore 
after independence 264 
According to Daniel Chipenda, 
Within the most exploited rungs of society, the less educated, there 
was not the possibility to define and analyse the reasons of colonial 
exploitation. Others [the leadership] knew better those reasons. 
That is why I say that there was a very broad notion of 
independence. For some it was simply to be in the place of the 
colons. [... ] I can tell you for instance that once, when I was 
director of the organisation of cadres, a comrade came to me 
saying: comrade Chipenda I want to study. I asked him what for? 
He answered, to become a postal clerk! [chefe de posto; one of the 
lowest positions within the colonial administrative hierarchy, but 
with a considerable power and material benefit within the rural 
milieus]. Well, as you see, we were fighting for independence, but 
he, within that concept of struggle, wanted to be a postal clerk. [... ] 
If you do remember well our programme, it said for instance, that 
the MPLA was the movement to defend the interests of the most 
exploited classes and that was in fact an easier way of mobilising 
263 Birmingham, David, Frontline Nationalism... op. cit. P. 81 
264 Carreira, Iko, 0 Pensamento ... op. cit. p. 148. 
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the less educated rungs of society, because there was no dialogue 
between the ones and the others [top and lower rungs of society], 
and that in fact served as a necessary incentive to the least 
educated, to bring them to fight; naturally, if they were to find there 
that phraseology it would be easier to convince them. However, We 
should have said that our struggle was for all and not just for the 
most exploited classes; we should have simply defined that our 
struggle was against a common enemy, colonialism. That aspect 
[that phraseology] in our programme brought us some problems 
creating different notions of independence [different 
expectations]. 265 
For the general population, the first phase between the 25th of April 1974 and 
independence, had been one of great freedom, with houses being occupied and 
the possessions of colonists fleeing back to Portugal being appropriated. This 
gave the impression that the distributive expectations of independence were 
being fulfilled by the MPLA and that, once victory over the FNLA and UNITA 
had been completely achieved, things would be even better, with the 
generalised enjoyment of the great wealth of Angola through the extensive 
distribution of income, privileges and benefits266. However, this did not happen 
and despite the large oil revenues, instead of the promised abundance and 
distribution, the economic situation of most of the population fell sharply into a 
state of acute shortage, with miserly `peoples' shops' and luxurious `leaders' 
shops' (as we will see in the next chapters). The new economic situation made 
itself felt through austerity and increased appeals to production and workers' 
sacrifices, engendering an understandable dissatisfaction and popular criticism, 
which were politically channelled by the youth committees towards the strike 
and protesting movement; thus representing: 
- on the one hand, a link between the frustrations of the younger 
generation and the lower social strata in general; 
26$ Public interview of Daniel Chipenda to the National Radio of Angola, programme Foi hä vinte anos 
(17th June 1995). Also supporting the same argument of a different conception of independence among 
the lower rungs of society, essentially based upon expectations of material benefits is Pepetela in 
private interview (7th July 1998). 
266 Obviously, such distribution was expected to discriminate `the enemy', UNITA and FNLA, and its 
internal supporters, increasingly identified with the Ovimbundu and Bakongo that did not adhere to the 
MPLA, as referred above. 
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- on the other hand, a political articulation between the youth committees 
and the lower social strata organisations. 
If we bear in mind that such political articulation took place within an 
unrestrained and totally out of control (anarchic) dynamic of poder popular, it 
is understandable that this was favourable ground for the emergence of a new 
faction, bent on challenging the movement's leadership. 
5.2 A New Political Faction and its Strategy to Challenge the MPLA's 
Leadership 
The new emerging political faction comprised in its leading core, two groups: 
Firstly there was a group originating from the MPLA's first military region 
(Dembos forest), including some elements from an older generation, such as 
Bakalov (Eduardo Evaristo), Monstro Imortal (Jacob Caetano Joäo), Sianouk 
and Ho-Chi-Minh (Bernardo Ventura). The first military region was the oldest 
(since 1961) and the most mythical, given its survival up to the end of the anti- 
colonial war in almost complete isolation from the rest of the MPLA267. 
Mainly because of its isolation, the first military region developed an 
identity very much its own and was very critical of the movement's leadership, 
whom they accused of negligence and blamed for the lamentable conditions 
which the region had endured since the beginning of the armed struggle: lack of 
arms, ammunition, food and communication with the outside world. Some of its 
members, considering themselves the true and most legitimate heroes of the 
267 Only in June 1966, an MPLA reinforcement, the Cienfuegos Column, managed to reach the Dembos 
forest after an epic trek from the Zaire frontier. In January 1967, a few survivors of another MPLA 
detachment, the Camy column, reached the Dembos after being sequentially ambushed by the 
UPA/FNLA guerrillas and the colonial troops. Besides those two occasions and despite several other 
suicidal attempts (decimated either by the UPA/FNLA or the colonial troops) there was no further 
contact between the first military region and the rest of the movement until 1974. From Private 
interviews with: J. M Mabeko Tali (27th April 1998); Lücio Lara (1st May 1998); Alexandre Sebastiäo 
(4th May 1998); Commander Bage from the first military region (26th May 1998); Luis dos Passos 
(13th May 1998); Filomeno Vieira Lopes (24th March 1998); Pepetela (7th July 1998). 
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anti-colonial struggle, deserving the leading role within the movement never 
allayed this criticism and resentment268. 
Secondly, there was a group representing the above mentioned youth 
committees generation, with some young ex-political prisoners from the Sao 
Nicolau Camp (in Southern Angola)269 led by Jose Van Dunem and other young 
activists, including so-called progressive whites such as Sita Valles (married to 
Jose Van Dunem after independence) and Rui Coelho, amongst others270. 
This motley alliance between nationalists from the first military region, 
and members of the young generation of activists who had not fought the war, 
was achieved by Nito Alves (or Bernardo Alves Batista, to give his full name), 
a representative of both groups: he was a political commissar from the most 
mythical military region (the Ist, of Dembos forest), but his young age (born in 
1945, at Piri, Dembos), his short but effective path as a high school student in 
Luanda 271 and his aggressive and unorthodox (i. e. confused) ideological 
discourse made him close to the young activists. 272 Nito soon became the most 
268 From Private interviews with: J. M Mabeko Tali (27th April 1998); Commander Bage from the first 
military region (26th May 1998); Luis dos Passos (13th May 1998); Filomeno Vieira Lopes (24th 
March 1998); Pepetela (7th July 1998). 
269 These young political prisoners were arrested in mid and late sixties (mainly students at high schools 
involved in clandestine political activities against colonialism); they are not to be confused with the first 
generation of political prisoners arrested in late fifties and early sixties (mainly deported to Tarrafal in 
Cape Verde or even to Portugal) to whom we will come back later. 
270 Because there seems to be some doubt about the `ethnic' background of Sita Maria Dias Valles, we 
must stress that she was white, bom in Angola in 1951, within a family of colonial classe moyenne, of a 
Portuguese mother and father (her father was of Goan origin), student of Medicine in Lisbon where, in 
the early seventies she became a member of the Portuguese Communist Party and an activist of the 
Union of Communist Students; she re-entered in Angola after the 25th April 1974 where she married 
and had a child with Jose Van Dunem; for bibliographical data see Expresso (25th January 1992). Rui 
Coelho was also white, born in Lobito and had always studied inside Angola at a high school level but 
with very profound interest in political ideologies, being responsible for the Nitistas sector of 
intellectuals and political education along with Sita Valles; his family was of Portuguese origin and 
very close to the author's own family, also from Lobito. 
271 Nito Alves studied at an evangelical mission near Piri, and then from 1960 in Luanda, living in the 
muceque of Sambizanga and studying at the Salvador Correia high school where he became involved in 
anti-colonial activity. When a number of his colleagues were arrested in 1966 and incarcerated in Sao 
Nicolau prison, Nito Alves left Luanda and joined the guerrilla fighters of the MPLA's first military 
region in the Dembos forest. After 25 April 1974, Nito went to Luanda where he came to regain 
contact with his former colleagues (then released) and started his political activity before going to 
Lusaka to attend the Congress in August 1974 with some of his old colleagues and new partners (young 
activists). For bibliographical data on Nito Alves see Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ... op. cit. 
p. 398; also Fauvet, Paul, `Angola ... op. cit. pp. 88-104. 272 As we have previously mentioned, the younger generation of the micro-groups developed an eclectic 
ideological approach ranging from pro-Chinese, pro-Soviet, pro-Guevara, Trotskyites, pro-Albania, 
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politically prominent member of those two groups -a rising star ever since the 
Congress of Lusaka (August 1974), where he made use of an extremely 
aggressive discourse against the other two factions disputing the movement's 
leadership - for which Neto was grateful, supporting Nito's promotion to the 
CC (Central Committee) at the Inter Regional Militants Conference (September 
1974) and later, after independence, to minister of Internal Administration. 
Embodying the frustrations and ambitions of both groups, Nito assumed 
their goal of increased power within the movement and the State. To this end, 
the Nitistas strategy was directed to a double target that we will now analyse: 1) 
towards the base structures of the new political system, pursuing the hegemony 
of poder popular and its institutionalisation; 2) towards the middle and top 
structures of the MPLA and consequently of the new State. 
5.2.1 Pursuing the Hegemony of Poder Popular 
In order to achieve the hegemony of poder popular, there was a need for the 
Nitistas to integrate the competing committees and dissolve those that refused 
to be integrated; a process that took several months-between mid 1975 and 
March/April 1976. 
At this level, although the number of youth committees surrounding and 
supporting Nito progressively became the majority (mainly bringing together 
the Henda, Sita Valles and Talahadi Committees) they were unable to integrate 
the Amilcar Cabral Committees, which fought their hegemonic ambitions; a 
struggle that took place within the MPLA's base structures such as 
Departamento de Orientacdo Politica-DOP (Department of Political 
Titists and so on. Nito started with a pro-Maoist discourse but then changed it to a pro-Soviet Marxism 
under the influence of Sita Valles' groups. Nevertheless, his discourse was always characterised as very 
confused and eclectic due to his late contact with such revolutionary theories (only after the 25th April 
1974). Although he presented himself at the Lusaka Congress with a great ability to quote Marxist texts, 
it became known that his Marxist preparation was based on the one and only book there was in the Ist 
military region during all the anti-colonial struggle, reported as Fundamentos do Marxismo 
(Fundaments of Marxism); from private interview with J-M Mabeko-Tali (27th April 1998). The same 
idea of Nito's ideologically confused discourse was expressed by Joaquim Pinto de Andrade in private 
interview (20th April 1998) and also by Pepetela in private interview (7th July 1998). 
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Orientation) and Departamento de Organizacdo de Massas-DOM (Department 
for Masses Organisation). Despite the above-mentioned option by the bulk of 
the youth committees (mainly the Amilcar Cabral and Henda) to maintain an 
organisational autonomy vis ä vis the MPLA's structures, they still tried to take 
over those departments in order to start imposing their propounded 
political/ideological projects. 
The Amilcar Cabral Committees were the first to enter the DOP, directed 
by Carlos Rocha `Dilolwa' and also the DOM, directed by Lücio Lara and 
Pedro Pacavira; they began to dominate important press organs such as 
Libertacdo Nacional (national liberation) and Revolucäo Popular (people's 
revolution). Members of the top echelons of the MPLA such as Dilolwa, Lara 
and also Pepetela did feel some initial sympathy for these committees; long 
time Maoists like Dilolwa and Pepetela found here the opportunity to express 
and develop restrained ideological beliefs and became leading members of 
these committees. 273 
Within the DOM and DOP, the Amilcar Cabral Committees soon faced the 
competition of the Henda Committees allied with the Sita Valles group and the 
Talahadi Committees, an alliance that progressively homogenised its 
ideological position in terms of a pro-Soviet stance (as propounded by the Sita 
Valles groups of thought). This group (Nitista) came to dominate the main press 
organ of the MPLA, A vitöria e certa (victory is certain) and important radio 
programmes such as Kudibanguela (our struggle) and FAPLA's Povo em Armas 
('people in arms'; under the influence of Jose Van Dunem, who was the second 
national Political Commissioner of FAPLA). 
Due to the increasing power of Nito Alves as Minister of Internal 
Administration and his persecution of the Amilcar Cabral Committees (pushing 
for the arrest of their members), the later opted for a total break with the MPLA 
in early 1976 and went underground transforming themselves into the OCA 
(Communist Organisation of Angola), but as early as March/April 1976 the 
273 See Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences... op. cit. p. 316, footnote52. 
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organisation disintegrated, with several arrests274. By then, the war for 
hegemony over poder popular was won. 
Having eliminated the competition, the next step for the Nitistas was the 
institutionalisation of their domain over poder popular. At this level, another 
major battle came to be fought with the discussion of the Law of Poder 
Popular, which would officially define such power, its organisational structures 
and their relationship with the movement's top organs. On the one hand, there 
was the Nitistas' position, standing for the flexible approach of Marxist 
democratic centralism, allowing and assuring effective autonomy for the new 
structures; on the other hand, there was the position sustained by the main 
leadership surrounding Neto at the Political Bureau, defending an orthodox 
interpretation of democratic centralism, meaning a strict control over poder 
popular, whose organisations could not have the autonomy desired by the 
Nitistas vis 6 vis the top organs of the movement. 
A compromise solution was found within the legislative text, stressing the 
principles of democratic centralism as sustained by the movement's leadership 
(subordination of inferior echelons to superior ones; the possibility to suspend 
deliberations and procedures of inferior organs by superior organs275), but still 
leaving a broad and effective political autonomy to the organs of poder popular 
at the regional and local leve1276. Together with the decree approving the 
criteria for election to the Neighbourhood Popular Commissions 277, the Law of 
Poder Popular represented the legal mechanism through which Nito Alves 
could institutionalise his power over the new organs, something that he 
effectively did with the elections being held in May 1976. Such electoral 
process, closely monitored and prepared by the Nitistas assured them the 
control over powerful Neighbourhood Popular Commissions such as 
274 Ibid. p. 294; also from private interviews with Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16th and 20th April 1998); 
also with Luis dos Passos (13th May 1998). 
275 See articles 37 to 39 in Law 1/76 DR, 29, Ist (5th February). 
276 See Law 1/76 DR, 29, Ist (5th February), especially articles 4° to 36°. 
277 Decree 45/76 DR, 130, Ist (3rd June). 
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Sambizanga, Patrice Lumumba, Nelito Soares, Operärio, Rangel, Neves 
Bendinha and Prenda. 278 
5.2.2 Pursuing Power over the Movement and State 's Top Structures 
Having accomplished the first stage of their move towards increased power (at 
the base structures' level), the Nitistas engaged the second and decisive one: the 
infiltration of governmental/administrative structures, as well as the military 
and the mass party organisations in order to finally take over the top leadership 
of the movement and consequently of the State. 
Thus, the leading members of the Nitistas, built a parallel network of 
power, spreading trusted elements throughout all the governmental, military 
and party structures, not only in Luanda but in several provinces as well279. 
At the governmental and administrative levels, as minister of Internal 
Administration Nito had the power to propose provincial commissioners (the 
highest executive position within the provincial administration). Even though 
the power to effectively nominate provincial commissioners rested with the 
Council of the Revolution (following a proposal by the Minister of Internal 
Administration), this was only a formal procedure. Neto and the Council of the 
Revolution approved most names proposed by Nito. This allowed the Nitistas 
to place their trusted members in several provinces such as Malange, Benguela, 
Huila, Kwanza-North and Kwanza-South besides Luanda's provincial 
commissariat under the direction of Pedro Fortunato. At the top, in central 
government, Nito counted on the active support of the Minister of Trade, David 
Aires Machado (a former activist of labour strike movements), among several 
other second rank cadres within ministries. 
At the military level, Monstro Imortal became Chief of Staff of the Armed 
Forces and Jose Van-Dunem the number two of the National Political 
278 See Fauvet, Paul, `Angola ... op. cit. pp. 96-97. 279 On this issue see Boletim do Militante -- BM, 3, (27 June 1977); also BM, especial number (12 July 
1977); also Fauvet, Paul, `Angola ... op. cit. pp. 88-104; also Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences 
... op. cit. pp. 404-407. 
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Commissariat of FAPLA. After the death of the National Political 
Commissioner, Commander Jika (loyal to Neto), Jose Van Dunem proposed the 
name of Bakalov in his place280. Together, they started to infiltrate their men 
(prepared in specific Centres of Revolutionary Instruction -- political/military 
schools -- such as Certeza from the Ist military region) into the military police, 
into units of the armed forces (such as the 9th brigade-an elite unit) and 
exerted influence over all military/political schools of FAPLA. 
At the level of party structures, the increasingly autonomous secretariat of 
Sita Valles based at DOM was able to establish Nitistas' cells all over the 
MPLA's mass organisations-JMPLA (MPLA Youth), UNTA (National Union 
of Angolan Workers), OMA (Organisation for Angolan Women), also 
manipulating important press organs and radio programmes to promote Nito's 
political image. 
Having infiltrated those organisations, the Nitistas then started a campaign 
to enlarge their support as much as they could, not only internally, but also 
externally. 
Internally, in an attempt to accommodate all the discontented and make the 
most of a difficult social and economic situation, Nito and his followers 
developed an opportunistic argumentation, tailored to the various audiences. 
When addressing middle social strata (young middle cadres from the State 
administration; middle ranking officers from the armed forces) the Nitistas 
denounced the lower living standards compared with the colonial period and 
with the ostentatious wealth of the new rulers, who had access to restricted and 
luxuriously supplied stores, contrasting with miserably supplied `people's 
stores' for general access281. When addressing lower socio-economic strata, 
their discourse included racist arguments, confusing class with race, blaming 
the petite bourgeoisie (identified with the mesticos and whites at the top of the 
apparatus-Lücio Lara, Carlos Dilolwa and Iko Carreira; the most publicly 
280 Due to his military inexperience Jose van Dunem could not replace Jika; from private interview with 
JM Mabeko-Tali (27th April 1998). 
281 From private interviews with Luis dos Passos (13 May 1998); Pepetela (7 July 1998). 
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known mesticos)282 for the scarcity and non-fulfilment of the general 
distributive expectations of the population and denying the long desired `power 
to the people'. At this level (lower social strata) such discourse had an 
enormous impact as stressed by Mabeko-Tali, 
Cette rencontre entre l'ancien guerillero [Nito] et les masses des 
quartiers pauvres va etre cimentee par [... ] la perspective d'une vie 
meilleure apres l'independance, et le reve d'un pouvoir d'abord et 
uniquement pour la masse noire des musseques. D'oü la grande 
popularite de la notion de `pouvoir populaire'. [... ]. Or, le discours 
politique, social et ideologique de Nito Alves se fera pas faute 
d'encourager ces aspirations, et de soulever les questions les plus 
sensibles, tels les privileges sociaux de certains groupes 
somatiquement determines de la societe angolaise sous la 
colonisation [whites and mesticos]. Il invoque la necessite de 
remettre en cause ces privileges par le combat politique-d'oü 
1'identification de la classe et de la race qui va caracteriser les 
discours populistes de cette epoque 283. 
Externally, the Nitistas deliberately looked for the USSR's support, seen as a 
key partner in any possible internal conflict284. As mentioned, under the 
influence of Sita Valles groups the Nitistas assumed a pro-Soviet stance and 
started a campaign portraying the MPLA's top leadership (mainly the Political 
Bureau) as dominated by anti-Soviets, Maoists and Social Democrats led by 
Lücio Lara, Carlos Dilolwa and Iko Carreira285. Leading the Angolan 
delegation at the XXVth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in March 
1976, Nito Alves and Jose Van Dunem presented Nito as the representative of 
the purely Marxist-Leninist wing, supported by former members of the 
Portuguese Communist Party and of the Union of Communist Students such as 
Sita Valles; the move seems to have had some impact and Nito was treated as 
286 an effective Chief of State and paid serious political attention. 
282 From private interviews with Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (20th April 1998); JM Mabeko-Tali (27 
Aril 1998); Pepetela (7 July 1998). 
28F Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences 
... op. cit. pp400-401. 284 Although the USSR had no military forces in Angola, there were many Cuban troops and war 
material, and the USSR could ultimately influence the alignment of the Cuban forces in any possible 
internal conflict. 
285 See BM, 3, (27 June 1977), p. 5; p. 29; see also Fauvet, Paul, `Angola ... op. cit. p. 
97; also in the 
same sense are private interviews with JM Mabeko-Tali (27 April 1998); Luis dos Passos (13 May 
1998); Commander Bage (26 May 1998). 
286 See Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ... op. cit. pp. 
416-419. 
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When Nito returned from this trip, the Nitistas seemed to have all in 
their favour. Besides the external support (at least thought by the Nitistas to 
have been assured287), their internal strategy effectively gathered broad social 
support, that ranged from a substantial part of the generation of young activists 
(from the so-called progressive whites to educated blacks and mesticos), 
workers' commissions and small independent labour unions, through to the 
general population of the lower social strata, including the so-called lumpen 
proletariat288. Others came from the civil service, especially from the lower and 
middle levels; from the armed forces, especially low to middle-ranking officers; 
from Party mass organisations such as JMPLA, UNTA and OMA. 289 
Nevertheless, such support turned out to be insufficient or was made 
insufficient by the strategic reaction of Agostinho Neto's leadership. 
5.3 Agostinho Neto's Leadership Reaction to Nitismo 
Notwithstanding all the above mentioned assets, the failure of Nitismo seems to 
have resulted essentially from its inability to attract any of the elite segments at 
the top of the movement's leadership (mainly the CC and the Politburo). 
Although I will come back to this issue in more detail, it must be stressed for 
now that the leadership was at that period essentially divided into two major 
political groups of unconditional supporters of Neto, corresponding in part to 
two sub-divisions of the Creole/M'Bundu elites, by then assuming opposite 
political sides-what can be considered a left and a right wing according to 
287 From private interview with Luis dos Passos (13th May 1998). 
288 For the official use of this term see speech made by Neto on 11 June 1977, cit. in BM, 3 (27 June 
1977), pp. 28-29. For the academic use in relation to Angola see Birmingham, David, Frontline 
Nationalism... op. cit. p. 79. For the most general (Marxist) definition of this term see Marx, Karl, 
`Class struggles in France' in Fever, Lewis S ed. Marx and Engels: basic writings on politics and 
philosophy (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959); Engels, Friedrich `Preface to the war in 
Germany' in Marx and Engels selected works (New York: International Publishers, 1968). 
289 See BM, 3, (27 June 1977); also BM, especial number (12 July 1977). 
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criteria that will be specified later (in chapter 8) in terms of positions assumed 
at the level of economic policy, political management and foreign policy290 
For now, it is important to stress that right and left wing can not be 
confused with previous party factions such as the Active Revolt or the Eastern 
Revolt (i. e. organised groups with a project and strategy to capture the party's 
top leadership - the presidency). That was not the case because both wings 
were made up of Neto's staunch supporters who wanted to achieve primacy 
around him and not replace him, essentially aiming to influence the political 
and economic path of the country and obviously to place themselves at the 
centre of decision-making. These wings were more like an aggregate of 
personalities linked by several types of solidarity ties but without a rigid and 
well-defined political alignment and strategy. Just like all the other socio- 
political classifications of the Angolan reality, these classifications must be 
seen as operative analytical categories implying generalisation, flexibility and 
located within a specific historical period. I will now provide a brief 
classification and return to the specific analysis and explanation in chapter 8. 
On the one hand, coming under the fierce attack of Nito Alves, there 
was a group mainly comprising mesticos, related to a coastal non-protestant 
segment of New Creoles, heirs of the colonial bourgeoisie of the beginning of 
the century (not to be confused with the old coastal aristocracy segment of the 
`old Creoles', like those of the Active Revolt). Despite, or probably because, 
their heritage (as we will see later), they could politically be considered left 
wing, assuming a strong ideological (Marxist) stance, but obviously distinct 
from Nito Alves' positions. All of them were sincere supporters of Neto. Their 
most prominent members were Carlos Rocha Dilolwa, minister of economic 
planning, Lücio Lara, party secretary for organisation, Iko Carreira, minister of 
defence and Antonio Jacinto, writer. 
290 For a discussion on the use of political left and right in African context see Wallerstein, Immanuel, 
`Left and Right in Africa', in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 9,1 (1971) pp. 1-10. 
155 
On the other hand, there was a group comprising the darker skinned, 
protestants, New Creoles from the interior (mainly from Catete), including 
some of the survivors of the nationalist insurrection of 1961 and the first 
generation of political prisoners of the late fifties, represented by Agostinho 
Mendes de Carvalho ('Uanhenga Xitu', the most prominent figure), Domingos 
Paiva da Silva, Imperial Santana, Bernardo de Souza and Manuel Pedro 
Pacavira. From all these personalities, the only one that was not from Catete 
was Pacavira, who was from Golungo Alto (located between Catete and 
Malange). Their education level was lower than the leftists, whom they saw 
with resentment as `intellectuals' and their political stance had nothing to do 
with Marxism or any ideology, which they clearly rejected from the very 
beginning291, but with what can be considered tradition and ethnicity, defending 
a M'Bundu (black) base of power with a dominance of the M'Bundu from 
Catete, the birth place of Agostinho Neto. They came to create their own 
Committees, the `4th February Committees' (aiming to dominate the People's 
Defence Organisation - ODP and the Neighbourhoods' Commissions)292. 
The main common denominator between these two groups was their 
proximity to and support for Agostinho Neto, because he had links with both 
and provided a useful balance within the leadership. He was Protestant, but 
communist; he was black from Catete in the interior, but quite acculturated, 
being a medical doctor who had trained in Portugal and even married a white 
Portuguese, had a long and strong friendship with many mesticos such as the 
above mentioned Lücio Lara, Iko Carreira and Carlos Dilolwa (the most 
prominent figures of the left wing). 
291 As re-confirmed to me by Agostinho Mendes de Carvalho, they always rejected Marxism and were 
never Marxist. He even warned several of his colleagues at the Central Committee of the danger of such 
an option, but had to adapt themselves to it as soon as the option was made; from private interview with 
Agostinho Mendes de Carvalho (17th July 1998). 
292 In Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ... op. cit. p. 
411. Again it must be stressed that these 
classifications are generalisations and there were some rare exceptions to the general rule: there could 
be found some darker skinned people from the interior who belonged to the left wing and vice versa. 
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The Nitistas were unable to attract any of those two major socio-political 
groups at the top of the leadership, partly due to their proximity to Neto, but 
partly due to the specific strategy followed by the Nitistas themselves: 
- on the one hand, choosing as their main targets all the mesticos and 
whites at the centre of the MPLA's leadership, blaming them for the 
existing problems and frustrated expectations, the Nitistas immediately 
and naturally set the left wing against them; 
- on the other hand, the Nitistas also distanced themselves from the right 
wing due to several reasons: a) their pro-Soviet crusade; b) their view 
that `the new should replace the old' (disrespecting the historical 
legitimacy gained by those who had survived the first anti-colonial 
insurrection and had been victims of colonial prisons)293; c) the fact 
that Nito and some of his followers were from Dembos and the 
majority of the right wing tendency was from Catete (there was an 
acute rivalry between those M'Bundu from Dembos and those from 
Catete since the anti-colonial struggle, as I have earlier mentioned); d) 
their aim to rule over the People's Defence Organisation, was 
challenged by the right wing and by its `4th February Committees' 
(such dispute led the Nitistas to attack Pedro Pacavira, in charge of the 
DOM, who as soon as the May 1976 elections took place, denounced 
the existence of a `Nitista plot to take over the MPLA's leadership' 
294). 
The Nitistas' attacks towards these two major political groups led the leadership 
to unite against what was perceived as an immediate and common threat295; a 
product of an unknown generation that did not entirely understand the `order of 
293 In Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ... op. cit. p. 
412. 
294 Ibid. p. 412-414. Sita Valles' autonomous secretariat at DOM exerted strict control over the electoral 
process and the names eligible for the Popular Neighbourhood Commissions, something that was too 
obvious and provoked immediate criticism; on this issue see also Fauvet, Paul, 'Angola ... op. cit. p. 
93. 
295 Although using a different denomination for those groups (calling `Traditionalistes' what is here 
called right wing and `gauche etouffee' what is here called left wing), this same 'alliance' between 
those two groups against Nitistas is also stressed by Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences... op. cit. 
p. 412. 
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play' nor accepted their `acquired' rights to manage the system. Thus, their 
reaction to such threat was firm and determined. Putting a double strategy into 
action (internal and external), the CC held one of its most important plenary 
sessions (the third, 23-29 October 1976), defining the official political and 
economic model of the future State (as we will see such model did not in any 
way constrained the development of a patrimonial working logic, on the 
contrary it was well adapted to it). 
1) Externally, the leadership attempted to cut the links between the USSR 
and the Nitistas, trying to ensure the support (or at least the neutrality) of the 
USSR and Cuba in case of conflict. To this end, the MPLA finally declared its 
official allegiance to Marxism-Leninism; a date was made for the end of 1977 
for the first congress of the movement which would have as a main item on its 
agenda the formation of a vanguard party of the working class, with the aim to 
construct Socialism in Angola296. After the plenary, Iko Carreira officially 
announced that `for the MPLA, the only socialism that exists is the Socialism 
of Marx, of Engels and of Lenin, scientific socialism'297. It is worth noting that 
Neto had visited Moscow earlier that month (7-13 October 1976), having 
signed on the 8 October, a twenty year Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation 
with the USSR298. 
2) Internally, the leadership attempted to break the Nitistas ties with the 
lower social strata organisations (neighbourhood commissions and labour 
strikers' movement). To this end, and after studying several reports that had 
been previously requested and prepared within a discussion on organisational 
party problems, it was stated that the main obstacle in the organisation of the 
movement was the existence of two MPLA's, the official one and the one led by 
Nito Alves and Jose Van Dunem, leaving the idea of possible fractionism. It 
also suggested that these two CC members, whilst exercising their official 
functions, had purposely caused food shortages to stir up discontent. It was then 
296 InACR, vol. 9 (1978), p. B453. 
297 Ibid. p. B453. 
298 See ACR, vol. 10 (1979), p. B509; also Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. p. 20. 
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decided that a commission of enquiry should be set up (led by Jose Eduardo dos 
Santos) to investigate dissident activity at the core of the MPLA and look into 
the reports on food shortages. 
299 
Knowing that the discontent amongst the great majority of the 
population (lower social strata) arose from frustrated economic distributive 
expectations, by blaming the main activist leaders for the situation of economic 
scarcity, and promising senior posts to the working class in a future Socialist 
society, the leadership turned the mistrust and competitiveness of the bottom 
rungs of the population (who had little or no schooling or political preparation) 
against the young activists (who did have schooling and political preparation) 
and against the middle professional cadres who might sympathise with Nitismo. 
In the meantime several important decisions were immediately made by 
the CC representing a major setback to Nitistas' plans: Nito Alves and Jose Van 
Dunem were to be suspended forthwith from their party and governmental 
offices until the enquiry came up with its conclusions. The Ministry of the 
Internal Administration (led by Nito Alves) was to be abolished and its major 
functions (liaison with Provincial Commissioners) to revert to the Council of 
Ministers and its day-to-day functions to lie in the hands of the Prime Minister 
and the President. A strong criticism was directed towards the behaviour of 
FAPLA's national political commissariat and it was decided that the CC should 
exercise greater control over that commissariat. Monstro Imortal and Bakalov 
were then suspended from the CC. Sita Valles and her partners were removed 
from DOM. The right to MPLA's membership was limited to Angolan citizens 
(automatically excluding several extreme left Portuguese working alongside the 
Nitistas such as Virgilio Frutuoso, director of the newspaper Diärio de 
Luanda). All organs of information were brought under the control of the 
MPLA's Department of Information and Propaganda and the Ministry of 
Information was suspended. Diärio de Luanda was suppressed as well as the 
299 See: BM, especial number (12th July, 1977), pp. 11-13; ACR, vol. 10 (1979), pp. B499-B500; 
Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences 
... op. cit. p. 
421-422. 
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radio programme Povo em Armas (Kudibanguela, had already been suspended 
earlier300). Nito Alves' appropriation of the organs of poder popular was 
strongly criticised and consequently, the legitimacy of the organs elected in 
May under the Law of poder popular was withdrawn. New elections were only 
to be held `where MPLA structures were sufficiently strong, organisationally 
stable and mature' 301 
With the October 1976 CC's plenary, siege was laid to the Nitistas. From 
then on, Alves and his most proximate collaborators probably started to plot the 
coup. Despite the setback imposed by the plenary's decisions, their activities 
were intensified through clandestine channels (pamphleteering, neighbourhood 
meetings, even activities through the Sambizanga football club of which Nito 
was president302), but always closely monitored by the leadership303 
In face of the most obviously expected result of the enquiry - 
confirmation of fractionism - the coup came to be planned to coincide with 
the meeting deciding on the expulsion of Nito and Jose Van Dunem initially 
scheduled for the beginning of the year of 1977. However, the meeting kept 
being adjourned under the justification that the report was not complete (maybe 
to give more time to the leadership to prepare itself) and was finally announced 
for the 20th May 1977 at the Museum of Natural History. The group rushed to 
prepare the coup for that day, which was supposed to start with a popular rally 
in front of the Museum against the harsh economic conditions. According to 
the plan, the rally would provoke a violent reaction from the police protecting 
300 Kudinbanguela had been suspended in February 1976; see article `La premiere manifestation hostile 
au regime s'est deroulee ä Luanda' of Rene Lefort in Le Monde (9 February 1976). 
301 On the decisions made by the CC October 1976 plenary see Fauvet, Paul, `Angola ... op. cit. pp. 94- 
95; Also ACR, 10 (1979), pp. B500-B501; also Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences... op. cit. 
pp. 421-423. 
02 From private interviews with Ruy Duarte de Carvalho (12th and 15th June 1998); also according to 
Birmingham, one supporters' group of the football club was allegedly trained as a political murder 
squad; see Birmingham, David, Frontline Nationalism... op. cit. p. 79. 
303 As stressed by Luis dos Passos in private interview (13th May 1998) and also by Rui Frende (Nito's 
chief of cabinet during the time he was minister of Internal Administration), Nito was closely monitored 
24 hours a day by DISA elements (Political Police), something that was obvious to everybody working 
in the ministry and known by Nito himself; from private conversations (not interviews) with Rui Frende 
-- Frende did not want to give a formal interview for security reasons (despite of the fact that he was not 
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the meeting, which was The pretext for a military intervention by those FAPLA's 
units infiltrated by the Nitistas. However, the party leadership was so well- 
informed about Nito's supporters' moves that, alerted to the plan by DISA, they 
decided at the last minute to change the venue to Futungo de Belas (a relatively 
distant place south of Luanda where the President effectively lived), thus 
thwarting the conspirators' plans 304 
As expected, the two-day CC meeting concluded that there was de facto 
fractionism, led by those two elements and expelled them from the CC. Nito 
still tried to deny the accusations resorting to what his supporters had been 
working on and circulating for several months -- Treze teses em minha 
defesa/Thirteen thesis in my defence, a 156-page document, analysing the 
nature of the MPLA and its political right-turn, accusing Lücio Lara of being a 
`social democrat', a `Maoist' and the person leading this right-turn. He claimed 
that corruption, incompetence and nepotism were rife within the MPLA, that 
ministers were engaged in diamond smuggling or debauchery (citing the name 
of Iko Carreira among others305); denouncing the deficiencies of the 
movement's course such as sectarianism, elitism, paternalism, manipulation and 
alienation from the grass roots (characteristics that we will clearly see 
developing through the next years, as shown in the following chapters). 306 
Nito was still offered the usual way out (i. e. a process of criticism and self- 
criticism admitting his faults) but refused and it became clear that the conflict 
was inevitable307. Thus, immediately after the end of the CC meeting (mid-day 
on the 21st May), and fearing Nitistas' reaction, Neto rushed into a public 
on the Nitista side and was even sacked by Nito before the ministry closure, he was arrested for several 
years for other political reasons). 
304 See Fauvet, Paul, `Angola ... op. cit. pp. 95-96; Mabeko 
Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ... op. cit. 
pp. 423-424; BM, especial number (12th July 1977), p. 21 
sos From private interviews with Luis dos Passos (13th May 1998); also in Fauvet, Paul, `Angola ... op. 
cit. p. 97. 
306 See Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences 
... op. cit. pp. 421-427; also Fauvet, Paul, `Angola ... op. 
cit. pp. 96-97; also confirming all this information are private interviews with Luis dos Passos (13 May 
1998) and Commander Bage (26 May 1998). 
30' From private interviews with Luis dos Passos (13 May 1998) and Commander Bage (26th May 
1998). 
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meeting where once again he re-affirmed the main guidelines of his double 
strategy: 
Internally, at the same time he publicly announced the expulsion of Nito 
Alves and Jose Van Dunem for fractionism and although the food shortages 
accusation was not proved by then, Neto still implicitly linked them to the 
scarcity of supplies, 
This is a serious time as regards the internal situation. Comrades, 
you know that very well. The problem of food supplies is serious. 
There is no cassava, no potatoes, no groundnuts, no palm oil. There 
is nothing in the market. No fish [... ]. This situation pleases no one. 
We pass by the Jumbo supermarket, we see long queues. A lot of 
people are there to buy things that do not exist. 108 
Feeling the need to defend the mesticos under attack, the President stated that 
he had absolute confidence in the key mestico leaders of the MPLA, naming 
personally Lücio Lara (Party Secretary for Organisation), Iko Carreira (minister 
of Defence) and Carlos Dilolwa (minister of Planning)309. It is important to 
stress once again that the Nitistas' accusations although personalised around 
these three prominent mesticos encompassed a wider target - whites and 
mestipos in general (mixing class with race as previously explained); Agostinho 
Neto himself later recognised this broader racial/class attack beyond personal 
attacks310 
Externally, Neto reiterated his `sovietism', 
308 Cited in ACR, 10 (1979), p. B497. Also stressing the food crisis before the attempted coup is 
Birmingham, David, `The Twenty-Seventh of May, an Historical Note on the Abortive 1977 Coup in 
Angola', in African Affairs, 77,309 (1978), pp. 554-564, especially p. 558; also Birmingham, David, 
Frontline Nationalism... op. cit. pp. 74-81. 
309 Cited in ACR, 10 (1979), p. B497; see also Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ... op. cit. pp. 426- 427. 
310 After the coup attempt Neto stated that `The new factionalists duped the masses and our militants, 
classifying this or that militant, this or that leader as "right-wing", "ultra-left", "Maoist", "anti-Soviet", 
"national socialist", "social democrat", thus camouflaging their essentially reactionary, regionalist and 
racist ideology', in BM, 3 (27th June 1977), p. 5. Speaking on the 1 June, the President described the 27 
May events as `a confrontation between radicals and the comrades who follow the movement's line', 
adding that `We defend national unity and they do not. They would like to see the working class rule, 
but rule alone and continuously fighting the other classes. I cannot conceive of this. One of the issues 
which has come under very frequent attack has been the racial question. Those individuals thought it 
necessary to remove whites and mesticos from the leadership and this explains some of the personnal 
attacks on certain comrade leaders'; cit. in ACR, 10 (1979), pp. B497-B498. 
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We know what the Soviet Union is. When we started the organised 
armed struggle here, the Soviet Union was at our side. It helped us, 
and so did all the other Socialist countries. We can never forget that 
if we achieved our independence, it was because we had the 
support of countries like the Soviet Union. We cannot be anti- 
Soviet because, objectively, we are with the Soviet comrades. "' 
The long planned strategy of the leadership had succeeded. The core leaders of 
the Nitistas started to receive contradictory messages from the USSR embassy 
(probably hesitating whether to support the Nitistas or not) and in the muceques 
of Luanda there was a lot of rumour and fear about `a popular uprising being 
prepared against the movement's leadership'; something that should have 
alerted Nito to the lack of the surprise factor312. The group became confused, 
hesitant and finally launched a coup d 'etat on 27th May 1977, resulting in total 
failure313: 
9 At an internal level, for a coup counting on massive popular support, it was 
an almost absolute failure, gathering only a few hundred of scared 
supporters, brought by Nito's partners from the muceques to the occupied 
National Radio from where they were supposed to march into the 
Presidential palace, something that did not happen. The FAPLA 9th brigade, 
infiltrated by Nitistas, did revolt and even assaulted the prison of Sao Paulo 
where some prisoners were released. But as soon as a tanks unit entered 
Luanda (coming from Cacuaco, north of Luanda, led by Delfim Castro from 
3 DISA and Moracem, a black Cuban probably in charge of that unit14) the 
311 Cited in ACR, 10 (1979), p. B509. 
"'According to the only two survivor leaders of the attempted coup, a week before the attempted coup 
the USSR's embassy assumed an ambiguous position, but Nito was still certain of their support, re- 
assuring everybody that as soon as the rebellion was under way they would support it. Days before the 
coup Luis dos Passos had contacts with people from the USSR embassy and got the impression that 
they were not that supportive; equally, within the neighbourhoods several anonymous people were 
talking about the date of the uprising and Luis dos Passos warned his partners about these problems but 
no one seemed to care; from private interviews with Luis dos Passos (13 May 1998) and Commander 
Bage (26th May 1998); also on the atmosphere surrounding the attempted coup see what Tali, who was 
there, has to say in Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ... op. cit. p. 427. 313 See BM, especial number (12th July 1977), pp. 20-31; also Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, 
Dissidences 
... op. cit. pp. 
393-397. 
314 Moracem had fought as a guerrilla in Cabinda during the anti-colonial struggle and also alongside 
Che Guevara. His precise functions at that tanks unit in Cacuaco is not disclosed by Iko Carreira, who 
says that the unit belonged to DISA, but from the report it also seems that he was somekind of an 
operativr, responsible for the unit. Delfim Castro went there as soon as the attempted coup started and 
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9th brigade composed of armoured cars had no military chance of 
successful opposition and Luis dos Passos immediately ordered the 
surrender of his men315; 
" At an external level, considering the Cuban participation (through 
Moracem) and the contradictory messages sent to Nito and his partners by 
the USSR embassy, it seems that the MPLA's leadership achieved, if not the 
neutrality, at least the passive impartiality of the USSR, not obstructing 
Cuban help to Neto's leadership. Despite the fact that the extent of the 
USSR involvement in the 27 May events and the contacts that might have 
occurred between this country and Cuba were never disclosed (allowing a 
great amount of speculation 316) it seems most unlikely that Moscow and 
Havana could have backed opposing sides; therefore in the end the passive 
neutrality of the USSR must have been decisive to Cuban help 31. Although 
much beyond the scope of this work, a possible explanation might also 
consider the fact that the change to a Marxist regime in Angola formally 
took place in 1977 (after the decision of the CC in October 1976), the same 
Moracem came with him, both leading the unit towards Luanda to end up with the uprising; see 
Carreira, Iko, O Pensamento 
... op. cit. pp. 
153-154. 
315 From private interview with Luis dos Passos (13th May 1998). 
316 Officially, Moscow and the MPLA strongly repudiated the allegation that the USSR had in any way 
supported the attempted coup, however, according to Mabeko-Tali, `pour les dirigeants du MPLA cette 
implication [USSR] ne semble faire l'ombre d'aucun doute, au regard des difficiles rapports 
qu'entretenait Agostinho Neto avec son puissant allie' in Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences 
... op. cit. p. 
393. Even the Political Bureau on the eve of the coup confirmed contacts between the 
`factionalists' and the USSR embassy, stating on the 26th May that `the new factionalists have shielded 
themselves by means of a simulated devotion to this or that friendly country, not hesitating even to visit 
certain embassies where they engaged in slanders against the MPLA and certain of its leaders and 
militants, in BM, 3 (27th June 1977), p. 5. As reported by the Financial Times, `According to semi- 
official account, Sita Valles sent a plea for help to the Soviet embassy in Luanda after the coup attempt 
failed. The message was intercepted but demonstrated that, whatever the position of the Soviets, the 
coup leaders believed they had the Kremlin's blessing'; in Financial Times (26 January 1978); Also 
referring the same Nitista hope towards the `soviet rescue' is Birmingham, David, Frontline 
Nationalism... op. cit. p. 81. Finally, according to Iko Carreira, `In the subsequent interrogation of the 
arrested putschistes, competent authorities made a balanced account of the situation and the range of 
external complicity. The most serious one was the Soviet participation. Two secretaries of the 
embassy's military representative had directly participated in the attempted coup. One of them, Pavel 
Stariakov (the other one was Yuri Fedin) had rented a house in Sambila (Sambizanga], using his own 
name, so certain was he of the victory; from there he could follow the course of the whole process and 
advise the putschistes. When the internal security went to look for them, they were gone. Contacts were 
made with the embassy and information was given that they had left for Moscow that same morning'; in 
Carreira, Iko, O Pensamento ... op. cit. p. 155. 317 Also supporting this idea is ACR, 10 (1979), p. B509. 
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year that this happened in Mozambique, following what must been strong 
external pressures from the USSR and the Eastern block to push these 
regimes to clearly and officially define their political model. In these terms, 
the ambiguous positions of the USSR towards the Nitistas might be seen as 
a way of pressuring Neto to clarify once and for all his political alignment. 
As soon as this was assured (October 1976, with the 20 years treaty signed 
in Moscow and the CC meeting adopting Marxism-Leninism) the Nitistas 
were no longer that useful. Support was halted and Cuba was allowed to 
help Neto. However, such speculation would have to be tested through 
further research. 
As will be seen in the following chapters, the importance of analysing the 
phenomenon here called Nitismo (its background, strategy and the reaction it 
provoked in the MPLA's leadership) has to do with the strong and direct 
influence it exerted from then on, on the framework of political, economic and 
ethical relationships between rulers and ruled. For instance, it had an impact on 
the fearful and resigned political behaviour assumed by the population in 
general and by the following generations in particular. 
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6- The Construction of a New Political Framework 
As previously explained, within the main discussion of this work, this chapter 
aims to analyse the type of political relationships that came to be established 
between rulers and ruled during Neto's presidency. The general purpose is to 
assess how successful they were in terms of integrating rulers and ruled, bottom 
and upper social layers or on the contrary breaking those links, insulating the 
political system from the effective participation of the population. For reasons 
already explained, this chapter will be structured around three main analytical 
indicators, namely the party (6.1), the exercise of the executive, legislative and 
administrative power (6.2) the judicial power (6.3). 
6.1 The Party: Purge, Authoritarianism, Rectification and Discrimination 
6.1.1 The Social and Political Purge and the New Policy of Cadres 
Speaking to the nation right after regaining control of the National Radio 
Station (occupied by the Nitistas), President Neto still assumed a conciliatory 
discourse and even admitted the possibility of re-integrating Nito Alves and 
Jose Van Dunem within the MPLA's leadership after a long process of 
rehabilitation 318. However, as soon as it became known that the rebels had 
killed top MPLA governmental and military officials, the conciliatory discourse 
was replaced by a radical campaign for the cleansing of society and of the 
political apparatus. 319 There followed a savage witch-hunt. 
And now the problem for our people is to find the minds behind 
this counter-revolution, the minds behind this attempted coup. They 
318 In Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ... op. cit. p. 394: also 
in Carreira, Iko, 0 Pensamento ... 
op. cit. p. 154 
319 The rebels killed top MPLA government and military officials: Commander Nzaji (Eugenio 
Verissimo da Costa), a member of the CC, the Council of Revolution and FAPLA's chief of security; 
Major Saidy Vieira Dias Mingas, the Minister of Finance, member of the CC and the Council of 
Revolution; Commander Perigoso (Paulo da Silva Mungungo), member of the CC, the Council of 
Revolution and FAPLA's general staff; Commander Bula Matadi (Jose Manuel Paiva), member of the 
Council of Revolution and deputy chief of staff of FAPLA; Helder Ferreira Neto, member of DISA 
(Angola's Directorate of Information and Security); and Antonio Garcia Neto, director of the 
international co-operation section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In BM, especial number (12th July 
1977), pp. 15-16, pp. 22-26; See also West Africa (6 June 1977). 
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are buried away in basements, hiding. But with the help of 
everyone, we can find out where they are and bring them to justice 
[... ] we are going to hunt them out in every neighbourhood, every 
town, every senzala, and every kimbo. We shall search for the 
reactionaries. As soon as we find them, they shall be brought to 
justice [Neto was talking of revolutionary justice and not exactly of 
formal judicial system, as we will see]. 
320 
Implicitly pointing out the targets, the leadership described the social basis of 
Nitistas, clearly singling out the generation that followed the nationalists and 
grew up during the last stages of colonialism in Angola. 
Comrades! The social support for Nito's followers came from the 
following: 
Certain sectors of the petite bourgeoisie, whose origins go back to 
the period after the beginning of the armed struggle for national 
liberation (1961); seeing their development process interrupted by 
the proclamation of independence, they converted to radical 
politics. These sectors of the petite bourgeoisie, meant by 
colonialism to be the elite of the neocolonisation that they intended 
to impose on us, were mobilised mainly on racist arguments 
[against the mesticos and whites in leadership]. They played a 
major role in the quashed coup d'etat. 
The unemployed and the marginalised, usually designated as 
lumpens, the unstable and discontented. They were mobilised 
through the populist promises of easy solutions to their problems. 
A sector of the youth, young people from the cities, attracted, 
through their inexperience and thirst for personal affirmation, by 
the grandiose cries of the dissidents and by the simplistic theories 
they thought would help them to understand Angolan society and 
the revolution. 
A number of workers, duped by their pseudo-revolutionary 
phraseology into believing that the current troubles were due to the 
government's not being able to solve such problems. 
32' 
Those who took part were mainly elements from Luanda, 
intellectuals from the bourgeoisie or the petite bourgeoisie. Some 
were our own countrymen, others were foreigners [... ] Elements 
from the youth, elements from OMA, some People's 
Neighbourhood Commissions, some members of government, some 
members of mass organisations, some members of managing 
320 In `Comunicacöes de Agostinho Neto ao pais de 27 a 30 de Maio', cit. in BM, 3 (27 June 1977), 
20. 
3Z1 In BM, 3 (27 June 1977), p. 24. 
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commissions [at public enterprises]. They made the most of all the 
discontent. 3"' 
The campaign resulted in innumerable deaths throughout the country, 
somewhere between 5,000 and 30,000, depending respectively on optimist or 
pessimist sources of information 323, with particular and obvious incidence on 
young activists, intellectuals and cadres, who from then on stopped being a 
threat or a nuisance to the old nationalist generation. As stressed by Mabeko- 
Tali who lived that experience in Luanda, 
Des rafles sont alors organisees dans les quartiers les plus affectes 
par les reseaux nitistes [... ] C'est meme l'occasion de reglements de 
compte personnels, ä travers des delations fantaisistes, au point que 
le pouvoir semblera lui-meme perdre pied dann le processus de 
liquidation physique qui va saigner le pays de cadres politiques et 
militaires, mais aussi administratifs, et de jeunes ä peine eveilles ä 
faction politique. Cette derive de la repression s'illustrera 
particulierement dans les provinces, sous faction de Commissaires 
provinciaux qui avaient des comptes personnels ä regler avec des 
cadres jeunes qui avaient eu le privilege d'une meilleure education 
et un niveau scolaire plus eleve ä l'epoque coloniale. Tel sera le cas 
de la province de Moxico, mais aussi la Huila. Dans cette derniere 
province par exemple, le principal dirigeant politique declarera 
quelque temps plus tard, alors que nous nous y trouvions nous- 
meme, que tous ceux qui avaient la Quinta Classe devaient titre 
'' consideres comme `des ennemis de classeza 
Neto's power was strengthened by this bloody purge and the arrest of Nito 
Alves, was filmed, photographed and published throughout the country, so that 
there could be no doubt that `the Chief killed the snake and brandished the 
322 Speech made by Neto on 11 June 1977; cit. in BM, 3 (27 June 1977), pp. 28-29. 
323 Although there is no official pronouncement over the subject, a discussion on the number of deaths 
resulting from the leadership reaction to the attempted coup was open among the press with the `20th 
anniversary' of the event (May 1997). The pessimist opinion on the number of deaths (twenty to thirty 
thousand) is usually defended by the polemic newspaper Folha 8 and its director, the Journalist 
William Tonnet and also by Leopoldo Baio, Director of the newspaper Actual Fax; the optimist opinion 
(five thousand) is naturally sustained by the ones more sympathetic to the MPLA's leadership such as 
the Director of the newspaper Angolense, Graca Campos or the Director of the newspaper Jornal de 
Angola, Luis Fernando; the moderate opinion (10 to 15 thousand) is defended by those newspapers and 
directors aiming to represent a `balanced opinion' such as Comercio e Actualidade, directed by Victor 
Aleixo and Agora, directed by Aguiar dos Santos. The subject will obviously remain open to 
speculation because it is extremely difficult to produce a sound calculation. From private interviews 
with Victor Aleixo (26th March 1998); Luis Fernando (26th March 1998); William Tonnet (30th 
March 1998); Aguiar dos Santos (31st March 1998); Graca Campos (3rd April 1998); Leopoldo Baio 
(27th May 1998). 
324 In Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences 
... op. cit. p. 
395; also in the same sense are private 
interviews with Luis dos Passos (13 May 1998); Victor Aleixo (26th March 1998); William Tonnet 
(30th March 1998). 
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stick' as `traditionally' demanded325. The terror inspired by the purge had the 
effect desired by its main executors, including Onambwe, Ludy Kissassunda, 
Lücio Lara and Iko Carreira; who have reportedly stated that `no one will dare 
to rise against the president for the next twenty years'. 326 Effectively, the purge 
and its traumatic memory32' became a powerful inhibitor of organised popular 
protest against the MPLA's leadership. Since then, at the first signs of any 
potential opposition demonstration (which have been banned since 27 May 
1977), all State security has to do is to circulate special troops around the 
streets in military vehicles, which is more than enough to dissuade the mentors 
of such projects328. 
As a general rule, the young people belonging to that generation and who 
escaped the purge, learnt their lesson and never again dared to make the 
slightest protest. They became politically silent but very competent 
professionals within State administration. In fact, it is to these elements and to 
the heirs of the old Creole aristocracy (who entered civil service as referred), 
that the maintaining of minimum effectiveness in public administration is 
owed, for a few years after independence 329 
325 This is a traditional saying (commonly heard in Malange) according to which a chief who is really a 
chief must kill the snake and brandish the stick. Then all heads will bow. From private interviews with 
several traditional chiefs in the rural areas of the province of Malange within a research on participatory 
development that took place in September 1995. 
326 From private interviews with Luis dos Passos (13th May 1998); William Tonnet, director of the 
newspaperfollha 8 (30 March 1998). 
327 The trauma of 27 May and its decimated generation is still felt today, as can be noticed in private 
publications in 1997, on the twentieth anniversary of 27 May: `how much suffering! How many people 
had to die to pay for the death of six `leaders'! Rivers of blood, highways of flesh and lakes of bones. 
My God! How could there be so much savagery! But we shall be reborn as a nation: the `African 
intelligentsia', the favourite target of the mentors of the 27`h, is being reborn again in a new and brilliant 
generation. ' In Jornal Folha 8 (30 May 1997), p. 10. 
328 From private interviews with Victor Aleixo, Director of the newspaper Comercio e Actualidade 
(26th March 1998); Leopoldo Baio, Director of the newspaper Actual Fax (27th May 1998). 
329 Although going a bit beyond the time scope of this work, but still useful to its global understanding, 
it is worth noting that these resigned cadres (generation of the youth committees that escaped the purge) 
became politically silent until very recently (1991-1992). From then on, they did voice some degree of 
criticism against the social situation (though very little regarding sensitive political matters) under the 
cover of the new multipartism freedom and the new jobs they found in the NGOs and other 
international organisations. In general, however, they remained loyal to MPLA and rarely embarked on 
new political party projects; some exceptions included Filomeno Vieira Lopes from the Amilcar Cabral 
Committees, who joined his uncle Joao Vieira Lopes from the old coastal Creole aristocracy, in order to 
form a new political party, the FpD ('Front for Democracy'), but without any significant political 
expression. On the professional course of these cadres see Vidal, Nuno, Estrategias de 
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Having in mind the-problems caused by the young generation (of the youth 
committees) educated during the last period of colonialism (benefiting from the 
colonial expansion of the education system) a new control over education was 
established by the party not only at the specific level of the party schools330, but 
more generally at the highest levels-high schools, universities and studies 
abroad. Through a presidential despatch dated February 1979, Neto determined 
that the Council for Student Grants towards Professional Training and 
Education Abroad and the Scholarship Fund (Internal and Abroad) should now 
be answerable to the Central Committee's Department of Party Cadres, itself 
directly answerable to the Party President331. In this way Neto created an 
obvious mechanism of economic and educational dependency of the 
scholarship students on the party's top organs -- a mechanism that was used 
(although informally) to reward or punish the students political behaviour 332 
Moreover, beyond scholarships, all the opportunities for the professional and 
social advancement of all cadres came under the party's strict control (through 
the nominations system) as clearly outlined in the CC report to the first 
extraordinary congress, 
[The Party] 
Leads the State and Mass Organisations by selecting, educating 
and appointing the main cadres of the different State and Mass 
Organisations; [... ] Accomplishes its leading role by 
transforming its main executives into main State and mass 
organisation executives [my bold]. "' 
The new policy had its results; as a general rule, the generation that followed 
the one of the youth committees understood and respected the new rules 
Desenvolvimento Participativo (Lisbon: ISCTE-Instituto Superior de Ciencias do Trabalho e da 
Empresa, 1997), a Master's dissertation. 
330 On these schools see Relatörio do Comite Central ao I°Congresso do MPLA (Luanda: DEPI, 1977), 
? p. 20-22. 
'1 Legal Despatch, DR, I, 29 (3 February 1979). 
332 From private interviews with Antonio Cazevo (10 March 1998); Victor Aleixo (26 March 1998); 
William Tormet (30 March 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998); JM Mabeko-Tali (27 April 
1998); Cornelio Caley (2 May 1998); Sao Vicente (5 May 1998); Luis dos Passos (13 May 1998); 
Eleuterio Freire (30th May 1998); Ruy Duarte de Carvalho (15th July 1998); also from my own 
personal knowledge and friendship with several scholarship funded students in Lisbon and London. 
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concerning the behaviour that was expected from them in order to access 
professional education and social betterment. They became politically well- 
behaved young members of the party, loyal to any given protector expecting 
benefits and retributions in exchange for loyalty and political correctness, with 
no `fancy' ideologies. 334 As we will later see, those who fitted within these 
parameters went on to higher education and did well; in the early 1980s, they 
were given top jobs in State administration (both in government and State 
enterprises) and those within FAPLA were promoted to higher ranks. A lot of 
them were recruited by the new president Eduardo dos Santos to become part of 
the powerful presidential administrative and political shadow government and 
military structure surrounding the presidency, provoking the resentment of 
some of the party's old nationalists who pejoratively called them miüdos do 
Futungo ('Futungo kids', after the name where the presidency is settled and 
where these `kids' work), a term that is commonly used by people within the 
Angolan political and media milieu to designate the new presidential 
entourage 335 
6.1.2 The authoritarianism of the new workers 'vanguard party 
At the same time as the purge, Neto made explicit the directives for the 
construction of a new party in search of unity, cohesion and internal security: 
the MPLA would now be in total control. The permanent commission of the 
Central Committee (the politburo or Political Bureau) would be in charge of 
333 Relatörio do Comite Central ao 1° Congresso Extraordindrio do Partido (Luanda: Secretariado do 
Comite Central, 1980), pp. 39-40. 
334 From private interviews with Victor Aleixo (26th March 1998); Filipe Amado (27th March 1998); 
William Tonnet (30 March 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23rd April 1998); JM Mabeko-Tali (27th April 
1998); Comelio Caley (2nd May 1998); Luis dos Passos (13 May 1998); Eleuterio Freire (30th May 
1998); Ruy Duarte de Carvalho (15th July 1998). 
335 The term miüdos do Futungo was usually employed (with the explained meaning) by several of my 
interviewees such as: Diögenes Boavida (13th March 1998); Gerönimo Belo (17th March 1998); Victor 
Aleixo (26th March 1998); Luis Fernando (26th March 1998); William Tonnet (30th March 1998); 
Aguiar dos Santos (31st March 1998); Graca Campos (3rd April 1998); Joao Vieira Lopes (13th April 
1998); JoAo de Melo (17th April 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (20th April 1998); Fernando 
Pacheco (23rd April 1998); JM Mabeko-Tali (27th April 1998); Vicente Pinto de Andrade (11th May 
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everything within the MPLA; no opposition or centre of power parallel to the 
MPLA would be tolerated, 
The course must always be set by the MPLA. And we will stick 
firmly to this line. That there will be no parallel organisations 
within the country. Here in Angola, it is the MPLA who is in 
charge. In the government, the members of the government must 
submit to the course set by the politburo, which is the permanent 
organisation of the Central Committee. There are to be no 
governmental decisions that are not controlled by the politburo. All 
ministers, all those who run the country must know that they 
can only do what is permitted by the politburo, and when the 
politburo makes a decision, that decision must be fulfilled with the 
utmost urgency. [My bold] 336 
In accordance with the decisions made at the third plenary of the Central 
Committee in October 1976, and putting into practice Neto's directives, in the 
wake of the attempted coup, the movement held its first congress in December 
1977. 
Approval was then given to the document submitted by the CC, which 
described the MPLA as an instrument to lead the revolutionary classes towards 
Popular Democracy and Socialism, a Workers' vanguard Party organised and 
structured according to Marxist-Leninist principles, adding PT to its logo 
(Partido do Trabalho/Labour Party). 337 The new principles were later 
integrated within the constitution, revised and approved in February 1978, 
whose article 2 clearly stated for the first time that, 
MPLA-PT constitutes the organised vanguard of the working class 
and, as a Marxist-Leninist party, it will provide the political, 
economic and social leadership of the State in its efforts towards 
the construction of a Socialist Society. 338 
In order to demonstrate and reinforce the party's integration of the Armed 
Forces, one third of Congress delegates and half the fifty-four elected members 
of the new Central Committee were also members of FAPLA or belonged to 
1998); Leopoldo Baio (27th May 1998); Pepetela (7th July 1998); Mendes de Carvalho (17th July 
1998), among several others. 
336 Speech made by Neto, on 11 June 1977; cit. in BM, 3 (27 June 1977), p. 30. 337 Relatdrio do Comite Central ao 1° Congresso ... op. cit. ... 1977, p. 17. 338 Article 2 of the Constitutional Law, DR, I, 31 (7 February 1978). 
172 
other security organisations 339. After independence this was the first step of an 
increasing interpenetration between party, State and military structures, which 
became accentuated with the rectification campaign that was to follow. As 
reported by international press correspondents at that time, 
The reality of the new MPLA-Labour Party is that the absence of 
working class members is compensated for by the presence of a 
large contingent of military members. They form half of the party 
central committee. 
340 
Dans telles conditions le premier congres ressemble plus a une 
reunion d'etat major qu'ä une session parlamentaire. Sa preparation 
qui semble avoir restreinte ä un cercle tres etroit de militants, 
indique sans l'ombre d'un doute que le MPLA, meme s'il reste une 
`organisation de masse' cedera la direction du pays ä un parti 
d'avant garde de la classe ouvriere 
341 
Probably remembering the ideological `liberalism' of the youth committees, 
affirmation was made of the party's ideological unity and cohesion of action at 
all levels of its structure, based on the rigid application of Marxist-Leninist 
principles; stressing that all manifestations of fractionism would be strongly 
fought. 342 Also bearing in mind the Nitista flexible interpretation of democratic 
centralism and the ensuing results in terms of autonomous (parallel) structures 
of Poder Popular, the Congress stressed that Principles of Democratic 
Centralism were to be applied more drastically to the running of the whole 
organisation and to party discipline; implying not only the previous `submission 
of the minority to the majority and fulfilment by the lower echelons of the 
guidelines and decisions of the superior echelons'343, but also adding that 
democratic centralism `presupposes the existence of a centralised leadership 
339 See Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, Angola ... op. cit. pp. 
163-167; also Le Monde (22 
December, 1977); also Marches Tropicaux et Mediterraneens (23 December 1977); also in ACR vol. 10 
(1979), p. B503. 
340 In West Africa (2 January 1978). 
341 Article `Le Premier Congres du MPLA s'est ouvert ä Luanda' of Rene Lefort in Le Monde (8 
December 1977). 
342Relatörio do Comite Central ao 1°Congresso ... op. cit.... 1977, pp. 19-20. 343 Ibid. p. 20; these principles had previously been institutionalised by the mentioned Law 1/76 of 
Poder Popular, in section I, art. 37 and if., DR, I, 29 (5 February 1976) 
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selection of membership candidates). Two ways of selecting new Party 
members were established: on the one hand, `according to previous 
register', which took into account those members registered before the 
first congress; on the other hand, `according to the Assembly of 
Workers', whereby the qualities of the worker in his workplace were 
taken into account, then followed by an interview348; 
- Thirdly, in accordance with the Central Committee directives, the 
movement for rectification had to break up the previous structures of 
Poder Popular such as Action Groups and Action Committees (the 
structural form assumed by the youth committees) and Provincial 
Directive Commissions; replacing them with cells, party committees, 
assemblies and hierarchical conferences. 349 (See figure 6.1.3.1). 
348 Ibid. pp. 12-13. From the beginning of the movement for rectification until the first Extraordinary 
Congress, in December 1980, selections were made, resulting in the recruitment of 15,294 militants (of 
whom 974 were women), 15,804 `aspirants' (aspiring or expecting to become members, of whom 1,694 
were women), 4,000 members for the JMPLA and over 6,200 sympathisers; 2,765 party cells were 
established, 65 local work committees and 4 sector committees, Ibid. pp. 17-18. 
349 Ibid. pp. 12-14. 
Figure 6.1.3.1: Basic MPLA organizational structure in the 1970's and 1980's 
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Bearing in mind the infiltration strategy of the Nitistas, the main targets for 
the movement of rectification were: a) the mass organisations; b) the forces for 
defence and security (especially the younger officers, who expressed some 
sympathy for the Nitistas). 
a) At the level of mass organisations, the leadership structures of UNTA, 
JMPLA and OMA were disbanded straight after the attempted coup; national 
and provincial restructuring committees (specifically directed to each of these 
organisations) were then set up. The restructuring process of UNTA, co- 
ordinated by Pascoal Luvualo and managed by Beto Van Dunem, was 
concluded in September 1978, when the first conference of the new era took 
place and UNTA was clearly and definitely changed into co-operative-style 
trade union federation. OMA was restructured under the supervision of the 
party's number two, Lücio Lara, who also brought his undertaking to a 
conclusion in September 1978, presenting it at the national conference in 
Malange. Finally, in October 1978, the national conference of a restructured 
JMPLA was presented in Luanda. 350 
b) With regards to the forces of defence and security, after the physical 
elimination of `harmful elements according to revolutionary justice' during the 
generalised purge351, the youth were the main concern of rectification due to the 
previous support that was given to Nitismo by young officials. Accordingly, the 
process of rectification in its third phase demanded a stronger presence of the 
party inside the defence and security apparatus in application of the `Regulation 
for Base Organisations and the Youth'. 352 The Minister of Defence, Iko 
353 Carreira, took personally the leading role in this rectification process 
350 All these restructuring processes were reported in Radio Havana (19 October 1978), cit. in ACR 
vol. I l (1980), pp. B486-B487. After being rectified, the national leadership representatives of JMPLA 
and OMA became part of the Council of Revolution, following previous nomination by the politburo; 
in art. 36 of the Constitutional Law, DR, I, 31 (7 February 1978). 
351 From private interviews with General Antonio Farrusco (2nd May 1998); Aderito Correia (13th 
April 1998); Diögenes Boavida (13th March 1998). 
352 The movement of rectification was divided into four main phases, according to the nature of the 
problems to be dealt with. The third phase took place between the 5`s and 6's national seminars on 
rectification - it was dedicated to: the implementation of rectification in rural areas; the formation into 
cells of rectified elements; age control of Party members; establishment of the first committee for 
neighbourhood sectors; implantation of the Party inside the organisms of defence and security, with the 
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In order to partially fill the void left by the dissolution of Nito Alves' 
Ministry of Internal Administration, a new secretariat of State for Internal 
Order was established in September 1978; it was a militarised organisation 
directly responsible to the President, aimed at keeping public order, internal 
security and control over the population. 354 Subsequently (October 1978) the 
designations of the general army staff, the national political commissariat, and 
various other sections of the army staff were changed, ending the restructuring 
process within these organisations35s 
As with the mass organisations, the process of rectification within the 
defence and security forces was completed by the end of 1978 and it can be 
said to have had very similar results to those of the new policy of cadres: the 
new rectified officers who fitted the established parameters (loyalty, political 
correctness and no `fancy' ideologies) rose within the military and 
administrative/governmental structure. The presence of the young officers and 
cadres at the 1980 congress was already significant356 and several of them were 
to integrate the emerging young presidential entourage in early eighties - as 
`Futungo Kids'. 
Here it must be stressed how complete the integration was between party, 
State and military structures in Angola, as a result of an old MPLA strategy 
during the anti-colonial struggle based on the need for firm political direction 
of the guerrilla units and the military structure. Such strategy was implemented 
in two complementary ways: political indoctrination and institutional 
penetration. Political education became an integral part of FAPLA's military 
training and political commissioners were attached to guerrilla units to ensure 
compliance with the movement's political directives. The integration and 
recommended application of `Regulation for Base Organisations and Youth' within the defence and 
security forces; launching of the newspaper A Celula ('The Cell') to stimulate communication between 
base organisations and to standardise their work. In Relatörio do Comite Central ao P Congresso 
Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980, pp. 13-15. 
353 See BM, 37 (September 1978), pp. 6-13 
354 Law 12/78 in DR I, 216 (12 September 1978). 
355 Executive decree 22/78, DR, I, 250 (21 October 1978). 
356 As noticed by Jean-Claude Pomonti in a report to Le Monde (29 January 1981). 
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penetration between the political and military structures was achieved through 
the simultaneous occupation of posts in both structures357. It was very common 
for political leaders (dirigentes) to hold military posts (even for those spending 
most of the time in foreign countries358) 
After independence, FAPLA was transformed into a conventional army, 
but the interpenetration with the MPLA was maintained throughout both 
organisations' hierarchies. Many of the independence leaders continued to hold 
concurrent positions in the party, government and military structures. At the 
regional level, the overlapping of military and political positions was also 
common practice and many of the provincial commissioners were both MPLA 
Central Committee members and FAPLA's Lieutenant-Colonels. Political 
commissioners within each unit of FAPLA reported not up the military chain of 
command but to the political leadership of the region or province 359 However, 
during the transition period up to the attempted coup (1974-1977), the 
leadership partially lost the control of political indoctrination and preparation of 
FAPLA units due to the Nitista strategy (as explained), but this was a very short 
period and that is probably one of the reasons why the Nitista strategy did not 
bear much results at the military level (besides the disaffected veterans of the 
Ist military region only young officers of the 9th brigade of armoured cars 
effectively came out onto the streets). 
From then on the leadership regained control over the political preparation 
of FAPLA and intensified politicisation of the military by institutional means 
(with special attention being paid to younger officers). 
Later, as we will see, the continuous war against UNITA and South Africa, 
brought what can be called a militarisation of society with more and more 
people involved in military or para-military structures: military conscription 
became compulsory for both men and women over the age of eighteen and after 
357 See Collelo, Thomas, ed., Angola, a Country Study (Washington: Federal Research Division, 1991), 
p. 212. 
ass From private interview with Pepetela (7 July 1998) 
359 See Collelo, Thomas, ed., Angola, ... op. cit. p. 212-213. 
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military service, all personnel were obliged to enrol in the ODP or other para- 
military organisations36o Ensuing re-structuring of State administration (mainly 
during the presidency of Eduardo dos Santos) took the interpenetration of the 
top party, state and military structures to an extreme, making it ever more 
difficult to distinguish between them, starting with the president himself, who 
effectively exerted the functions of Head of State, Head of Government and 
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. This deep and progressively 
increasing interpenetration was probably the soundest obstacle impeding the 
military from becoming an autonomous political, economic or even social force 
as happened in other African countries such as Nigeria . 
361 Therefore, it is 
misleading to distinguish between the military, the State and party's top organs 
as autonomous structures, since they were all equally subjected to other more 
relevant forms of socio-political divisions (such as those that have been 
stressed throughout this work) and to the prevailing patrimonial working logic. 
6.1.4 The Balance of the purge: discrimination and `elitism' 
The balance of the first three years of rectification was presented at the first 
Extraordinary Congress, in December 1980; it was above all marked by a 
significant drop in the number of effective members of the new MPLA-PT, 
down to 31,098 members from 110,000 members at the time of the first 
congress, in December 1977362. In an estimated population of 7-8 million in 
'6° Recruitment and conscription were carried out by the General Staff's Directorate for Organisation 
and Mobilisation through provincial and local authorities. A two-year conscription period was initiated 
in 1978 and the 1980 party congress decided for universal and compulsory military training. Officials in 
charge of workplaces and schools were instructed to deny admission to anyone not properly registered 
for military service and women effectively played a role in national defence; in Collelo, Thomas, ed., 
Angola, 
... op. cit. pp 222-223. In practice the time limits for military service were usually extended 
and people could stay in the army for ten or more years; from private interviews with General Farrusco 
(2 May 1998) and also from personnal knowlege of people in this situation. Also supporting the idea of 
an increasing militarisation of society is a 1978 report from a British pilot stating that `Everyone seems 
to be in the army, and I am told you are either in the army or on the reserve from 18 to 35'; in The 
Sunday Telegraph (25 june 1978). 
361 See Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. 362 In Relatörio do Comite Central ao 10 Congresso Extraordindrio... op. cit... 1980, pp. 17-18. 
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1980363, the new party- members represented circa 0.4% of that population, 
which was quite small considering that it was a single party system. 
By then, selection criteria of members (ordinary members364) were said 
to have strictly followed the orientations established at the first Congress of 
1977 in order to achieve the purpose of the new Party -a vanguard 
organisation to lead the revolutionary classes towards scientific socialism36s 
In these terms, the CC report to the 1980 congress explained that, 
If the party fights for the construction of scientific socialism, its 
members must be intransigent fighters of all the obstacles and 
distortions to socialist guiding principles [... ] set the example in 
terms of work, study and discipline, [... ] defend the principle of 
proletarian internationalism keeping solidarity with all the peoples 
fighting imperialism, capitalism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and 
racism. 
[Therefore] the MPLA [will be] formed by the more aware 
elements of revolutionary social classes and social strata366 
Accordingly, in order to become one of `the more aware elements of the 
working class and the working masses dedicated to the proletariat cause 067 
(usually taken as those capable of studying and quoting the manuals of political 
instruction distributed by the party); members of the new party would need a 
minimum of education and preparation to study and defend socialist principles, 
especially during the interview set to approve or reject the candidate 
363 There was no national census since 1970, when a population of 5.62 million was recorded 
(excluding an estimated 500.000 refugees). Estimatives to 1980 indicate 7 to 8 million; from private 
interviews with Manuela Gonzales (6 March 1998) and Carlos Pinto (16 february 1998). 
364 We are talking of ordinary members, because top members of the party and State hierarchy-usually 
called dirigentes or responsäveis-as long as they had not any participation on the attempted coup, had 
almost automatically assured their membership and political positions. The target of rectification was 
obviously not the top leadership of the party and the State such as the members of the CC, the 
politburo, the General Staff and the government's ministers (restricted and relatively small organs 
within which it was easy to find and eliminate the Nitistas and pro-Nitistas). 
365 See Relatörio do Comite Central ao 1° Congresso Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980, pp. 12-13; also in 
the same sense are previous recommendations of Relatörio do Comite Central ao 1° Congresso ... op. 
cit. ... 1977, pp. 18-19. 366 Relatörio do Comite Central ao 1° Congresso ... op. cit. ... 1977, pp. 18-19; 22. Introducing these 
paragraphs, a previous sentencie stressed that the MPLA as an organised political force will be formed 
by the best elements of the workers class and other revolutionary social groups'; ibid. p. 18. 
367 Relatörio do Comite Central ao 1° Congresso Extraordindrio... op. cit... 1980, p. 39. 
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member368. Such educational criteria represented a first selection mechanism 
for party base membership, discriminating not only against the `less aware 
workers' but especially against the peasants, given their relatively limited 
access to information, education and instruction (most of them were 
illiterate)369. 
Looking at the social composition of the new party membership, it was 
clear that the peasantry had effectively been the main victim of rectification 
merely representing 1.9% of that membership370. In the words of Lücio Lara 
(Party Secretary for Organisation), priority was given to workers in the 
selection process: they only had to undergo one year's observation, as opposed 
to the peasants' two years, before becoming members. 37 1 The CC report clearly 
assumed such priority of the working class over peasantry towards membership 
in the following terms, 
The working class, though small in numbers, is the most suitable 
for the assimilation of Marxist-Leninism [... ] its living and 
working conditions are the guarantee of greater capacity for 
organisation and discipline in order to follow the scientific and 
technical progress as well as a higher level of collectivism [... ] thus, 
it is the guiding force of our revolution. The working peasantry, 
because of their living and working conditions, is not able to lead 
the struggle. This is because the peasant, as our late Comrade 
President Agostinho Neto said, is a `capitalist in the making', 
because he owns a piece of land and has means of production, and 
aspires to increase them all the time. 
372 
As stressed by Somerville, such criteria simply ignored the fact that 60% of the 
whole working force worked in agriculture, most of them as peasant farmers 
368 From private interviews with Mario Seteco (10th March 1998); Carlos Pinto (16th February 1998); 
Benjamim Castello (20th February 1998); all these interviewees had effective contact with this kind of 
rectification sessions in several provinces. 369 The above mentioned expansion of education - especially primary education - during the last 
stage of colonialism did not have much impact out of the urban centres. See Marques da Silva, Elisete 
O papel ... op. cit. pp. 18-19. By the first congress in 1977, the illiteracy rate was reported to be at 80% 
of the whole population; see Somerville, Keith, Angola ... op. cit. p. 
91; see also Bhagavan, M R, 
Angola's 
... op. cit. P. 9. 370 In a sample of 49% of the 31.098 party members, there were 49.1% workers (25.9% industrial and 
23.2% agricultural-Le working in State cooperatives); only 1.9% were peasants; 1.6% were 
intellectuals and technicians; 16.8% employees; 22.5% office workers and 3.4% others. In Relatörio do 
Comite Central ao I° Congresso Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980, pp. 17-18. 
371 Cit. in Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, Angola ... op. cit. pp. 167-168. 372 In Relatörio do Comite Central ao 1° Congresso Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980, p. 35. 
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and that 74% of the population still lived in rural areas. 373 In other words, such 
selection criteria for party membership mainly discriminated against the lowest 
(although larger) social strata, already at the margins of society (the poorest, the 
less educated, the less close to the urban centres); they became distanced or 
discarded from the party 374 
The genesis of this process can be traced to the October 1976 plenary; its 
motives (beyond Marxist-Leninist directives), seem to be related to Neto's 
distributive promises to the urban working class within his attempt to break the 
Nitistas ties with the labour strikers' movements (Cf supra). Later, at the 21 
May 1977 Central Committee plenary (where Nito and Jose Van Dunem were 
expelled from the CC), Nito Alves explicitly denounced the effects of such 
process, calling it party `elitism' promoted by the top leadership and later on, 
during the 1980 congress, the delegates to that congress approved a resolution 
denouncing the existence of such `elitism' as one of the `reactionary practices 
of the petite bourgeoisie'375 
Despite such denunciations 376, party discrimination and `elitism' 
continued to increase during Eduardo dos Santos presidency (as we will see 
later), but for now it is important to stress that these phenomena started with 
Neto's administration. 
6.2 The Administrative Centralisation and Concentration of Power 
The new political framework was characterised by a process of administrative 
centralisation and concentration of power in the hands of the President of the 
37 See Somerville, Keith, Angola ... op. cit. pp. 
96-97. 
374 As reported by several of my interviewees, an `elitist' official slogan emerged by then, according to 
which Ndo e do MPLA quem quer, mas quern pode (The MPLA is not for those who want to be in it, 
but for those who can be in it); from private interviews with Gerönimo Belo (17th March 1998); Joäo 
de Melo (17th April 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (20th April 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23rd 
April 1998); Vicente Pinto de Andrade (11th May 1998); Pepetela (7th July 1998); Gabriela Antunes 
(18th June 1998); several private conversations (not interviews) with Conceicäo Neto during the 
research period. Also Messiant stresses the extreme marginalisation of peasants within the new political 
and social system; in Messiant, Christine, `A propos des..., op. cit. p. 77. 
375 In Resolucöes e Mensagens do I° Congresso Extraordinärio do MPLA-PT de 17 a 23 de Dezembro 
(Luanda: Secretariado do Comite Central, 1980), p. 36. 
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Republic and in the Central Committee (to be more precise, in the politburo, 
dominated by the President of the Republic). This process unfurled in four main 
stages: 
1) The first stage goes back to the above mentioned third plenary 
session of the CC in October 1976, and seems to be greatly influenced by the 
necessity to counter the effects of the Nitista strategy of infiltrating the 
governmental and administrative structures (as discussed). By then, probably 
alerted by the danger represented by the autonomy and effective power of the 
executive members of the government (Nito Alves, David Aires Machado and 
several other pro-Nitistas), the plenary decided to revise the constitution. 37 It 
concentrated executive and legislative power in the Presidency of the Republic 
and also in the MPLA's Central Committee at the expense of the government 
and the Council of Revolution (the supposedly main executive and legislative 
organs as previously defined by the constitution 378). 
At the level of the Presidency, the President of the Republic was considered 
an integral part of the executive and presided over the Council of Ministers, 
combining the role of chief executive and head of government (previously, the 
President of the Republic was not part of the government, which was presided 
over by the Prime Minister). He became responsible for nominating and 
removing from office the provincial commissioners 379, a task which previously 
befell the Council of Revolution, but was effectively exerted by Nito Alves as 
Minister of Internal Administration, who effectively used such power to place 
his trustees in provincial commissariats throughout the country (as 
explained) 380 By then, probably envisaging a possible confrontation with the 
376 Denunciations produced at the congress were made within the discussed spirit of critica and auto- 
crItica. 
"' Law 71/76 in DR, I, 266 (11 November 1976) whereby articles 32,33,35,36,38,39,41,48 and 50 
were re-written. 
378 See articles 35 to 45 of the Constitutional Law, DR, I, 1 (11 November 1975). 
39 See article I of Law 71/76 in DR, I, 266 (11 November 1976). 
380 Under Law 1/76, the provincial commissioners were hierarchically answerable to Nito Alves as 
Minister for Internal Administration; although they were officially nominated by the Council of 
Revolution, many had been selected by Nito himself in his strategy of parallel power as explained 
above. See Law 1/76, in DR, I, 29 (5 September, 1976). 
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Nitistas, the President was also empowered to declare a state of siege or of 
emergency, which used to be the preserve of the Council of Revolution as 
well. 3a1 
At the level of the Central Committee (already relieved of Nitistas 
suspended from their positions at that same plenary) all its members were 
integrated into the Council of Revolution, whereas before, only members of the 
politburo were allowed in. Integrating the Council of Revolution itself, the CC 
members (and especially its permanent commission - the Politburo) thereby 
exerted a great part of the power of that supreme organ, including the guidance 
of internal and external policy382. 
From the measures adopted it can be seen that the Nitistas' strategy had a 
clear influence over this first stage of presidential concentration of powers. 
However, the Nitista threat to Neto's leadership must be seen as the then most 
recent of such previous threats and challenges (such as the Active Revolt, the 
Eastern Revolt or the OCA). Therefore, the President probably saw the 
concentration of power and centralisation of administration as a necessary 
overall and long-term strategy to counter such recurrent challenges beyond 
Nitismo. That is probably why this was just the first stage of a long process 
developed long after the Nitista threat had disappeared (developed not only by 
Neto but also by his successor, as we will see). 
2) The second stage in the process of concentration of power involved 
another CC plenary in August 1977, which within the same line of procedure 
altered once again the constitution. This time, power was given to the President 
to nominate and remove from office the Prime Minister and other members of 
the government; previously, the Prime Minister and other members of the 
government were nominated or removed from office by the Council of 
383 Revolution following indication from the MPLA 
381 See article I of Law 71/76 in DR, I, 266 (11 November 1976). 382 See articles 4 and 5 of Law 71/76 in DR, I, 266 (11 November 1976). 393 Law 13/77, DR, 1,194 (7 August 1977), whereby articles 32 and 38 of the Constitution were 
rewritten; these concerned the powers of the President of the Republic and the Council of Revolution, 
respectively. 
185 
3) The third stage comprised another revision of the constitution 
approved by the CC in January 1978 (right after the first congress-December 
1977). This revision not only reflected the already high level of presidential 
concentration of powers (resulting from earlier stages of that process384), but 
also represented another important Presidential `absorption' of the powers of 
the Council of Revolution (CR) and the Council of Ministers (CM). 
In terms of the CR, the constitutional revision determined the creation of a 
Permanent Commission for that council, able to decide on its behalf emergency 
cases and composed only of those of its members present in Luanda at any 
given time (art. 37)385. In practice, this meant that the President could preside 
and decide for that supreme legislative organ (CR) whenever he wanted, 
without having to depend on the presence of all its members in Luanda as 
previously established. 
In terms of the CM (already presided by the President of the Republic as 
Head of Government), the constitutional revision clearly defined it for the first 
time as the executive organisation of the government (art. 40). Again (as in the 
CR's case) a new permanent commission was created to run the CM's affairs 
between ordinary sessions (art. 44). Such Permanent Commission of the Council 
of Ministers was also to be presided over by the President of the Republic in 
order to co-ordinate the various ministries and central organisations, being able 
to decide on the competence of the CM; it was to be the responsibility of the 
CM itself to decide on who would belong to the said permanent commission 
(art. 44). The CM was to have a Secretariat responsible for the resolution of 
day-to-day problems and for monitoring the implementation of its instructions 
384 The President of the Republic was the President of the Party, who was the Head of the State and of 
the government, who was also the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces; his powers included 
presiding over the Council of Ministers, administering national security and defence from above, 
nominating and removing from office provincial commissioners, and choosing from among them those 
who were to become part of the Council of Revolution (art. 6,31 and 32); local administration was to be 
guided by democratic centralism in its dealings with central organisations. (article 54); the 
commissioners nominated in the provinces and in municipalities were considered organs of local power 
and administration, but were also considered representatives of the central government in their different 
spheres of action (art. 55); in Constitutional Law, DR, I, 31 (7 February 1978). 
385 Constitutional Law, DR, I, 31 (7 February 1978). 
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and decisions (art. 45). The Prime Minister was now to be considered no more 
than a direct collaborator of the President of the Republic (art. 46)386. 
In order to facilitate the effective (although not officially assumed) 
Presidential government, subsequent legislation determined that ministers and 
secretaries of State would form two commissions within the CM, namely, the 
Commission for socio-political matters and the Commission for socio- 
economic matters387. In these terms the government became divided into two 
main areas in order to facilitate the President's governmental activity. 
In practice, all these measures meant that the President of the Republic 
effectively governed the country, through restricted and more manageable 
organisations such as the permanent commission of the Council of Revolution 
(able to decide on behalf of that legislative organ at any time), the permanent 
commission of the Council of Ministers (able to decide on all executive matters 
to do with the Council of Ministers) and the Secretariat of the Council of 
Ministers (able to solve day-to-day problems and monitor the whole executive 
process); all these restricted organs were directly dominated by the President 
himself. 
The importance of the CM's Secretariat increased over the years, at the 
same time as executive and legislative power became more and more 
concentrated in the person of the President of the Republic. In due course, the 
President, the Secretariat of CM and the person responsible for the Secretariat 
(the Secretary of the Council of Ministers), working daily in the same space, 
namely the presidential buildings based in Futungo de Belas (a few miles south 
386 Constitutional Law, DR, I, 31 (7 February 1978). 
387 This measure arose, not from the constitutional revision, but from art. 3 of `Regulations of the 
Council of Ministers', approved by the Council of Ministers itself (no Law or decree number is 
provided), in DR, I, 278 (24 November 1979); according to the same regulations, amended by DR, I, 13 
(16 January 1980), the commission for socio-political matters was to comprise the ministries for 
education, justice and health, and the secretariats of State of social affairs, sports and physical 
education, and old veterans; the commission for socio-economic matters would comprise ministries for 
planning, finance, internal trade, external trade, work and social security, industry and energy, oil, 
fisheries, building and housing, transport and communications, provincial coordination and foreign 
relations, and the secretariat of State for cooperation. 
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of Luanda, away from the city centre and the ministries) '388 
became the true and 
effective nucleus of government, dominating the executive process: they 
prepared the subjects and plans to be discussed in the meetings of the Council 
of Ministers and in the meetings of the Council of Ministers' permanent 
commission389; they solved the current problems, and monitored the 
implementation of instructions and decisions made by the CM and by the CM's 
Permanent Commission. 390 The executive and legislative autonomy and 
initiative of the ministers and their respective ministries were thus substantially 
reduced. 
4) The fourth and final stage of centralisation of administration and 
concentration of power during Neto's presidency occurred at the CC's plenary 
in December 1978. The plenary, once again approved new executive and 
legislative powers for the President, not only regarding central power, but also 
regarding local power391 The posts of Prime Minister and Vice-Prime Minister 
were abolished, following Neto's public argument that this measure would 
enable him to relate directly with the ministers, with no intermediaries. 392 A 
new ministry was created for provincial co-ordination and provincial 
commissioners were integrated into the Council of Ministers, therefore giving 
more regular account of their actions to the President. The number of 
specialised departments in the Central Committee was increased `in order better 
to control government activity', thus ensuring that the specialised departments 
of the Central Committee fully supported the President's executive functions. 393 
388 Neto gradually based the presidency in Futungo, transferring it from the government palace in 
Luanda, probably as it was more shielded from popular manifestations and attempted coups; from 
where the Council of Ministers, the permanent commission and the secretariat operated. Neto's 
successor strengthened this process by building from scratch various residential infrastructures, such as 
the presidential palace, and accompanying support services. 
389 In `Regulations of the Council of Ministers' (no Law or decree number provided), in DR, I, 278 (24 
November). 
390 In art. 45 of Constitutional Law, DR, I, 31 (7 February 1978). 
391 See Law 1/79, DR, I, 14 (16 January 1979). 
392 Article `Le pouvoir du president Neto est renforce par la destitution du premier ministre' in Le 
Monde (12 December 1978); also in Radio Luanda (11 December 1978), cit. in Sumary of World 
Broadcasts -- SWB (13 December 1978); also in ACR, 12 (1980), p. B668. 393 Relatörio do Comite Central ao I° Congresso Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980, p. 6. 
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By then, the process-of personalisation, centralisation of administration and 
concentration of executive and legislative powers in the person and institution 
of the President of the Republic had already reached a very high level - as 
demonstrated by Law 1/79 introducing the decisions of the plenary, mixing 
constitutional matters (such as the abolition of the posts of Prime Minister and 
Vice-Prime Minister) and ordinary legislation (such as changes in ministerial 
organisation)394, without revising the constitution (as it should). The 
constitution was to remain in force without the suppression of the articles 
relative to the Prime Minister and Vice-Prime Minister, although in practice, 
the referred Law had already abolished these posts. 395 
In sum, with these four main stages of increased centralisation of 
administration and concentration of powers in the Presidency, Agostinho Neto 
was able to run the government directly, without intermediaries or limits 
imposed; as a direct and obvious consequence, the governmental ministries and 
respective ministers became substantially devoid of their powers (be it 
legislative or executive initiative). 
As mentioned, these stages were gradually achieved under the auspices of 
the Central Committee dominated by the politburo and the President himself 
(through CC's plenary sessions where major decisions on that process-such as 
constitutional revisions-were firstly approved). The CC support for such a 
process was later assumed, explained, justified and sanctioned by the Central 
Committee's report to the first Extraordinary Congress (December 1980) under 
the argument of the party's prominent social and political role at all levels: 
According to Party statutes, [... ] the party `(... ) is the superior force 
of all the Angolan People's Republic life, the force directing the 
Angolan State and society'. [... ] [Thus] The State and the Mass 
Organisations exert their activities according to Party directives 
and decisions, as expressed in the resolutions made by the 
Congress, the Central Committee and its politburo. At the same 
time, through the secretariat of the Central Committee, through the 
intermediate and basic organisations and through its members, the 
394 Law 1/79, DR, I, 14 (16 January 1979). 
395 For a discussion on this matter see Correia, Aderito and Bornito de Sousa, Angola, Histöria 
Constitucional (Coimbra: Almedina, 1996), pp. 27-28. 
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party helps the State and the Mass organisations to apply its 
decisions. The monitoring of the fulfilment of these directives is 
also an important aspect of the work of the party leadership, which 
is why art. 3 of its statutes states that 'in all domains of activity, the 
MPLA-PT will determine the political lines to follow, guiding their 
application and striving for the fulfilment of party directives' [my 
bold]. 396 
6.3 The Judicial System: Military and Political Control 
The restructuring of judicial power was undertaken in parallel, complementary 
lines with the aforementioned processes (social and party purges; concentration 
of powers in the presidency) forming the new political framework. The process 
of judicial restructuring was based on three main pillars: 
1) The first was the legitimisation of revolutionary justice. As referred, 
revolutionary justice, incited and authorised by Neto, had degenerated into a 
savage and terrifying witch hunt against all the conspirators (effective or simply 
reported Nitistas) and involved varying degrees of illegality also promoted by 
Neto himself, 
We are definitely not going to waste too much time on trials. We 
shall pass sentence. We shall not resort to the usual process, which 
would not be fair. We shall be as swift as possible in resolving these 
problems and we shall make decisions according to Revolutionary 
Law. 397 
The so-called revolutionary justice - violence and assassinations - 
completely overturned the judicial system, which had been incapable of 
controlling the hearings and summary executions throughout the country; the 
most elementary procedures, as written in the constitution and complementary 
legislation, were not adhered to, in some cases going so far as to dispense with 
396 In Relatörio do Comite Central ao I° Congresso Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980, pp. 39-40. 
397 In `Comunicacöes de Agostinho Neto ao pais de 27 a 30 de Maio', cit. in BM (27 June 1977), pp. 9- 
10. 
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the gathering of any proof whatsoever of the collaboration or the participation 
of the accused in the plot. 398 
Unwilling or unable to stop the violent and illegal purge process, the 
solution later found was in part to legalise and legitimise such revolutionary 
justice through the approval of the death penalty (Law 3/78). 399 This was 
basically reserved for all civilians guilty of an attempt against internal and 
external State security, endangering the main interests of the revolution (a long 
list specifying these crimes are part of the Law 7/78). 400 They were to be put on 
trial before the People's Revolutionary Tribunals (Tribunals Populares 
Revolucionärios-TPRs), who would be given new remits according to a new 
law establishing the right procedures to hold trials (Law 8/78). 401 However, in 
order to officially justify and legitimise the purges (killing) after the attempted 
coup, it was publicly acknowledged that the death penalty had already and 
previously been used under revolutionary justice. 402 
2) Gradual militarisation of the judicial system represented the second 
main pillar of judicial restructuring. In parallel to the People's Revolutionary 
Tribunals (civilian courts answerable to the Minister of Justice), a military 
judicial system evolved, answerable to the Minister of Defence. It meted out 
heavy penalties, punishing many crimes with the death penalty or with twenty- 
four year prison terms (Law 16/78)403 and it was given broad competencies, 
which coincided with those of the TPRs (Law 17/78), 404 increasingly meshing 
the civil and military areas. 
398 Often the criterion for determining a person's participation in the attempted coup was the answer 
given to two questions: had they ever read Thirteen Thesis in my Defence, by Nito Alves, and what 
level of education did they possess (with tragic consequences if they had significative high school or 
university education). From private interviews with Luis dos Passos (13th May 1998), William Tonnet 
(30th March 1998), Victor Aleixo (26th March 1998); JM Mabeko-Tali (27th April 1998); see also the 
already quoted Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ... op. cit. p. 395. 399 The death penalty was introduced with Law 3/78, reformulating n°. 1 of art. 55 of the penal code. °0°Articles 1 to 32 of the Law 7/78, DR, I, 136 (10 June 1978). 
'01 `Law of people's Revolutionary Tribunals', Law 8/78, DR, I, 137 (26 May 1978). 
402 Cit. in A CR, 11 (1979), p. B487. 
403 Law 16/78 (Law of Military Crimes), DR, I, 15 (24 November 1978). 
404 Law 17/78 (of Military Penal Justice), DR, I, 15 (24 November 1978). 
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The law on military penal justice (Law 17/78) started off by providing the 
Military Tribunals with the ability to pronounce at criminal trials where a 
military person stood accused; this would include members of the armed forces, 
of security forces, of internal order, other para-military forces and all citizens 
subjected by law to the military forum (art. 9). However, the same law added 
that, in the event of war or of military operations, those tribunals could 
adjudicate in all cases where civilians or military were on trial, whatever the 
nature of the crime (art. 9, no. 4); thus by-passing art. 5 of the law on People's 
Revolutionary Tribunals (law 8/78), by which this civilian court had previously 
been given the authority to judge crimes against State security committed by 
civilians or military alike. 
Many people were involved in one way or another with military or para- 
military organisations; the war was increasing in intensity, and affecting all 
spheres of national life, be it directly or indirectly. This coupled with art. 9, no. 
4, meant that military justice and its judicial system became the most important, 
effective and feared judicial system for the majority of the population by- 
passing the civilian tribunals (TPRs). However, such `militarisation' of the 
judicial system was to be mainly applied on political and security issues and not 
much at the level of ordinary crimes such as the ones committed against the 
state's property as we will see in the next chapter. 
3) The third main pillar for the restructuring of the judicial system 
consisted of the politicisation and the political control of military and civilian 
judicial systems: 
a) Regarding the political nature of judicial systems, in the case of the 
People's Revolutionary Tribunals, such can be confirmed by its legitimacy, 
which according to law, 
[... ] Arises from its nature as a creation of the supreme State 
organisation of the People's Republic of Angola, namely the MPLA 
[watching over] the preservation and continuity of the revolutionary 
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process, aimed- at establishing poder popular, and creating a fair 
society and a new man. 
405 
As for military tribunals, the existing legislation also stated that `the juridical 
penal role of the armed forces derives from Revolutionary Power. '406 
b) Regarding political control, the two judicial systems (civil and 
military) and their respective tribunals were subordinated to the party, and 
ultimately to the President of the Republic inasmuch as: on the one hand, the 
president of the military tribunal of the Armed forces would be nominated by 
the National Security Commission of the MPLA's Central Committee (presided 
over by the President of the Party/President of the Republic), after consultation 
with the Minister of Defence407; on the other hand, all the judges in the People's 
Revolutionary Tribunals were also nominated or removed from office by the 
said Commission 408 
Concluding chapter 6, it can be seen that during Agostinho Neto's presidency 
the construction of the new framework of political relationships was marked by 
three main characteristics: 
" Firstly, the onset of a process of substantial partisan discrimination (called 
`elitism' by the Nitistas) towards the lowest social strata, after a violent 
purge and selective rectification campaign within a monolithic party built 
upon a rigid hierarchical/pyramidal structure (according to the new 
democratic centralism). 
" Secondly, a high level of administrative centralisation and concentration of 
executive and legislative powers at the top structures of the Party and the 
State (namely the Central Committee, the politburo and the President of the 
Party/President of the Republic); a process legally supported by the CC (the 
organ empowered to revise the constitution). 
405 Preamble to Law 7/76 that instituted Popular Revolutionary Tribunals; DR, I, 102 (1976). See also 
preamble to Law 8/78 in DR, I, 137 (26 May 1978). 
406 Art. 1 of Law 17/78 in DR, I, 15 (24 November 1978). 
407 Art. 6 of Law 17/78 in DR, I, 15 (24 November 1978). 
408 Art. 7, no 1, Law 8/78 in DR, I, 137 (26th May 1978). 
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" Thirdly, an authoritarian, and much feared `militarisation' of the judicial 
system with drastic penalties (mainly for political and security crimes), 
functioning under a vague and almost limitless revolutionary legitimacy. 
Insofar as the central discussion of this work is concerned (relationships 
between rulers and ruled), such characteristics mainly represented the 
beginning of a process of political `insularisation', i. e. the political, institutional 
(legislative plus executive) and juridical systems became dominated by the 
President and his entourage at the CC and Politburo, who now operated with a 
very large degree of autonomy. These systems became to have limited 
possibilities of formal intervention or participation by the general population. 
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7- The Construction of a New Socio-Economic Framework 
This chapter attempts to analyse the type of economic relationships established 
between rulers and ruled. The main purpose is to assess how successful they 
were in terms of integrating rulers and ruled through rentiere and distributive 
practices (modern patrimonialism) or on the contrary, breaking those 
distributive ties (post-modern patrimonialism). 
At independence, the MPLA leadership was faced with a difficult 
economic situation due to two major sets of reasons. 
Firstly, the war. After the withdrawal of South African forces from 
southern Angola in March 1976, the military situation did not get better and 
probably worsened with the changeover from conventional military 
confrontation to guerrilla warfare: in Cabinda with the activities of FLEC, 
supported by Mobutu's Zaire; in the North, with FNLA also supported by Zaire; 
in the South, with UNITA, strongly supported by South Africa409. 
In the ensuing years, although the FNLA was disbanded41° and FLEC was 
controlled militarily, UNITA reinforced its alliance with South Africa and 
greatly increased its military and destructive capacity through the guerrilla 
warfare that gradually spread to an ever-growing number of provinces411. The 
immediate aim of guerrilla activity was to disrupt the MPLA's economy, 
attacking and destroying the infrastructure throughout the country, such as 
power stations, dams, water supplies, roads, bridges and communication 
409 See Birmingham, David, Frontline Nationalism... op. cit. pp. 80-81. 
410 As we will see below, some disbanded FNLA guerrilla groups survived until October 1984, when 
the last groups surrendered to the MPLA, but during all the period until then, they had no significant 
military impact. 
411 South Africa needed UNITA's support in fighting SWAPO, who operated from Angolan territory. 
On the `alliance' between UNITA and South Africa and their military activities see Guimaräes, 
Fernando Andresen, The origins ... op. cit. especially chapter5; Soremekun, Fola, 
Angola ... op. cit. 
chapter7; Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, Angola ... op. cit. chapters 
1-4 and 10-11; also ACR, 
11 (1980), pp. B488-B491, and ACR, 12 (1981), pp. B672-B678; on the area affected by UNITA's 
activities see The Times (27 September 1977); on UNITA's activities reported from inside see The 
Sunday Times Magazine (10 September 1978), pp. 29-35. 
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systems412. Attempting to escape the war, part of the rural population migrated 
towards the cities413 and in some cases emigrated towards neighbouring 
countries such as Zambia in the East and Namibia in the South414. Important 
agricultural and industrial concerns were then abandoned 415. Therefore, directly 
and indirectly the war affected the production in these sectors. 
However, it must be remembered that the war does not in any way explain 
several other problems equally affecting the production levels such as the 
rentiere mentality, thefts, diversion of means of production, absenteeism, the 
organisation of networks to divert and sell official produce in the black market, 
lack of co-ordination between State ministries and so on. These other problems 
will be stressed in this chapter as being at the centre of this work's main 
discussion (the type of economic relationships established between rulers and 
ruled). Thus, the fact that the well-known and commonly reported problems of 
the economic impact of war are not extensively explored in here, does not mean 
that they are undervalued, but just that other factors must be highlighted within 
the analytical perspective and discussion of this work416 
Secondly, the Portuguese had left en masse and therefore the country had 
lost most of its businessmen, commercial farmers, senior and mid-level civil 
servants, engineers, doctors, teachers and shopkeepers 417. In August 1976, over 
80% of farmland had been abandoned by previous Portuguese landowners; only 
40% of industries were still operating (under the control of its previous owners 
or managers) but in miserable conditions and far from its regular production 
capacity; over 30,000 technicians, professionals and skilled workers had left the 
412 See ACR, 9 (1978), p. B460. 
413 Officially, such migration movement (not even estimated until the early eighties) was recognised and 
defined as 'an exodus of rural population towards the cities'; in Relatörio do Comite Central ao 1° 
Congresso Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980, p. 72. 
414 See ACR, 10 (1979), p. B508. 
415 See ACR, 9 (1978), pp. B448-B450. 
416 Our approach is mainly political/sociological, but even approaching the war impact on a strictly 
economic point of view, the production decline can not in no way be basically explained with the war as 
argued in an interesting thesis of the economist Ferreira, Manuel Ennes, A Indüstria em tempo de 
Guerra (Angola, 1975-91) (Lisbon: Edig6es Cosmos/IDN, 1999). 
417 See Bhagavan, M R, Angola's ... op. cit. pp. 7-8; also Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. 
pp. 30-31. 
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country; 2,500 businesses closed down, 75% of which had been abandoned by 
their owners; from the 135,000 vehicles registered before independence, only 
8,000 remained operational; circa 130 bridges in main roads had been destroyed 
during the civil war; the system of trade and distribution (mainly composed by 
25.000 small trade businesses) collapsed with the departure of the bush 
traders. 418 
Faced with this urgent situation, the government went for State 
intervention in the economy, but limiting its involvement to the most important 
commercial and industrial enterprises abandoned by their former owners and to 
the large strategic industries as stated by the `Law on political economy'. 419 
Private interests and activity were to be respected, protected and guaranteed as 
determined by the constitution. 420 There was no intention to follow a policy of 
nationalisation as stressed by Eduardo dos Santos (by then in charge of foreign 
affairs). 
Un principe general est inscrit dans notre constitution. Nous 
sommes prets ä respecter les interets des compagnies 
multinationales en Angola si elles aident au developpement de 
notre economie et au bien etre de notre peuple. Nous sommes donc 
ouvers aux investissement de 1'Est comme de 1'Ouest. En regle 
418 See Maximino, Mario Nelson (top manager of Angolan National Bank) `Economic development in 
the People's Republic of Angola', communication at the conference on Angola promoted by the 
foundation Friedrich Ebert in Bonn (October 1983); cit. in Meyns, Peter "0 desenvolvimento da 
economia Angolana a partir da independencia: problemas da reconstrucäo nacional", in Revista 
Internacional de Estudos Africanos, n°2 (1984), p. 121-161; also Telex Angop: transcricdo na integra 
do discurso proferido por Jose Eduardo dos Santos na sessäo de abertura do seminärio sobre 
Saneamento Econömico e Financeiro (17 August 1987), Part I; also ACR, 9, (1978), pp. B457-B458; 
ACR, 10, (1979), p. B514; also Collelo, Thomas, ed., Angola, ... op. cit. pp. 
113-116. 
41 Law 3/76 `on the political economy of resistance' stated that: 1. `The economic politics of resistance 
are characterized by the construction of economic planning comprising three sections: State economy, 
cooperatives and private businesses [... ] The material basis for this economy requires the broadening of 
cooperatives, as well as the development of a State sector to take control of medium and large strategic 
industries. On the other hand, it is essential to make full use of existing resources, many of which have 
been abandoned by the colonists and are currently unproductive. The private sector, according to the 
economics of resistance, will have to be encouraged and supported by the State, as long as it acts in 
accordance with the economic and labour policies of MPLA. 2. It is precisely this chaotic situation, 
inherited from colonialism and worsened by the imperialist war that created the need to nationalise 
forthwith some of the business and goods abandoned or belonging to traitors [those who collaborated 
with fascist colonialist or anti-nationalist organizations, UPA-FNLA/UNITA, FLEC, ELP ('Army of 
Popular Liberation'), a whites' party]; in Law 3/76, DR, I, 52 (3 March 1976). 
420 The general principles of Angola's approach to economic policy were written into the constitution. 
`The RPA recognises, protects and guarantees private interests and activity, even from foreigners, as 
long as they are useful to the country's economy and in the interests of the Angolan people (art. 10); 
Constitutional Law of the People's Republic of Angola, DR, I, 1, (11 November 1975); Also in the 
same sense is Law on economic policy 3/76 quoted in the previous footnote. 
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generale, nous n'avons pas I'intention pour le moment de proceder 
ä des nationalisations, sauf si les enterprises industrielles ou 
commerciales ä capitaux etrangers ont ete abandonnees par leur 
proprietaire. 42' 
Nationalisation was imposed mainly on fishing, sugar production, textiles, 
cement and steel422. It included 386 of the existing 482 coffee plantations, 
establishing coffee, sugar and sisal state farms. Intervention committees were 
set up to manage the abandoned businesses. 423 
The major change in economic policy orientation occurred with the 
October 1976 CC's plenary once the movement officially declared its 
adherence to Marxism-Leninism and commitment to the construction of 
Socialism. In that same month, the government took over the two main banks 
(Banco de Angola and Banco Comercial de Angola renamed Banco Nacional 
de Angola and Banco Popular de Angola respectively; other smaller banks 
were shut down)424. In general terms, the plenary decided to concentrate the 
economic policy `on ways of increasing government control and supervision of 
the economy, encompassing decisions to continue with confiscation and 
nationalisation'; to draw up yearly plans for 1977,1978,1979 and multi-year 
plans thereafter; to continue the measures tending to guarantee a state 
monopoly on foreign trade425. These economic policies were put into practice 
mainly during 1977, and by the middle of that year, the State had already 
confiscated and nationalised around 85% of designated businesses. 426 Later 
(right after the first congress) the constitution was accordingly revised to 
include the new macro economic orientation in its article 9, stating for the first 
time that, 
The basis for economic and social development is socialist 
ownership, consolidated through state ownership and co-operative 
421 From interview with Jose Eduardo dos Santos (Foreign Minister) to Rene Lefort; Le Monde (14 
February 1976). 
422 From Jane Bergerol article `MPLA confiscation' in Financial Times (6 May 1976). 
423 In ACR, 9 (1978), p. B475; also Zenha Rela, Jose Manuel Angola ... op. cit. p. 50-51 424 Latter on, in February 1978, banking was formally made a State monopoly; in Hodges, Tony Angola 
to the 1990's ... op. cit. p. 
32. 
425 In ACR, 10 (1979), p. B514. 
426 Roque, Fatima et al. Economia de Angola (Lisbon: Bertrand, 1991), p. 221. 
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ownership. The State will take the measures necessary for the 
constant broadening and consolidation of socialist production 
relationships. 427 
The official adherence to a Socialist economic system was thus constitutionally 
proclaimed. However, as we will see, that did not impede the development of a 
patrimonial working logic. The new economic framework that emerged during 
the presidency of Agostinho Neto will now be more accurately analysed, 
according to the previously outlined and explained five main indicators: public 
administration (7.1); material production (7.2); the informal sector (7.3); the 
economic and political impact of the war (7.4); the social policies (7.5). 
7.1 Public Administration: the Inefficient Growth of the State's Bureaucracy 
In conformity with Socialist political and macro-economic practice, but also 
fulfilling the previously mentioned patrimonial distributive promises and 
expectations (pressures), the public sector underwent enormous growth; it grew 
not only in terms of an increased number of businesses and economic activities, 
such as commercial farms and various industries, but most of all in terms of 
administrative bureaucracy. 428 
The huge growth of the public sector partly satisfied the aspirations of the 
urban masses in obtaining work for the State, jobs they had long hankered for 
and which had been the most highly prized during colonisation. As a general 
rule, positions within public administration were distributed among members of 
the Creole/Mbundu alliance, be it at the top, medium or base levels of the 
hierarchy. 
At the top of the public administration, posts were mainly occupied by the 
descendants of the Old Creoles' 'aristocracy' (coastal and interior nuclei). 
Despite their links with the Portuguese administration and privileged position 
during colonialism, their experience in the Portuguese administrative system, 
427 Article 9, Constitutional Law in DR, I, 31 (7 February 1978) 
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their relatively high levels of education and the generalised lack of cadres were 
a great advantage to them429. They were soon followed (but at medium level of 
the hierarchy) by the survivors of the youth committees generation discussed 
above. 
At the medium and lower levels of the hierarchy, positions were mainly 
and massively occupied by civil servants belonging to the great 
Creole/M'Bundu alliance but with no qualifications whatsoever for their posts, 
immediately representing technical inefficiency of public administration not 
only because of the lack of qualifications of the new personnel, but also 
because of overstaffing. 430 
The non-Creole/Mbundu who were not long time MPLA members were 
excluded from State administration and, as a general rule, were `forced' into the 
emerging alternative of informal markets; this included especially those 
Bakongo who did not belong to the MPLA, and had increasing FNLA and anti- 
Creole/Mbundu connotations 431, having returned in large numbers from Zaire 
in 1977 (around 200,000432). These returnees were from the start subjected to a 
strong social discrimination, pejoratively called Zairotas-implying that they 
were not Angolans but Zairian 433 Given their knowledge and the experience of 
428 The figures on the workforce are few and imprecise due to the confusion that developed between the 
Party, the State, the Forces of Defence and Security; it is estimated that public enterprise employed 
45% and public administration, 40%. See Roque, Fatima et al. Economia ... op. cit. pp. 
176-178. 
429 See Somerville, Keith, Angola 
... op. cit. p. 
86; Also Zenha Rela, Jose Manuel Angola ... op. cit. 
p. 48. 
430 In terms of overstaff, in order to find occupation to all the new civil servants, activities had to be 
divided; the work that was previously done by one person came to be performed by several, but given 
their lack of qualification and increasingly difficult articulation between too many people, work 
division represented an enormous cost in terms of wasted hours to get the most simple tasks and 
services done; from private interviews with Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Antonio Cazevo (10 
March 1998); Carlos Feij6 (10 April 1998); Pitra Neto (8 July 1998); also Zenha Rela, Jose Manuel 
Angola 
... op. cit. p. 49. 431 See Messiant, Christine, `A propos des..., op. cit. p. 79, footnote 38. 
432 See ACR, vol. 10 (1979), p. B508. From 1978 onwards, the Bakongo 'returned' to Angola at a rate of 
50.000 a year until 1982; in ACR, vol. 14 (1983), p. B590. 
433 For the most complete approach on this problem of the retornados from Zaire (a problem whose 
roots can be found long before the independence, during the anti-colonial struggle as we have 
previously mentioned and still goes on today with dramatic episodes) see Mabeko-Tali, JM Les 
Bakongo et la Transition Democratique en Angola: Democratie ou Representation Ethnico- 
Regionale? ' (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique/CNRS, 1993), Rapport Scientifique 
de la Mission ä Luanda; Groupe de Recherches 846 'Afrique Australe'; see also ACR, vol. 15 (1984), 
p. B597. 
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the small-time marginal- trade that was widespread in the cities of Zaire, they 
brought about a marked upsurge in informal markets for a wide variety of small 
businesses producing goods and providing services434 
Such type of discrimination in State employment along with the high 
socio-professional status of civil servants during colonialism and rentiere 
mentality of post-independence (as discussed) all favoured an attitude of 
haughtiness and disdain of the new public administration towards the people 
(lower social strata). As a general rule, the public servants behaved as though 
they were not there to serve the public but to charge a right supposedly due or 
promised by the State and to fully exert the privileged professional, economic 
and social status that was usually given to the administrative sector during the 
colonial period 435 . 
Even though the majority of the new civil servants had been 
underprivileged people in relation to Creole/M'Bundu segments of elite during 
the colonial administration, the new attitude was to become the general rule 
from top to bottom of the State's administration. In the face of this, Lücio Lara 
(party secretary for organisation), found it necessary in 1977 (in the run up to 
the first congress) to warn against party officials and civil servants adopting 
superior, bourgeois attitudes towards poorly educated workers and peasants 436 
Lara also criticised `some civil servants who questioned the ability of illiterate 
workers and peasants to govern the country' and opposed to the idea of a party 
comprising only an educated elite437. In other words, Lara was criticising 
434 As described by Birmingham: `In Kinshasa, Zairians held the State jobs and the immigrants held the 
private sector jobs, often under the high patronage of the State president who was the greatest private 
entrepreneur of them all. In Angola the returnees found that the State sector was monopolised by the 
supporters of the MPLA, but the private sector was vacant and open to them. The private sector in 
Angola had been dominated by white migrants from Portugal until ninety per cent of them fled in the 
panic of 1975. There were therefore openings for taxi-drivers, shirt-makers, shop-keepers, bar-tenders, 
cook-stewards, electricians, plumbers, lorry mechanics, and every kind of wheeler-dealer; in 
Birmingham, David, `Angola revisited'... op. cit. p. 3. 
ass This idea with some nuances is supported by several of my interviewees such as Fernando Pacheco 
(23 February 1998); Femanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Antonio Cazevo (10 March 1998); Carlos Feijö 
(10 April 1998); Pitra Neto, minister of Public Administration (8 July 1998). 
436 Cit. in Somerville, Keith, Angola ... op. cit. p. 
83. 
437 Cit. in Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, Angola ... op. cit. p. 164. 
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exactly the same attitude that had been previously denounced by Nito Alves as 
`elitism in the civil servicei438 along with `elitism' in the party. 
In order to avoid the Nitista terminology, such attitude was officially 
termed burocratismo ('bureaucratism'), defined by the party as, 
the ideological cover or the ideological expressions of bureaucracy. 
An aggregate of ideas and attitudes which represent the ideological 
support of bureaucracy [... ] and are part of the reactionary 
bourgeois ideology [... ] revealing, above all, a deep disrespect for 
the great majority of workers and peasants. 
439 
Thus, there was the consciousness that such phenomenon was much more than 
isolated attitudes and the same party document proceed on its general analysis 
stating that, 
Civil servants exhibit haughtiness and superiority in relation to the 
public, they became inaccessible and with a spirit of `omniscience'. 
Such superiority and `distance' usually conceal a deep 
incompetence [... ] They have not yet understood the role of workers 
and peasants in our society and have not yet understood that in the 
end workers and peasants created and create the conditions 
allowing the exercise of their functions as civil servants. Within this 
perspective, public servant must bear in mind that he is in his place 
essentially to serve those who look for his services and not to 
become an untouchable element, distant, to whom one must ask for 
favours. [... ] They do not want to understand that they are fulfilling 
their duty and not doing any favour. [... ] It must also be noticed that 
[... this attitude goes on] with the acquiescence of responsäveis or 
hierarchical superiors who also participate in such disrespect for 
those who work. [... ] Such attitudes are expressions of petit 
bourgeois ideology that must be fought. 
440 
A few months after this statement, within the previously explained mechanisms 
of self-criticism, the CC report to the 1980 congress also stressed the need to 
fight `bureaucratism and parasitismo [parasitism]'441 
Such attitudes of civil servants along with the unsolved technical 
problems (overstaff and lack of qualifications), led to an overall inefficiency of 
public administration 442 
438 See Alves, Nito Discurso no comicio de encerramento da campanha eleitoral para os orgäos do 
poder popular (Luanda: DOP-MPLA, 1976), pp. 21-26, cit. in Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences 
. op. cit. p. 414. 439 In BM, 57 (March 1979), p. 14. 
440 Ibid. p. 14. 
441 In Relatörio do Comite Central ao 1° Congresso Extraordindrio... op. cit... 1980, p. 89. 
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7.2 Material Production: the Decrease in Agricultural and Industrial Output 
and the Increased Dependency on Oil Revenues 
7.2.1 Agriculture 
The new independent State considered it essential to get agriculture production 
going, as around 60% of the economically active population was engaged in 
agriculture and that 74% of the population still lived in rural areas (cf. supra). 
At first, particular attention was paid to coffee, as Angola's second major 
export; this however was not very successful since the coffee farms had 
depended heavily on an estimated 120.000443 to 180.000444 'Ovimbundu' 
migrant workers, the majority of whom left the northern coffee estates when the 
country was plunged into war in 1975-76, returning to their place of origin (the 
central highlands)445. In an attempt to overcome the flight of these workers, the 
government forcibly recruited a large number of urban unemployed and 
students into harvesting teams. This repressive and unpopular exercise, named 
Operation Coffee, started with the July 1976 harvest446 but with no effective 
results because people resisted given the freedom allowed during the youth 
committees' period' 7. Consequently, production was nil in 1976 (other than for 
the selling of already existing stock, stored during the last years of 
colonialism 448). The same repressive procedure was carried out in the following 
year, this time with effective results under the fearful authoritarian policies of 
the post-27th May 1977, with 90,000 recruits and 100.000 tons of harvested 
coffee 449 However, the continuing war, the passive resistance of workers, and 
442 From private interviews with Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 
1998); Antonio Cazevo (10 March 1998); Carlos Feij6 (10 April 1998); Pitra Neto (8 July 1998). 
443 In Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. P. 91 444 In ACR, vol. 10 (1979), p. B515. 
aas See Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. p. 91; also Birmingham, David, Frontline Nationalism... op. cit. p. 77; also ACR, vol. 10 (1979), p. 13515 446 In ACR, vol. 9 (1978), p. B460. 447 Birmingham, David, Frontline Nationalism... op. cit. p. 77. 448 InACR, vol. 9 (1978), p. B460. 
449 Reports of Rend Lefort in Le Monde (8 December 1977); see also ACR, vol. 10 (1979), p. B515. 
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the neglect of coffee -plantations (with beans left unpicked causing pest 
infestation and the spread of root fungi) 450 progressively destroyed the bulk of 
plantations and drastically decreased the production from 1979 onwards 451 
After the October 1976 CC's plenary and the move towards Marxism- 
Leninism, co-operative peasantry became the main agricultural objective and 
also involved an increasing governmental and administrative control at all 
levels: prices, quantities, investment, trading, distribution, export and import. 
Agricultural activity was divided between: a) State farms, or AUPs 
(Agrupamentos de Unidades de Producdo/Groups of Production Units), 
financially and administratively dependent on the government, with no 
autonomy on production decisions and producing almost exclusively for the 
State; b) farmers' associations (Associaq es de Camponeses) which produced 
autonomously from the State programmes; c) the campesinato, small producers 
and herdsmen with very rudimentary systems of production and very limited 
production; d) the few Portuguese farmers who had not left. 452 
All these producers were dependent on the government for the provision of 
support services, which were absolutely crucial for the good functioning of 
State agriculture: ENAMA (Empresa Nacional de Maquinizagdo 
Agricola/National Enterprise for Agricultural Mechanisation) providing 
mechanical support to agriculture; DINAMA (Distribuidora Nacional de 
Materiais Agricolas/National Distributor of Agricultural Supplies) which 
bought and distributed agricultural tools, fertilisers and insecticides; Agro- 
Sementes, responsible for the buying and distribution of seeds; and 
ENCODIPA (Empresa Nacional de Comercializagdo e Distribuigäo de 
Produtos AgrIcolas/National Enterprise for Commercialisation and Distribution 
of Agricultural Produce) first led by the Ministry of Agriculture and latter by 
the Ministry of Internal Trade, responsible for the commercialisation and 
450 In ACR, vol. 11 (1980), pp. B503-B504. 
451 In 1979 the production was 40.000 tons, in 1980 was 33.366t and in 1981 was only a mere 21501t 
(approximately one tenth of 1973 production), in ACR, vol. 14 (1983), p. B597. 
452 In Roque, Fatima et al. Economia ... op. cit. pp. 213-214. 
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distribution of consumer goods in rural areas in exchange for agricultural 
produce 453 
In theory, the entire Agriculture State sector was precisely structured and 
ready to work in full, but in practice it was an almost absolute failure, be it in 
administrative or economic terms. 
In administrative terms, the whole system gradually went into self- 
strangulation essentially due to a double reason: firstly, the bureaucratic 
complexity along with the lack of specialised personnel to run central co- 
ordination of all these organisations (a mega-structure encompassing the whole 
country and several ministries)454; secondly, the lack of efficient 
communication and transport between the capital city (where major decisions 
were taken) and the provinces (where agricultural production took place). 455 
In economic terms, administrative inefficiency represented the failure of 
crucial services to producers. Such inefficiency in conjunction with other 
policies and events (rejection of market incentives and unfavourable terms of 
trade between agricultural and industrial products456; massive population shifts 
due to the war, mostly towards the cities457; hostility of rural people to 
ass Ibid. pp. 213-214; also in Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. pp. 
85-86. Also in the same 
sense are private interviews with Benjamim Castello (20 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 
1998). 
454 See Relatdrio do Comite Central ao I° Congresso Extraordinärio ... op. cit... 
1980, p. 88; see also in 
the same sense another document issued from the same congress, 'Principais resultados do 
desenvolvimento econömico-social da RPA no trienio 1978-1980' in Orientacöes Fundamentais para 
o Desenvolvimento Econömico e Social para o perIodo 1981-1985 (Luanda: Secretariado do Comit6 
Central, 1980), pp. 10-11; also Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. pp. 
85-86. 
455 In Zenha Rela, Jose Manuel Angola 
... op. cit. pp. 
53-56, the author was a consultant of the Angolan 
Ministry of Agriculture until 1987 and also professor of economy at the Agostinho Neto University; 
also in the same sense is `Principais resultados do desenvolvimento econömico-social da RPA no 
trienio 1978-1980' ... op. cit. pp. 10-11; also 
in the same sense are private interviews with Vigilio 
Ribeiro da Silva (8 September 1995); Benjamim Castello (20 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 
April 1998). 
456 Agricultural products were undervalued and industrial products were overvalued in the official 
systems of trade; from private interviews with Vigilio Ribeiro da Silva (8 September 1995); Benjamim 
Castello (20 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998); also Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, 
Jane, Angola 
... op. cit. p. 
143. 
457 From 1975 to 1985, this migration movement in relation to the whole urban population went from 
18% to 31%; from private interviews with Carlos Pinto (16 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 
1998); Manuela Gonzalez (6 March 1998). 
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collectivisation458), all contributed to the slump in agricultural production 459 In 
the end, as stressed by Birmingham, `the whole of the food distribution network 
failed at three levels, in production, in transport, and in retailing 460 This 
failure represented a major setback not only to the production level but also to 
. the collectivisation process 
itself 461 
By 1979-1980, agriculture production became mainly directed to 
personal consumption (subsistence economy) 462 and surplus production was 
preferentially diverted to black markets where prices were substantially higher. 
As stressed by Wolfers and Bergerol 
The root of the problem in building links between town and country 
lay in marketing the peasant's surplus. Government buyers wanted 
priority over private buyers, but many peasants were committed to 
the private market; because 1) government purchasing was 
disorganised and infrequent, centring on market towns but lacking 
transport to get the crop to the market place; 2) government tended 
to pay in script instead of cash; 3) government prices were lower, 
and finally the adverse effects of inflation and shortages on the 
money economy by mid 1978, resulted in many peasants bartering 
their crops for industrial goods, which private traders willingly 
provided. Some provincial authorities half-heartedly tried to cut out 
private buyers instead of improving their own buying organisations 
and providing more industrial goods to attract the producers. [... ] 
Consequently, private purchasing continued to grow, a proportion 
of which increasingly supplied the black market in Luanda, and 
further demoralised the state marketing boards. "' 
458 From private interviews with Vigilio Ribeiro da Silva (8 September 1995); Benjamim Castello (20 
February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998); also in Financial Times (26 January 1978). 
459 'The production of maize dropped from 333,800 tons in 1973 to 36,800t in 1977 and to 23,700t in 
1981; taking the same reference years, dried cassava fell from 61,800 tons to 1,200t but then rose to 
19,000t [and then dropped again to 1,000t in 1985]; beans declined from 33,500 tons to 6,700t and then 
fell again to 1,070t [... ]; cotton from 79,300 tons to 1,400t to 1,050t; and so on for all the major food 
crops, cash crops and livestock and dairy products. ' In Bhagavan, M R, Angola's ... op. cit. p. 
19. See 
also'Principais resultados do desenvolvimento econömico-social da RPA no trienio 1978-1980' ... op. 
cit. p. 16. 
460 Birmingham, David, Frontline Nationalism... op. cit. p. 77. 
461 In 'Principais resultados do desenvolvimento econömico-social da RPA no trienio 1978-1980' ... 
op. cit. pp. 15-16,22-23. 
462 Ibid. pp. 22-23; also from private interviews with Vigilio Ribeiro da Silva (8 September 1995); 
Benjamim Castello (20 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998); Heimer also stesses that 
'L'affaiblissement de la societe centrale [apres l'independance] a diminue de fawn dramatique son 
interaction avec les societes peripheriques, particulierement ont sans trop de mal pu assurer leur 
reproduction materielle, en renforcant leur economie d'autosubsistance. ' In Heimer, Franz-Wilhelm, 
'Formation sociale ... op. cit. p. 
38. 
463 Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, Angola ... op. cit. p. 
143. 
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In parallel to the decrease in agriculture output, the fishing industry reduced 
drastically its production levels. Fisheries like agriculture and other sectors 
suffered from the 1975-76 upheaval with onshore installations abandoned by 
Portuguese owners, managers and technicians. Since then, even if this sector 
was not directly affected by the war, the problems of shortages of skills, delays 
in supplies of vital inputs and spare parts all contributed to the slump in fishing 
production46a Attempting to solve the problem, the government licensed 
foreign fleets and `the fishing industry was by agreement taken over by the 
Soviet Union and Cuba whose refrigerated vessels took all but 15% of the catch 
to overseas markets, the remainder going to Angola 465 However, that did not 
solve the problem either and the fish landed by foreign fleets (98.500 tons in 
1981466) was far below the 467.000 tons landed in 467 - 
As an obvious consequence of this downward trend in agriculture and 
fishing output, the country soon went from being able to export food (during 
the last period of colonialism) to having to import massive amounts of 
foodstuffs of all kinds. As soon as 1979, the level of agricultural production 
within commercial circuits controlled by the State provided just 12% of 
consumers needs and circa 15% of raw materials to the industry468. In face of 
the growing evidence, in the 1979 May Day speech, Neto admitted that the 
country was `short of food and the cost of living was extremely high'469, 
something that had been previously reported by several foreign observers (in 
December 1978) 470 
464 See Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. p. 
97. 
465 In Financial Times (26 January 1978). 
466 In Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. p. 98. 467 Estimates of annual tonnage of fish landed in 1977-1980 varied between 30.000t and 90.000t a year, 
way below the 467.000 landed in 1973, of which 162.000 were exported; in ACR, vol. 14 (1983), 
p. B597. 
468 In `Principais resultados do desenvolvimento econömico-social da RPA no trienio 1978-1980' ... 
op. cit. p. 16; also in the same sense see Meyns, Peter, '0 desenvolvimento ... op. cit. pp. 
121-122. 
469 Cit. in Associated Press (2 May 1979). 
470 During the visit of US senator McGovern to Luanda, several reporters decribed the situation of food 
scarcity, commercial and distributive disruption: `Food is scarce. Long lines of people in front of shops 
wait for distribution of potatoes and grain. The port is clogged and functions only sporadically. Shops 
and offices abandoned by the Portuguese at the time of independence in 1975 remain closed and partly 
destroyed. Urban transportation is difficult with people piling on the few rickety buses running', 
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Finally, the 1980 report of the Central Committee to the congress 
confirmed in full all the above mentioned phenomena on the agriculture sector 
during Neto's presidency, not only in terms of production failure and 
inefficiency, but also in terms of the discrimination against peasants within the 
party (as discussed), all resulting in the deterioration of their living conditions 
and increased differences between town and country. 
The lack of barely satisfactory supplies to rural areas contributed 
towards the sharp absenteeism of agricultural workers, who often 
felt obliged to pay more attention to subsistence. This lack of 
regular, satisfactory supplies also played a part in the disbanding of 
the agricultural co-operatives and of the often forgotten peasants' 
associations, and also in discouraging market production in general. 
We must recognise that those matters related to the betterment of 
the peasants' living conditions were not given sufficient 
importance. We must not forget that during the first liberation 
struggle [anti-colonial], the majority of our fighters came from the 
peasantry and it is the peasants who have always been the safety 
back up of our fighters. Because of this, and because they are the 
majority of our population, it would be logical that the State and 
party organisations should pay more attention to them. However, 
that did not happen and their living conditions are little better than 
during the colonial period; changes in production relationships are 
not much more than goodwill. The peasants do not have the support 
to increase production; peasants have difficulties in selling the 
goods they produce and manufactured goods are almost non 
existent in the country. Differences between town and country did 
not disappear in the least, but showed instead a tendency to 
471 increase. 
These remarks made by the congress (like all the others) must be seen within 
the previously discussed self-criticism mechanisms used in the preparation of 
congress documents (see introduction) and not so much as an effective 
commitment to change the situation -- which in fact only got worst as we will 
see. 
reported from Luanda by Flora Lewis to The New York Times (13 December 1978); 'long lines of 
women form before dawn to buy essential foods from nearly empty shops', reported by David Lamb in 
Los Angeles Times (3 December 1978); 'Downtown shops are deserted and even basic food items and 
other goods are scarce'; in The Sun (US) (13 December 1978); see also in the same sense The Sunday 
Telegraph (25 June 1978). 
471 Relatörio do Comite Central ao 1° Congresso Extraordinärio ... op. cit... 
1980, p. 53; also in the same 
sense see `Principais resultados do desenvolvimento econömico-social da RPA no trienio 1978-1980' 
... op. cit. pp. 22-23. 
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7.2.2 Industry - 
Although the government's economic aim during the first few years of 
independence was to restore production to pre-1974 levels, the effective 
production of manufacturing industry between 1975 and 1977 was (according 
to different sectors) between 20 and 30 per cent of the 1973 levels. 472 Diamond 
production, the third major export after coffee, had gone down to 400.000 
carats in 1977, compared with 2 million before independence. 473 
Beyond the lack of specialised manpower, the lack of qualified 
managers, the shortage of raw materials, the destruction of infrastructures and 
lack of efficient water and electricity supply caused by the war, the production 
of manufacturing industry was deeply affected by the previously discussed 
wave of labour strikes. Therefore, unable to immediately act upon the other 
constraints, the leadership could only act upon the labour strike movement, 
which was gradually fought after the October 1976 plenary when all the 
Workers' Commissions and independent trade unions were forced to join 
UNTA and wages were frozen474. The repression was increased after the 
attempted coup, when non-authorised strikes and street demonstrations became 
overtly suppressed; the violence of the purge was more than enough to dissuade 
once and for all such practices, as mentioned. This was reinforced with the 
effective application of austere, punishing legislation on workers' activities that 
had not been implemented until then, such as: 
a) The `Law for the Disciplining of the Productive Process' (Law 
11/75), which outlined various crimes against productivity, including passive 
resistance in the workplace, paralysis of work and strikes not led by the 
472 See Ferreira, Manuel Ennes, A Indtistria ... op. cit. p. 468. 473 In ACR, 10 (1978), p. B495. 
aua All wage negotiations that had been dragging on since the time of the transitional government were 
suspended from 5th July 1976; in Africa Research Bulletin -- ARB, I (August 1976); and wages were 
freezed since the implementation of the October 1976 plenary decisions; in ACR, 10 (1979), p. B514. 
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syndicates or trade union commissions; these were to be punished by prison 
sentences of up to two years in labour camps. 475 
b) Law 57/76 (formulated as a result of the inefficiency of the previous 
law) which broadly and arbitrarily defined as economic sabotage all actions 
seen as damaging to the steady evolution of the revolutionary process in the 
field of national economy (art. 2). Crimes of economic sabotage were more 
severely punishable and ranged from two to eight years' imprisonment in 
production camps. 476 
The effective application of this legislation during the more repressive 
period that followed the attempted coup in May 1977, contributed to a slight 
recovery of the production levels of the manufacturing industry (reaching its 
peak in 1981 with 40% of 1973 levels) but from then on, it was to return 
steadily to its downward trend (to the levels of 1976) and soon to even lower 
levels477. 
Confirming a tendency that grew over the years, from 1976-1977 onwards, 
only the oil industry functioned normally, first through Gulf Oil and then 
through other foreign companies operating in Angola, producing in 1976, 
130,000 barrels a day, compared with 150,000 barrels a day before 
independence and reaching the pre-independence levels in 1977478, which were 
soon surpassed with an ever increasing production coming from the exploration 
of new oilfields479. The oil production also benefited from the rise in 
475 Law 11/75, DR, I, 29 (15 December 1975). 
476 Law 57/76, DR, I, 157 (5 July 1976). 
477 See Ferreira, Manuel Ennes, A Indüstria ... op. cit. p. 468. 478 In article of Rene Lefort in Le Monde (8 December 1977); Financial Times (26 January 1978); also 
ACR vol. 13 (1982), p. B655. Tony Hodges gives slightly different numbers but still supporting that pre- 
independence levels were achieved as soon as 1977, which is the only thing that is important to stress 
here: 172.282 b/d in 1974; 101.837 b/d in 1976; 171.200 b/d in 1977; in Hodges, Tony Angola to the 
1990's 
... op. cit. p. 53. 479 The steady increase in oil production was recognised by the CC report to the congress, stating that 
`In the oil industry [... ] much work has been done in the domains of research and the increased 
extraction of oil from oil-producing fields. New oilfields are being explored [... ] and some structures 
with fine prospects have been discovered. The increase in oil reserves achieved over the past few years 
has enabled us to guarantee an increased production in the years to come'; in Relatörio do Comite 
Central ao 1° Congresso Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980, p. 74; also in the same sense is `Principals 
resultados do desenvolvimento econömico-social da RPA no trienio 1978-1980' ... op. cit. p. 
17. 
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international oil prices480, representing major revenue of circa 800 to 1200 
million of US dollars a year between 1976 and 1980481. 
As internal production decreased (agriculture and manufacturing), oil 
became the main revenue source for the State budget, financing not only the 
inevitable growth of imports (all kinds of goods sold at subsidised prices in 
State shops), but also the wages of inefficient manufacturing industry and 
agriculture State sector along with the public administration. The CC report 
ended up implicitly recognising that wages paid to all those inefficient sectors 
were at least in part a State subsidy (or a rent) with no relationship with 
production or even less with productivity, 
Most of the goods in commercial circulation come not from internal 
production, but from importation; therefore there is no direct 
relationship between the wages fund and the volume of products in 
circulation. We can say that salaries paid to the population were 
higher than the population's contribution to production, or in other 
words, were higher than the goods and services available to the 
population. 482 
Another congress document noted the lack of vision of several workers, 
managers and ministerial directors with the ambition of simply extracting from 
the State as much as they could. 483 
In sum, a rentiere type of relationship was established between the 
majority of employees (workers in the manufacturing industry, State agriculture 
and public administration) and the State (main employer). This rentiere 
relationship was financially supported by the oil revenues managed by the 
State/Party top organs, thus also representing a distributive type of relationship 
480 By the end of 1973, prices had gone from US$2.50 to US$12, and in 1979, the prices went from 
US$14 to US$28; in Shell Bulletin SBS (1986); cit. in Stoleru, Lionel L'Ambition Internationale (Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 1987), p. 144. 
481 See Hodges, Tony, Angola from Afro-Stalinism... op. cit. p. 2; also article of Rene Lefort in Le 
Monde (8 December 1977); Financial Times (26 January 1978); 
482 In Relatdrio do Comite Central ao 1° Congresso Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980, p. 74; also in the 
same sense is `Principais resultados do desenvolvimento econömico-social da RPA no trienio 1978- 
1980' 
... op. cit. p. 13. A previous official statement justifying the suspension of wage negotiations on 
5th July 1976 had already stressed the lack of relationship between wages and productivity; cit. in ARB 
(1 August 1976), p. 6293 
483 In `Principais resultados do desenvolvimento econömico-social da RPA no trienio 1978-1980' ... 
op. cit. p. 28. 
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between the upper and lower layers of society. However, the oil revenue did not 
solve all the needs, expectations and economic problems of the lower social 
strata and the rentiere relationships evolved with increasing strain. One 
immediate consequence of the lack of relationship between production and 
productivity, the report said, was the reinforcement of speculation, parallel 
markets, inflation and the decreased purchasing power of salaried employees. 
The low level of production and productivity did not allow the 
necessary increase of revenues to the state budget, creating growing 
imbalances between the monetary mass in circulation and the 
volume of merchandise on the market, with all the ensuing negative 
consequences coming from there - speculation, queues [in 
people's shops], parallel market and, finally, the maintenance of 
favourable conditions to high prices and consequent low purchasing 
power of national currency 
484 
7.3 The Informal Sector: Development and Relationship with the Official 
Sector 
The conjunction of previously discussed factors such as: a) the one party 
system with discriminatory and selective criteria for membership; b) economic 
scarcity (that was increasing since the transition to independence and the civil 
war in 1975-1976); c) the frustrated distributive and rentiere expectations of a 
significant part of the population (derived not only from economic scarcity but 
also from the decreased purchasing power of frozen salaries); c) the 
administrative centralised management of the economy with subsidised official 
prices and salaries (without any connection to productivity); all triggered a 
double and inter-related phenomenon: 
Firstly, the development of the informal/parallel/black market with 
higher prices than the official market, thus attracting ever more goods and 
484 In Relatörio do Comite Central ao 1° Congresso Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980, p. 83; also in the 
same sense is `Principais resultados do desenvolvimento econömico-social da RPA no trienio 1978- 
1980' 
... op. cit. p. 
27. As early as July 1976, when wage negotiations came to a halt it was officially 
acknowleged that `random rises out of all proportion with productivity are causing inflation, 
speculation and illegal trade [black market] and are weakening the country's economy. '; in official 
statement justifying the suspension of wage negotiations on 5 July 1976; cit. in ARB (1 August 1976), 
p. 6293. 
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factors of production from the official market through predatory practices (as 
defined in Part I); 
Secondly, an ever increasing relationship between formal and informal 
markets through straddling activity, spreading throughout the whole social 
strata, but still under party control. These phenomena will be now expounded in 
more detail 
7.3.1 Development of informal markets through predatory practices 
The emergence of parallel markets implied the development of new economic 
practices (predatory) which were necessary to feed it, including: diversion of 
means of production, straightforward theft of goods and merchandise, bribes, 
corruption (taking personal/private advantage of official positions) and 
absenteeism to work. These practices spread out through several economic 
sectors (including public administration) in order to compensate for the 
salaries' loss of purchasing power, thus further contributing to the drastic fall in 
production levels. The first official acknowledgement of these practices came 
as soon as December 1975 in the `Law for the Disciplining of the Productive 
Process' (Law 11/75), whose text states clearly that: 
Considering that there are `workers' who inject corruption and 
other deviations into the heart of the masses, [crimes against 
production will include] [... ]: the diversion of means of 
production that reduces or paralyses the production process 
[... ]; all extortion even when not committed by a civil servant 
[... ]; bribes, perjury and corruption even when not taking place 
in public offices [... ]; theft and larceny in the workplace [... ]; 
lack of punctuality at work [... ]; absence from work during 
working hours without previous authorisation from above [... ]; 
unjustifiable absences. [My bold] 
485 
Facing a more repressive attitude from the authorities after the attempted coup, 
with frozen salaries and continuing scarcity, the workers turned their demands 
towards the appropriation of part of the factories production in which they 
worked -a practice that came to be known as self-consumption (auto- 
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consumo). The produce -acquired in this way was then sold on the black market 
making it possible for those workers to buy other consumer goods that were not 
available on the official market. Although never legally authorised, auto- 
consumo rapidly developed (almost as an acquired right) and spread throughout 
all State production units, be it industrial, agricultural or commercial; a fact that 
led the 1980 CC report to highlight the need for such practices to cease: 
It has become [... ] paramount to eliminate situations of inequality 
and injustice resulting from the practice of improper appropriation 
of a part of the production (inappropriately known as self- 
consumption) from within the Units of Production and 
Commercialisation. 486 
Despite the post-27 May attempt to make more effective the application of 
legislation disciplining the productive process (which ended up essentially 
acting upon salaries and prohibiting independent labour movements), predatory 
practices not only spread but rapidly reached a higher dimension, with the 
organisation of networks in all sectors of activity in order to satisfy the ever 
increasing demand of informal markets, as officially reported and condemned 
at that same 1980 congress, 
[Measures must be taken] regarding the individual or organised 
practice of networks of deviation and thefts in ports and 
airports, on the railways, in factories, warehouses and shops; 
the hoarding of deviated and stolen goods to feed the illegal 
parallel markets; the speculative use of private, even State, means 
of transportation; the speculative sale of food and industrial 
produce in legal and illegal markets, in the streets and in 
people's homes; the acquisition of goods for resale at 
speculative prices [... ] the speculative sale of home-made food; 
the destruction of the people's possessions, including means of 
transportation, all without due sanctioning of the offenders [my 
bold]. 87 
Absenteeism and lack of assiduity in the work place, although condemned by 
the law, was the norm, and the reason for this became obvious through the 
reading of that same document - which highlighted the workings of the 
parallel market, including production of cakes and other food stuffs for sale at 
485 Law 11/75, DR, I, 29 (15 December 1975). 
486 Resolucöes e mensagens do I' Congresso Extraordinc rio ... op. cit... 
1980, p. 39 
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home or in black market, private transport in private or State cars, specialised 
technical out-of-hours services, and so on488. These practices thrived with the 
complicity of hierarchical superiors as recognised by other congress documents 
remarking that Ministries, managers of State companies, co-operatives and 
other organisations were not committed to the enforcement of labour and State 
discipline and assumed liberal and condescending attitudes towards laziness, 
absenteeism and the damage of socialist property such as theft and auto- 
consumo489. As stressed by several of my interviewees, everybody had to find 
an esquema (scheme) to compensate for the low official income. Soon (in the 
first years after independence) it became a commonly accepted practice to take 
the afternoon off in order to engage in other more profitable activities; such 
practices started within the public administration but gradually spread to all 
other sectors of the economy (mainly when State companies began to fail on 
their provision for food and transportation services)490 
The congress noted that all those practices here called predatory, 
representing `distortions within the distribution and commercialisation circuit', 
considerably worsened `the already insufficient purchasing power of the 
working masses '49' . In 
fact, the more the parallel economy grew through 
predatory practices, the more the official economy weakened and the more the 
purchasing power of official salaries eroded due to the hidden inflation of the 
black market; leading to a renewed need to join the parallel economy in search 
for an extra income. This vicious circle did not provide a viable solution for the 
lower social strata (whose purchasing power continued to decrease), but 
benefited mainly the main speculators: 
487 Ibid. p. 40 
488 Also confirmed in several private interviews: Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 
February 1998); Fernands Vieira (2 March 1998); Pitra Neto, minister of public administration (8 June 
1998). 
489 In `Principais resultados do desenvolvimento econömico-social da RPA no trienio 1978-1980' ... 
op. cit. p. 27. 
490 From private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 
1998); Femanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Pitra Neto, minister of public administration (8 June 1998). 
491 Resolucöes e mensagens do 1° Congresso Extraordinc rio ... op. cit... 1980, p. 
39 
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We must stress. the existence of a deep and progressive unbalance 
between the monetary income and expenses of the population, 
implying an increase in the cost of life and having a negative 
impact over the real purchasing power of the population. 
Such relative scarcity of consumer goods caused the large scale 
functioning of speculation, with prices several times superior to the 
official ones. It is important to underline that the speculation market 
[black market] led to real insufficiency of the salary, although such 
salary is higher than the respective production, and above all it led 
to the transfer of important monetary funds from the workers 
to the speculators. [My bold] 
492 
7.3.2 Increasing Articulation Between Formal and Informal Markets 
Economic scarcity allied to Socialist administrative centralised management of 
the economy and the one Party State had two main effects. First, it produced 
the rationing and discriminatory system common to other socialist systems, 
with access to official supply channels and other benefits determined by the 
position occupied within the State and/or Party hierarchy. Second, it led to the 
equally common straddling between official and parallel markets - though still 
closely controlled by the party. 
Although differences in salaries were not broad (from 1 to 3 in 
average493), there emerged three major mechanisms of socio-economic 
differentiation between top and bottom of the party/State/military hierarchy and 
also between those who were members of the party and those who were not 
(even though, in the early eighties there was not much difference left between 
the bottom members of the party and the bottom social layers outside of the 
party in terms of economic advantages, as we will see): 
1) A primary and most obvious mechanism of socio-economic 
differentiation was the shop system, which supplied food and industrial goods 
492Relatdrio do Comite Central ao P Congresso Extraordinärio ... op. cit... 1980, p. 
74; also in the same 
sense see `Principais resultados do desenvolvimento econömico-social da RPA no trienio 1978-1980' 
op. cit. p. 13. X93 
Officially, the salary levels span a scale of 1 to 19, the lowest being 1 at 5.000 Kwanzas a month, the 
highest being 19 at 35.000 Kw/month, however the bulk of cash income earners lie in two broad 
categories: 10.000-15.000 Kw/month and 15.000-25.000 Kw/month. The top end (35.000/month) and 
the bottom end (5.000/month) were thinly populated. Thus, the dominant income differential was I to 
3; In Bhagavan, M R, Angola's 
... op. cit. p. 
63. It must be stressed that the field research for this work 
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at low controlled prices (official). This system was divided into four types of 
shops following the socio-political hierarchy of the State and the Party: a) the 
people's shops (for the bottom social strata, i. e. all the working class belonging 
to the party or not and the urban poor; b) the shop for responsäveis (middle- 
level cadres, party members or not); c) the shop for the dirigentes (higher levels 
in State and Party bureaucracy such as executive directors of several CC 
departments, national directors of ministries and managers of State companies, 
amongst others); d) the shop for the top levels in State and party (CC and 
politburo members, ministries and secretaries of State, FAPLA's Major General 
Staff) 494 Prices for basic commodities were the same in all four shops; the 
differences were in terms of type, quantity and quality of the products available. 
The existence of broad differences between official and black market 
prices (30 to 100 times higher on the black market, in the late seventies and 
early eighties)495 opened up several opportunities for making money. People 
bought as much as possible at official prices in State shops and sold it 
afterwards on the black market with considerable profit. Such profits were 
obviously proportional to the position occupied by each one within the 
party/State/military hierarchy and, consequently, to the type of shops each one 
had access to. 
2) The second major mechanism of socio-economic differentiation was 
the system of requisicöes and credenciais, which allowed access to scarce 
goods, ranging from the highly prized apartments and cars to more `ordinary' 
electric generators, cookers, motorbikes, refrigerators, water pumps, house 
furniture and so on. Theoretically, anyone could be given a requisicäo or 
credencial to access those goods, but in practice it would follow the usual 
(Bhagavan's) took place in 1983; ibid. p. 46. He is probably the most reliable reference (among foreign 
authors) on data over the first half of the 1980's. 
494 From private interviews with Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); J-M Mabeko-Tali (25 February 
1998); Femanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Gerönimo Belo (17 March 1998); see also Bhagavan, M R, 
Angola's 
... op. cit. p. 
21; There were also `Especial shops' well-stocked of products, but only to be 
accessed by foreigners who payed in hard foreign currency, and 'shops to cooperantes (foreigners 
working for the government)' with salaries payed in local non-convertible currency (Kwanza), also 
state-supplied and suffering from the same shortages as the peoples shops; Ibid. p. 21 
495 In Bhagavan, M R, Angola's ... op. cit. p. 
22. 
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Party/Military/State hierarchy and discriminatory procedures favoured middle 
and top members of those structures. Again, just like in the shop system, a 
significant part of goods accessed through this way ended up re-sold in parallel 
markets (obviously excluding apartments, that could not be sold)496. 
3) A third major mechanism of differentiation was the privileged access 
to foreign currency at the official rate (an overvalued rate) for work or tourist 
trips to foreign countries. Work trips or viagens de servigo (arranged for the 
most diverse motives) became so common that they were seen as a perk, a 
compensation for the officially low salaries, whose frequency became 
informally established as once a year for middle cadres and at least twice a year 
for top members of the State and Party hierarchies 497. Such trips were 
subsidised with US dollars according to the position held within those 
hierarchies and the time spent abroad; allowing to afford not only the living 
expenses abroad (in very comfortable conditions) but also to spend on 
shopping, most of which also ended up on the Angolan black market with 
significant profits498. 
To give just one of several possible examples on how the dynamics of 
the informal markets grew: from the experience of work trips, a new business 
(within middle social strata) rapidly emerged in the late seventies and early 
eighties consisting in `tourist' (commercial) trips to Brazil and Portugal where 
the most varied articles were bought and sold back in Angola on the black 
market. The scheme was quite simple and people recall it nowadays with sweet 
nostalgia as `those days of the one party system, when we could travel around 
a% From private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 
1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Gerönimo Belo (17 March 1998); see also Messiant, 
Christine, `A propos des..., op. cit. p. 78 
49 From private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 
1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Gerönimo Belo (17 March 1998). 
498 As an example, subsidies for top hierarchy members of the State and Party would be calculated to 
support a luxurious lifestyle during the time spent abroad, including prices of five star hotels, top rental 
cars, top restaurants, pocket money including shoping and so on; usually ranging between two to four 
hundred US dollars a day for trips to Portugal, which was an absolutely outrageous amount in late 
seventies and early eighties. For the middle cadres it was not that much (50 to 1000S$/day) but still 
allowing an extremely commfortable life abroad; from private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 
1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Gerönimo Belo (17 
March 1998). 
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the world with a box of beer'. This commonly heard sentence means that once 
having access to a box of beer - 24 bottles - at the official price, it was re- 
sold in the parallel market for a hundred times more. Then, the profit was in a 
very small part used to buy an airline ticket (at an officially low price) and 
subsequently to access a significant amount of US dollars (at the official rate) 
allowed for tourist trips abroad (in fact used for commercial purposes). Even 
considering the fines that had to be paid for luggage excess (paid at an official 
exchange rate; meaning ridiculous amounts) and the bribes to the airport 
customs, it was an extremely profitable business499 
All the schemes developed at an incredible speed through all sectors of 
economic activity, directly and indirectly involving ever more people and 
assuming ever more elaborated forms, taking advantage of the above mentioned 
mechanisms of socio-economic differentiation and the possibility of straddling 
between formal and informal markets. Just like in all commercial businesses, as 
much as the profits allowed it, the network of intermediaries grew from the first 
buyer to the final consumer, also involving several other agents that had to be 
bribed at every step of the business, such as authorities (customs and police) or 
civil servants (bank workers to get more foreign currency for each trip; people 
working in the national airline to get tickets abroad or to the provinces when 
needed; workers at the ministries departments of human resources to arrange 
work trips, and so on and so forth in an endless network of schemes500). 
Therefore, the economic need for some and the possibility of making a 
huge profit for others, led to a growing involvement of the population in 
499 From private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 
1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Gerönimo Belo (17 March 1998). 
500 Towards the eighties, new and even more elaborated schemes were developed in all sectors of 
activity, be it with the national airline almost transformed in a cargo line to support informal trade, not 
only from Portugal and Brazil, but also and especially to the provinces where industrial products could 
be bartered with agricultural products which would then be resold in Luanda at extremely high prices 
on the black market; be it with the national shipping company which would serve the same purpose 
transporting containers full of illegal trade that were then introduced in Luanda's black market with the 
knowledge and collaboration of port authorities; from private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 
1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Gerönimo Belo (17 
March 1998). 
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straddling activities, from the lower to the upper social strata; a reality officially 
admitted by a congress resolution, 
These practices [all the above quoted from this same document, 
such as generalised thefts, deviations, corruption, organised 
networks and so on] worsen day by day, through corruption, 
protectionism and liberalism on behalf of leaders and managers; 
through the inefficiency of the mechanisms of prevention and 
repression and the generalised lack of control over the people's 
possessions [... ]. 
Considering that the above mentioned situation tends to be 
generalised, it necessarily affects the class situation of the 
masses, in particular workers and peasants, and leads to their 
ideological degradation by turning them into small traders [... ] 
The Congress draws special attention to the need to punish most 
of all the leaders, the managers, the technicians, the agents for 
defence and security and all workers in the State sector in 
general who practice, aid or abet these practices, or who are in 
any way connected to the counter revolutionary practices which are 
the subject of this resolution. [My bold] 
501 
Despite these denunciations (allowed within the ambit of auto-critica 
mechanisms discussed at the introduction) no effective measures were ever 
taken against such practices as a whole502. On the contrary, the leadership learnt 
how to manipulate it and control it, making it structural to the political- 
economic system 503 As explained by Messiant, 
L'existence de l'informel et de la corruption est ainsi le corollaire 
oblige de la rarete, de la dictature et de la gestion administrative. 
Avec un cercle vicieux, donc, des lors qu'aucune garde-fou, si ce 
nest celui `du parti' lui-meme-qui laisse faire, manipule, contröle 
ou reprime cette corruption en fonction de ses propres criteres (et 
luttes internes) 504. 
Insofar as the party dominated the discriminatory apparatus, which gave access 
to the main supply channels (privileges and benefits), it also controlled the bulk 
of the informal sector. Therefore, the informal sector became an integral part of 
sot Resolucoes e mensagens do 1° Congresso Extraordimirio ... op. cit... 
1980, pp. 40-4 1. 
502 As observed by Bhagavan in 1983, `one finds that a "high price" parallel economy is functioning 
outside of the realm of the State. It is an economy that the State knows about, and with good sense and 
wisdom has so far allowed to function'. In Bhagavan, M R, Angola's ... op. cit. p. 
23. Also in the same 
sense see Messiant, Christine, `A propos des..., op. cit. pp. 78-79 
503 Christine Messiant calls it `necessite structurelle'; in Messiant, Christine, `A propos des..., op. cit. 
78 footnote 37. 
04 In Messiant, Christine, `A propos des..., op. cit. p. 78 
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the centralised system of Party control and domination over the whole emerging 
framework of economic relationships. Informal activities could not provide 
significant economic power independently from the party. It is important to 
note that the great majority of products feeding and fuelling the black market 
(legally or illegally imported goods) were all paid with US dollars coming from 
exactly the same source - the oil rent, distributed according to party criteria. In 
the end, the oil revenue came to support the running of the informal sector 
inasmuch as it supported the official sector (as previously analysed), thus 
allowing the party to control both. 
Within the main discussion of this work, it is important to stress that 
such increasing economic dependency on oil brought about the beginning of a 
process of economic autonomy of the ruling elites in relation to the productive 
effort of the ruled masses due to the enclave nature of this major source of 
revenue (as explained in Part I). 
7.4 The Economic and Political Impact of War 
As already explained, this thesis seeks to stress not so much the intricacies of 
the war in Angola in terms of the concrete military situation and the impact of 
the Cold War, but its influence on the pattern of relationships that was evolving 
between rulers and ruled. 
7.4.1 The Socio-Economic Impact 
The disruption of economic activity, destroying the infrastructure throughout 
the country (blowing up or sabotaging power stations, dams, water supplies and 
communication systems, mining roads and bridges) was the main objective of 
UNITA/South Africa military activities. Such type of actions was a lot easier in 
the countryside (provinces) than in the urban centres. It had two main effects: 
on the one hand it greatly affected the communication and transport systems 
between the capital city and the other provincial cities; on the other hand, it 
caused an exodus of rural population fleeing the war, migrating towards the 
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cities505 or to neighbouring countries (Zambia and Namibia506) in search of 
security and better living conditions. 
With this kind of warfare, economic activities were hardly viable in the 
provinces. Thus, in economic terms, the war actively and directly represented: 
on the one hand, an impediment to the development of significant local and 
regional (provincial) economic activity; on the other hand, a contribution to 
economic scarcity (through the disruption of the agricultural and industrial 
production, destroying infrastructure and absorbing resources to support the 
war effort). Consequently, the war (indirectly) reinforced the overall economic 
dependency on oil and inherently, the process of economic autonomy of the 
ruling elites in relation to the productive effort of the ruled masses. 
7.4.2 The Socio-Political Impact 
In socio-political terms the impact of the war was mainly twofold: 
Firstly and insofar as the war was an impediment to the development of 
provincial economic activities, it ended up supporting the extremely centralised 
political and economic system, not allowing the possibility of constructing 
provincially autonomous political constituencies through the distribution of 
economically autonomous benefits by so-called local bosses or strongmen, as 
happened in so many other African countries, such as the Cameroon or 
sog Nigeria 
Secondly, the war strengthened the link between the Ovimbundu and 
UNITA, especially after the 1975-1976 civil war, when the MPLA retook the 
highlands and UNITA increased its guerrilla activities. By then, the violence 
exerted by the MPLA's armed forces in the highlands (probably unable to avoid 
a straightforward and primary identification between Ovimbundu and 
505 In Relatörio do Comite Central ao I° Congresso Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980, p. 72. 
506 See ACR, 10 (1979), p. B508. 
507 See for instance Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa 
... op. cit.; also 
Bayart, Jean-Francois, 
L'Etat au Cameroun ... op. cit. 
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UNITA508), ended up -favouring this process by effectively pushing more 
Ovimbundu towards UNITA. As explained by Messiant, 
C'est la violence de la guerre sur le haut plateau [... ] 1'ampleur de la 
repression menee par 1'UNITA d'abord puis par le MPLA quand il 
reprend possession des territoires qu'avait occupes l'UNITA 
[1976], qui donnent ä celle-ci son premier [solide] ancrage 
ethnique, une partie des elites et de la population s'associant ä son 
sort ou etant rejetee vers elle. 509 
In another work Messiant reinforces this argument stressing that 
L'organisation [UNITA], qui s'est fortement "Ovimbunduisee" avec 
l'afflux qui suit la defaite, s'est aussi ruralisee dans sa composition 
et dans son experience et eile s'est militarisee. Elle est une 
organisation politique oü la transmission de l'ideologie et de 
1'identite organisationelle est tres forte510 
Also similar is Heywood stating that 
By 1974 the regional and ethnic orientation of UNITA's leaders led 
to fundamental rifts between UNITA and the MPLA. [... ] UNI TA 
became a forum for rural, regionalist, and ethnic sentiments. 
511 
Insofar as the growing ethnic identification of UNITA represented a socio- 
cultural threat against the great Creole/M'Bundu alliance (as previously 
discussed), the development of the civil war also reinforced the consciousness 
of a specific identity among the Creoles/M'Bundus themselves. This 
consciousness prevented the break up of the alliance despite all the differences 
and rivalries between its groups. Moreover, this threat did not just affect the 
elites but also the populations of those areas most influenced by colonisation. 
Thus, the ethnic threat of UNITA guaranteed the MPLA elites significant 
popular support and legitimacy despite growing scarcity, loss of purchasing 
power, austerity measures and so on. 
In sum, the war had a reinforcing effect on the framework of 
relationships that had been developing between rulers and ruled, namely, 
508 From private interviews with Fernando Pacheco (25 February 1998); Jü1io Morais (11 April 1998); 
General Farrusco (2 May 1998). 
509 Messiant, Christine, `Angola, les voies ... I, op. cit. p. 169. 510 In Messiant, Christine, `MPLA et UNITA... op. cit. p. 46. Also in the same sense is Messiant, 
Christine, `Angola: entre guerre et paix' ... op. cit. p. 169; also Messiant, 
Christine, 'Angola, les voies 
I, op. cit. pp. 155-210. 
In Heywood, Lynda, Contested ... op. cit. p. 
152. 
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strengthening the increasing dependency on oil (and consequently the 
increasing economic autonomy of the ruling elites) and favouring micro- 
identity political alignments and solidarities. 
7.5 Social Sectors: First Signs of Neglect by the end of Neto's administration 
Social sectors are the last analytical indicator chosen for the analysis of the 
framework of economic relationships. The purpose here is to gauge the level of 
commitment to public services, which is very low within a modem patrimonial 
working logic and almost non-existent in a post-modem patrimonial working 
logic. 
Regarding these sectors, during the first few years after independence, at 
the height of ideological and revolutionary fervour, there was a certain degree 
of commitment to the idea of implementing the programmes and policies for 
the development of the social action sectors, including education, health, 
housing, social support and community services. This commitment was also 
fired by the arrival of Cuban volunteers trained in these areas, especially in 
health and education, who made a contribution to its management and 
organisation. By 1977 these Cubans numbered 5000512. However, after an 
initial phase during which the government showed some concern in these areas, 
by the end of Neto's presidency (1977-1979) there were clear signs of 
contraction in social expenditure, which led to the strangulation of many 
projects in most sectors, starting off a process that would accelerate during the 
ensuing decade (despite the presence of those foreign technicians). 
" Education. 
During the first few years after independence, several measures were 
successfully implemented for the development of education. These included the 
massive intake of children for the first four academic years; in 1979, the intake 
was 2,4million children, four times greater than in 1973513 Significant efforts 
512 In Le Monde (9 November 1977); also ACR, 10 (1979), p. B510. 
513 In Relatörio do Comite Central ao 1° Congresso Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980, p. 80. 
224 
were made in adult education, especially for the veterans of FAPLA, workers 
and peasants and between 1976 and 1979 around 330,000 people were made 
literate. 514 Almost 759,000 illiterate adults were enrolled in 37,000 literacy 
classes; 70,000 literacy teachers had been trained and 615 literacy brigades 
constituted, composed of 4,950 young volunteers. 515 A system of technical and 
professional training was set up. The Faculty of Juridical and Administrative 
Sciences was inaugurated, as was the Higher Institute of Educational Sciences; 
by 1980, there were over 2,000 university students. 516 
However, between 1979 and 1981, the number of primary-school 
children remained exactly the same517 and the number of literate people grew by 
only 9,000 518; an insignificant number when compared with the previous 
330.000 and the already mentioned illiteracy rate of 80% at the time of 
independence. From the two thousand university students enrolled in 1980 it 
was later known that only 180 had finished their courses and the number of 
literacy enrolments drop in the ensuing years from the previous 759.000 to just 
100.000519 These were clear signs of regression in the education sector, a 
tendency that would drastically increase in the ensuing five years as we will see 
during the analysis of Eduardo dos Santos presidency (in section C). 52° 
" Health. 
During the first few years after independence, much help was given by foreign 
doctors (the number of Cuban doctors increased by 16.5% between 1977 and 
1980). 521 The government set up, under its own auspices, 1,260 health units; the 
most important of which were the Central Hospitals of Luanda. It comprised 8 
hospitals, 16 provincial health centres, 32 municipal hospitals, 16 centres for 
5: 4 Ibid. p. 80. 
55InACR, 14 (1983), p. B590. 
516 Relatdrio do Comite Central ao 1°Congresso Extraordindrio... op. cit... 1980, pp. 80-81. 
51 In ACR, 13 (1982), p. B651. 
518InACR, 14 (1983), p. B590. 
519 Relatörio do Comite Central ao I1° Congresso do Partido, realizado em Luanda de 2a 10 de 
Dezembro de 1985 (Luanda: Edicäo do Secretariado do Comite Central, 1985), pp. 120-122. 520 Ibid. pp. 120-122. 
521 In Relatörio do Comite Central ao 1°Congresso Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980, p. 81; see also ACR, 
13 (1982), p. B651. 
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mothers and children, 16 leprosy hospices and 6 tuberculosis sanatorium. 522 
Several free vaccinations campaign for children were launched every year. 523 
Healthcare beyond the hospital walls was developed, with the creation of health 
centres, especially in rural and suburban areas. A project for the education of 
paramedical professionals was implemented, for the training of nurses, 
midwives and other health care technicians 524 . 
However, as with education, many problems including a distrust of 
Cuban physicians525, the contraction of disposable means and lack of financial 
and material resources, along with poor transportation to the provinces and bad 
co-ordination between sectors for import and distribution of medicines526, all 
brought about the rapid dereliction of the short lived successes of the health 
sector. 527 
" Housing 
After the colonialists' departure, apartments and villas were in part confiscated 
to house the new rulers and in part occupied by the general mass of population 
already living in those cities (with a clear priority given to the urban middle 
social strata528). 
Despite such occupation of vacant places, housing became one of the 
most severe social problems due to several factors: a), the continuous exodus of 
rural population towards the cities, prompted by the war; b), the arrival of an 
Su In Relatörio do Comite Central ao 1°Congresso Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980, p. 81. 
523 For example, to mark World Health Day (7 April 1977), 1,5 million children were vaccinated 
against polio; see ACR, 10 (1979), p. 508. 
524 In Relatörio do Comite Central ao 1° Congresso Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980, p. 81. 
525 As ironically mentioned by several of my interviewees, the only thing Cuban doctors were good at 
were amputations; from private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 
February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16 April 1998). The 
same idea is reported from Angola by David Lamb in Los Angeles Times (3 December 1978), who also 
states that Agostinho Neto himself had expressed the popular displeasure with Cuban physicians and 
suspicion towards the knowledge of a 22-year-old Cuban head surgeon at one 300-bed hospital in 
Luanda; see also in the same sense Herald Tribune (6 December 1978). 
526 Serious failures in medicine distribution emerged throughout the whole country, as reported in 
`Principais resultados do desenvolvimento econömico-social da RPA no trienio 1978-1980' ... op. cit. 
p. 25. 
527 See Relatörio do Comite Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, pp. 123-125. 528 From private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Antonio Cazevo (10 March 1998); 
Mario Seteco (10 March 1998); Pedro Kiala (13 March 1998); Francisco Tunga Alberto (16 March 
1998). 
226 
increasing number of foreign advisers, counsellors, technicians, military and so 
on (the majority of whom were Cuban529); c), the formation of new State cadres 
in the meantime, demanding to be properly housed by the State 530 . 
For the lower social strata, who were flocking to the cities coming from 
rural areas, the solution was obviously to build more muceques and these 
spread out-of-control around the cities, especially in Luanda, in a process which 
started as soon as 1976/77 531, increased during the eighties and still goes on 
today. As mentioned above, among the new comers to the capital city were the 
returned Bakongo (returned from Zaire), 200.000 as soon as 1977, who set up 
their own muceques such as Palanca, Maborr or Petrangol53z 
For the new middle cadres of the State and the Cubans, a few dozens of 
low-quality blocks of flats were built in Luanda in late seventies and early 
eighties, with Cuban co-operation. However the State's building sector did not 
go beyond those few buildings in Luanda and soon became totally stagnant. 
Once again, it was the informal sector that filled that void and the whole city of 
Luanda turned to informal anarchic construction 533, whereby thousands of 
annexes were built in the yards and gardens of houses or even on the flat roofs 
of blocks of flats 534 . 
" Social Support 
During the first years of independence, several national projects of social 
support were discussed and started to be implemented under the pressure of 
529 The number of Cuban military was not made official but in 1978 was estimated in 19.000; in ACR, 
vol. 11 (1980), p. B493. As referred, as soon as 1977, the number of Cuban civilians in Angola under 
co-operative agreements (economic, scientific, cultural, technical and so on) was 5.000; in Le Monde (9 
November 1977); also ACR, 10 (1979), p. B510. 
530 From private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Antonio Cazevo (10 March 1998); 
Märio Seteco (10 March 1998); Pedro Kiala (13 March 1998); Francisco Tunga Alberto (16 March 
1998). 
531 In ACR, 15 (1984), p. B597; We are obviously talking of enlargement and construction of new 
muceques, because as it is known, muceques do exist since the colonial period. 
532 From personal knowledge of these muceques and also from private interviews with Paula Braz (13 
February 1998); Antonio Cazevo (10 March 1998); Mario Seteco (10 March 1998); Pedro Kiala (13 
March 1998); Francisco Tunga Alberto (16 March 1998). See also Bhagavan, M R, Angola's ... op. cit. 
p. 24. 
533 In `Principais resultados do desenvolvimento econömico-social da RPA no trienio 1978-1980' ... 
op. cit. p. 25. 
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workers and neighbourhood commissions as well as youth committees and 
mass organisations, including: nurseries for children of working women; socio- 
economic support to former guerrillas, widows and orphans of guerrillas; 
homes for the elderly and handicapped persons; refugee camps for people 
fleeing the war53s In 1977 around 50,000 Namibian refugees, targeted by South 
Africa, were transferred from the South to the North, where new camps were 
set up to this effect. In the north-east provinces (Lunda South and Lunda 
North), camps were set up for around 18,000 refugees from Shaba (in Zaire) 
and several other initiatives of this kind were taken to support hundreds of 
thousands of displaced Angolans 536 
However, as early as the end of 1977 and 1978, the necessary means to 
support such initiatives decreased and the first signs of neglect and deficient 
functioning of those projects became evident537. By the 1980 congress, the 
results of such programmes were reduced to a mere declaration of future 
intentions towards the sector, but without presenting anything concrete538. As 
an alternative, and especially in terms of refugees and internally displaced 
people, the Angolan government increased its demands for international 
support from organisations such as the UN system (UNHCR, UNICEF, OMS, 
FAO, WFP), the League of Red Cross Societies and Northern European 
countries such as Sweden and Norway539 These were the first signs of a 
534 From personal knowledge and private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Pedro Kiala 
(13 March 1998); Francisco Tunga Alberto (16 March 1998). 
535 From private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 
1998); Femanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16 April 1998) among several 
others. 
536 See UNHCR publication, 5 (October 1977), p. 2; also ACR, 14 (1983), p. B590. 
537 From private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 
1998); Femanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16 April 1998) among others. 
538 See Relatdrio do Comite Central ao I° Congresso Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980, pp. 93-94. 
539 In UNHCR publication, 5 (October 1977), p. 2; The UNHCR built up a sum of US$1.2 million into 
its 1977 emergency programme and a further 4.1 million for 1978 to finance the relief phase. A 
programme of longer-term assistance was to follow; ibid. p. 2. Significant humanitarian aid to Angola 
began during this period (late 1977-1978), when the first signs of collapse in the social sectors 
emerged. Such aid strongly increased during the first five years of the 1980s as we will see. 
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tendency, which grew stronger in 1979 540 and even stronger during Eduardo 
dos Santos presidency (as we will see in section Q. 
" Community Services 
In the field of community services, in parallel with the main responsibility 
belonging to provincial commissariats, several tasks were given to ODP groups 
(People's Defence Organisation). Apart from their role as paramilitary forces, 
these groups were to provide community services in their respective provinces, 
communes, neighbourhoods or villages, such as carrying out maintenance and 
repairs on schools, hospitals and various other public buildings, cleaning and 
sanitation. Beyond the ODP and commissariats, in the first years of 
independence (1975-1977), there were regular government appeals to voluntary 
civic work on specific days of the month to clean the streets. These activities 
were quite successful541 
Nevertheless, as early as 1978, neither the commissariats nor the ODP or 
even less the voluntary activities were effectively fulfilling their tasks and 
community services soon became markedly neglected not only in the provinces 
but even in the capital city. In 1978, Luanda was reported to have fallen `into a 
tatty and dirty state of disrepair'542 `turning to decay, with rubbish and rubble in 
the ill-repaired streets'543 with chronic and progressively acute lack of water, 
electricity, basic sanitation, drains and rubbish collection 544 . 
In sum and taken as a whole, the analysis of the Angolan social sector 
reveals an initial concern and effective commitment with this kind of policies, 
but, even before the end of Neto's presidency, the first signs of political failure 
in these sectors started to appear. The major question is why? 
540 In ACR, 14 (1983), p. B590. 
54' From private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 
1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16 April 1998). 
542 Reported by David Lamb to the Los Angeles Times (3 December 1978). 
543 Reported to The Sunday Telegraph (25 June 1978). 
544 From private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 
1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998). 
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The standard answer is that this was due to the war effort and the 
increasing imports of consumer goods and equipment (and that will be in part 
the official argument used 545) However, if such increased expenditure must be 
acknowledged, it can not be taken as the main reason for that sudden collapse 
(end of 1977 and 1978) because: a), that period also coincides with the increase 
in Angolan oil production (as we saw) and with the drastic increase of the 
international oil price (progressively rising from US$12 per barrel in 1974 to 
US$14 between 1974 and 1978, and then to US$28 in 1979)546, representing an 
average income of US1000 million/year between 1975 and 1980547; b) arms 
expenditure remained relatively constant in late 1970's (around US$500 million 
per year) and only increased significantly in early eighties548; c) those services 
did not depend exclusively on the State, also significantly relying on voluntary 
work and community commitment of the general population. Thus, a different 
explanation must be looked for. 
From the government's perspective, the decline in social policies seems to 
be related with the appearance of a phenomenon explained in Part I, whereby 
the ruling elites became progressively comfortable in socially, politically and 
economically neglecting the ruled masses mainly due to a double reason here 
discussed: 
" Firstly, they became to feel quite secure in economic terms, with a huge oil 
rent that did not depend on the productive effort of the ruled masses; 
" Secondly, they also felt politically secure, because; a) the ruled masses had 
no votes to express their political disaffection within a centralised 
administration and concentrated power system within a party, purged, 
rectified, tightly controlled and able to count on a fearful political police 
and judicial system (especially and mainly towards political and security 
sas On the use of the war argument to justify the non-achievement of several socio-economic goals 
during the three year period of 1977-1980 see See Relatörio do Comite Central ao /° Congresso 
Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980, p. 83. 
546 In Shell Bulletin SBS (1986), cit. in Stoleru, Lionel L'Ambition ... op. cit. p. 
144. 
sal Hodges, Tony, Angola from Afro-Stalinism... op. cit. p. 2. 
548 In Collelo, Thomas, ed., Angola, ... op. cit. p. 234. 
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crimes); b) insofar as UNITA was still militarily active, the government 
could always count on support generated by the fear of UNITA, which 
represented a threat against the great Creole/M'Bundu alliance. 
From the people's perspective (those supposed to participate in voluntary work) 
the reasons for the lack of community commitment seem to be twofold: 
" Firstly, it seems to be related with the post-27th May 1977 repression. As 
mentioned, the repression was mainly directed towards the revolutionary 
and ideologically fervent generation of the youth committees (usually 
involved, concerned and committed with social policies, mobilising and 
pressuring the people for several voluntary activities), also castrating the 
independent activity of workers and neighbourhood commissions, 
syndicates and mass organisations (related with the youth committees in 
terms of social initiatives) 549; 
" Secondly, the decline of social service seems also to be related to the 
general disillusion that came from betrayed expectations of redistribution, 
followed by the austerity of the economic situation and the need for an 
increasing involvement in intense time consuming informal activitiessso 
Condensing these two reasons, Zenha Rela states that, 
[The 27th May] marks the end of any etat de grace that the 
politicians might have had to mobilise the people. It was the crude 
awakening from the state of euphoria in which people lived until 
then, the counciousness of daily difficulties and a transformation 
of attitude: the solution of problems which was until then 
considered as a collective action [... ] became each one's 
problem, because each one had to solve its own problems; if 
`schemes' were the only way to solve these problems, then 
everyone tried to be involved in one551 [my bold]. 
sag From private interviews with Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 
1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16 April 1998); JM Mabeko-Tali (27 April 1998); Luis dos Passos 
(13 May 1998), among others. 
550 This reason is also supported by some of my interviewees such as Fernando Pacheco (23 February 
1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16 April 1998); JM Mabeko-Tali 
(27 April 1998). 
55ß Zenha Rela, Jose Manuel Angola 
... op. cit. p. 53. 
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Therefore, from the government or the people's perspective there were clear 
signs of a weak public commitment to public welfare. The palpable result was a 
decline in social services by the end of 1977 and during 1978. Consequently, 
not only did the existing living conditions deteriorated for most of the people 
(in terms of education, health services, housing, social support and community 
services), but their future perspectives were also jeopardised (diminishing, for 
instance, their and their children chances of socio-professional and economic 
promotion as well as their life expectancy). In the medium and long term, such 
decline meant an increasing economic, political and social fragility for the 
bottom layers of society (the majority of the population) most in need of social 
support. 
Concluding chapter 7, and based on the five main analytical indicators used, it 
can be asserted that during Agostinho Neto's presidency, the construction of the 
new framework of economic relationships was essentially marked by a double 
characteristic: firstly, the general inefficiency and lack of productivity of the 
State sector, be it in terms of public administration, agriculture or 
manufacturing industry; secondly, an overall economic dependency on the oil 
rent. 
This brought about the beginning of a process of economic autonomy of 
the ruling elites in relation to the productive effort of the ruled masses and also 
the increasing economic fragility of the ruled masses, most affected by the 
scarcity and loss of purchasing power (that was not entirely compensated by the 
informal practices, which mainly benefited the upper social strata). Factors 
such as the war or the neglect of social sectors reinforced all this process (the 
war contributed to economic scarcity; the social sectors neglect further 
reinforced the economic fragility of the lower social strata). 
The oil rent ended up as the main support of the whole economic 
system: directly supporting the official/formal economy (financing the 
subsidised prices of goods and equipment and also the salaries of the inefficient 
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and unproductive State sector), and indirectly supporting the 
unofficial/informal economy (financing all the administrative economic 
distortions, privileges and benefits which allowed straddling activities). 
The party top organs controlled all this oil supported system, be it at the 
level of the formal economy (managing the government and the State 
structure), be it at the level of the informal economy (managing the 
nominations giving access to all the main privileges and benefits). 
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8- The Framework of Ethical and Normative Principles 
I now turn to the normative rules that emerged during this period, clarifying the 
emerging political and economic framework of relationships between rulers and 
ruled. According to a modem patrimonial perspective these principles sustain 
the personalisation of political power, along with the legitimisation of rentiere 
and predatory economic practices, through lines of micro-identity solidarity. 
Such principles shared by all social layers support and reinforce the existence 
of extensive distributive chains of dependence between rulers and ruled. A 
post-modem patrimonial system sustains the existence of those same principles 
and practices at the top or bottom social layers. Nevertheless, in face of the 
non-fulfilment of the distributive obligations by the ruling elites towards the 
population, a flexible or pragmatic normative framework emerges, according to 
which the ends justify the means (unregulated predation) breaking the 
normative interdependence ties between rulers and ruled. 
In order to gauge the emerging framework of normative principles 
during the presidency of Agostinho Neto, this chapter will be structured around 
two main indicators: the principles that guide the economic and political 
management of power used by the leader at the top of the system, which is 
important when gauging the criteria that influence the exercise of power, its 
guiding principles and inner logic (8.1); the normative principles and criteria 
underlying and guiding the economic and social practices of the greater part of 
the population (8.2). 
8.1 The Main Principles at the Top of the System 
Clarification of the principles that were to guide the economic and political 
management of power emerged after a direct confrontation between the left and 
rightwing at the December 1978 CC plenary. 
The struggle and internal balance of forces between both wings inside 
the party went through different stages. Right after the independence the 
rightwing seems to have acquired a first advantage in this struggle. Their 
influence over Neto was significant and came to be ironically referred within 
the leadership as Catetizagdo do Poder. As explained by Mabeko-Tali, 
Les conceptions de cette tendance [called rightwing in this work 
and traditionaliste in Tali's work] tournent autour de la defense 
d'une base M'Bundu du pouvoir politique, avec predominance des 
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M'Bundu de Catete-dont est originaire Agostinho Neto [... ] C'est 
d'ailleurs dejä le facteur fondamental de leur relative influence sur 
Agostinho Neto. [... ] ce fut un facteur non negligeable dans la 
maniere dont le chef de 1'Etat gerait alors le pouvoir: les decisions 
prises en haut lieu pouvaient cependant-des 1'independance-eire 
alterees en fonction des entrees et sorties du palais presidentiel des 
"sages" ou d'autres personnalites importantes Catete, liees ou non ä 
552 
ce groupe. 
Thereafter, due to the Nitista threat (bringing about the union of both wings 
against the Nitistas - seen as a common threat) and to the October 1976 
plenary (with the official adherence to Socialism), the leftwing achieved a 
political preponderance. However, as soon as the Nitista threat disappeared 
(with the purge and rectification), divergences between both groups re-emerged 
and became progressively more acute in late 1977 during the preparations for 
the first congress. By then the rightwing attempted to place as many of its 
members as it could in the CC and to get at least one seat in the Politburo; a 
move that was so obvious that it was criticised by some at the congress553 and 
reported externally as the action of a `regional lobby known as the Catete 
group' 554 Although the rightwing failed to get the long desired Politburo seat, 
it nevertheless secured several places at the CC555, regaining its initial 
advantage on the internal power struggle. 
Progressively (by the end of 1977 and during 1978), such power struggle 
became more politically defined in terms of opposing organisational principles 
and concrete policies sustained by each side as expounded below and close to 
the main criteria established by Wallerstein to define left and right in Africa 
(economic policy; political management/ideology; foreign Policy) 556 Before 
entering into the concrete analysis of the opposing political positions assumed, 
it must be once again stressed that these are not fixed and need to be placed into 
the specific historical context, as explained by Wallerstein: 
552 In Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ... op. cit. p. 
411. 
553 See Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, Angola ... op. cit. p. 167. 554 In Somerville, Keith, Angola ... op. cit. p. 86; also Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, Angola ... 
op. cit. p. 167. 
55 From the previously mentioned prominent members of the rightwing, Imperial Santana was the only 
one out of the CC. 
556 See Wallerstein, Immanuel, `Left and ... op. cit. pp. 5-10. 
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Of course, the appropriate labels vary, the programmatic contents of 
the parties vary, the relative strengths of the factions vary, the forms 
of political alliances vary - all according to the particular 
historical circumstances, both nationally and internationally. 557 
This said, the left and right wings here mentioned, must be understood as any 
other socio-political classification used in Angola - useful to explain a 
specific period (1975-1983) but changeable over time, and fading in 
importance from 1982/83 onwards as we will see. 
Hence, the leftwing (whose most prominent or publicly known members 
were Lücio Lara, Carlos Dilolwa, Iko Carreira and Antonio Jacinto) defended 
the notion of a Marxist-Leninist ideology and a steady progression towards 
Socialism558: 
a) In terms of economic policy, they advocated an all-out fight against 
the anti-revolutionary practices such as the black market, 
absenteeism, diversion of produce and non-fulfilment of production 
targets, as well as deeper economic co-operation with countries of 
the Eastern block, especially Cuba. This leftwing position on 
economic principles was led by Carlos Dilolwa (minister of planning 
and second deputy prime minister) 559; 
b) In terms of political management, the leftwing supported a system 
exclusively determined by revolutionary criteria, i. e. if the main 
objective was the construction of Socialism, then the top (strategic) 
positions of the Party and the State should be occupied by a 
vanguard, well-versed in Marxist-Leninist theory, deeply committed 
to that aim; rejecting any criterion of demographic weight within the 
557 Wallerstein, Immanuel, `Left and ... op. cit. p. 
2. 
sss It must be stressed that the classification of left and rightwing is mine according to the criteria 
presented and following Wallerstein's mentioned article. The people interviewed on this subject have 
other classification for these two groups; for instance, Mabeko-Tali calls the rightwing traditionalist es 
and the leftwing gauche etoufee (as previously referred), all the other interviewees call them just 
`tendencies', because it was recently accepted within the MPLA the right to political tendency and 
therefore, it became the most commonly used term in political millieux. Nevertheless, the important 
here is to define the concrete positions of each side. 
559 From private conversations with late Carlos Dilolwa (August-September 1994); also from private 
interviews with Costa Andrade N'Dunduma (30 March 1998); Raül Araüjo (2 April 1998); J. M 
Mabeko Tali (27 April 1998); Lücio Lara (1 May 1998); Paulo Jorge (26 June 1998); Pepetela (7 July 
1998); Antonio Cardoso (10 July 1998). 
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Creole/M'Bundu alliance, therefore rejecting the rightwing pressures 
for a black M'Bundu base of power (mainly from Catete, cf. 
supra)560 Although respecting the possible ideological honesty of 
such position, we can not ignore that it served well the personal 
interests of its proponents within the party; i. e. despite the smaller 
demographic weight of this lighter skinned coastal segment of elite 
(basically sustaining the leftwing), their relatively higher educational 
level and ideological preparation would ensure their political primacy 
in a vanguard party. 
c) In terms of foreign policy, the leftwing stood for an intransigent and 
radical path alongside other Socialist countries, reinforcing the 
Cuban presence at all levels of co-operation (military and civil), 
rejecting any concession towards the U. S/South Africa demands for 
Cuban troops withdrawal and rejecting any relationship between the 
presence of Cuban troops in Angola and the implementation of UN 
435 resolution (independence of Namibia). 561 
On the other side, rejecting Marxism or any other ideology and defending 
culture and tradition, the rightwing (whose most prominent members were 
Agostinho Mendes de Carvalho, Domingos Paiva da Silva, Imperial Santana, 
Bernardo de Souza and Manuel Pedro Pacavira) sustained: 
a) In terms of economic policy, a more pragmatic and flexible position, 
accepting socio-economic organisation as it now was, i. e. an 
officially proclaimed Socialist model masking and indirectly 
supporting a generalised and effective straddling between legal and 
illegal markets (private business) through an 
hierarchical/discriminatory distributive system of benefits and 
56° From private conversations with Carlos Dilolwa (August-September 1994); also from private 
interviews with J. M Mabeko Tali (27 April 1998); Lücio Lara (1 May 1998); Paulo Jorge (26 June 
1998). 
56' From private interviews with Costa Andrade N'Dunduma (30 March 1998); Lücio Lara (1 May 
1998); Paulo Jorge (26 June 1998); Antonio Cardoso (10 July 1998). 
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privileges managed by the top leadership of the Party 562. They had 
little faith in the communist policies of collectivisation of the land 
and criticised the leftwing radical stance towards the private 
initiative 563 
b) In terms of political management, the rightwing supported a 
leadership system respecting the demographic weight of each 
Creole/M'Bundu elite segment within the MPLA, through which, 
though darker, less educated and from the interior of the country, 
they could achieve political primacy, dethroning the leftwing lighter 
skinned, coastal ideologues or intellectuals (as they called them). 
Once assured of their primacy within the Creole/M'Bundu core of 
the MPLA and following the same logic, they favoured a balanced 
representation of other regional and ethnic sensibilities, providing 
them with places within the party hierarchy, but obviously without 
challenging the Creole/M'Bundu primacy over the whole political 
system. Towards those groups outside the MPLA, the rightwing 
stood for a pragmatic solution, i. e. the co-option or integration of 
their members within the middle rank hierarchy of the party (and 
consequently within the distributive hierarchy), thus broadening the 
socio-political support of the MPLA5M; 
c) In terms of foreign policy, they placed nationalism above 
internationalism, having serious reservations about the Cuban 
presence, sustaining a more flexible and pragmatic approach on 
562 From private interviews with J. M Mabeko Tali (27 April 1998); Pepetela (7th July 1998). 
563 From private interviews with J. M Mabeko Tali (27 April 1998); Pepetela (7th July 1998); As 
previously referred, according to Mendes de Carvalho, (the most prominent leader of the right wing) he 
and those who shared his opinnions always rejected Marxism and were never Marxist. He even warned 
several of his colleagues at the CC ('those who were always defending Socialism and Marxism') of the 
danger of such an option and that `it was going to lead us nowhere'; from private interview with 
Mendes de Carvalho (17 July 1998). 
564 From private interview with J. M Mabeko Tali (27 April 1998); and from what can be clearly 
deducted from private interview with Mendes de Carvalho; without specifying any further Mendes de 
Carvalho sustained that `We must be realistic and cautious towards the regional and racial factors and 
to the majority in order to avoid negative comments like those usually heard among the people, pointing 
to the privileges of some [obviously the whites and mesticos]. This has nothing to do with racism, just 
diplomacy, wisdom and good sense'; from private interview with Mendes de Carvalho (17 July 1998). 
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diplomatic issues concerning the West and especially the US and 
South Africa; i. e. accepting the possibility of making concessions 
towards the US/South Africa demands for Cuban troops withdrawal 
in order to facilitate the implementation of UN resolution 435 and 
56s the US recognition of the Angolan government 
The struggle for power and for opposing organisational principles between left 
and rightwing reached its height at the CC's plenary in December 1978 (6th to 
9th December). There the two wings had a head-on collision, pressuring Neto 
to take sides, but the President's hybrid nature (whereby he represented some 
features of both sides) and his already strong personal control over the whole 
political system, allowed him options very close to the ones sustained by the 
right wing, but without making it look like a defeat for the left, as we will now 
see. 
8.1.1 The normative principles of economic practice 
At this level, the leftwing suffered a major setback. The pragmatism and 
flexibility sustained by the rightwing won right out: 
a), internally, the CC meeting gave the go-ahead to private Angolan 
businessmen to set up construction companies and trucking businesses 
(merchandise transport to provinces). At a rally in Luanda on 10 December, the 
day after the meeting, Neto stressed that private Angolan capitalists would have 
a role to play in the country's economy566 and a week later, on the 17 December, 
declared `the need to offer more possibilities to private initiative in our country 
[... ] which is not as counter-revolutionary as might seem at first. '567; he also 
announced the lift of the prohibition towards informal construction 
(recognising the State's incapacity in the housing sector) and suggested a more 
565 From private interviews with Joäo Melo (17 April 1998); J. M Mabeko Tali (27 April 1998); Mendes 
de Carvalho (17 July 1998). 
566 Cit. in ACR, 11 (1980), p. B487. 
567 Speech by Agostinho Neto made in Luanda on 17 December 1978, entitled `Nothing can stop our 
revolution. ' Cited. in Meyns, Peter, `0 desenvolvimento ... op. cit. p. 144. 
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flexible attitude towards the petit commerce as a possible way to help the 
recovery of rural markets, recognising that `men and women who live in the 
country suffer a lot, because they can hardly sell, buy or even produce'568. Even 
foreign observers usually sympathetic to leftwing positions such as David 
Ottaway, admitted and justified the need for Neto's pragmatism, 
The need for pragmatism is apparent to the visitor. Every Luanda 
grocery store seems to have a long queue outside, and fruit, 
vegetables and meat are in short supply. In a land that once ranked 
among the world's leading coffee exporters, there is little coffee 
available in the capital. 569 
Apparent or not, such pragmatism was seen as a major setback to the leftwing, 
especially to Carlos Dilolwa who expressed his disagreement not only towards 
such concessions, but also towards the `patrimonial way of managing the 
economic affairs'570, having immediately resigned his place in government (as 
second deputy-prime minister for economy) and his politburo seat. The prime 
minister Lopo do Nascimento, by then assuming a position close to Dilolwa 
(although it is arguable if he in fact assumed a leftwing stand in all matters), 
lost his place at the politburo and also his place as prime minister, a position 
that was quite simply abolished (as previously discussed) . 
571 Other leftwing 
members such as Antonio Jacinto ended up accepting Neto's pragmatism572. 
A few months later, during his May Day speech, Neto specified the new 
areas open to private initiative, particularly limited private commercial 
activities of food and consumer goods in order to help to make up for shortages 
caused by inefficient production and distribution 573. While Neto was publicly 
568 Reported by Augusta Conchiglia to Afrique-Asie, 177 (25th December 1978), pp. 23-25; also in 
Radio Nacional de Angola (10th December 1978), cit. in SWB (13 December 1978); see also Le Monde 
(12 December 1978) 
569 Article of David Ottaway `Angola tries new pragmatism; Neto asks for help to repair economy' in 
Herald Tribune (27th December 1978). 
570 From private conversations with Carlos Dilolwa (August-September 1994); also in Mabeko Tali, 
Jean-Michel, Dissidences ... op. cit. p. 410. 571 Contrary to Dilolwa who resigned from all posts within the Party and the government, Lopo do 
Nascimento kept his seat at the CC and was later reassigned to a place representing Angola in the OUA 
(obviously a demotion) and then as provincial commissioner; from private interviews with Diögenes 
Boavida (13th March 1998); Victor Aleixo (26th March 1998); Aderito Correia (13 April 1998). 
572 In Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ... op. cit. p. 410. 573 Cit. in Associated Press (2 May 1979). 
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announcing several concrete concessions towards the private sector, the only 
thing the leftwing achieved was a vague and vacuous May Day politburo 
statement denouncing the retrograde values of capitalism sustained by some 
sectors of the `petite bourgeoisie' (obviously referring to the rightwing). 
Some sectors of the petite bourgeoisie want to step into the shoes of 
the colonial bourgeoisie and thus increasingly assume the 
ideological and moral values of capitalism - disdain for the 
working class, refusal to solve the concrete problems of the 
masses, the love of luxury and the easy life, the spirit of 
ostentation, negligence, political and economic corruption, 
opportunism, spreading of obscurantism and superstitious 
concepts [most probably referring to traditional superstitions 
related with sorcery] - in a word all the retrograde moral values of 
the enemy [my bold] 
574 
b), externally, Neto showed some signs of pragmatism and liberalism even 
before the CC plenary. In an attempt to normalise economic relationships with 
the West, the President began to approach the EEC countries in general575 and 
Belgium in particular, whose foreign minister was told by Neto that Angola was 
eager to establish co-operative economic relations with West European 
countries in order to diversify its international relations and reduce its 
dependence on Cuba and the Soviet bloc576. Beyond government-to- 
government agreements, Neto showed his interest in private Western 
investment on a large scale, mainly directed to oil exploration (open to other 
companies besides Gulf and Petrofina57), but also including development 
projects in other areas such as fisheries, the recovery of the port of Lobito, the 
574 Cit. in The Guardian (US) (9th May 1979). 
"51n July 1978, the EEC's Commissioner for Development, Claude Cheysson, visited Angola and 
according to his own words, `Angola wanted to increase trade with the West and welcomed Western 
investment [... ] I was struck by the desire of Neto and his Ministers to immediately discuss certain 
development problems. Their traditional partners cannot offer them much in this field'; cit. in ACR, 11 
(1980), p. B497. 
576 Such statement was made during a visit of Henri Simonet (Belgian foreign minister) to Luanda in 
September 1978; in New York Times (18 September 1978); also ACR, 11 (1980), p. B497. 577 See The New York Times (18 September 1978). 
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Benguela Railway, iron- and uranium mines578. In the mean time, Angola was 
granted the status of observer in the renegotiations of the Lome Convention. 579 
At the level of foreign economic policy, a few days before the plenary 
Western reporters already talked of a `shift from ideology to pragmatism' as the 
internal `economy founders'580 and by the time of the CC plenary (6-9 
December 1978) the economic approach towards the West was re-affirmed and 
made concrete. Neto, thus announced the preparation of a new and more 
attractive law for private foreign investment which was effectively passed in 
July 1979, covering all aspects of economic activity, allowing several benefits 
such as the repatriation of profits, guarantees of compensation in the event of 
nationalisation, exemption from tax and from customs duties581. In the specific 
case of the oil sector, the new law was even more `liberal' than the ones already 
582 approved in 1978 
8.1.2 The normative principles in terms of power management 
After the plenary Neto definitely put in place a management system based upon 
the distribution of privileges and benefits through rotating nominations to Party 
and State top positions; making for a kind of a carrousel of posts on which the 
key elements of the Party rotated according to the political needs of a system 
which took into account micro-identity internal (ethnic, sub-ethnic, regional 
578 In West Africa (23 October 1978). 
579 The renegotiations of the Lome Convention took place in Brussels, on 18 September, in a joint 
session between EEC and ACP countries (African, Caribbean and Pacific); in ACR, 11 (1980), p. B497. 
580 In article of David Lamb `Angola moving to end isolation from the West and dependency on 
Cubans' in Los Angeles Times (3 December 1978); also article of David Lamb `Cuban advisers 
downgraded; Angola turns pragmatic as economy founders' in Herald Tribune (6th December 1978); 
also article of David Ottaway `Angola tries new pragmatism; Neto asks for help to repair economy' in 
Herald Tribune (27th December 1978). 
581 In article `Angola states terms for investors' by Quentin Peel in Financial Times (11th July 1979); 
see also Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. pp. 
32-33. 
582 As stressed by Bhagavan, just like the earlier `Oil Law' (13/78 of 1978), this new law appeared 
somewhat liberal compared with other African countries with similar economic systems, providing 
benefits such as guaranteed non-nationalisation for 10-15 years; guaranteed payment of adequate 
indemnities and interests for a later nationalisation allowing the transfer of profits of up to 25% of the 
invested capital; access to the Angolan credit market; exemption or reduction in taxes and import or 
export duties during the first years of production; authorised transfer of ways of paying foreign debts. In 
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and racial) balances. Obviously, as should be clear, this balance was in fact 
meant to be skewed in favour of the Creole/M'Bundu core of the MPLA, 
assuring them the political and economic supremacy over the great alliance 
represented by the MPLA and, consequently, over the State. Such supremacy 
was achieved not only through the Party's all powerful presidency (occupied by 
Neto), but also through the occupation of a higher number of top positions -- 
mainly in the Politburo, the Central Committee, the General Staff, central and 
local government (ministers, vice-ministers, secretaries of State and provincial 
commissioners), top management of public companies and embassies. 
In these terms, after the plenary the President remodelled the top organs 
of the Party and of the State, starting with the Politburo, which was to comprise 
three mesticos (Lücio Lara, Iko Carreira and Antonio dos Santos Franca 
N'Dalu)583, three black Mbundu (Agostinho Neto, Eduardo dos Santos and 
Joäo Luis Neto Xietu), three Bakongo (Pascoal Luvualo, Rodrigues Joao Lopes 
Ludy Kissassunda and Ambrosio Lukoki) and two Cabindan (Evaristo 
Domingos Kimba and Pedro Maria Tonha Pedale). 584 The supremacy of the 
Creole/M'Bundu was clear with six elements. The Ovimbundu were the only 
ethnic group, from amongst the larger and more political relevant groups, that 
were not represented in the Politburo because of the resentment provoked by 
renewed UNITA/South Africa offensives and growing linkages between the 
Ovimbundu and UNITA. Nevertheless, below the Politburo level some MPLA 
Ovimbundu old time members managed to achieve top positions; such was the 
case of Faustino Muteka who was nominated minister of transport in January 
1979.585 Following the same management principles of rotation and micro- 
Bhagavan, M. R., Angola. prospects for Socialist industrialisation (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of 
African Studies, 1980), research report n°57, p. 21. 
583 As previously mentioned, the other two mesticos in the politburo - Dilolwa and Lopo do 
Nascimento - had resigned and been dismissed, respectively. Although Lopo is not a mulato (son of a 
black and a white parent like Dilolwa), he is still a mestiro (those with some degree of mixed race 
between black and white) coming from an old family of mixed race in Golungo Alto (Kwanza Norte 
province); information drawn from personnal knowledge of some members of his family. 
584 The secessionist tendencies, the activities of FLEC and the growing economic dependency from oil 
demanded special attention to Cabindans, reserving them important places at the top organs of the 
Party. 
585 In Radio Nacional de Angola (17 January 1979), cit. in SWB (19 January 1979). 
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identity balance there was reshuffling in the Central Committee and also in the 
central and provincial governments; in consequence of such rotation, in 1979, 
all provincial commissioners were ex-officio members of the government. 586 
Beyond those very top organs, at an intermediate level of the State 
hierarchy, a few months before the plenary Neto had already shown signs of 
wanting to manage the political system based on the strategic or selective 
integration and co-option of members of other movements and even of 
dissident groups within the MPLA. Therefore, in September 1978, he 
announced in Cabinda, his policy of clemency and partial amnesty followed by 
integration within the MPLA, towards members of the FNLA, the FLEC, the 
Active Revolt, the Eastern Revolt and Nito's sympathisers (still without 
mentioning UNITA)587. Later on, right after the plenary, Neto stated that all 
those who once belonged to such organisations `must have the same 
opportunities and rights without any discrimination whatsoever' 588. As a result 
of this new policy of clemency, several members of the FNLA deserted and 
surrendered to the MPLA during 1979, after which they were reintegrated 
within State structures along with the freed members of MPLA's dissident 
groups. 589 
In sum, with the exception of UNITA and the Ovimbundu (for the 
reasons explained), the management strategy pursued was becoming clearly 
close to the one characterised as modern patrimonial in part I -- according to 
which the art of politics consists in satisfying lavishly your own socio-cultural 
586 Due to the enormous extension of all these reshuffling it is not possible to describe it in here in 
detail; for a complete outline of such reshuffling see Diärio da Republica, I, November-December 
1978, especially from no. 266 to no. 301, and January-December 1979. 
587 Speech made by Agostinho Neto in Cabinda on 16 September 1979, in Seleccdo de discursos do 
Camarada Presidente Agostinho Neto (Luanda: DIP, 1978), pp. 43-54. 
588 In Radio Nacional de Angola (17th December 1978), cit. in SWB (19th December 1978). 
589 Five leaders of the FNLA, all old members of Chipenda's Eastern revolt, returned to Luanda in 
January 1979: Victor Kambuta and Luis Azevedo Jnr, both members of the FNLA's politburo; Manuel 
Antonio, Silva Neto and Dinis de Moura, both members of the FNLA's Central Committee. Due to 
previous negotiations with Zaire in late 1978, Neto got Mobutu to announce the expulsion of the FNLA 
and the FLEC from Zaire; latter, on 27 October 1979, even Holden Roberto was expelled from Zaire, 
taking refuge in Paris with several other leaders of the movement, representing a major and definite 
military blow to Holden Roberto's FNLA ambitions; In ACR, 12 (1981), p. B674; on the agreement 
Neto and Mobutu see Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, Angola ... op. cit. pp. 216-223. 
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and identity group, while rewarding the elites of other such groups sufficiently 
for them to have an interest in maintaining the status quo (cf. supra, Part I). 
8.1.3 The guiding principles in terms of foreign policy 
In parallel to the attempted normalisation of economic relationships with the 
West (during the summer of 1978), Neto also pursued a foreign policy designed 
to weaken external support for UNITA (and what was left of FNLA and FLEC), 
approaching diplomatically not only the EEC countries as mentioned, but also 
Portugal (where UNITA found support among the Portuguese returnees)590 and 
even cultivating the US (by discussing the intention of reducing dependency on 
Cuban and Soviet influence). On the US side, the move was immediately 
reciprocated in June 1978 by the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, announcing 
that Washington `wished to improve its relations with Luanda 591 and right after 
the CC plenary a US delegation visited Angola (13 December) and was told by 
Neto that Angola was `prepared and willing to establish diplomatic relations 
with the US, although it could do nothing about reducing the number of Cuban 
troops because of South Africa's daily attacks'592. By then, during the `Carter 
administration', Washington came very close to recognise the Angolan 
593 government despite the Cuban military presence 
590 In June 1978, there was an historic meeting between Neto and Portugal's President Ramalho Eanes 
in Guinea-Bissau which resolved many of the issues that had kept Angolan-Portuguese relations very 
cool since independence such as the activities of the FNLA, UNITA and FLEC in Portugal. For the 
amazement of many observers, Neto invited the estimated 7000 refugees in Portugal to return home and 
a contingent of Portuguese technicians was expected to go to Angola; in Herald Tribune (6 December 
1978); see also ACR, 11 (1980), pp. B496-B497. 
"'In ACR, 11 (1980), pp. B493-B494. 
592 As reported by David Ottaway to The Washington Post (14 December 1978); see also the report of 
Flora Lewis to The New York Times (13 December 1978); also The Sun (US) (13 December 1978). 
593 See Wright, George The Destruction of a Nation, United States' policy toward Angola since 1945 
(London: Pluto Press, 1997), chapter 5 and 6; also in the same sense, Patricio, Jose Angola - EUA, os 
caminhos do bom senso (Luanda: Executive Center, 1997), pp. 50-5 1. However, the recognition did not 
happen and was delayed with the Reagan Administration (1981-1984) and the increased number of 
Cuban troops. The number of Cuban troops progressively increased from the estimated 19.000 in 1978 
to 40.000 in 1987; see ACR, vol.! l (1980), p. B493 and ACR, vol. 20 (1989). 
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In sum, it must be stressed that although in general terms the rightwing 
prevailed in terms of normative principles at the top of the system, this did not 
represent a decisive political defeat to the leftwing members. With the 
exception of Carlos Dilolwa who in fact resigned from his functions at the 
Politburo and the government (against Neto's wi11594), the leftwing members in 
general kept their seats within the CC and the Politburo595, as much as the 
rightwing members kept theirs at the CC596 Thus, the internal balance of forces 
between the two socio-political groups was in general maintained. 
8.2 The Main Principles for the Whole Population 
Beyond the top of the system, there emerged a normative framework in terms of 
economic practices, prevailing solidarities and political procedure, which began 
to affect the day-to-day living conditions of the general population. 
8.2.1 The normative principles in terms of economic practices 
For the majority of the population, the pragmatic (rightwing) economic position 
assumed by Neto at the top of the system was obviously seen as a first 
concession to the private/informal/illegal procedures based on straddling that 
had been rife in all sectors of activity and throughout all social strata. Much 
more than that, it was implicitly taken as a first `official' acceptance of the 
legitimising principles supporting those practices. Such procedures were made 
legitimate in the face of two simultaneous processes: a), the State's ever 
594 According to Dilolwa, Neto became furious when confronted with his resignation and tried to 
change his mind by all possible means. However, for Dilolwa, the economic concessions made by that 
plenary was a decisive setback on the road to Socialism and a major crackdown on the principles he 
sustained and believed in; their long friendship and complicity since the anti-colonial struggle came to 
an end, because, according to Dilolwa, Neto could not stand to be so publicly rebuked. From private 
conversations with late Carlos Dilolwa in Luanda (August-September 1994). 
595 As previously stressed, Lopo do Nascimento (although it is arguable if he was with the leftwing in 
all matters) lost his place at the politburo but not at the CC. 
s% Those that we have previously mentioned as prominent `rightwing members' such as Mendes de 
Carvalho, Domingos Paiva da Silva, Bernardo de Souza and Manuel Pedro Pacavira remained at the 
CC and those we mentioned as prominent 'leftwing members' such as Lücio Lara and Iko Carreira 
remained in Politburo; from private interviews with Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16 April 1998); Mario 
Antonio Carvalho (6 May 1998); Paulo Jorge (26 June 1998); Mendes de Carvalho (17 July 1998). 
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decreasing fulfilment of its distributive `obligations' towards the majority of the 
people (decreasing purchasing power of the salaries, shortage of food and 
goods at official prices, deterioration of social support); b), the ever 
discriminatory and selective character assumed by the party and State 
nominations (and consequently, the ever discriminatory and restrained access to 
benefits and privileges allowed by such nominations). 
Beyond any discussion about the justification for this pragmatic 
legitimacy597, it is important to stress that once it was `officially' accepted it 
became a way of legitimising predatory practices. According to Messiant, 
Un tel systeme, en Angola comme ailleurs, des lors qu'il repose sur 
l'inegalite de l'acces aux biens entre la nomenklature et le peuple et 
sur la seule `loi'-donc l'impunite-du parti, est particulierement 
propice au (ou, plutöt, obligatoirement producteur du) 
developpement de la corruption-au sens, ici, de l'abus individuel 
de position de pouvoir -, celle-ci prenant de I'ampleur, en meme 
temps qu'une fonction sociale et une `valeur' accrues, au fur et 
ä mesure que la gabegie We aux criteres politiques-partisan de 
nominations et ä la bureaucratisation reduit l'ampleur des dites 
libertes reelles-notamment la satisfaction des besoins de 
subsistance elementaires-et aboutit ä une economie de rarete. 
[... ] la `debrouille' individuelle et la corruption des serviteurs de 
l'Etat: c'est la pratique qui se developpe ä un niveau individuel 
des detournements et des vols sur les lieux de production et de 
travail, ce sont surtout bientöt, pour repondre aux besoins les 
plus essentiels que l'Etat remplit de moins en moins (dont 
I' alimentation, I habillement). [my bold] 
598 
From then on, a self-fulfilling cumulative process was unleashed through which 
the increasing weakness of the official economy to provide goods and services 
along with the party's nomination system ('elitist' and discriminatory), 
legitimised the informal economy and pushed for its ever increasing 
development, further weakening the official economy and further legitimising 
the informal/illegal. 
597 Strictly from an economic point of view such an argument is clearly fallacious and unacceptable, 
essentially resulting from unsustainable distributive expectations: ceteris paribus, the destructive effects 
of informal practices over the official economy necessarily diminish the State's capacity to fulfil 
expected obligations. 
598 In Messiant, Christine, `Ä propos des..., op. cit. pp. 78-79. 
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Therefore, contrary to Neto's announced provisional character for the 
concessions made to private initiative599, the obvious truth to everybody was 
that those concessions were just the first of a long list to come. In fact, as soon 
as 1981/1982 there were already many signs of the irreversible character of this 
self-legitimising cumulative process supporting the spread of predatory 
practices and the informal market; according to Zenha Rela, 
[In early 1980] `Despise the private' so characteristic of the first 
years of independence, was progressively transformed in `desire to 
be private' [... ] Those in 1976 who attacked the saboteurs of the 
economy [the ones in the informal/private sector] were now 
beginning their path towards `entrepreneurship', having gone 
through the intermediate and uncomfortable phase of candongueiro 
[person acting in the black market]. In 1981/1982, signs that this 
course was already on the way were too many and allowed one 
to state its non-reversible character. [My bold] 600 
Insofar as the pragmatic or self-reinforcing legitimacy was obviously not legal, 
there emerged a distance between such pragmatic legitimacy and the legal 
legitimacy; i. e. informal practices that were illegitimate from the legal point of 
view, were in fact legitimate according to the accepted and spreading pragmatic 
legitimacy. The net result of this distancing was the general disrespect and 
contempt for the juridical order60' reported by the CC in 1980 as `non- 
fulfilment of the Law'602 and by other congress documents in more drastic 
terms, 
[The non-enforcement of sanctions] increased the discredit for 
legislation and for the seriousness of principles, thus decreasing the 
state's authority and facilitating petit-bourgeois attitudes such as the 
lack of discipline, o deixa andar [don't give a damn] and even the 
moral, intellectual and material corruption. Therefore, the 
established legality or, to be more precise, the legality that was 
59' Right after the plenary when Neto announced that small private enterprises would be allowed, he 
stressed that such move did not mean that the aim of establishing a communist State was abandoned, 
adding that he looked forward to the day when every Angolan would stand up and say proudly "I am a 
communist". Things would be different in 10, or 20, or 30 years, but the immediate and urgent need 
was just to get the society working smoothly and to solve the people's problems; reported by Flora 
Lewis to The New York Times (13 December 1978). 
600 Zenha Rela, Jose Manuel Angola ... op. cit. pp. 57-58 601 We are obviously talking of civil matters; on defence and security matters the juridical order was 
feared and respected as we mentioned above. 
602 In Relatörio do Comite Central ao I° Congresso Extraordindrio... op. cit... 1980, p. 95. 
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aimed to be established, has suffered some serious infractions. 
[My bold] 603 
[Besides several other factors mentioned] The fundamental causes 
for the low level of accomplishment of those resolutions made by 
the Ist congress of the MPLA [in 1977] were [... ] the non-exercise 
of authority by the police and the generalised non-fulfilment of 
the law [my bold] 604 
Recalling the argument in Part I it can be said that the moral order was 
becoming distinct and distant from the juridical order. 
8.2.2 Normative principles in terms of prevailing solidarities 
A specific type of solidarity began to prevail more in consonance with the 
developing economic procedures. The 1980 congress, which had denounced all 
the informal activities (generalised thefts, diversion of produce, corruption, 
organised networks, involvement of managers, cadres and security forces, and 
so on) also attacked the prevailing solidarities making it possible, namely the 
`regionalism, racism and sectarianism [... ] which contributes to the 
disorganisation and lack of discipline in production and distribution, hampering 
the progress [... ] towards Socialism'. 605 The CC report went even further, 
stating that, 
The divisionist elements who take advantage of still-existing 
prejudice, be it tribal [ethnic], regional or racial, within Angolan 
society, just so they can pretend to be `defenders of the people' 
whilst striving for personal interests or those of their group, must be 
persecuted as enemies of the working class, of the Angolan nation 
and of Socialism [... ] Regionalism, tribalism and racism are 
reflections of pre-capitalist production relationships and colonial 
domination. These concepts, as we have been seeing, bring about 
divisions that can be taken advantage of by opportunistic elements 
in order to divide the popular masses. 606 
603 In `Principais resultados do desenvolvimento econömico-social da RPA no trienio 1978-1980' ... 
op. cit. p. 11. 
604 Ibid. p. 27. 
605 In Resolugdes e mensagens do 1° Congresso Extraordinärio ... op. cit... 1980, p. 
36. 
606 In Relatörio do Comite Central ao 1° Congresso Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980, p. 37. 
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A third congress document, drawing an economic and social balance of the 
1978-1980 period added to those prevailing solidarities the 'nepotism' 607 and 
apadrinhamento [i. e. patrimonial protection or preferentialism], thus 
`promoting incompetence 608 
What made ethnicity, regionalism or nepotism `a problem' in Angola 
as elsewhere in post-independence Africa was basically the preferential, 
sectarian and discriminatory type of solidarities it supported and the subsequent 
socio-economic distortions it generated609; distortions that could be effectively 
felt in Angola's daily life, not only at the level of informal business but in more 
general terms, as a national phenomenon spread throughout the whole country, 
as stressed by Neto in 1978, before that 1980 congress, 
We know that there is tribalism still [meaning ethnicity]. It exists 
and we can feel it here in Bie [an `Ovimbundu province'], in 
Luanda [a `Creole/M'Bundu province'], in Zaire [a `Bakongo 
province'], and in the provinces of Cabinda [of `Cabindans'] and 
Moxico [Eastern and SouthEastern ethnic groups such as Lunda- 
Tchokwe, M'Bunda, Luchaze, among others]. It is there, despite the 
work we have been undertaking in order to accomplish national 
unity. We have achieved much through this effort. However, we 
have to recognise that tribalism exists. [My bold] 
610 
In these terms can be understood the advantages of the principles of political 
management developed by the President at the top of the system (in favour of a 
more `balanced' ethnic and regional composition of top organs): on the one 
hand, as an attempt to set an example from above in order to avoid a 
radicalisation of such distortions throughout the whole society and country; on 
the other hand, as an `official' acknowledgement of the necessity to manage 
such reality, thus integrating it instead of fighting it. In one way or another, the 
607 `Principais resultados do desenvolvimento econömico-social da RPA no trienio 1978-1980' ... op. 
cit. P. It. 
608 Ibid. p. 27. 
For a comprehensive discussion of this subject see Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. 
cit. chapter 1. 
610 On Radio Luanda (12 February 1978), cit. in ACR, 10 (1979), p. B505. Later, in December 1978, 
Neto referred again such problems of `racism, tribalism and regionalism', in Radio Luanda (17 
December 1978), cit. in SWB (19 December 1978). 
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position taken by Neto represented an allowance or acceptance of micro- 
identity solidarities, even if politically managed and controlled. 
8.2.3 The normative principles in terms of political practice 
The beginning of the process of the insularisation of the formal political system 
after the 27th May attempted coup (analysed in chapter 6) effectively 
represented the beginning of political demobilisation and alienation for the 
majority of the population, be it from formal or informal political mechanisms. 
As stated by Messiant, 
Sur cette question aussi [debrouille individuelle et corruption des 
serviteurs de 1'Etat] il me semble important de prendre en compte 
dans le developpement du phenomene, outre sa `necessite 
structurelle' [... ] certains facteurs politiques, non seulement ceux 
lies aux aspirations et aux divisions au sein du pouvoir `marxiste- 
leniniste', mais aussi certains `effets' sociaux de la repression du 
coup d'Etat de 1977 qui aliene au pouvoir une partie de sa base 
sociale, notamment urbaine et populaire. [my bold] 
611 
Also in a proximate sense is Zenha Rela, previously quoted, stressing that the 
post-27th May repression and discrimination represents `the end of any etat de 
. 
2 
grace that the political power might have had to mobilise the people'6I 
However, insofar as the socio-political impact of the war ensured the 
continuation of significant political support for the MPLA, because of the fear 
of UNITA, such political demobilisation and alienation did not represent a 
straightforward loss of political legitimacy. It was the beginning of an 
ambiguous process through which it was possible for the government politically 
and economically to alienate the majority of the population but without loosing 
its support (at least of those identified with the Creole/M'Bundu alliance). 
Concluding chapter 8, we see that throughout Neto's presidency, the emerging 
framework of ethical and normative principles was essentially marked by a 
double characteristic: 
611 In Messiant, Christine, `Ä propos des..., op. cit. footnote 37. 
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1) At the top of the system, a clearly modern patrimonial model was 
adopted in terms of power management; a kind of patrimonial carrousel within 
which key elements of the party circulated according to the political needs of a 
system balancing micro-identity criteria through distribution. The main aim was 
for the leading group (the Creole/M'Bundu core of the MPLA) to ensure its 
control and primacy in sharing the spoils, whilst at the same time satisfying the 
needs of potential rivals, and to try to co-opt and integrate elements from other 
movements and ethnic backgrounds or internal rivals (except for the 
Ovimbundu). 
2) At the bottom of the system, predatory practices spread throughout the 
whole social strata, legitimised by the decreasing fulfilment of the State's 
expected distributive obligations and the party's `elitism'. It was the beginning 
of the collapse of ethical and normative distributive principles between rulers 
and ruled and the breakage of extended distribution, even though this did not 
represent a straightforward loss of political legitimacy. 
612 In Zenha Rela, Jose Manuel Angola ... op. cit. p. 53. 
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9- The State During Agostinho Neto's Presidency (1975-1979) 
The Angolan State, as has been shown, was to adopt the structure of a modem 
polity (Socialist-Marxist as opposed to other countries which adopted a 
Liberal-Capitalist model) whilst at the same time submitting that structure to a 
patrimonial working logic, thus bringing together two theoretically 
incompatible rationalities. 
In practice, as has been demonstrated, the working logic of patrimonialism 
was quite compatible with, and even benefited from, adopting a Socialist- 
Marxist model of economic and political organisation of society and the State. 
According to such model, there is one Party only, ruled by principles of 
monolithic democratic centralism, which deeply penetrates the State and the 
armed forces. The Party manages the whole administratively run economy and 
the hierarchical system of access to material privileges and benefits. Therefore, 
within such a structure, the party/State became a valuable asset for patrimonial 
management, which required the concentration of power and centralisation of 
administration into a pyramidal configuration in order to subsequently 
concentrate and centralise the general distribution of benefits and privileges (as 
discussed in part I). 
As in much of Africa, Angolan patrimonialism started off by being 
markedly partisan, soon displaying signs of presidentialism -- a process of 
concentration of power in the person and institution of the President of the 
Republic/President of the Party. The President then took on the main leadership 
of the patrimonial system. However, inasmuch as this presidential concentration 
of powers was based on and exerted through the party's top organs (the 
Politburo and the CC), the party maintained a central role in the management of 
the system. 
In sum, because of the general similarities between this State and the 
kind of State described by the modern patrimonial perspective and because of 
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its essentially partisan form, the Angolan State and the social organisation it 
supported during Neto's presidency, will be here designated as `partisan 
modem patrimonialism'. Even though by the end of Neto's presidency the 
political and economic framework of relationships between rulers and ruled 
already showed some signs of post-modem patrimonialism (such as the 
beginning of the dissolution of distributive interdependence ties) it still can not 
be considered post-modem as defined in part I 
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CASE STUDY, SECTION -C: DEVELOPMENT OF POST 
INDEPENDENCE SYSTEM OR PRESIDENTIAL POST- 
MODERN PATRIMONIALISM, 1979-1985/87 
After discussing in section B, the construction of the new post-independence system 
of social organisation in terms of the emerging framework of political, economic and 
normative relationships, we will now analyse the development of this system during 
the Socialist-Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos's presidency (1979-1985/1987). 
The purpose is to compare two administrations and two subsequent periods 
of time in order to gauge differences in terms of patrimonial working logic. In 
short our intention is: 1) to see if those patrimonial principles and expressions as 
analysed in Neto's presidency did stabilise or whether they intensified; 2) to see if 
they did integrate rulers and ruled or on the contrary broke the ties that linked 
both. The aim is assess the main differences between modern and post-modern 
patrimonialism. 
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10 - Context of Socio-Political Events: Renewed Conflicts Between Left 
and Right at the Top 
After the death of Agostinho Neto on September 9,1979, the choice of 
Eduardo dos Santos by the politburo and the Central Committee613 was 
relatively smooth for three main reasons. 
Firstly, because Eduardo dos Santos had been the implicit choice of 
President Neto, who left him in charge during his final trip to Moscow (where 
he died). 
Secondly, because Eduardo dos Santos was able to get the support of the 
majority of the party leadership. He was seen as a sociological and political 
compromise between both groups: he was from the coast (Luanda), like most of 
the leftwing members, but unlike them he was from the muceques with very 
humble origins, not coming from the colonial bourgeoisie 614 As in the case of 
613 After the death of President Neto, the Central Committee decided unanimously to nominate Eduardo 
dos Santos as Party President on the 20th September 1979. Born on 28 August 1942 in Luanda, Jose 
Eduardo dos Santos became the second President of the People's Republic of Angola. He was a black 
M'Bundu who grew up in Luanda's muceques and left colonial Angola to join the MPLA in 1961, the 
year the anti-colonial struggle was launched, and quickly rose to become a youth leader in Leopoldville 
(Kinshasa) and then chief representative in Brazzaville, where he underwent military training. Chosen 
for scholarship, Eduardo dos Santos went to the USSR in November 1963 where he spent six years 
graduating as a petroleum engineer. After his graduation in 1969, he took a military 
telecommunications course in the USSR, and in 1970, he went into the field as a radio operator and 
deputy head of telecommunication services in the MPLA's second politico-military region, Cabinda. At 
independence, dos Santos became the country's first foreign minister and later, first deputy-prime 
minister. After the 1977 Party congress where he was elected onto both the Central Committee and the 
politburo, he headed the Party Economic Development and Planning Secretariat and after the 1978 
reorganisation, he became Minister of Planning in place of Carlos Dilolwa. At the MPLA-PT's first 
Extraordinary Party Congress held in 1980 (17 to 23 December), dos Santos was unanimously 
confirmed as the MPLA's president. The politburo's member, Lücio Lara, told the opening session that 
all members of the Party had expressed confidence in dos Santos at provincial and municipal meetings. 
According to the Angolan Constitution, the Party leader was automatically Head of State and 
Commander-in-Chief of the FAPLA. For bibliographical data on Jose Eduardo dos Santos see ARB 
(September 1979), p. 5400 a-b; also ARB, (December 1980), p. 5902; also Hodges, Tony Angola to the 
1990's ... op. cit. p. 11; also Biografia 
Oficial de Jose Eduardo dos Santos, Presidente da Republica de 
Angola (Luanda: np, nd); probably written in 1994 after the signature of the Lusaka protocol which is 
the last event mentioned. 
614 His father was a mason of humble origins without resources and although his mother still bore the 
Van Dunem name (a family belonging to the `old coastal aristocracy'), it was not a 'legitimate' or direct 
familiar link. As explained to me by Pepetela who did some research on the background of the Van 
Dunem family before the writing of his book A gloriosa famllia, there are hundreds (probably more 
than a thousand) people bearing the Van Dunen name, but the great majority of them are poor, 
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the leftwing members -he was quite acculturated, having finished his high 
school education in the Liceu Salvador Correia (the most prestigious high 
school in Angola, mostly attended by whites and mesticos), but like most of the 
rightwing members he was black. He was a communist, with further education 
obtained in the USSR (petroleum engineer), but a moderate one, known for his 
discreet and conciliatory stance over antagonistic positions within the politburo, 
the CC or the government615, showing some signs of pragmatism during the 
time he was deputy foreign minister (cf. supra). Besides this hybrid stance 
between left and rightwing, he could even be considered a bridge to the 
younger generations, being very young (37 years old), but not from the youth 
committees generation, having left Angola in 1961, when the anti-colonial 
struggle began. Thereby he represented what several of my interviewees have 
referred to as the `lowest common denominator between the main tendencies at 
the top leadership' (called left and rightwing in this thesis). 616 
Thirdly and finally, because both wings within the top leadership of the 
MPLA could see in Eduardo dos Santos, because of his young age and unclear 
political stance, the possibility of manipulating and influencing him in favour 
of their respective interests. 617 
The political practice of Eduardo dos Santos when President confirmed 
these observations about his hybrid nature and his capacity to articulate 
antagonistic positions. However, to the great disappointment and frustration of 
the competing party wings, the new President, whilst adopting a political stance 
very close to that assumed by Neto at the December 1978 plenary (closer to the 
underprivileged in socio-professional or economic terms and without any relationship to prominent 
members of the family. Some are bastard descendants of original Van Dunem, born from their 
relationships with slaves or concubines; some others are descendants of slaves or workers of the family 
who ended up informally adopting their name (as Van Dunem's property); from private interview with 
Pepetela (7th July 1998). 
6`5 Pepetela remarked on how Jose Eduardo dos Santos always made a point, during government 
meetings, of being the last to talk; he would then take the stance he saw as most neutral and 
conciliatory; he usually did the same at CC and politburo meetings as Pepetela was told (Pepetela only 
had access to government meetings); from private interview with Pepetela (7th July 1998). 
616 From private interviews with Joäo Melo (17 April 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998); JM 
Mabeko-Tali (27 April 1998); Pepetela (7 July 1998). 
617 Several interviewees provided this angle: Mabeko Tali (27th April 1998); Joäo Melo (17th April 
1998); Fernando Pacheco (23rd April 1998) and Pepetela (7th July 1998). 
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pragmatic rightwing line), soon affirmed his power downgrading right and 
leftwing members, taking advantage of a favourable political context (as we 
will see). 
According to one of his close collaborators, Eduardo dos Santos set 
himself two major strategic objectives by the time he assumed the 
presidency618: 
Firstly, the President wanted to assert his personal and institutional power 
beyond all groups and individuals within the Party and the State, ending the 
proximity and effective influer}ce that `old' prominent party members (of both 
political wings) had over the presidency during Neto's administration. The new 
president aimed to be surrounded by younger cadres, more technically and 
professionally prepared (be it in governmental or military issues) and less 
politically involved in old power disputes619 
Secondly, he wanted to find a solution to the `UNITA problem', be it 
through military destruction or integration, or a combination of both. Such a 
solution would necessarily imply coming to terms with South Africa and the 
US in order to cut their support to Savimbi, involving negotiation on the Cuban 
and Namibian issues (i. e. Cuban troops withdrawal and Namibian 
independence). The sensitivity of this second objective implied that the first 
objective be completely achieved (i. e. personal and institutional assertion of 
presidential power over the whole political system, groups and individuals); 
allowing him to take control of Angolan foreign policy. 
Eia This information was given to me by Carlos Feij6, secretary of the Council of Ministers for several 
years and commonly known as very close to the president. According to Feijö, these objectives were 
explicitly and personally discussed by the president himself. Such information was taken as credible not 
only by the credit such person deserves within the Angolan political milieu, but essentially because the 
analysis of Eduardo dos Santos practice during his Marxist phase confirms it; from private interview 
with Carlos Feijö (10th April 1998). 
619 In the words of Carlos Feijö, `The president wanted to refresh the presidential entourage and 
therefore we were born', referring to himself and whole the other technicians and cadres pejoratively 
called `kids from Futungo' as previously explained; from private interview with Carlos Feij6 (10th 
April 1998). Also referring to the young technocrats as an emerging influential group in 1982 see the 
report of Michael Holman in Financial Times (21 June 1982). Even the official biography of Eduardo 
dos Santos contains a reference to the emerging young cadres around the presidency; see Biografra 
Oficial 
... op. cit. p6. 
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Insofar as the achievement of that first major objective greatly influenced, 
not only the achievement of the second major objective, but also the 
development of the political and socio-economic system during the Marxist 
phase of Eduardo dos Santos (the main focus of this section), there is a need to 
analyse it as the proper context for the understanding of the remaining chapters. 
The analysis of the pursuit of the second objective will be provided later in sub- 
chapter 13.1.3. 
10.1 The Internal Political Affirmation of the New President: 1979-1982 
Attempting to take advantage of the transition period between presidential 
administrations, the leftwing launched new political offensives in order to 
recover from previous defeats, especially in terms of economic policy. Such 
new offensives resulted in three famous political/judicial cases (known as the 
Monty, Angonave and Kamanga cases) and the infamous incident of `the 
picture and the play'. It was the manner in which the President handled this 
sequence of cases that enabled him to assert his personal and institutional 
power beyond all groups and individuals. 
The first great leftwing offensive against the rightwing happened as 
early as September 1981, with the Monty case. It involved the Minister of Oil, 
Jorge Augusto de Morais `Monty', a mestico, former chief of the MPLA's 
guerrilla and brother-in-law of Agostinho Neto, by then a leading left-winger, 
especially in terms of the fight against widespread corruption and the straddling 
activities that permeated the national oil company, Sonangol, from the top 
down620. Monty publicly denounced the managing director of Sonangol, 
Herminio Escörcio of receiving bribes and `making irregular contracts for the 
62 sale of crude to the Gulf Oil Company'1. He wanted to investigate fully the 
620 From private interviews with Jülio Morais (11th April 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16th April 
1998); Cornelio Caley (2 May 1998); Mendes de Carvalho (17th July 1998). 
621 In Foreign Report (11th November 1981), published by The Economist, p. 5. 
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corruption, pointing out the need to keep the oil accounts firmly under 
governmental control (thus, under his own control as minister of oil). 622 
Herminio Escörcio, in turn, though also a mestico, was not in anyway 
aligned with the leftwing, being close to the economic positions of the 
rightwing (even if he was not in any way directly related to them), being 
essentially a loyalist to the president or what is called in Angola um homem de 
lealdades pessoais (a man of personal loyalties) -- unconditionally loyal to his 
`boss', to the one who `feeds' him, the one who employs him in high places 
where one has access to privileges and benefits. He was not concerned with 
more encompassing strategies and manoeuvres of power influence like those of 
the left and right. Like so many others, he simply decided to make the most out 
of his position as long as he could. However, probably quicker than others, he 
understood that such possibility depended upon the new president's personal 
will. 623 This is exactly the type of men that the president wanted around him. 
The president nominated an `independent' commission of inquiry and 
denied Monty the possibility of leading the investigation as Minister of oil. 
Probably dubious about the efficiency of that commission, Monty still tried to 
participate in the investigation 624 and was soon dismissed by presidential decree 
in November 1981 (approximately forty days after the accusations were 
made)625. Herminio Escörcio kept his place, although his guilt was clear to a lot 
of people626. From then on (as we will accurately see in chapter 11), oil 
accounts came under the personal and institutional control of the President and 
622 From private interviews with Jü1io Morais (11th April 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16th April 
1998); Cornelio Caley (2 May 1998). 
623 Ibid. 
624 Ibid. 
625 'The Oil Minister, Jorge Augusto de Morais "Monty", is removed from office for not having 
presented valid reasons to justify his disobedience of the President of the Republic's orders regarding 
the exercise of his office of oil minister and taking into account that his behaviour has contributed to the 
deterioration of working relationship between the oil minister and the Sonangol company, causing the 
breakdown of authority and discipline in the oil sector; also considering that the allegations against two 
Sonangol directors of bribery to the sum of US$10,000 each were not proven to this day, forty days 
having already passed. ', in presidential decree 88/81, DR, 1,262 (6 November 1981); see also Le 
Monde (3,5 November 1981); also ARB (November 1981), p. 6241-a; also West Africa (9 November 
1981). 
626 From private interviews with people who asked strict anonymity, for obvious reasons. 
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were sheltered from the fiscal control of the government -- and any leftwing 
members within it. 
Given the failure of the first offensive, two others followed, which had 
far greater repercussions. Several months after the Monty case, in mid 1982, 
some anonymous rumours and documents were strategically put into circulation 
within the higher echelons of the party and State hierarchies (most probably by 
elements linked to the leftwing which dominated the Party's sectors for 
propaganda and information), uncovering frauds, deviations of funds and 
corruption schemes in Angonave, the national shipping company627. 
Subsequently, and using the same strategy, denunciations and damning 
information were spread in the second half of 1982 regarding another scandal, 
that of a network of diamond trafficking (Kamanga), which was rife at the very 
top of the party/State/military apparatus. So many people and so many posts 
were said to be involved that it was almost an `institutionalised' activity628. 
The last great offensive by the leftwing took place almost in parallel 
with the previous ones, on the 28th August 1982, on the occasion of the 
celebrations of the President's birthday. It took the form of a picture (a satirical 
cartoon of the President that was given to him during the official ceremony of 
his birthday629) and a play (which ridiculed, belittled and indirectly insulted 
some of the rightwing ministers, including its most prominent member, the 
Minister for Health and CC member Agostinho Mendes de Carvalho, known as 
Uanhenga Xitu, implicitly characterising them as corrupt, incompetent and 
ignorant)630 The new offensive provoked the immediate reaction of several 
627 From private interviews with Jülio Morais (11th April 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16th April 
1998); Comelio Caley (2 May 1998); Mendes de Carvalho (17th July 1998). 
628 From private interviews with Jülio Morais (11th April 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16th April 
1998); Cornelio Caley (2 May 1998); see also Le Monde (11th December 1982); also Expresso (7th 
July 1984); also ACR, Vol. 17 (1986), p. B611 and p. B625 footnote 9. 
629 In the cartoon, the President was represented as a footballer with a ball at his feet, with an oil well 
spouting cash, a sensual woman at his side and a woman's sexy legs coming out of a rubbish bin, a 
reference to his new girlfriend and the girlfriend he had recently left, the implication being that the 
President was happy-go-lucky, caring only about football, women and money. From private interviews 
with Raül Araüjo (2nd April 1998), the person who personally handed the picture to the president; 
Pepetela (7th July 1998); also from private interview with Christine Messiant (January 1998). 
630 From private interviews with Raül Araüjo (2nd April 1998); Pepetela (7th July 1998); also from 
private interview with Christine Messiant (January 1998). Although Costa Andrade N'Dunduma, the 
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members of the rightwing; especially those most targeted in the play. They 
alerted Eduardo dos Santos to the mockery of the picture and the play and 
dramatically interpreted it as lack of respect towards the President63' 
In Angola (as in most patrimonial systems) accusations of corruption, 
deviations or thefts do not have a significant impact, either on those who stand 
accused, or on public opinion in general, given the spread of these practices 
throughout the whole society. However, personal mocking is a totally different 
matter, especially to people in leadership positions, responsäveis or dirigentes, 
as called in Angola. These acts are dramatically referred to in Angola as falta 
de respeito (lack of respect), and have a devastating effect on the capacity to 
keep a leadership position. If this person is the Head of State, then it becomes 
even more serious since the attacks imply that he lacks all credibility as Chief, 
unable to display the main attributes of a leader, namely strength and authority. 
Playing with this argument632, the rightwing members led by Mendes de 
Carvalho `pushed the President against the wall'. The fight between left and 
right had come to its climax and the Head of State was, therefore, left with no 
alternative other than to `kill the snake and exhibit the stick' -- in other words, 
he had to affirm his personal and political authority with strength and might. 
This is exactly what he decisively did. However, he did it not only towards 
the left but also towards the right, taking the opportunity offered him by the 
internal contenders themselves. On the one hand, the left had given him the 
necessary weapon to politically demoralise and neutralise the rightwing 
person who wrote the play, was interviewed, he refused to talk much about the play's content, still 
admitting that some people at the top leadership felt personally insulted with it and also considered an 
offence towards the president. During a private interview (30th March 1998), Costa Andrade, now MP 
for the MPLA, expressly confirmed that those who pressured for his imprisonment had informally and 
personally apologised before his re-integration in late eighties. Although N'Dunduma had not 
mentioned any names, from what I could check with some journalists he was almost for sure referring 
to Mendes de Carvalho. Later Mendes de Carvalho told me that those problems about the play had been 
solved through personal conversation and that the people involved had apologised to him; from private 
interview with Mendes de Carvalho (17th July 1998). Implicitly both confirmed the effective war 
between groups and personalities that was deployed because of the play. 
631 From private interviews with Costa Andrade N'Dunduma (30th March 1998); Raül Araüjo (2nd 
April 1998); Pepetela (7th July 1998); Mendes de Carvalho (17 July 1998). 
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members who feared that investigations and trials on corruption cases might 
reveal possible the implication of its members; on the other hand, the right had 
given him the long desired legitimate argument (traditional) to react with 
firmness against the disrespectful attitude of the leftwing, which allowed him to 
neutralise the power of its members within the party. 
The president could count on a lack of reaction from those two groups, 
firstly, because they were in a fragile position with the attacks they threw at 
each other; secondly, because a presidential punishment against both sides 
would not represent a victory of one over the other in their direct confrontation; 
thirdly, because it was clear to everybody that the party could not afford another 
bloody purge that would necessarily follow if any of them decided to resist the 
president; fourthly, there was no other member within the politburo that could 
embody the same political and sociological balance as Eduardo dos Santos; 
fifthly, because UNITA's guerrilla activity was increasing (with the help of 
South Africa) pressuring the party to unite against that common threat. 
In the face of renewed internal discipline problems and new South African 
incursions from August 1981 onwards633, Eduardo dos Santos demanded from 
the CC sweeping `special/emergency powers', including military (which will be 
accurately analysed in the next chapter). Such powers were unanimously 
conceded at the CC's 11th ordinary session (held from 30 November to 8 
December 1982) and served in the first place to initiate a selected political 
purge (more like a punishment) directed at some right and leftwing members at 
the top of the party and government, without avoiding two of the most 
prominent figures - Lücio Lara for the left and Mendes de Carvalho for the 
right; both of whom had approved such powers at the CC's plenary probably 
611 Such position (using that argument) was confirmed in private interviews with Costa Andrade 
N'Dunduma (30th March 1998); Raül Araüjo (2nd April 1998); Pepetela (7th July 1998); Mendes de 
Carvalho (17 July 1998). 
633 On 23 August 1981 South Africa launched operation Protea, which consisted in a huge cross-border 
incursion with SA forces advancing north of the Namibian border into the Cunene province. Other 
incursions and withdrawals followed in the ensuing months and during 1982; see ACR, vol. 14 
(1983), pp. B582-B585; also ACR, vol. 15 (1984), pp. B599-B600; also ACR, vol. 16 (1985), pp. B603- 
B605. 
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without even imagining that they would be the first to be punished. That 
plenary marks the beginning of a new period of Eduardo dos Santos -a period 
of near-absolute personal control over the power apparatus and complete 
mastery over internal divisionism - that is the successful achievement of his 
first strategic objective. 
10.1.1 The assertion of presidential power over the leftwing 
The punishment of the left started soon after the mentioned 11th CC's plenary 
with the imprisonment of the author of the play, Costa Andrade N'Dunduma, a 
mestico clearly aligned with the leftwing634, secretary of the journalists' union 
and former official biographer of Agostinho Neto. N'Dunduma was arrested on 
22 December, accused of factionalism and `lack of respect for the President'. 635 
There then followed the arrests of prominent members from the DEPI - 
Departamento de Estudos Propaganda e Informagdo (Department of Studies 
Propaganda and Information) and from the Department for Organisation, both 
dominated by leftwing members; all under the same accusation of `lack of 
respect for the President' 636 Within the DEPI, the most significant arrests and 
dismissals were those of Raül Araüjo, who had personally handed over the 
cartoon to the President, and Vantagem Lara, the adoptive son of Lücio Lara637 
Within the department for organisation, directly supervised by Lücio Lara as 
Secretary for organisation and cadres, the most significant arrest was that of 
one of its leading figures, Simäo Paulo638 followed by the suspension of Ruth 
634 From private interviews with JM Mabeko-Tali (27 April 1998). 
635 In ARB (February 1983), pp. 6704-6705. 
636 See Diärio de Noticias (10th February 1983); also in ARB (February 1983), p. 6739. 
637 According to Radl Araüjo, the President's immediate reaction to the picture was one of relative 
indifference; the real problem came with the amplification given by `other people' (obviously the 
rightwing members), who tried to take political advantages from it; from private interview with Raül 
Araüjo (2nd April 1998). 
638 Simäo Paulo was soon released (a month and a half later) with both Vantagem Lara and Raül 
Aradjo; from private interview with Raül Araüjo (2nd April 1998). Costa Andrade N'Dunduma, 
however, remained imprisoned until 25 January 1984; from private interview with N'Dunduma (30th 
March 1998). 
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Lara, the chief of MPL-A's section of cadres and wife of Lücio Lara639 The 
assaults on these two departments clearly represented a major attack on Lücio 
Lara, usually considered internally and externally as the party's number two640 
The purge also included the head of DEPI, Ambrosio Lukoki, a Bakongo, 
old time member of the MPLA and Neto's companion. He lost his seat at the 
politburo and also at the CCC". Although Lukoki was not aligned with the 
leftwing, he allowed them great room for manoeuvre within the DEPI and did 
not care much about their effective domain over the department's day-to-day 
activities. His dismissal was for having authorised the showing of the play 
without first having checked its content642. In a clear demonstration of force, 
Lukoki was replaced in the politburo by Lt. -Col. Francisco Magalhäes Paiva 
N'Vunda, head of FAPLA's political commissariat and Vice-Minister of 
Defence 643. At the DEPI, Lukoki was replaced by Roberto de Almeida644, a 
man distanced from the disputes between left and right, basically a loyalist to 
the new president as he had been to Neto, known as an `apparatchik', inflexible 
follower of orders and bureaucratic procedures, who was to imprint an austere 
environment within the department6as 
On 23 December, the purge reached the government, with the removal 
from office of three members of the executive, usually identified with the left: 
the governor of the National Bank, Jose Vitor de Carvalho (replaced by the 
Finance Minister, Augusto Teixeira de Matos) and two vice-ministers, Luis 
Fonseca dos Santos, from the Ministry of Construction, and Artur Pestana 
Pepetela (the novelist), from Education. 646 
639 In ARB, (February 1983), pp. 6704-6705. 
640 See ACR, 15 (1984), p. B598. 
641 Lukoki's dismissal occurred at the end of the CC's December plenary. He lost his seat at the 
politburo and also at the CC; in Radio Nacional de Angola (9 December 1982), cit. in SWB (13 
December 1982). 
642 From private interview with Raül Araüjo (2nd April 1998). 
643 In ACR, vol. 15 (1984), p. B598. 
644 Almeida was also promoted to the place vacated by N'Vunda as candidate member to the politburo; 
in Radio Nacional de Angola (9 December 1982), cit. in SWB (13 December 1982). 
645 From private interview with Mena Abrantes who worked closely with Roberto de Almeida (12th 
June 1998). 
646 In ACR, 15 (1984), p. B598; also Le Monde (7,11,24 January 1983). According to Pepetela himself, 
in a private interview (7 July 1998), he was not removed from office; he resigned as he had been 
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By the end of December 1982, the purge had brought about the arrest of 32 
members from the DEPI and the department for organisation 647. In February 
1983, having asserted his power and calmed down the Party groups, the 
President reshuffled the ministries and took the opportunity to readmit 18 of the 
32 suspended members, but only those who had proved to have had only minor 
involvement in the case648. Ruth Lara, however, remained suspended from 
office649, a mighty blow for Lücio Lara who, from then on, gradually lost 
importance within the apparatus, being removed from the Politburo at the 
earliest opportunity, namely the following Congress in 1985; and his portfolio 
as secretary for organisation was absorbed into that of the president of the 
party. 650 
10.1.2 The assertion of presidential power over the rightwing 
Demonstrating that the rightwing itself was not to escape the President's power, 
on July 1982, Manuel Pedro Pacavira was dismissed as Party Secretary for 
Production for alleged errors in his previous position as Minister of Agriculture 
(which he had relinquished two years previously -- obviously a pretext 
651) 
Another prominent member of the right, Paiva Domingos da Silva was 
dismissed from his post as leader of the ODP652 and even Agostinho Mendes de 
Carvalho (the main target of Ndunduma's play and the most prominent or 
planning to do for a long time already and that had nothing to do with the picture and the play, but as 
his resignation occurred when it did and as the author was clearly linked to the leftwing, such 
resignation represented another loss for the left. This idea was reinforced a few days later, on 29 
December, when Pepetela publicly criticised the arrest of Costa Andrade during an open debate 
amongst writers from both party wings in the Union of Angolan Writers. At that debate, the leftwing 
were in the minority and went out defeated in the criticism against N'Dunduma's arrest. Abroad, the 
removal of Pepetela was interpreted in exactly the same way, as can be checked in the mentioned 
articles of Le Monde (7,11,24 January 1983) and also in ACR, 15 (1984), p. B598. 
"7 See Le Monde (8,28,31 December 1982). 
648 In Diärio de NotIcias (10th February 1983); also in ARB (February 1983), p. 6739. 
6°9 Ibid. 
650 In ARB (February 1986), p. 7925a, b, c, and p. 7926a; see also ACR, vol. 18 (1987), p. B620. 
651 See ARB (July 1982), p. 6538; also The Guardian (25th July 1982). 
652 Ibid. 
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visible personality of the rightwing) was later dismissed from his post as Health 
Minister and dropped from the Council of Ministers on 3 June 1983 653 
In order to keep the right neutralised and fearful during 1983, the 
presidency promoted and allowed free judiciary investigation of the more 
visible cases of corruption, such as Angonave and Kamanga (launched by the 
leftwing in order to implicate rightwing members). The Monty case was an 
exception, being investigated by a special commission of inquiry nominated by 
the president, which was said to have found nothing, but still resulted in 
Monty's dismissal. Besides this exception and probably for the first time in 
post-independence Angola, investigations on corruption followed a free course 
almost without political interference (the only political intrusion occurred when 
unexpectedly, some clues came to suggest a possible implication of the 
presidency in the Kamanga case, a suggestion that was immediately ruled out 
by the presidency itself654) . Regardless of that `little' 
incident, the investigations 
provided concrete data for the elaboration of judicial processes, which made 
possible for trials to take place and judgement to be passed -- for the first and 
last time in cases of corruption. 
The Angonave case was heard on 17 March 1984, but previous 
investigation revealed, 
[... ] The level of anarchy and disorganisation prevailing in the 
company and it was noted that the crisis was due to large scale 
economic sabotage [the usual term to designate all informal/illegal 
practices] involving almost the entire company management. [... ] 
Who together with their relatives, used to travel abroad and stay in 
luxury hotels. These managers often acquired excess commodities 
and spent unjustified and astronomical sums when working for the 
company. 655 
The People's Revolutionary Tribunal in Luanda judged and condemned in 
absentia the managing director, Carlos Osvaldo dos Santos Rübio, to eight 
653 See ACR, vol. 16 (1985), p. B598. 
654 See `Speech of the President to one of the working commissions on the Party's leading role' in 
Documentos da 1° Conferencia Nacional do MPLA-PT, de 14 a 19 de Janeiro (Luanda: EdigAo do 
Secretariado do Comite Central, 1985), pp. 76-77. 
655 In Radio Nacional de Angola (10th January 1983), cit. in SWB, weekly economic reports (18th 
January 1983). 
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years imprisonment for- misappropriation of funds and several other company 
managers to lighter sentences656 
The Kamanga case (lawsuit 105/83) was heard two months after the 
Angonave hearing, in May 1984, in the midst of great media attention; 124 
defendants were taken to court 657 (a very small number in relation to the size of 
the effective network and did not include the main leaders658). They were 
accused of trafficking in diamonds and of illegal tender (US dollars). Of the 
124 accused, 28 were tried in absentia and 60 were foreign (56 Portuguese)659. 
Several employees of the State Airline TAAC, including 8 pilots, were accused 
of helping to carry smuggled diamonds out of the country. Several senior state 
officials and high-ranking FAPLA officers were involved too660 Two members 
of the Central Committee, Lt. -Col. David Antonio Moises `Ndozi' and 
Celestino Bernardo `Tchizainga' were suspended from their party positions (but 
not accused) following a report to the Party leadership from the Ministry of 
State Security suggesting they were implicated 661. The trial ended on 30 
October with the death sentence for one Angolan defendant of Portuguese 
origin, Francisco Fragata, and 73 jail sentences, ranging from 5 1/2 to 16 
years662. On 5 November, Roberto de Almeida, member of the CC announced 
that circa 500 people had been detained on diamond theft and trafficking 
charges. A series of smaller trials began after the main Luanda trial ended on 30 
October663. 
As the main objective of the president with those investigations (during 
1982/83) was to strengthen his power and to keep the `right' neutralised and 
fearful, rather than fight corruption (whose ramifications were everywhere, 
656 In ACR, 17 (1986), p. 1361 1. 
657 In Expresso (7th July 1984). 
658 From private conversations with a member of the `Kamanga network' who asked me for anonymity. 
Also related to this `Kamanga' process is the episode occurred within the family of Arlindo Barbeitos 
(writer) and reported in Part I as an example of conflict between judicial norms and moral norms. 
659 In Expresso (7th July 1984). 
60 Ibid. 
661 Ibid. 
662 In ACR, Vol. 17 (1986), p. B611. 
663 Ibid. p. B625 footnote 9. 
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including members of the CC and allegedly the presidency), once the power of 
the new president had been made manifest, the sentences (passed in 1984) 
turned into nothing. In the Kamanga process all the defendants appealed right 
after the trial and had their sentences commuted664, and none of them served 
more than 1-'/2 years of their sentences, including Francisco Fragata66s As for 
the Angonave case, excluding Osvaldo Rübio (who simply and strangely 
`eluded local vigilance forces and succeeded in leaving the country before the 
hearing'666), all the other condemned managers appealed and were freed shortly 
afterwards 667 
Later on, in January 1985 during the national conference preparing the 
congress, at a time when the president had already assured his `absolute' 
control over the power apparatus, he made himself quite clear on all the 
`corruption cases' (Monty, Kamanga, Angonave), arguing the existence of a 
`class struggle' (the usual Marxist term used to characterise all the power 
struggles within the MPLA) between two sides with different interests: on the 
one hand the `supposedly great Marxist-Leninists' or Monty's partisans (called 
leftwing in this work); and on the other hand, `other partisans' (non-specified; 
but obviously referring to those here called rightwing). However, distorting the 
facts, the leftwing was blamed for the unsuccessful outcome of judicial 
processes. 
Regarding the case of the former oil minister, Mr. Monty; he [... ] 
made an insulting intervention during the Extraordinary Congress 
[December 1980] Many comrades considered him a great Marxist- 
Leninist. Now they might say that this is no longer the case, but it 
seems to me that at that time, he was considered a great Marxist- 
Leninist. 
It was not easy for me to deal with this matter regarding Monty 
because there were grave accusations of deviations of funds and 
664 Ibid. p. B611. 
663 Whose family I personally know for more than 20 years. 
666 As reported by Radio Nacional de Angola (10th January 1983), cit. in SWB (18th January 1983). 
According to some of my sources (people who worked at that time in Angonave with Rübio and 
nowadays work in Secil Maritima, a company which came to replace several commercial activities 
previously done by Angonave), R6bio was `officially' allowed to leave the country before the trial in 
order to avoid the implication of higher echelons of the party and the government in the scandal; these 
sources asked for anonymity. 
667 From private conversations with people working for Secil Maritima and who worked in Angonave 
by the time of the process; these sources asked for anonymity. 
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commissions. We responded speedily, and once again I resorted to 
the legal services to investigate the matter in order to attribute 
responsibility, because there were reciprocal accusations between a 
member of the Central Committee [Herminio Escörcio] and a 
member of the government [Monty] [... ] Nothing came out of it, 
the legal services were unable to attribute responsibility, because 
[... ] when it comes to class struggle, there are interests and of 
course partisans on either side, and at that time, Monty's partisans 
made sure that the trials did not come up with the desired results, 
the same can probably be said about Angonave, the same could 
probably be said for other situations, for otherwise it would not 
make sense that blows were aimed at me too, as President of the 
Party, as Head of State, so that by using the services of my cabinet, 
we had to make public interventions during trial 105 [Kamanga] in 
order to redress the truth. I believe they wanted to hit me because I 
am Jose Eduardo dos Santos [President of the Party] because if I 
was Jose Eduardo dos Santos, worker in any company, nobody 
would worry about me. 
But it was a hard knock because certain accusations were made 
up: vehicles were illegally appropriated, they tried to implicate me 
in diamond trafficking, and so on. A hearing took place without any 
one from my cabinet or even myself being consulted or heard. It 
was the Procurator General of the Republic [Procurador Geral da 
Republica or Procurador Popular] who at a certain point became 
concerned enough with that hearing at court to inform the President 
of the Party, because at the end of the day that tribunal depends on 
the President of the Republic. This is not normal behaviour in 
capitalist societies, let alone in our own. 
668 
Explanations about `the picture and the play' were given at the CC's report to 
the second congress (December 1985), interpreting that episode within the 
same context as the Angonave and Kamanga cases, namely as a reflection of 
the activities of Monty's partisans or the supposedly great Marxist-Leninists. 
The incident of the picture and the play was mainly directed against 
the institutionalised power of the country and against the President 
and the party leadership; it somehow shook the party unity and 
cohesion and represented a serious violation of democratic 
centralism. When analysing this process, the Central Committee 
realised that there was a coincidence between the positions of the 
authors of the picture and the play and the stances taken by a group 
of party militants during the Party's first Extraordinary Congress 
[Monty's partisans]. These demonstrations expressed the position 
of a minority current within the Party, who must be completely 
eliminated. They were duly attacked and the main people 
responsible duly punished. " 
668, Speech of the President to one of the working commissions ... op. cit. pp. 76-77. 669 In Relatdrio do Comite Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p. 69. 
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As we will see in the next chapters, once the President had ensured his 
domination over the power apparatus (mainly from 1982 onwards), he then had 
more space for manoeuvre and to impose his own policies without constraints: 
on the one hand he gradually deprived the government and Party apparatus 
(where members of both party wings held posts) of effective executive power; 
on the other hand he took to extremes the centralisation of administration and 
concentration of executive and legislative powers in the institution and person 
of the President (as Head of State, Head of government and Commander-in- 
Chief of the armed forces) and in subsidiary organisations, such as the 
secretariat of the Council of Ministers, the cabinet of the President of the 
Republic (with a civil and a military branch) and the cabinet of the Head of 
Government. 
Although the posts and organisations that surrounded the presidency 
were subsidiary and supposed to provide only practical support, their effective 
power was on the increase. These institutions comprised mainly young people, 
namely the post-27 May generation; they were the `Futungo kids', purged and 
rectified by Neto, submissive and subservient to the President to whom they 
owed their social, professional and economic advancement (above referred). 
They held military and technical administrative positions and were regular party 
members. By then, it can be said that the president had fully achieved his first 
major strategic objective (through a process that we will analyse in detail). 
Concluding chapter 10, it must be stressed that in terms of the pursuit of the 
expounded presidential objectives, the administration of Eduardo dos Santos 
during his Marxist phase can be divided into two sub-periods: a first 
transitional period, between 1979-1982, during which the new president had to 
affirm internally his power within renewed conflicts between left and 
rightwing; a second period, from December 1982 onwards, which definitely 
saw the imposition of the President's personal and institutional power over the 
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political system. This - context is necessary for the understanding of the 
remaining chapters. 
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11 - Development of the Political Framework 1979-1985/87 
This chapter aims to analyse the development of political relationships between 
rulers and ruled during dos Santos' administration so as to compare them with 
those prevalent in Neto's presidency. In short, the purpose is to gauge if the 
signs of `insularisation' of the political system that were to be seen by the end 
of Neto's presidency increased and effectively excluded the ruled masses from 
formal political participation. In order to compare the two administrations this 
chapter will follow the same analytical indicators used to analyse Neto's 
presidency. 
11.1 Party: More Rectification and Discrimination 
Due to party discrimination and centralisation (all signs that were clearly to be 
seen during Neto's presidency), the lower levels of the party structure (party 
cells) were increasingly neglected in the distribution of privileges and benefits. 
In the early eighties, those party members who held positions in such marginal 
structures had no special material privileges in relation to other workers who 
were not party members, on the contrary, party work meant an additional 
burden, taking time that could be used in informal activities: 
They were paid the same wages as other workers, they shopped at 
the same shops, and the burden of party work actually meant they 
had less free time, since party cell meetings took place outside 
normal working hours. Party membership did hold the promise of 
reaching higher positions in your profession, but this was not 
guaranteed. 670 
Such type of party membership and party work at the base, became ever less 
attractive and the obvious result was the paralysis of party cells activity (socio- 
economic and socio-political programmes), especially at the provincial level. 
The first official warning regarding this situation came from the CC's report to 
the first extraordinary congress in December 1980, commenting on the 
increased problems of communication between the top and the bases of Party 
organisational structure, inasmuch as the decisions and directives from the 
670 Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, Angola ... op. cit. p. 177. 
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leadership were neither- promptly nor efficiently passed down to the bottom, 
ending up as archive documents with further other use whatsoever. According 
to the report it was necessary to imbue the cells and the methods used with 
more dynamism in order to fulfil the Party's programmes. 671 
Considering the inactivity of the party bases; considering the amorphous 
condition of mass organisations (JMPLA, UNTA, OMA) after the purge; 
considering the need to mobilise the masses towards party programmes 
(security tasks and socio-economic production campaigns); the new President 
therefore exhorted the Congress to reflect on means of ensuring revitalisation 
of the basis, expecting everyone to take part in Party activities, increasing Party 
membership, but without questioning the principles of rectification (i. e. without 
questioning the selective and discriminatory criteria as implemented during the 
Neto's presidency), 
The huge growth of the party must not deceive us, instead we must 
concern ourselves with changing quantity into quality and this 
Congress must take on the responsibility of reflecting on the 
mechanisms that will allow the next stage of normal ingress of 
members through the cells to establish, on the one hand, the 
necessary filter inspired by the principles of rectification and on 
the other hand, to ensure the ideological education and cultural 
improvement of each member, demanding that all should take part 
in party activities. [my bold] 
672 
It was difficult to increase party membership maintaining the same selective 
discriminatory ('elitist') criteria, especially because what was needed were 
mainly members from the provinces to occupy the provincial party base 
structures, where membership had less privileges and people were less educated 
(thus less capable to fulfil such criteria). The Campaign for Party Growth began 
recruiting in 1983 and its stated objectives were to double membership from 
671 In Relatörio do Comite Central ao 1° Congresso Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980, p. 21. 
672 'Opening speech of the President to the Congress' in Relatdrio do Comite Central ao 1° Congresso 
Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980, p. 5. Later on, during the above mentioned CC's plenary of December 
1982, the situation had not improved in anyway and the plenary `studied the reasons for the poor 
functioning of party structures'; in Radio Nacional de Angola (9 December 1982), cit. in SWB (13 
December 1982). 
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30.000 to 60.000.673 However, given these difficulties, the figures quoted two 
years later (by the CC report to the 1985 congress) accounted for just 3.634 
new members, far fewer than the 30.000 hoped for 674 
The alternative found by the party to integrate the masses in its 
programmes was a new mass organisation created in August 1983 through 
which, all Angolan citizens (men or women) were expected to volunteer for 
security and socio-economic development programmes - the BPV (Brigadas 
Populares de Vigiläncia/Popular Vigilance Brigades)675. Without selective 
criteria and pressuring people to volunteer676, the recruitment for BPV 
comprised over 800.000 members677, existing side-by-side with the ODP 
(People's Defence Organisation; with an estimated force of 500,000 men). 678 
Nevertheless, without any palpable benefits and not even being 
considered members of the party, the new BPV members contributed little to 
the revitalisation of the party organisation or its programmes. The functioning 
of the party at the base level got even worse, as can be later understood from 
the President's own words to the first National Party Conference in January 
1985, 
[Party organisation still has] insufficient mechanisms for 
communication and information at various levels, between central 
and peripheral structures, and between these and base organisations 
[... ] it is up to the Party leadership to take the necessary measures 
673 This decision was taken during a CC meeting in June 1982. In his opening speech, Eduardo Santos 
said that `we now feel the need to expand the party by admitting new members who may bring to the 
party new resourcefulness and greater dynamism. '; in Radio Nacional de Angola (29 June 1982), cited 
inACR, 15 (1983), p. B597. 
674 In Relatörio do Comite Central ao If Congresso ... op. cit... 
1985, p. 22-23. 
675 `Considering that the defence of the Angolan revolution [... j demands that all Angolan citizens, from 
Cabinda to Cunene, do their bit towards popular vigilance [... ) the politburo of the MPLA-PT, during 
the meeting on 17 August 1983, approved the basic principles and institutionalised the BPVs as a mass 
organisation that functions under the guidance of the MPLA-PT, integrating Angolan citizens willing to 
undertake work complementary to that of the Defence and Security. ' (in preamble of the Law); BPV's 
tasks ranged from security to ideological education, promotion of public health, cleaning of 
neighbourhoods, promotion of voluntary work for economic and social programmes and any other 
determined by the MPLA-PT (in art. 2 para. a. to g. ) in `Regulations for the BPV's' approved by 
presidential decree no. 47/83, DR, I, 221 (19 September 1983). 
676 From private interviews with Mario Seteco (10 March 1998), also Elias Santos (4 June 1998). 677 In Relatörio do Comite Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p. 64. 678 In Collelo, Thomas, ed., Angola, ... op. cit. p. 92. 
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in order to wrench the base organisations from the pernicious state 
of apathy they have slumped into. 679 
Implicitly confirming that the party selection criteria (initiated by Neto and 
maintained afterwards) were mainly discriminating against the peasantry and 
rural areas, Eduardo dos Santos told the national conference that, 
The Movement of Rectification ended its mandate without fully 
achieving the goals it had set itself for structuring the Party in rural 
areas. The criteria established for the selection of members did not 
allow for recruitment of members in the rural areas. 
680 
Insofar as the above-referred party programmes were especially needed in the 
countryside (rural areas; where guerrillas' activities were spreading681), the 
maintenance of such discriminatory criteria for party membership was perfectly 
counter-productive. Alternative manoeuvres such as the membership in the 
BPV could only fool but the party leadership itself. 
Thus, one year after the First National Conference and two and a half 
years after the party membership and BPVs campaigns, the CC report to the 
Second Congress (December 1985) again mentioned: on the one hand, the 
`noticeable deficiencies in passing information to the bases, regarding decisions 
and guidelines from the top and the lack of a corps of activists to maintain 
regular contact with base organisations'682; on the other hand, the `slowness in 
the constitution of party structures in rural areas. [Acknowledging that] 
established criteria for membership selection in the countryside has made this 
process more difficult'683 
In fact, the analysis of the socio-professional background of the 
delegates to the second Congress showed that, in terms of integrating the 
679 `Opening speech of the President of the Republic to the Ist National Conference' in Documentos da 
1' Conferencia Nacional do MPLA-PT de 14 a 19 de Janeiro (Luanda: Edicäo do Secretariado do 
Comite Central, 1985), p. 14. 
680 Ibid. pp. 13-16. 
681 Ibid. p. 16. 
682 In Relatörio do Comite Central ao Il° Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p. 20. The same deficiencies 
in 
party functioning had also been previously referred in Documentos da 1° Conferencia Nacional do 
MPLA-PT (Luanda: Edicäo do Secretariado do Comite Central, January 1985), p. 59 
683 In Relatörio do Comite Central ao II° Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p. 19, see also p. 16; the same deficiency had also been previously referred in Documentos da ' Conferencia Nacional ... op. 
cit... 1985, p. 61. 
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masses in general and the peasantry in particular684, there had been no actual 
progress: out of the 628 delegates, only 12 were peasants whereas 
administrative office-workers numbered 269 (most of them civil servants)685 
The absurdity of keeping such selective criteria went so far as to exclude from 
party membership several MPLA guerrillas from the period of the anti-colonial 
struggle (illiterate and of peasant origin), something that was recognised by the 
First National Conference686 and also by the II Congress687. 
It is worth reminding ourselves that the adoption of these criteria was the 
result of a party policy of rectification seeking to assert internal security and 
ideological discipline after the attempted coup. Rectification restricted the party 
to a limited number of members and the selection criteria ended up favouring 
the urban and literate against the rural and illiterate. However, this can not be 
seen as a deliberate decision to exclude peasants and ex-guerrillas of peasant 
origin, but as an indirect consequence of the existing criteria. It should also be 
remembered that despite criticism produced by the congress documents (within 
the critica and auto-critica mechanisms, including criticism expressed at 
provincial level) those selective criteria were to remain until late eighties, when 
the transition to multipartyism began. 
In sum, by 1985 the party had reinforced its `elitist', selective, 
discriminatory and restrictive character as implicitly recognised by the 
President, 
684 These terms ('masses' and `peasantry') are the same ones used in the CC report; in Relatörio do 
Comite Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. cit... 
1985, p. 19. 
685 Attempting to increase the number of peasants in the social make-up of the whole Party, the CC 
report, in an administrative legerdemain, started to include in the term `peasantry' a large number of 
those who had previously been referred to as `agricultural workers and others' (most of them working 
in State co-operatives which survived mainly through subsidies as we saw), thus stretching the 
percentage of peasants from 1.9% in the 1980 report to 23% in the 1985 report, and shrinking the 
numbers of agricultural workers from 23.2% in 1980 to 8.6% in 1985. According to the 1985 report, 
the social make-up of the Party comprised peasants, 23%; industrial workers, 26.4%; agricultural 
workers, 8.6%; intellectuals and technicians, 6%; employees, 12.9%; managers, 21.9%; others, 1.2%. 
This administrative `coup' was unmasked when it was discovered that out of the 628 delegates to the 
Congress, only 12 were peasants and more incredible was the number of administrative office-workers 
(269) among the 628 delegates to the congress. See Relatörio do Cornite Central ao /1° Congresso 
... op. cit... 1985, pp. 22-23; compare with previously given figures of Relatörio do Comite Central ao 
/° 
Congresso Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980; see also Somerville, Keith, Angola ... op. cit. p. 
105. 
696 In Documentos da I" Conferencia Nacional ... op. cit... 1985, p. 61. 
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In organisational terms, the main problem remains the small 
number of party members when compared with the size of the 
whole population of the country. Consequently, the party can not 
physically exist in vital and priority sectors of the nation's life. 
Another problem is the number of bureaucratic workers within the 
party, too high when compared with the total number of party 
members, thus favouring bureaucratic work instead of political 
activity. 688 
11.2 Executive, Legislative and Administrative Powers: extreme reinforcement 
of centralisation and concentration in the presidency 
When taking over the presidency, Eduardo dos Santos resumed the 
development of his predecessor's policy of centralisation of administration and 
concentration of power within the institution and person of the President. 
However, he took these to extremes, especially after reasserting his power 
internally. 
The extreme levels of this process were achieved through the construction 
of a complex institutional web. Although intricate, such web is extremely 
important to the understanding of the socio-political system. It is one of the 
main distinctive features of the Angolan case, which is not merely another 
example of ordinary presidentialism in Africa, where the ruler reaches a point 
where he simply ignores all institutional procedures and starts governing the 
whole system through a myriad of presidential decrees689. At the highest level 
of State organs every power relationship or political procedure (even the most 
`obscure') is supported by legislation (which is not the case at lower levels of 
administration, as we have seen above). As previously explained, this was due 
not only to a Portuguese colonial bureaucratic tradition but also to the necessity 
of establishing and clarifying a complex power structure to balance and manage 
687 In Relatdrio do Comite Central ao ! 1° Congresso ... op. cit... 
1985, p. 16 
688 'Opening speech of the President to the Ist National Conference' ... op. cit. pp. 16-17 699 For a characterisation of cases where centralisation of power reaches the level of `presidential 
decree' type of government see, Jackson, Robert & Rosberg, Carl, Personal Rule ... op. cit. 
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a multiplicity of interests within the MPLA itself (an issue to which I will 
return in sub-chapter 13.1.2). 
During the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos' presidency, we can 
identify three main political steps towards the construction of such extremely 
centralised and concentrated power web. 
11.2.1 The institution of new organs for poder popular' 
The first step took place during the very first months of the new president's 
mandate, at the CC meeting on 10 December 1979 (three months after Neto's 
death). It consisted in the adoption of a measure that had been planned by Neto 
before he died and left almost as his last testament-, concerning the institution 
of new organs for poder popular, especially the People's Assembly that was to 
replace the Council of the Revolution as the supreme legislative organ 690. By 
then, after the whole purge and rectification process, the President probably felt 
that the party was organisationally stable enough to allow the process of poder 
popular to take place. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the previous experience of 
the organisation controlled by Nito Alves691, the new electoral legislation 
established the method of indirect elections that were restricted and controlled 
at all levels by the Party central structures. 692 
690 On the eve of Neto's last trip to Moscow he told Lara and other colleagues at the Politburo about 
his will to implement the new organs of poder popular and especially the people's Assembly during the 
following year (1980); from private interview with Lücio Lara (1 May 1998). 
691 See A CR, 13 (1982), pp. B646-B647. The earlier process of instituting poder popular was begun by 
Nito Alves in June 1976 during his strategy for taking over power; it started with the election of 
neighbourhood committees, but was soon after suspended by the Central Committee on October 1976, 
as discussed earlier. 
692 Certain directives were put together for the Party's provincial sections, containing methods for 
selecting delegates for the electoral conferences and candidates for deputies, and for the preparation 
and running of the electoral conferences in each province. Thus, the delegates for the provincial 
electoral conferences were elected, from 23 August 1980 onwards, by a show of hands, into State and 
co-operative economic units, military units and other institutions chosen by the Party's provincial 
committees and commissions (6,750 delegates were chosen in this manner); these delegates elected the 
provincial assemblies, on 12 October 1980, and their members in turn elected the deputies to the 
People's Assembly. At all stages and levels, this process was supervised by the National Commission 
for the Institution of Poder Popular, which was responsible for presenting the candidates previously 
selected by the Party and by its mass organisations. In this manner, 203 deputies were elected to the 
People's Assembly (58 workers, 48 `peasants' [i. e. workers of State co-operatives], 7 intellectuals, 6 
civil servants, 20 members of the defence and security forces and 64 political and administrative 
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The institutionalisation of new organisations forced the CC to amend the 
Constitution, during the meeting on 11 August 1980, by changing the articles 
referring to the organisation of the State (its institutions, principles, organs and 
attributes). 693 By analysing these amendments it can be seen that, although it 
might appear as a means of formalising the separation of powers (i. e. potential 
decentralisation and de-concentration)694, it was in fact much more of a 
reinforcement of the earlier process of administrative centralisation and power 
concentration, both in terms of the relationship between the presidency (central 
power) and local power, and in terms of the relationship between the presidency 
and other organs of central power: 
a) In terms of the relationship between central and local power, the 
amendments to the constitution, on the one hand defined the new organisations 
of poder popular as sovereign organisations of State power at each level of the 
political and administrative hierarchy of the State, i. e. People's Assembly at the 
national level and Popular Assemblies at the levels of province, municipality, 
commune and village (art. 33); relying on the initiative and participation of the 
people in collaboration with social and mass organisations (art. 32)695. However, 
on the other hand, it also gave the President and the Council of Ministers new 
powers to control and revoke all executive or legislative acts of the new 
organisations of poder popular. 
Regarding the President of the Republic, he was now able to revoke all 
decisions of the provincial commissioners that went against the general 
interests of the country (art. 53, pars j). It was effectively left to the President to 
decide what did in fact constitute the `general interests of the country' at any 
leaders). In Relatörio do Comite Central ao 1° Congresso Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980, p. 44. See 
also ACR, 13 (1982), p. B647; also ARB (August 1980), p. 5772-b 
693 Amendment to Constitutional law, DR, 1,225 (23 September 1980). 
694 Although such change had nothing of democratic (as will be seen), according to some foreign 
reports the constitutional amendments were meant `to introduce democratic institutions at all levels'; 
see ARB (September 1980), pp. 5799 b-c, 5800-a. 
695 Amendment to Constitutional law, DR, I, 225 (23 September 1980). 
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given point in time. In -other words, the President was allowed to revoke any 
decision made by the provincial commissioners. 696 
Regarding the Council of Ministers (led by its permanent commission or, 
to be more precise by the head of government, in fact the President -- as 
discussed during the analysis of Neto's administration) it was now able to 
propose to the People's Assembly the revocation of the deliberations of the 
local popular Assemblies (provincial, municipal or communal) that went 
against the general interests of the country or other administrative and political 
areas (art. 58, para. k). Again, it was up to the Council of Ministers and its 
president to assess the general interests of the country and of any other political 
and administrative areas. This meant in fact that all decisions by all local 
Popular Assemblies could be revoked as well. 697 
Thus, the institutionalisation of new organisations of poder popular and 
the accompanying constitutional changes meant that, in terms of the 
relationship between central and local power, the process of administrative 
centralisation and concentration of power in the presidency and the Council of 
Ministers was greatly reinforced, as can be clearly and simply observed in the 
State organisations' chart (see figure 11.2.1.1). 
696 Besides those powers, the President's constitutional rights in relation to local power were 
substantially increased well beyond appointing or removing from office provincial commissioners; he 
was now able to appoint or remove from office all assistants to those posts (art. 53, para. d); all 
provincial commissioners were from then on considered as representatives of the President and his 
government (art. 70; previously they only represented the government); in Amendment to Constitutional 
Law, DR, 1,225 (23 September 1980). 
697 The Council of Ministers would direct the whole administrative activity of the State's local 
organisations (art. 58, para. i); would also be able to revoke all the decisions made by any local 
government members who violated constitutional law or contradicted any other law and legal 
disposition, the resolutions made by the People's Assembly or the Council of Ministers (art. 58, para. j); 











































b) In terms of the relationship between the presidency and other organs 
of central power, there was a generalised increase of the President's attributes, 
both with regards to other holders of public office in the central apparatus, and 
with regards to the National People's Assembly, the government and the Party 
itself. 
With regards to other holders of public offices in the central apparatus, the 
new constitutional text granted the President, besides the extension of 
nomination and demotion powers, 698 the power effectively to revoke all and any 
decisions made by any member of the central government. 699 
With regards to the People's Assembly (the legislative organisation par 
excellence), the new constitutional text considered it the supreme organisation 
of State power expressing the sovereign will of the people (art. 37), and granted 
it (at least in theory) wider competence as befitting a legislative chamber such 
as changing the constitutional law (art. 38 para. a. ), controlling government 
decisions (art. 38 para. g. ), revoking and modifying the legislation of the CM- 
Council of Ministers contrary to the legislation approved by the Assembly 
(art. 38 para. j. ). 70° Nevertheless, the new constitutional text also implicitly 
revealed that those powers were to be more formal than effective, by 
establishing the PR-President of the Republic as the President of the People's 
Assembly (art. 41), and giving him enormous powers over that supposedly 
sovereign organisation. The assembly was to be convened by its President only 
twice a year in ordinary sessions (art. 42) and between those sessions the 
functioning of the Assembly was assumed by a permanent commission (art. 49) 
to be convened and presided by the PR and essentially composed of the 
698 It extended the nomination and demotion powers of the President now to include all judges from the 
Supreme Court, the Procurator and the Vice-Procurator General of the Republic, the Governor of the 
Central Bank, university Rectors and Vice-Rectors (art. 53, para. d); in Amendment to Constitutional 
Law, DR, I, 225 (23 September 1980). 
699 It granted the President the power to revoke any and all decisions made by members of central 
government who violated constitutional law, other laws and legal dispositions, or contrary to the 
general interests of the country (art. 53, para. j); it was up to the President, or the organisations he 
controlled, to define at any point in time what constituted the best interests of the country, which 
enabled him in fact to revoke all and any decisions made by members of central government; in 
Amendment to Constitutional Law, DR, I, 225 (23 September 1980). 
700 In Amendment to Constitutional Law, DR, I, 225 (23 September 1980). 
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MPLA's politburo (art.. -50). Although the permanent commission could not 
actually alter the constitution on its own (art. 49) it was granted privileged 
legislative initiative for changing the constitution 701. In practice, the People's 
Assembly became reduced to a chamber for the ratification of its permanent 
commission's decisions and initiatives, completely dominated by the President 
and the members of the Politburo702. 
With regards the government (an essentially executive organisation, 
though with some legislative competencies) there ensued an intensification of 
the practice that had been initiated by Agostinho Neto, whereby the President 
(besides the power directly assumed) indirectly absorbed executive 
governmental powers through smaller organisations such as the CM's 
permanent commission and the CM's secretariat and specialised commissions. 
Therefore, more powers were conceded to these organisations (and thus, 
indirectly, to the President). Whereas the CM had previously been considered 
the government's executive organ, the new constitutional text considered it the 
effective government of the People's Republic of Angola, and therefore, the 
supreme organisation of State administration (art. 56)703. In the same way, 
according to the new internal regulations of the Council of Ministers704, its 
specialised commissions (the inter-ministerial planning commission, the 
commission for socio-political affairs, the commission for socio-economic 
affairs) played an increasingly legislative and executive role. Their original 
functions (such as analysis and discussion of proposed laws and supervision of 
the execution of legislation approved by the CM705) were now duplicated and 
701 Ordinary legislative initiative to change the constitution was shared by several organisations, namely 
the Central Committee, the Permanent Commission of the People's Assembly; other deputies and 
commissions of the People's Assembly, the Council of Ministers and UNTA's Central Council (art. 
45); in Amendment to Constitutional Law, DR, I, 225 (23 September 1980). 
702 On 13 November 1980, two days after its first session, the Assembly elected its permanent 
commission comprising 25 members: the President, 13 members of the Politburo, all of them deputies, 
and a further 11 members proposed by the Central Committee accomplishing with the determinations of 
art. 50 of the Amendment to Constitutional Law, DR, 1,225 (23 September 1980). 
703 In Amendment to Constitutional Law, DR, I, 225 (23 September 1980). 
704 The Council of Ministers' new internal regulations were approved in July, two months before the 
constitutional amendment; in decree 87/80, DR, I, 172 (22 July 1980). 
705 In `Regulations of the Council of Ministers' Commission for Socio-Political Affairs', art. 4 of decree 
39/80 of the Council of Ministers, DR, I, 110 (10 May 1980). 
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were superimposed not only on the functions of the various working 
commissions of the People's Assembly, (such as discussing, studying and 
preparing legislation for approval), 706 but also on the functions of specialised 
departments of the Central Committee (such as studying and preparing 
orientations and directives to be adopted and applied to the State organs)707. In 
comparison to the specialised departments of the CC and the working 
commissions of the People's Assembly, the CM's specialised commissions 
were more restricted and more directly open to manipulation by the presidency 
(apart from the planning commission which was personally co-ordinated by the 
President himself, the other two commissions were co-ordinated by one 
minister each, chosen from the CM's permanent commission nominated for this 
purpose by the President708). 
As the range of executive and legislative tasks for the permanent 
commission of the Council of Ministers became broader, the role of its 
secretariat increased. 709 Consequently, the Secretary (nominated by the 
President of the Republic70) in charge of the secretariat also played an 
increasingly important governmental role in supporting the executive and 
legislative tasks of the head of government, not only by running the secretariat, 
but also by co-ordinating the secretariats of the Council of Ministers specialised 
commissions for socio-political and socio-economic affairs. '71 1 
706 In art. 3 and art. 24 n°2 of Decree 87/80, DR, I, 172 (22 July 1980), approves the Council of 
Ministers' Internal Regulations. The coinciding competence of the working commissions of the 
People's Assembly can be found in art. 4 of the People's Assembly regulations, DR, I, 89 (16 April 
1981). 
707 In art. 2 and art. 24, n°I para. a, b, c, of Decree 87/80, DR, I, 172 (22 July 1980), approves the 
Council of Ministers' Internal Regulations. The coinciding competence of the specialized departments 
of the Central Committee can be found in Regulamento do Comite Central do MPLA-PT (Luanda: 
Secretariado do Comite Central, 1987), especially art. 53, para. b), c), and art. 54., para. 1-d) and 2. 
708 In art. 26, Decree 87/80, DR, I, 172 (22 July 1980); see also art. 24 to 28 of this same decree. 
709 According to the new statute, it was now, inter alia, in charge of the resolution of current problems 
(art. 3) and in control of the preparation and execution of the deliberations made by the Council of 
Ministers and by its permanent commission, along with the decisions made by the head of government 
(art. 3, para. l); in Decree 25-B/80, DR, I, 78, addendum (2 April 1980); this approves the organisational 
statutes of the Council of Ministers' secretariat. 
710 Art. 5, Decree 25-B/80, DR, I, 78, addendum (2 April 1980). 
711 In art. 6, para. g., Decree 25-B/80, DR, 1,78, addendum (2 April 1980). 
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Thus, indirectly, via the Council of Ministers (in general), via the CM's 
permanent commission, the CM's specialised commissions, secretariat and 
Secretary (in particular), the President of the Republic broadened, deepened 
and reinforced his executive and legislative powers in relation to the 
government. 
Finally, with regards to the Party (but also the government itself), the 
President of the Republic began to isolate certain areas of government that were 
previously under strict Party control, namely foreign economic affairs; to this 
effect, a new subsidiary organisation - the President of the Republic's Cabinet 
- was created on 1 April 1980, directly dependent on the President, and that 
was to support him in the exercise of his functions as Head of State. 712 
According to its statutes, the new organisation was divided into various 
secretariats with their own secretaries according to different areas of activity: 
socio-economic, juridical, defence and security, information, foreign affairs and 
others (art. 2); apart from its more mundane functions - collecting and co- 
ordinating matters for study and information, elaboration of reports and 
enquiries, giving public information and advice - it was expected to 
'establish, maintain and develop contacts with public or private foreign 
entities when asked to do so by the President of the Republic' (art. 1). 713 
The President's intention to dominate, isolate and make autonomous the 
State's business affairs with private and public entities abroad was beginning to 
become clear. The purpose was to escape any possible interference, 
surveillance and control, not only by the People's Assembly (its permanent and 
working commissions), 714 but especially by the Party's top organs, mainly the 
712 Implicitly confirming the increasing institutional and administrative duties of the President of the 
Republic, the presidential decree which created the President of the Republic's Cabinet justified itself 
with the following statement: `the complexity and the exercise of the Head of State's duties, either 
politically or administratively, demand the creation of structures around the President of the Republic 
able to adapt to the needs for effective response in all domains of presidential activity. ' Presidential 
decree 25-A/80, DR, I, 72 (1 April 1980). 
713 Presidential decree 25-A/80, DR, I, 72 (1 April 1980). 
714 According to its amendment of 23 September 1980, article 38 of constitutional law expected the 
People's Assembly to `g) exercise the highest control over the activities of the government and other 
State organisations [... ] q) to deliberate over other fundamental questions of internal and external State 
politics. '; See Constitutional Amendment, DR, I, 225 (23 September 1980) 
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Central Committee, which had specialised and influential departments in 
external affairs with private or public entities, thus controlling the income from 
oil -- a percentage of which devolved directly to the Party, as established during 
Neto's presidency. 715 
By then, despite the already high level of administrative centralisation and 
concentration of power, there was still a certain amount of permeability and 
informal control between various organisations at the top of the central political 
administration (the politburo, the CC, the Council of Ministers, the government 
and the People's Assembly's permanent and working commissions), especially 
because these organs included several members of the right and leftwing 
seeking to leak information against each other as part of their political struggle. 
The President therefore felt it was necessary to create a new body under his 
exclusive control, run by younger cadres and impervious to those State and 
Party organs, allowing him to have autonomous control over external sources of 
income - the main means of political power in a patrimonial system like the 
Angolan. 
However, as already mentioned, at the time of the creation of the new 
cabinet (April 1980) the president was still trying to assert his personal power 
and the cabinet did not achieve immediate results. During the Monty case 
(September 1981), some information on the oil business was disclosed and used 
as a political weapon between left and rightwing. Nevertheless, the President 
was able to nominate the investigation commission and avoid an effective trial 
where a lot more information could have been disclosed 
It was only when the President managed to consolidate his hold (December 
1982 onwards) that there could emerge secret, direct negotiations and 
autonomous agreements between the presidency (i. e. the President and a very 
restricted group of his trusted collaborators) and various public and private 
715 The percentage was established according to the price of each oil-barrel and calculated according to 
the number of barrels produced yearly; from private interview with Mendes de Carvalho (17 July 
1998). 
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foreign entities - which only came to light recently, but have their origins in 
early eighties76 
11.2.2 The Regional Military Councils and the Council for Defence and 
Security 
The second main step towards reinforcing the process of administrative 
centralisation and concentration of power started with the previously mentioned 
eleventh ordinary plenary session of the CC, from 30 November to 8 December 
1982, which unanimously decided to grant the President special emergency 
powers"7. 
Above and beyond allowing the President to discipline the left and right 
wings, the new emergency powers turned into a veritable political and 
administrative revolution, taking the earlier processes of power concentration 
and administrative centralisation to extremes, as became apparent at the level of 
the relationships between: a) the President (central power) and local power; b) 
the President and other organs of central power. 
a) Regarding the relationship between central and local power, the aim 
of the President's new powers and his emergency plan was only established at a 
later date (July 1983) through Law 5/83 approved by the permanent 
716 These activities are only now being uncovered by media outrage, with cases such as the `Mitterand, 
Falcone and Gaidamak scandal' and the `Global Witness Report', but their origin lies in a complex 
institutional web gradually put together by Eduardo dos Santos, since the beginning of his presidency. 
These cases are only mentioned here as a concrete example of how these activities evolved, but its 
deeper analysis is not here included for being out of this work's time frame. For an in-depth approach 
on the scandals of gun-running, diamond trafficking and money-laundering that recently involved Jean- 
Christophe Mitterrand (son of Francois Mitterrand), Jacques Attali (former president of BERD, Bank 
Europeenne pour la Reconstruction et le Developpement), Pierre Falcone (arms dealer and main 
supplier of arms to Luanda) and Arkadi Gaidamak (arms and diamonds merchant, holder of the former 
Angolan debt to the USSR), with multiple ramifications (including Sonangol), see 0 Independente (23 
July 1999); also Publico (5 and 6 December 1999), (14 January 2000), (11 April 2000), (30 July 2000), 
(9 December 2000), (23 December 2000); also Expresso (16 December 2000), (8 September 2001); 
also the reports by Global Witness that names several members of the presidential clique involved in 
networks of arms dealing, missing accounts from oil income to the State and so on: `A Crude 
Awakening: the role of the oil and banking industries in Angola's civil war and the plunder of the state 
assets', a report by Global Witness, December 1999; also `All the Presidents' men', a report by Global 
Witness, March 2002: also `A Rough Trade: the role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan 
Conflict', a report by Global Witness, December 1998 Editions at [www. oneworld. org/globalwitness/]. 
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commission of the People's Assembly. In the face of a worsening political and 
military situation, a new national political, military and administrative structure 
was created -- the CMRs (Conselhos Militares RegionaislRegional Military 
Councils). 718 The CMRs took over the political, military, economic and social 
leadership of their various areas of jurisdiction (art. 1) and, within the exercise 
of their duties, they could `impose restrictions on the freedom of movement of 
people and goods, as well as requisition of people and goods' (art. 3). They were 
directly answerable to the President of the Republic in his role as Commander- 
in-Chief of the armed forces (art. 2). The President had the power to nominate 
the CMRs' authorities (art. 2); determine the areas of national territory that the 
councils were to target (art. 5); `approve the defining norms for the 
composition, organisation and competence of CMRs and any other norms 
demanded by the political and military situation or by the effective application 
of this current law' (art. 5)719. In short, the CMRs could be and do anything that 
the President wanted them to be or do. 
Under the cover of the worsening military and economic situation, and in 
the face of intensified internal political conflicts, the President became almost 
plenipotentiary with his new emergency powers, which enabled him to make 
drastic changes to the structure of military, political and economic 
administration (see figures 11.2.2.1 and 11.2.2.2)720. 
717 See ARB (December 1982), p. 6678, b; also Radio Nacional de Angola (9 December 1982), cit. in 
SWB (13 December 1982); also ACR, vol. 15 (1984), p. B598. 
718 Law 5/83, DR, 1,179 (30 July 1983). 
719 Ibid. 
720 As can be seen from the above mentioned figures, the jurisdiction areas of the CMRs did not 
coincide with the existing political and administrative division, clearly representing an alteration of 
such division. 
Figure 11.2.2.1: Military regions and principal bases, 1987 
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Figure 11.2.2.2: Administrative divisions of Angola, 1988 
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Therefore, the new administrative and political system became increasingly 
militarised taking to an extreme the previously discussed interpenetration of the 
military, state and government structures. The overwhelming majority of the 
CMRs were led by FAPLA's Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels holding 
concurrent positions at the top of the party apparatus (usually at the CC)721. 
Their authority in their respective regions superseded that of the supposedly 
sovereign organisations of poder popular (the Provincial Commissariat, the 
Provincial Commissioner and all the local People's Assemblies), reporting 
directly to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (the President), the 
highest authority of the CMRS722. 
Thus, through the CMRs, the President reinforced his legislative and 
executive powers over the whole territory, above and beyond any other State 
organs. 
b) Regarding the relationship between the President and other 
organisations, the new emergency powers meant the immediate demotion of the 
People's Assembly (supposedly the supreme organisation of State power). The 
same CC meeting that gave emergency powers to the President deferred the 
ordinary session of the People's Assembly (due 14-17 December 1982), until 
such a time as the emergency plans for the State's safety, defence, economy and 
apparatus had been implemented 723. New elections to organs of poder popular 
(due in 1983) were cancelled and at its sixth ordinary session, held from 22-24 
February 1983, the People's Assembly voted to extend its term of office as well 
as that of Local People's Assemblies until 1986 724. 
As for the remaining organs of central power and the structure of the 
central apparatus in general, the aim of the President's new powers and of the 
721 See ACR, vol. 16 (1985), p. B602; also ACR, vol. 17 (1986), p. B610; see also Collelo, Thomas, ed., 
Angola, 
... op. cit. p. 170, pp. 212-213.. 722 See Law art. 2. of Law5/83, DR, I, 179 (30 July 1983); see also Collelo, Thomas, ed., Angola, ... 
op. cit. p. 170. 
723 In ACR, vol. 15 (1984), p. B598; also Radio Nacional de Angola (9 December 1982), cit. in SWB (13 
December 1982). 
724 In Angop/Angolan News Agency, (21 March 1983), cit. in ACR, vol. 16 (1985), p. B602. 
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emergency plans were established in January 1984, with the passing of Law 
3/84 by the permanent commission of the People's Assembly, whereby the CDS 
(Conselho de Defesa e Seguranca/Council for Defence and Security)725 was 
created. It was `a collegial organisation (örgäo colegial) of reduced 
membership for the management of affairs of State and for directing the war, a 
body to assist the Head of State and the Commander-in-Chief of the FAPLA in 
the exercise of the special powers granted to him by the Central Committee. '726 
The CDS fulfilled the need for an operational, dynamic and even more 
restricted organisation, having complete freedom to direct the new CMRs' 
administrative structure, forming a sort of crisis government with almost 
unlimited powers and competence: 
1) It assumed the duties of the Council of Ministers between sessions 
(art. 1), thereby replacing the Council of Ministers' permanent commission 
whose internal regulations were expressly revoked by this law; 727 it held weekly 
sessions on defence and security matters, and twice-weekly sessions on all 
other issues; 728 
2) It was chaired by the President of the Republic and comprised the 
minister of Defence, the minister of Internal Affairs, the minister of Planning, 
the minister of Provincial Co-ordination, the vice-minister of Defence/General 
head of Staff of FAPLA (art. 2)729 and the CC's secretary for ideology as a non- 
permanent member (still following the `old' tradition of politicisation of the 
military or the militarisation of politics; by now there was no distinction 
between the two)730; 
725 Law 3/84, by the Permanent Commission of the People's Assembly, creating the CDS, DR, I, 22 (26 
January 1984). 
726 In Relatörio do Comite Central ao 110 Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p. 54. 727 Decree 87/80, regulations of the Council of Ministers was expressly revoked by art. 8 of law 3/84, 
DR, I, 22 (26 January 1984). 
728 Art. 5, no. l of decree 6/84, DR, I, 79 (3 April 1984), approves the regulations of the Council for 
Defence and Security. 
729 Law 3/84, by the Permanent Commission of the People's Assembly, creating the CDS, DR, I, 22 (26 
January 1984). 
730 In art. 2, no. 3, of decree 6/84, DR, I, 79 (3 April 1984). 
293 
3) It was structured into three working commissions: defence and 
security; propaganda and counter-propaganda; planning, finances and foreign 
trade, banking and international co-operation . 
73 1 These commissions took on 
important executive duties, superseding the Council of Ministers' specialised 
commissions, the People's Assembly's working commissions and the 
specialised departments of the Central Committee (which had already lost much 
of their powers to the Council of Ministers' specialised commissions, as 
previously discussed); 732 
4) It assumed direct authority over the CMRs; 733 
5) It was given far-reaching and almost unlimited martial law powers 
such as: directing military action; mobilising the country's human and material 
resources according to the needs of national defence, security and economy; co- 
ordinating actions connected with the organisation and cohesion of defence and 
security forces; co-ordinating the management of the economy and socio- 
economic development; co-ordinating, directing and controlling the activities of 
ministers, State secretariats and local administration organisations; taking 
measures to improve the administration of the State; and controlling all 
financial dealings with the outside 734; i. e., confirming that external 
relationships and financial dealings with the exterior (effectively made through 
the president's cabinet as explained) would from then on be controlled 
exclusively by the President himself through the CDS. 
In sum, there was now a new structure for political, economic and 
military administration (the CMRs) and a new, all-powerful executive (the 
731 Art. 4 of decree 6/84, DR, I, 79 (3 April 1984). 
732 These CDS commissions were given an important executive power, fulfilling all the duties 
incumbent to the CDS; they controlled the execution of duties entrusted to central administration within 
their areas of speciality; they pointed out to the CDS the necessary means for bringing about the 
fulfilment of their duties; see art. 17 of Decree 6/84, DR, 1,79 (3 April 1984). 
733 The CMRs stopped being subordinated to the President to become subordinate to the CDS (itself 
completely dominated by the President), though it was still the President's personnal prerogative to 
nominate CMRs members (art. 6 of law 3/84). In this sense, art. 8 of law 3/84 explicitly revoked art. 2 of 
law 5/83 which subordinated the CMRs directly to the President; See Law 3/84 creating the CDS, DR, 
I, 22, (26 January 1984); also Law 5/83, creating the CMRs, DR, I, 179 (30 July 1983). 
734 Art. 4 of law 3/84, in DR, I, 22 (26 January 1984). 
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CDS) under the President's total domination in his capacity of Commander-in- 
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The regime had gone as far as it possibly could in the interpenetration of the 
military and political spheres; run by President Eduardo dos Santos, exerting in 
full his functions as Head of State, Head of Government and above all 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, as if he had become some kind of 
generalissimo at the apex of the CMRs and CDS structure. The increasing 
military role of the president was later to be given formal recognition when the 
president resolved to create in the armed forces the rank of Official General, 
which he attributed to himself exclusively (all other promotions were to lower 
ranks such as Major-General, Colonel-General, Lieutenant-General)735. 
By then, the president had complete control over the armed forces and the 
top State and Party organs, having promoted younger officials and cadres 
(whose positions had been reinforced since the first extraordinary congress in 
December 1980736) not only at the FAPLA's level, but also at the top of the 
government and party as was the case for the Lt-Colonel Manuel Alexandre 
Rodrigues `Kito' (Minister of Interior since 1980) and Lt-Colonel Pedro de 
Castro Van-Dunem `Loy' (Minister of Energy since 1980 and also of Oil in 
1981) -- both were promoted to the Politburo during the second congress 
(December 1985)737. Such promotions occurred in parallel to the demotion of 
party veterans such as Lücio Lara and Ludy Kissassunda, along with Henrique 
de Carvalho dos Santos `Onambwe', Major Evaristo Domingos `Kimba', Paulo 
Jorge and even Iko Carreira the head of the Air Force and once Minister of 
Defence and General Commander of FAPLA. Lara, Onambwe and Kimba 
735 The resolution 14/86 by the Permanent Commission of the People's Assembly, DR, I, 98 (8 
December 1986), created the rank of Official-General within the FAPLA, and resolution 13/86, by the 
same commission, DR, I, 101 (20 December 1986), attributed the rank of Army General to the 
Commander-in-Chief of the FAPLA, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, also promoting several other officers 
and party members but to lower ranks in relation to the President. 
736 From report of Jean-Claude Pomonti in Le Monde (29 January 1981), cf. supra sub-chapter 6.1.3. 
737 See ACR, vol. 18 (1987), pp. B619-B. 620. Although these two young cadres were not exactly from 
the post-27 May purged generation as the majority of those who were promoted within FAPLA and 
State administration, they were quite young (the same age of the president) and with a similar position 
in terms of distancing from the 'old' left and rightwing disputes. Loy was a close friend and former 
colleague of president dos Santos from Baku University, with exactly the same age of the president. For 
a small biography of `Loy', born in Catete (died in September 1997 from disease) see Carvalho, 
Mendes de, Cultos Especiais (Luanda: Edicäo do Autor, 1997), pp. 9-14. 
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retained their CC seats, -but Kissassunda was dropped even from the CC; Paulo 
Jorge and Iko slipped to the rank of alternates at the CC 738. 
The case of Iko Carreira is paradigmatic of the president's strategy to 
demote veterans and promote younger cadres. Iko had been member of the 
politburo, Head of FAPLA and minister of defence since independence but he 
was clearly identified with the leftwing. He was especially targeted by the 
rightwing members who had always nurtured a peculiar hate towards him for 
his proximity to and strong friendship with Neto and most of all for being 
extremely light skinned (almost white) holding such prime position in the 
armed forces739. A lot of veiled criticism circulated within the top party and 
State ranks on Iko's military preparation (he had no advanced military training 
to justify such office)740. Although Neto never cared about that and had always 
supported his friend and minister (as was obvious during the Nitistas attacks), 
as soon as Eduardo dos Santos assumed the presidency, such criticism and 
pressures grew and in December 1979, Iko opted to go to a military academy in 
the USSR741. From there he was supposed to return as an academically 
legitimated General Commander of the armed forces. Iko effectively returned 
two years later, in 1982, with all the required preparation (the highest in Angola 
at that time), however, he suffered from the infighting between left and right 
(being a close friend of N'Dunduma) and never again recovered his previous 
place in the army or at the Politburo, being nominated Head of the Air Force, 
later downgraded during the 1985 congress to the post of alternate member of 
the CC742 and retired a few years later743 
Finally, with regards to party organs, it is important to notice that the 1985 
congress also represented a significant decrease in the effective political power 
738 In ACR, vol. 18 (1987), p. B620. 
739 From private interviews with Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16th April 1998); General Antonio 
Farrusco (2nd May 1998). 
740 Ibid. 
741 See ARB (December 1979), p. 5501-b, c; also ARB (February 1980), p. 5572 b-c; also ACR, vol. 13 
(1982), p. B645. 
742 See ACR, vol. 18 (1987), pp. B619-B. 620. 
743 Later Iko started to have serious health problems, which took him to be treated in Spain where he 
lived for several years until his death in late nineties. 
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of the CC. This organ was enormously enlarged (from sixty to ninety members 
and alternates744) and from then on it became ever more difficult to discuss any 
important issues, reach consensus or take decisions among so many people with 
endless and usually inconclusive debates745. From the original 35 members at 
the beginning of Neto's presidency746 the CC was progressively enlarged and 
had now reached proportions that limited its once prominent role. 
11.2.3 The System of Ministers of State 
The third and final step towards the most extreme reinforcement of the process 
of administrative centralisation and concentration of power during the 
Socialist-Marxist phase, occurred with the CC extraordinary session (16-17 
January 1986) which, following the guidelines approved by the Second 
Congress of the MPLA-PT (December 1985), revised again the constitution in 
order to create a system of three Ministers of State747. They were to be 
nominated by the Head of Government (President) and answerable directly to 
him, with the specific objective of `co-ordinating the main areas of government 
activity, assisting the Head of Government in his executive duties. '748 This 
restructuring was an attempt at simplifying the Head of Government's 
enormous legislative and executive activity by concentrating government 
activity into three `super-ministries', led by three trusted `super-ministers', who 
would depend personally and institutionally on the President (see previous 
figure 11.2.2.3). They were Maria Mambo Cafe, Minister of State for social and 
744 In ACR, vol. 18 (1987), p. B620. 
745 From private interview with Mendes de Carvalho (17 July 1998). 
746 For the names of the original 35 members of the CC elected at the Inter Regional Militants 
Conference in September 1974 and who came to exert those positions at the independence see 
ColecVdo de Textos do MPLA: Programa, Estatutos, Lei de Disciplina, Membros do Comite Central e 
do Bureau Politico, Conferencia Inter-Regional de Militantes de 12 a 20 de Setembro de 1974 
(Luanda: Edicäo do Departamento de Informacäo e Propaganda, n. d. ), pp. 31-32. 74' Amendment to the constitution, Law 1/86, DR, I, 9 (1 February 1986) created the system of 
Ministers of State. 
748 In the introduction to law 2/86, DR, I, 9 (1 February 1986), which approved the new organisational 
structure of the central State apparatus to include the Ministers of State. 
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economic affairs; 749 Pedro de Castro Van-Dunem `Loy', Minister of State for 
production; 750 and Kundy Paihama, Minister of State for State inspection and 
contro1751. From then on, all the other ministers were to become subordinated to 
the State Ministers, be it in executive or legislative matters. 752 
This organisational restructuring represented another step in political and 
administrative centralisation and concentration of power in the institution and 
person of the president in terms of relationships between a) the President and 
local power organisations; b) the President and other organisations of central 
power. 
a) At level of the relationship between the presidency and the organisations 
of local power, the organisational restructuring brought about the extinction of 
the Ministry of Provincial Co-ordination, 753 whose functions became the 
responsibility of the Council of Ministers' secretariat and the respective 
secretary. According to a new organisational statute, the CM's secretariat was 
749 This Minister was responsible for the ministries of planning, finance, foreign trade, work and social 
security, health, education and internal trade; the National Bank of Angola; the Secretaries of State for 
co-operation, sports and physical education, culture, social affairs, housing and war veterans; in 
appendix to law 2/86, DR, I, 9 (1 February 1986). 
750 This minister was responsible for the ministries of agriculture, industry, oil and energy, transports 
and communications, construction and fisheries; see appendix of law 2/86, DR, I, 9 (1 February 1986). 
'S' This minister was responsible for a central organisation of inspection and control to be created by 
law; in appendix of Law 2/86, DR, I, 9 (1 February 1986). Paihama is from the south, from the Ovambo 
ethnolinguistic group, a small group that adhered to the MPLA since the early days of 1974 due to its 
long - pre-colonial - conflict with the Ovimbundu or those from the `nano' as they call the Ovimbundu 
(i. e. those from above, the high plateaux); on this issue see Carvalho, Ruy Duarte de, Aviso ... op. cit. 
Paihama is an old time member of the MPLA, absolutely loyal to the president and as usual with a 
governmental and military trajectory, from FAPLA official to provincial commissioner to minister. 
Although beyond of this work's time frame, it might be interesting to notice that he was until recently 
Minister of Defence and Chief of Staff of FAPLA after replacing General Joäo de Matos (another 
young cadre promoted by Eduardo dos Santos up to the position of Chief of Staff of FAPLA after the 
1992 elections). Together they were responsible for the reorganisation of the armed forces after the 
pillage that followed its restructuration in 1991. 
752 At an executive level, the new State ministers had the competency to co-ordinate, guide, control and 
approve the activities and action-plans of the various organisations within their respective fields of 
responsibilities, especially ministries and secretariats of State; they were expected to give regular 
accounts to the Head of Government on the degree of accomplishment in the above-mentioned areas. 
At a legislative level, they were given the competency to analyse the legal documents and proposals by 
the organisations they co-ordinated before submitting them to the approval of the Head of Government; 
they could exercise any other duties entrusted to them by the head of government; see law 2/86, DR, I, 
9 (1 February 1986) and decree 10/86, DR, I, 45 (7 June 1986), which approved the general regulation 
of the role and competencies of the State Ministers. 
753 The aforementioned law 2/86 of 1 February brought the Ministry of Provincial Co-ordination to an 
end. As a result, the Minister for Provincial Co-ordination left the CDS, as mentioned in the decree 
67/86, DR, I, 32 (21 April 1986), which approves the new regulation of the CDS. 
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seen as the government organ that should act as the link between the Central 
State apparatus and the organs of local power (art. 1). 7sa 
Inasmuch as that secretariat and its Secretary (the highest ranking 
secretary, now promoted to minister) were institutionally and personally 
dependent on the head of Government755, the broadening of their competence in 
terms of local power reinforced, albeit indirectly, the process of concentration 
of the President's powers at local level. 
b) At the level of the relationship between the presidency and other 
organisations of central power, the restructuring brought about the immediate 
broadening of the President's constitutional rights, and he was now entitled not 
only to appoint and remove from office any new minister of State, but also to 
nominate or sack from office the Vice-Governors of the National Bank of 
Angola. 756 With this move, there was no significant post beyond the direct 
powers of the presidency. 
Regarding the People's Assembly, the restructuring represented once again 
a downgrading of its powers. 
" On the one hand, the three new Ministers of State were to become 
`automatically' part of the 24 members of the permanent commission of the 
People's Assembly757; they were to co-ordinate 3 of the 11 working 
commissions of the Assembly. 758 This integration of Ministers of State 
preceded the second general elections for the organisations of poder 
popular in December 1986, which, just as in 1980, took place indirectly and 
754 Decree 26/86, in DR, 1,95 (29 November 1986), approving the new organisational statute of the 
Council of Ministers. 
755 Ibid. 
756 New wording of art. 53, para. d, of the Constitution, introduced by law 1/86, DR, I, 9 (1 February 
1986). 
757 Resolution 7/86, DR, I, 90 (10 November 1986), contains the names of the 24 members of the 
permanent commission of the People's Assembly. 
758 All the other co-ordinators were also members of the permanent commission of the People's 
Assembly. Resolution 8/86, DR, I, 90 (10 November 1986), contains the names of the People's 
Assembly's working commissions and their respective co-ordinators. 
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were highly controlled at all levels by the Party; again, the ministers of State 
were automatically included within the eligible positions. 759 
On the other hand, and according to new organisational statutes, the CM's 
secretariat was given broad competence to `co-operate' with the secretariat 
of the People's Assembly; this meant that in practice the Ministers of State 
and the CM's secretariat, following the directives from above (the 
President), could prepare and directly introduce the issues to be discussed in 
the sessions of the People's Assembly, as well as influence and direct the 
reports and proposals of the People's Assembly's working commissions to 
the Council of Ministers and its organs. 760 
Regarding the CDS, the new restructuring led to the approval of a new 
regulation (on 21 April 1986) that defined five main areas of activity, to be 
personally co-ordinated by the different Council members, but all under the 
ultimate direction of the President of the Republic and the President of the 
CDS. 761 By dividing the Council's tasks into areas of activity and providing 
759 According to the existing legislation regarding the electoral process, the mandate of the deputies 
elected in 1980 should have come to an end in 1983; however, as referred, due to the war situation the 
CC prorogued their mandates until December 1986, when the second elections for these posts were 
held. The second electoral process followed the same lines as the first, namely indirect elections 
controlled at all levels by the Party; a national electoral commission and provincial electoral 
commissions were set up for the explicit purpose of `leading and controlling the electoral process in 
accordance with the principles and guidelines set from above. ' The national and provincial electoral 
commissions were to be co-ordinated, respectively, by the Central Committee's Secretary for State and 
judicial organisations and by the Party's provincial first secretaries. This second legislature increased 
the number of working commissions, but they were still co-ordinated by the usual members of the 
Central Committee and the politburo. Apart from Lücio Lara (who was excluded in this second 
legislature for the reasons mentioned above: his son's arrest and his wife's suspension), all the previous 
co-ordinators became `automatically' the co-ordinators of the second legislature, which also increased 
the number of members on the permanent commission to 30, compared with 24 before; the permanent 
commission was made up of all the commission co-ordinators and remaining members of the Central 
Committee and the politburo. See resolution 6/87 on the working commissions of the People's 
Assembly, and resolution 7/87 on the constitution of the second legislation of the People's Assembly 
and its permanent commission; both resolutions in DR, I, 17 (7 February 1987). 
760 The Council of Ministers' Secretariat was given the broad competence to `co-operate' with the 
Secretariat of the People's Assembly in the co-ordination of measures necessary for the preparation and 
running of the permanent commission of the People's Assembly (art. 3, para. d) and to `analyse the 
reports and proposals of the working commissions of the People's Assembly on the activities of the 
Council of Ministers and its organisations' (art. 3, para. e); Decree 26/86 of the CDS, DR, I, 95 (29 
November 1986). 
761 Although the new regulation allowed the competencies and duties of the CDS to remain the same 
(according to the above-mentioned law 3/84) with the inclusion of new members, the CDS was 
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them with specific co-ordinators the President further reinforced his personal 
domination over each area and over each co-ordinator, thereby diminishing the 
range of influence and participation of each one of them on activities beyond 
their own. This weakened an organisation that was supposedly one of 
collective deliberation and responsibility (colegial), where all members were 
supposed to consider all matters concerning all the duties within the 
competencies of the Council. 
Regarding the Council of Ministers' secretariat, the restructuring meant, 
once again, a considerable broadening of this organ's duties and competence. 
According to its new organisational statute the secretariat had to ensure all the 
necessary support to the State's main executive organisations such as the CM, 
the CDS and the Ministers of State (art. 1). 762 This turned the secretariat into a 
kind of unofficial government, under the President's personal orchestration. 763 
Consequently, in more ways than one, the CM's Secretary took on the role of 
unofficial Prime Minister (standing-in for the President in day-to-day 
governmental matters). 764 
structured into five areas: defence and security, personally co-ordinated by the Head of Government; 
the three areas co-ordinated by the three Ministers of State (socio-economic affairs; production; State 
inspection and control); the area of propaganda and counter-propaganda, co-ordinated by the Central 
Committee's secretariat for ideology; in Decree 6/86, DR, I, 32 (21 April 1986), approves the new 
regulation of the CDS. 
762 Decree 26/86 by the CDS, DR, I, 95 (29 November 1986), gives approval to the new organisational 
statute of the CM's secretariat, revoking the earlier organisational statute approved by mentioned decree 
25-B/80, DR, I, 78 addendum (2 April 1980). 
763 Amongst other duties, it was the secretariat's job, for example, to propose to the Ministers of State 
what the best measures were for improving the running of the areas they co-ordinated (art. 3, para. m); to 
guarantee the running and the activities of the State Ministers' cabinets in financial, administrative, 
technical and material terms (art. 3, para. p); to provide all and any data and information on the work of 
the government to the Head of Government and, when told to do so, to pass his recommendations on to 
the organisations and the populations (art. 3, para. f); to suggest to the Head of Government the measures 
best able to improve the running of the Council of Ministers, the Council of Defence and Security and 
the working commissions (art. 3, para. 1); to proceed with the study and analysis, and comment, on all 
matters deliberated in the meetings of the Council of Ministers, the CDS and their working 
commissions (art. 3, para. h). In decree 26/86, DR, I, 95 (29 November 1986). The aim of broadening 
the executive powers of the secretariat of the Council of Ministers had been previously and explicitly 
assumed in Relatörio do Comite Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p. 
2 1. 
764 Apart from the above-mentioned tasks inherent to the secretariat, it was the Secretary's personal duty 
to suggest to the Head of Government means of verifying and controlling the degree of fulfilment of all 
the tasks that were supposed to be performed by the ministers of State, by the Regional Military 
Councils and by the provincial commissioners (art. 4, para. c); to write the reports of all meetings of the 
Council of Ministers and the CDS (art. 4, para. d); to write the reports of the meetings of the CDS 
working commissions and the areas co-ordinated by the Ministers of State (art. 4, para. e); to undertake 
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Finally, in August- 1987, the President felt the need to create a new 
subsidiary organisation, again to come under his own personal rule, namely the 
Cabinet of the Head of Government, parallel in structure to the Cabinet of the 
President of the Republic, this time for the support of the growing 
governmental duties, both executive and legislative, of the president in his role 
765 as head of Government (see previous figure 11.2.2.3). 
In sum, it can be seen that this last step in reinforcing powers into the 
institution and person of the President was taken, on the whole, indirectly 
(through his three trusted super-ministers and the subsidiary organs of practical 
support such as the Council of Ministers' secretariat and Secretary and the new 
Cabinet of the Head of Government), proving that the process of the direct 
concentration of power in the president had been achieved. 
11.2.4 Powerful subsidiary organisations supporting the Presidency 
As expounded, the subsidiary organisations (such as the Council of Ministers' 
secretariat, the Cabinet of the President of the Republic and the Cabinet of the 
Head of Government) came out significantly empowered by the three main 
steps of the process of administrative centralisation and power concentration. 
Apart from the gradual broadening of their effective competence, the most 
important point to mention is the nature of their staff, carefully chosen amongst 
the post-27 May generation. As referred in the previous chapter, this had been 
one of the main strategic objectives set by the president since the beginning of 
his administration, but was only fully achieved after he managed to assert 
power over the left and right-wing of the party. In these terms and within such 
context, speaking to the National Assembly on the 23 February 1983, the 
any task entrusted to him by the Head of Government (art. 4, para. d). In decree 26/86 by the CDS, DR, 
I, 95 (29 November 1986). 
76s The cabinet was divided into three main sectors: socio-economic affairs, production affairs and 
support for the emergency programmes. Presidential decree 15/87, DR, I, 62 (3 August 1987), created 
the Cabinet of the Head of Government and approved its organisational statute. 
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President made clear that medium and high-ranking technical cadres (several of 
them holding concurrent military positions or at least with a previous military 
path, given compulsory conscription since 1978) would be professionally and 
economically compensated for their status. Eduardo dos Santos mentioned the 
fact that these cadres were increasingly discontented with their professional and 
socio-economic situation and that some of them were either leaving their jobs 
to seek employment in foreign companies working in Angola or were leaving 
the country in order to find better living conditions abroad766. Their 
dissatisfaction arose from the perennial shortages in foodstuffs and consumer 
goods, the lack of suitable housing and public transport. Some were also 
leaving the country because they rejected socialist ideology and politics767. 
According to the President, urgent measures would be taken in order to 
promote this technical elite to adequate positions and to provide them with 
essential goods, suitable housing and private transportation; he appealed to 
their patriotism to get them to stay in the country and contribute to national 
reconstruction 768. 
From then on, the new policy was strictly planned and executed under the 
President's close supervision. Therefore, the aforementioned law 3/84 which 
created the CDS in 1984 also gave that Council a double competence in this 
area: 1), the CDS would co-ordinate the execution of a policy on cadre 
formation (art. 4)769; 2), the CDS would be charged with taking the necessary 
measures to improve the running of the State's administrative apparatus 
(art. 4)770. These measures thus accomplished the presidential stated objectives 
of appointing better prepared cadres to middle and top positions within the 
State's' structures. 
766 Cit. in Bhagavan, M R, Angola's 
... op. cit. pp. 31-32. 767 Ibid. pp. 31-32. 
768 Ibid. p. 32. Later, in 1985, congress documents specified several directives in terms of policy of 
cadres, again referring that some were leaving the country to Portugal and stating the need to promote 
and nominate the recently formed cadres to managing positions among other measures; in Documentos 
da l° Conferencia Nacional 
... op. cit... 1985, pp. 70-72; see also Relatörio do Comite Central ao 
11° 
Congresso 
... op. cit... 
1985, pp. 99-100. 
769 Law 3/84, DR, I, 22 (26 January 1984), created the CDS. 
770 Ibid. 
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Later on, with the restructuring that ensued from the creation of the 
Ministers of State, the policy was entrusted to the Council of Ministers' 
secretariat, whose new statute gave it responsibility for two main organisations 
dealing with this matter: INORADE (Instituto Nacionalpara a Organizacäo da 
Administragdo do Estado/Institute for the Organisation of State Administration) 
and INABE (Instituto Nacional de Bolsas de Estudo/National Institute for 
Study Bursaries)771; (see previous figure 11.2.2.3). 
Results from the strategic policy pursued in terms of younger and more 
technically prepared cadres surrounding the president, became clearly 
perceptible as soon as the second ordinary congress took place (December 
1985), and culminated in the enhanced authority of the president as reported by 
foreign observers, 
There was a distinctly technocratic flavour to the debates [... ] this 
was reflected in the elections to the party leadership, which brought 
in or promoted younger, more professional people at the expense of 
some of the veterans of the struggle for independence. The congress 
confirmed the growing influence of the armed forces (an inevitable 
consequence of the regime's preoccupation with defence), while 
President Jose Eduardo dos Santos personally emerged with 
enhanced prestige and authority. 772 
Equally, at an internal level, the official biography of president Eduardo dos 
Santos confirms such strategic options, stating that 
The first attempts to create the objective and subjective conditions 
towards the deep political and economic reforms dates from the 
first half of the eighties; such attempts had the support of young 
pragmatic militants that came out of the faculties of Engineering, 
Law and Economy. The situation of war did not allow a quicker 
materialisation of those attempts, but the second congress of 
MPLA-PT in 1985 approved this pragmatic line and confirmed Jose 
Eduardo dos Santos in all his positions [cargos]. 
773 
77' In art. 3, para. n, decree 26/86 by the CDS, DR, I, 95 (29 November 1986). 
772 In ACR, vol 18 (1987), p. B617; Foreign observers remarked the growing political influence of 
younger and more technically prepared cadres surrounding the presidency since 1982 (when the 
President affirmed his power); see for instance the article of Michael Holman in Financial Times (21 
June 1982); also mentioning the promotion of younger cadres at the 1985 congress is Hodges, Tony 
Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. p. 14. 773 In Biografia Oficial ... op. cit. pp. vi-vii. 
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New presidential power (extremely centralised and concentrated) created new 
powerful individuals among those surrounding the president and fulfilling the 
subsidiary organisations - most obviously as was the case for the secretary of 
the Council of Ministers, to give but one example. However, contrary to the 
influential left and rightwing members, these new powerful individuals did not 
have any political capital of their own, i. e. their young age, their recent and 
technocratic career, their distancing from the traditional political and historical 
cleavages and disputes within the great Creole/M'Bundu alliance (as 
expounded in chapter 4), their `cocooned" and discreet political life in 
Futungo; all transformed them into some kind of `stars without a light of their 
own' (estrelas sem brillho pr6prio774) extremely dependent on the president (be 
it in the presidency or in the army). Unlike members of the left and right-wing 
and those associated with other dissident movements (such as the old 
aristocracy of the Active Revolt or even the youth committees generation) 
whose political legitimacy derived from personal and effectively lived political 
parcours (be it in colonial jails, armed struggle or even internal subversive 
activity), these Futungo Kids had no other political legitimacy other than the 
one given by the president and while the president wanted it. They thus posed 
no political threat to Eduardo dos Santos (at least not the type of threat 
represented by the old cleavages). 775 
On the `veterans' side (from the left and right), as much as they tolerated 
the existence of these Futungo Kids (for the reasons explained in sub-chapter 
10.1), the option was therefore to accept the positions they were given within 
74 Using this same expression to characterise these young cadres or sustaining the same idea are several 
of my interviewees: Gerönimo Belo (17 March 1998); Victor Aleixo (26 March 1998); Aguiar dos 
Santos (31 March 1998); Lucas N'Gonda (19 March 1998); Raül Araüjo (2 April 1998); Joäo de Melo 
(17 April 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998); Jaka Jamba (7 July 1998); Pepetela (7 July 1998); 
Mendes de Carvalho (17 July 1998); 
775 They will most probably be intensively involved in any future struggle for the succession of Eduardo 
dos Santos, but until then they will hardly be a threat to his power; from private interviews with 
Gerönimo Belo (17 March 1998); Victor Aleixo (26 March 1998); Aguiar dos Santos (31 March 1998); 
Lucas N'Gonda (19 March 1998); Raül Araüjo (2 April 1998); Joäo de Melo (17 April 1998); 
Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998); Jaka Jamba (7 July 1998); Pepetela (7 July 1998); Mendes de 
Carvalho (17 July 1998); for a discussion on the succession of Eduardo dos Santos, the expected 
candidates and respective supporters see Expresso (8 September 2001). 
307 
the nominations carrousel initiated by Neto and developed to the extreme by 
the new president, thus being unable to construct and enlarge significantly their 
own political constituencies due to three main obstacles: firstly, due to their 
constant circulation through several positions within the State and party 
structures not only in the capital city but also in the provinces, never staying too 
long in a place; secondly, due to their economic dependence on Presidential 
largesse (access to State resources coming through positions held at the top of 
the apparatus); thirdly, because of the lack of development of provincial 
economic activities that could serve as an independent source of revenue for 
these `veterans' and also as an autonomous base for the construction and 
enlargement of their own political constituencies (their own chains of 
dependants through their own autonomous distribution) as seen in other African 
countries (becoming so-called local bosses)776. Changes in the model of power 
management during dos Santos' administration will be accurately discussed in 
chapter 13. 
11.3 Judicial System: Reinforcement of its Militarisation and Political Control 
The final analytical indicator for the analysis of the political framework of 
relationships regards the judicial system. Once again, Eduardo dos Santos 
intensified the processes started by his predecessor of political control and 
militarisation of the judicial system. 
a) The reinforcement of political control over the judicial system was 
achieved in a double way: 
- On the one hand, through the approval of the Organisational 
Regulations of the PGR (Procuradoria Geral da Republica/Office of the 
Procurator General of the Republic) in 1980, which made this important 
judicial organisation and its highest officer (the procurator-general) directly 
dependent on the President of the Republic; the Procurator was considered 
776 On local bosses and the construction of provincial networks of dependants see for instance Bayart, 
Jean-Francois, L'Etat au Cameroun ... op. cit.; 
Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit.. 
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subordinate to the President (art. l) and it was decreed that he should receive 
direct instructions from the President of the Republic, which he was obligated 
to fulfil (art. 2). 77' As we have previously seen, this was a smart move that came 
to bear its fruits as soon as the Kamanga case emerged (1982), unexpectedly 
implicating the presidency; 
- On the other hand, it was achieved placing the whole ministry of 
justice under the direct subordination to the president of the republic as can be 
clearly seen in the diagram of the State's central structure (see previous figure 
11.2.2.3). 
b) The reinforcement of the process of militarisation of the judicial 
system was achieved through the creation of CMRs (Regional Military 
Councils) in July 1983, which broadened the range of competence of the 
military courts, deeming them fit to try `all offences against State security, 
economic sabotage, speculation and disobedience to orders issued by the 
CMRs, as well as all offences damaging or endangering the interests of 
collective defence and security within the CMR's areas' (art. 4 of Law 5/83)778. 
Inasmuch as it was the role of the military tribunals to decide what 
constituted an offence damaging or endangering the interests of collective 
defence and security, and their role to define the interests of collective defence 
and security, the military tribunals were in fact free to try any offence. 
Following on from this broadening of competence, the new regulations for 
the organs of military justice779 explicitly granted juridical preponderance to 
regional military tribunals within the areas of jurisdiction of their respective 
CMRs, thus placing them above civil circuit tribunals780: allowing them to hold 
normal trials for all offences (as defined in art. 4 of law 5/83) committed by 
military or civilians alike781, and to hold summary trials (within 15 days) when 
"' Decree 25/80, DR, I, 70 (24 March 1980), approves the organisational regulation of the Office of the 
Procurator General of the Republic. 
778 In Law 5/83, DR, I, 179 (30 July 1983). 
79 Law 14/84, DR, 168 (17 July 1984) `regulation of organs of military justice'. 
780 Previously (by the end of Neto's administration) the primacy of military tribunals over civil tribunals 
was of an implicit type and occurring from practice as discussed. 
781 Art. 1 of Law 14/84, DR, I, 168 (17 July 1984) `regulation of organs of military justice'. 
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the perpetrators were caught in flagrant delictum. 782 Again (as stressed during 
the analysis of Neto's administration), such judicial militarisation was mainly to 
be applied to political and internal security issues and not so much to ordinary 
civil crimes, such as those against the state's property, which massively 
increased as we will see in the next chapter. 
The political control of the military tribunal magistrates was ensured since 
the presidents and the professional judges of the regional military tribunals 
were to be directly nominated by the President of the Republic. 783 
Concluding chapter 11, it can be said that after the extreme reinforcement of 
the various processes started by Neto (be it in terms of party discrimination; 
administrative centralisation and power concentration or judicial militarisation), 
the formal political system became almost totally `insulated' -- i. e., the system 
began to have almost no possibility for formal (institutional and minimally 
effective) intervention or for allowing participation by the general population, 
being dominated with near-absolute autonomy by the President of the Republic. 
This meant a near-total political distancing of the ruled masses from the formal 
political system. Therefore, the difference with Neto's administration was not 
just quantitative. It was primarily qualitative. 
782 Art. 4, n°l para. a, b, c, d, e, f, of Law 14/84, DR, I, 168 (17 July 1984) `regulation of organs of 
military justice'. 
783 In art. 7 para 2 of Law 14/84, DR, I, 168 (17 July 1984) `regulation of organs of military justice'. 
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12 - Development of the Socio-Economic Framework 1979-1985/1987 
This chapter aims to analyse the development of economic relationships 
between the rulers and ruled during dos Santos' administration and compare 
them with those obtaining under Neto's administration. The main purpose is to 
see if the predatory and rentiere practices intensified and led to the effective 
breakage of the distributive ties between rulers and ruled as argued within a 
post-modern patrimonial perspective. As explained in order to compare the two 
administrations this chapter follows the same analytical indicators as those used 
for the Neto's presidency. 
12.1 Public Administration: Greater Inefficiency 
During Neto's presidency, Socialist practice and patrimonial distributive 
promises and expectations, led to an enormous growth in the public 
administration, which comprised a minority of bureaucrats coming from the 
colonial period, a few survivors of the youth committees generation and a 
majority of personnel without the required qualifications (mainly 
Creole/M'Bundu). The fact that most were unqualified staff with a rentiere and 
haughty bureaucratic attitude (burocratismo) and their need to spend a 
significant amount of time on informal activities, all led to the inefficiency and 
low work productivity of the state's administrative apparatus. Throughout the 
first half of the eighties, the problem only got worst, leading the President 
himself to admit it during his opening speech to the first national Party 
conference in January 1985: 
During the period since the first Extraordinary Party Congress 
[from 1980 to 1985] we also noticed that a large part of our State 
budget was absorbed by the salaries paid to workers in public 
administration with no significant improvement, in return, in the 
effectiveness of their work. The increase in the number of civil 
servants has raised neither efficiency, nor the quality of the 
services, mainly because there are, as yet, no criteria to enable us 
better to select workers fit for the posts they hold and with the 
prerequisites to occupy positions of responsibility. 
784 
784 `Opening speech of the President to the Ist National Conference' ... op. cit. p. 
22. 
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Therefore, the Conference stressed that there was a need, 
To continue with the reorganisation of the system of supplying 
urban areas, in order to implement the principle that "he who 
doesn't work, doesn't eat", so that everyone is forced to work for 
themselves and for society. 
785 
In other words the conference admitted that there was a lot of people eating 
(benefiting from State goods), but without working (at least for the State). Even 
though salaries were drastically losing purchasing power, they were still a rent, 
since productivity was plummeting, as remarked by the second congress 
(December 1985), not only in the public administration, but in the whole State 
sector, acknowledging that there was `a divorce between the level of salaries 
and the level of work produced'. 786 Rentiere mentality remained strong 
throughout the whole State sector and, as observed by Bhagavan in 1983, 
unrealistic expectations prevailed according to which the State was supposed to 
perform the role of the big man, freely dispensing goods and services787. 
Within the explained mechanisms of critica and auto-critica, problems 
such as haughtiness, contempt for the people or burocratismo were again 
remarked by congress documents in 1985, 
We must fight against all incorrect behaviour amongst leaders, 
cadres and party members such as acomodamento [laziness], 
burocratismo, auto-suficiencia [self-sufficiency, i. e. 
haughtiness]788 
We must fight [... ] petit bourgeois behaviour such as contempt for 
the people 789 
Inasmuch as the whole Socialist economic system depended very much on the 
functioning of public administration, therefore an increasingly inefficient 
bureaucracy had an increasingly `deadening effect on most activities'790 with 
791 an `incalculable economic cost' during Eduardo dos Santos administration. 
785 Documentos da I" Conferencia Nacional ... op. cit... 1985, p. 44. 786 Relatörio do Comite Central ao I1° Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p. 106. 787 In Bhagavan, M R, Angola 's 
... op. cit. pp. 43-44. 788 In Documentos da I' Conferencia Nacional 
... op. cit... 1985, pp. 64-65. 789 In Relatörio do Comite Central ao Il° Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p. 33. 790 `The government bureaucracy, operated as it is by a mere handful of dedicated and skilled civil 
servants, backed up by an army of semi-literate manual workers has a deadening effect on most 
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12.2 Material Production: Reinforcement of Agricultural and Industrial 
Inefficiency and Oil Dependency 
Before entering the concrete analysis of economic activity, it is worth repeating 
that our analytical perspective, although acknowledging the economic impact of 
the war on the production levels (in terms of destruction of infrastructure, 
utilisation of resources and so on), stresses all the other factors also 
contributing to the decline of production and that cannot be explained by the 
war: namely the lack of co-ordination, absenteeism, predatory and rentiere 
practices. The war did increase from 1980 onwards and within this work's 
discussion I will stress its effect on the pattern of relationships that was 
evolving between rulers and ruled - as in sub-chapter 12.4. 
12.2.1 Agriculture: production collapse 
The situation of the agricultural sector during the first half of the eighties was 
one of generalised collapse both at: a), the co-operatives level; b), the private, 
peasant level. 
a) During the first half of the eighties co-operative farms or State farms 
survived almost entirely on State subsidies792. Even those economic analysts 
who most sympathised with the Socialist path acknowledged that `these [state] 
farms have failed in an economic sense. The value of their output has been 
lower than the value of their input. '793 
activities'; as reported from Luanda by Quentin Peel, Africa Editor in Financial Times (14 September 
1981). 
791 As observed by Birmingham in the eighties, `Many of the places in the administration serve no 
earthly residual function but to abolish them would be politically inconceivable. [... ] The cost, however, 
in terms of thousands of staff-hours wasted queuing for valueless permits, unnecessary licences, 
authorisations, chits, booking forms, boarding passes, meal tickets, provincial visas, lodgings 
registrations, laissez passer stamps is uncalculated and incalculable. '; in Birmingham, David, `Angola 
revisited' ... op. cit. p. 8. 792 From private interview with the director of IDA-Malange ('Institute for Agricultural Development' 
of Malange), Virgilio Ribeiro da Silva (8 September 1995). 
793In Bhagavan, M R, Angola's ... op. cit. p. 39. 
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The disruption caused by the war could not be taken as the only 
explanation of such generalised collapse in the whole country. Several 
provinces in the Southwest, with direct access to seaports and not much 
affected by the war (such as a good part of Benguela, Namibe and Huila) were 
in the same situation794. Beyond the war, one of the main problems was clear. It 
was the increasing incapacity of co-ordinating several sectors by an enormous 
and ever inefficient administrative apparatus that was supposed to back-up a 
centrally planned agricultural system. The evidence of such reality forced its 
official recognition by the CC report to the December 1985 Congress: 
As the main problems expressed by this sector concern its 
relationship with other sectors, who are either badly run or running 
late and can therefore affect the whole agricultural year, it is 
necessary to look again closely at who is responsible for carrying 
out decisive tasks for agricultural production, including the 
importation and distribution of seeds, fertilisers and tools, trading 
in the fields, the distribution of mercantile production and support 
for the peasantry sector. 
795 
Moreover, according to Hodges, nationalisation itself proved a failure, 
Starved of skilled personnel in all domains, the government could 
not provide cadres with the requisite managerial and technical skills 
to operate hundreds of modem farms [... ] The AUP's [state farms as 
already explained] began to break down, spare parts were difficult 
to obtain, technical expertise was scarce, production inputs arrived 
late or not at all, and consumer goods became ever scarcer, farm 
labourers lost interest in working for wages. Much of the AUP's 
land was appropriated for individual family farming and 
almost all their cattle was stolen and absorbed into peasant 
herds. By the early 1980's the remaining AUP's were a manifest 
failure, dependent on state subsidies to cover regular, sizeable 
deficits796 [my bold]. 
b) At the private level (peasants and farmers), during the first half of the 
eighties it can be said that the tendency that was already in evidence towards 
794 To give but one example, the valley of the Cavaco river between Lobito and Benguela was a very 
productive area during the colonial period. After the independence it was a safe place and had a short 
access to the port of Lobito (c20km of safe road) or to the Benguela airport, however its production 
also collapsed. From private interviews with Virgilio Ribeiro da Silva (8 September 1998). 
795 Relatörio do Comite Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p. 109. 
Several concrete examples of 
such lack of co-ordination were reported to me by Vicente Pinto de Andrade in private interview, about 
the mid-eighties while he was manager of a State company in a southern province (11 May 1998). A 
concrete example of such lack of coordination can also be found in Pepetela, A Geravdo... op. cit. 
p. 234. 
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the end of Neto's presidency worsened, whereby the overwhelming majority of 
peasants stopped trading in formal commercial systems, and turned to 
producing for personal consumption, exchanging their little surplus with private 
traders who went out to the rural areas. As mentioned, extremely high prices for 
agriculture products in the parallel markets were an incentive to this kind of 
business797. However, contrary to what could have been expected, such non- 
official trade was unable to develop agricultural production because there was a 
limited variety and quantity of goods that could be offered by the peasant to the 
private trader (unable to expand production in face of the recrudescence of the 
war) and also a limited variety and quantity of goods that could be offered by 
the private trader to the peasant, due to the restricted number of supply sources 
and goods that could be legally or illegally obtained by the trader for further 
resale. As observed by Bhagavan in 1983, 
The private trader has three main sources for the basic commodities 
which are in high demand [... ] The first is the people who queue up 
to buy at the people's shops and resell to traders at a substantial 
monetary profit to themselves. The second source is the workers 
who sell part of the commodities they get paid in or have the right 
to buy at subsidised prices in factories where they themselves 
produce these goods - this is called `self-consumption'. The final 
avenue is those workers, supervisors, petty bourgeois elements, etc., 
who simply steal goods from their workplaces in ports, airports, 
factories, state owned internal commercial establishments, etc., and 
sell these stolen goods. 798 
To these three sources we must add the previously mentioned illegal/informal 
importation through work and tourist trips to the exterior, but also with definite 
limits. All these sources were obviously incapable to generate a regular and 
substantial flux of products to feed a large scale economic business with 
peasants through the whole country (at least in the most secure areas) in order 
to compensate for the inefficient state sector. 
7% In Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. pp. 85-86. 797 In 1983, the price for the same agricultural products was anything from 30% to 100% higher in the 
parallel market; in Bhagavan, M R, Angola 's ... op. cit. p. 22; this tendency was to continue 
in the 
following years as reported in 1986 by Tony Hodges in Financial Times (4 August 1986) 
798 In Bhagavan, M R, Angola's 
... op. cit. p. 23. 
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Faced with the -total failure of the system of supplying agricultural 
produce and attempting to attract some produce into the official channels, in 
1981, the government launched a trading campaign, organising markets for 
barter that coincided with the harvest-time of specific crops, in areas of 
intensive agriculture. 799 Lorry-loads of industrial products were taken to the 
fields where they were exchanged directly with the peasants for agricultural 
produce800. However, the exceptional character of such measure, limited in time 
and space801, did not solve the immediate problem802, and even less the general 
problem. Therefore, it was unable to avoid the continuous downward trend in 
agricultural production (be it in the coffee803, cassava, cereal, cotton or sisal 
production 804). Despite not being directly affected by the war, the fishing 
industry also declined805. 
If during Neto's presidency reports talked about chronic food scarcity in 
people's shops, during the first half of the eighties, the situation was even more 
799 See Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, Angola ... op. cit. p. 
143. 
S0° From private interview with the director of IDA-Malange ('Institute for Agricultural Development' 
of Malange), Virgilio Ribeiro da Silva (8 September 1995). 
801 Only four out of a total eighteen provinces were part of these campaigns due to transport problems 
and UNITA's ambushes; in Radio Nacional de Angola (2 November 1981), cit. in SWB (4 November 
1981). 
802 Such measures were unable to avoid that marketed production was down 26 per cent in 1981, 
creating widespread shortages in the towns; as reported by Michael Holman in Financial Times (21 
June 1982). 
803 By 1981/82, coffee production had fallen to 20.040t (334.000 bags of 60Kg) compared with the 
21.501t of 1981 (see figures presented during Neto's presidency); there was a further fall in 1982/83 to 
17.400t (290.000 bags) and to 10.589 t. in 1984 (176.483 bags), recovering slightly to 13.686t in 1985 
(228.100 bags); in ACR, vol. 16, (1985), p. B612; also ACR, vol. 18 (1987), p-13631- 
804 Angola's production of dried cassava fell from 19.000t in 1981 to just 1000t in 1985; cereal 
production in 1984 was estimated to be circa 7% less than the average estimated output in 1979-1983 
and in the year to 31 March 1986 Angola required 330.000t. in cereal imports and the UN's World 
Food Programme established food aid needs at I20.000t. Another commercial crop facing difficulties 
was sugar; the only three estates still in production fell short of their production targets to 1984/85 due 
to shortages of inputs and was less than a third of its usual level in the 1970's. Sisal and cotton 
production had shrunk by roughly similar proportions, in ACR, vol. 16, (1985), p. B612; ACR, vol. 17 
(1986), p. B621; ACR, vol. 18 (1987), p. B631. 
805 The national fishing fleet had to reduce its already very low 1984 plan target by 38% to 65.000t 
(even less than the 75.890t landed by Angolan boats in 1983), and still apparently could not meet even 
this lower target because many fishing boats needed repairing and spare parts were in short supply or 
entirely unavailable; in ACR, vol. 17 (1986), p. B621. According to Hodges, in 1985 the catch went 
down to 62.500 tons; in Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. p. 
98. Problems such as the 
paralisation of part of the fishing fleet, deficient technical and material support to fishing industry and 
regular lack of food to fishermen, is reported in congress documents such as: Documentos da P 
Conferencia Nacional 
... op. cit... 
1985, p. 37; also Relatörio do Comite Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. 
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alarming. Fresh fruit and vegetables had simply disappeared from official retail 
markets in Luanda, even fish was in shortage and the situation was far worse in 
the provinces 806. The search for sufficient food was a major part of daily 
life807; strikers in Luanda harbour demanded food and not salaries' increase808. 
Regardless of the food scarcity, and in parallel with the discrimination of 
peasants within the party, agricultural activity as a whole was progressively 
neglected by the central government which started to pay it less and less 
attention in terms of the investments and expenditure that were crucial to its 
recovery; as confirmed by the CC report to the second party congress, summing 
up the first five years of the decade: 
The values reached during the five-year period were not only much 
lower than planned, but production fell yearly, dropping sharply in 
1983 [... ] a careful analysis of State accounts shows how little 
attention this sector received compared to other sectors of our 
economy because the figures do not support the definition of 
agriculture as the basis of our development. By analysing the 
money spent from the budget, it can be seen that agriculture was 
given [... ] only 8% of budget expenditure [My bold] 
809 
This type of economic neglect might be referred to as the corollary of `a long- 
term policy of feeding the city but neglecting the farmers', to use Birmingham's 
cit... 1985, p. 110. Reports from 1982, on the lack of fish and the abusive activities of Soviet fishing 
boats on the Angolan coasts can be found in Pepetela, A Geracdo ... op. cit. p. 
226. 
806 In Foreign Report (11 November 1981), published by The Economist, p. 5. Reporting to 1982, 
several references to such accute scarcity can be found in Pepetela, A Geracdo... op. cit. pp. 193,208, 
211-213,234,236. 
807 `The search for sufficient food - either by standing in the long queues at the state controlled 
distributors, or scouring the markets - is a major part of daily life. Foreign companies either import 
the basic needs of their staff, or accept that their employees search for food will take up half of the 
office day'; In report of Michael Holman in Financial Times (21 June 1982). 
so" '[Les dockers sont en grove] la raison de cette grove sur le tas: les ouvriers avaient faim. La monnaie 
locale - le kwanza - etant totalement depreciee, ils ne reclamaient pas des augmentations de salaires, 
purement nominales mais des allocations supplementaires de farine de manioc ou de pain. [... ] Pour 
resoudre le probleme, les etrangers ont obtenu 1'autorisation d'importer de quoi nourrir leurs employes 
locaux. [... ] Les stigmates de 1'epreuve sont encore omnipresents. Les magasins de Luanda, dans leur 
immense majorite, demeurent fermes. Derriere leurs rideaux de fer, les vitrines et les etalages sont 
vides. Devant los rares magasins d'Etat, aux heures d'arrivage, dc longues queues se forwent. [... ] Place 
Kinaxixi, au centre, le grand marche couvert aurait fair abandonne sans un attroupement bruyant forme 
autour d'un carrion qui decharge quelques regimes de bananes. La plupart des cafes sont fermes et leurs 
terrasses desertes'; in article of Jean-Claude Pomonti under the title 'Les stigmates d'un effondrement', 
in Le Monde (28 January 1981). 
809Relatörio do Comite Central ao 110 Congresso ... op. cit... 
1985, p. 109. 
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expression810 (bearing in mind that even the cities were now facing scarcity of 
food). 
Reflecting in very simple terms on the downward trend of the 
agricultural sector during the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos' presidency, 
the 1985 CC report concluded that `the country has to import most of the food 
it eats' 811 . To this statement we must add that the country was already receiving 
substantial quantities of food aid812 in order to compensate for acute 
8 malnutrition and hunger in several provinces throughout 1985 13. 
12.2.2 Industry: production collapse 
At the level of the manufacturing industry, the more austere application of 
repressive labour legislation right after the attempted coup (cf. supra) became 
absolutely innocuous from 1980/1981 onwards. Practices that emerged during 
Neto's presidency such as absenteeism (while working on the parallel market), 
diversion of produce (to feed the parallel market), lack of discipline and 
efficiency in workplaces, became the general rule for workers and managers 
alike. In 1983, Bhagavan described the situation of the manufacturing industry 
in the following terms: 
[There is] absence of a commitment to work. Absenteeism is rife at 
all levels and among all strata of workers and employees. 814 
810 Birmingham says that `Six months after the 1977 coup Angola was forced to airlift 30.000 bags of 
maize from Zambia for emergency feeding. It was the beginning of a long-term policy of feeding the 
city but neglecting the farmers'; in Birmingham, David, Frontline Nationalism... op. cit. p. 78. If that is 
said to be the beginning of such policy, therefore we may say that the CC's reported lack of investment 
was the corollary of that same policy. 
B1 Relatörio do Comite Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. cit... 
1985, p. 101. 
812 In June 1982, FAO announced that it was giving US$2Im to Angola; in Radio Nacional de Angola 
(6 June 1982), cit. in SWB (8 June 1982). This same organisation reported on 15 January 1985 that 
Angola expected to commercially import about two-thirds of its 1984-1985 food deficit and had 
succeeded in securing food aid pledges for most (71.000t) of the 83.000t balance; cit. in A CR, vol. 17 
(1986), p. B621. 
813 `More than 500.000 people are estimated to be in critical need of assistance, mainly in the Northern, 
Central and Southern provinces. [... ] Assistance Measures: some 96.1 million dollars are urgently 
required in order to meet outstanding needs'; in Africa Emergency - UN Office for Emergency 
Operations in Africa (June 1985); on the decline of food production and acute hunger see also ACR, 
vol. 18 (1987), p. B631, see also Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. p. 
89. 
814 In Bhagavan, M R, Angola's ... op. cit. p. 27. 
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Workers avoid work, and so do the managers. Workers and 
managers come to their workplaces in the morning, record their 
presence for the sake of their job security, wages and salaries, and 
disappear after a while. What do they do the rest of the "working 
hours"? [... ] It seems that the skilled workers spend their time away 
from the factories providing services in exchange for other services 
and goods in the so called "informal sector" (this kind of activity is 
called esquema in popular parlance) [... ] The lack of industrial self- 
discipline is endemic in all workplaces [... ] Work efficiency is very 
low because of the combined and cumulative effect of the 
following: the absence of systematic and planned execution of 
work; the impossibility and indeed the inadvisability of relying 
upon someone to do a piece of work he has been given to do, or 
taken the responsibility to do, within a margin of reasonable and 
acceptable delay; lack of care of tools, implements, machines, etc.; 
the persistence of anarchic individualism among all strata of 
employees. 815 
Acknowledging the ineffectiveness of previous repressive legislation and the 
general surrendering to such practices, the CC report to the second congress 
merely stressed `the urgent need to formulate a new law that will punish more 
severely and in a more cautionary manner all those who commit offences 
against the national economy. '816 But the matter went no further and even 
foreign observers acknowledged the `impossibility or unwillingness (or both) of 
imposing industrial discipline from the outside, using threats of punitive 
action'. 
$" 
In consequence of such practices, and also because of the disruptive 
effects of the war on the infrastructure and the supply of raw materials, 
production in the manufacturing industry fell dramatically during the first five 
years of Eduardo dos Santos presidency. As early as 1981, Roberto de Almeida, 
the party secretary for economic and social policy warned that several factories 
were not producing `even to meet the salaries of their workers'818. The meagre 
815 In Bhagavan, M R, Angola's 
... op. cit. pp. 
39-40. It should also be taken into account the previous 
quote from this same work, where Bhagavan refers the three main sources to access basic commodities, 
including `those workers, supervisors, petty bourgeois elements, etc., who simply steal goods from their 
workplaces in ports, airports, factories, state owned internal commercial establishments, etc., and sell 
these stolen goods. '; ibid. p. 23. Quentin Peel also reports the problem of lack of skills meaning a `lack 
of maintenance of all forms of equipment, causing frequent breakdowns and often the complete 
destruction of machinery'; in Financial Times (14 September 1981). 
816Relatörio do Comite Central ao If Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p. 23. 817 In Bhagavan, M R, Angola's 
... op. cit. p. 27. 818 In Radio Nacional de Angola (2 November 1981), cit. in SWB (4 November 1981). 
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recovery between 1977=1981 (reaching a production peak in 1981 of 40% of 
1973 levels), regressed to its 1976 figures in 1982 (c. 35% of 1973 production), 
falling again in 1983 to 32% of 1973 production level, then to 30%, just to drop 
once again in 1987 to 20% (a level of production that was to be maintained in 
the following years). 819 By 1983, it had already become clear that the 
manufacturing industry had simply collapsed - as stressed by authors such as 
Peter Meyns820 or Bhagavan, 
It is not an exaggeration to say that the manufacturing industry has 
collapsed. Compared to 1972, when 5,561 manufacturing 
enterprises were functioning, by 1981 this number had dropped to 
148, out of which 97 were entirely state-owned, 44 were entirely 
private, while 7 were joint-ventures between the state and private 
owners. In these, capacity utilisation is down 20-30%. 
Correspondingly, there has been a massive reduction in the total 
number of employees from 125,373 in 1973 to 38,851 in 1981.821 
Faced with the evidence, the CC report to the second congress acknowledged 
the chaotic situation and tried to explain it in these terms: 
[The situation in manufacturing industry] was aggravated by the 
war, by the stagnation and fall in prices [official prices], by the 
insufficient supply of technical materials, by the interruptions in the 
provision of water and electric energy and by the economic and 
financial mismanagement of finances, of stocks, of raw materials 
and cadres [... ] the gross value of estimated production has 
dropped and this sector's contribution to the total internal product 
is around 8%, including the food industry, light industry and heavy 
industry. 822 
The picture was no better in the mining industry, with a sharp decrease in the 
volume of diamond production, due to, among other factors, the illicit trade and 
the worsening of the military situation, all contributing to the national diamond- 
mining company being in deficit823 (it must be noticed that illicit trade included 
819 In Ferreira, Manuel Ennes, A lndüstria ... op. cit. p. 468. 820 As observed by Meyns, `Because of the great decrease in industrial and agricultural production, 
added to a continuous, severe strangulation of supplies, it has become obvious that the [official] 
economic structure of the country is aiming for collapse'; In Meyns, Peter, '0 desenvolvimento ... op. 
cit. pp. 121-122. 
821 In Bhagavan, M R, Angola's 
... op. cit. p. 
25. 
822 Relatörio do Comite Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. cit... 
1985, p. 111. 
823 `Activity in this sector is characterised by annual decrease in production. [... ] The inefficient use of 
the installations for treatment of gravel, the irregular supply of technical materials, the illicit trade and 
the worsening of the military situation, all contributed to the national diamond-mining company being 
in deficit'; in Documentos da 1" Conferencia Nacional 
... op. cit... 
1985, pp. 38-39. 
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not only UNITA's activities, trafficking diamonds since 1977824, but also 
practices of organised crime run from Luanda, as exemplified by the above 
mentioned lawsuit 105, or Kamanga case). 
After several years of a supposed dictatorship of the proletariat, by the end 
of the Eduardo dos Santos Marxist phase, the industrial proletariat represented 
a mere I% of the entire national workforce and the number of employees in the 
organised/official sectors of the economy, i. e. employed waged labour in 
agriculture, mining, construction and manufacturing, represented less than 2% 
of the entire national workforce. 825 
By then, the gross domestic product per capita had dropped by 10% in 
relation to 1981826 and the economy was more dependent on the oil sector than 
ever. The increase in exploration, the additional wells being drilled, the increase 
in production and the growing number of operating foreign companies 827 _ the 
result of the politics of `opening up to the West' towards the end of Neto's 
presidency - meant that the oil sector was the only one showing any 
significant growth (47.5 million barrels produced in 1981, nearly 75 million in 
1984 and 80 million in 1985), representing almost 90% of all exported 
merchandise. 828 Within the usual mechanism of critica and auto-critica the CC 
report showed concern at such dependence, but also as usual with this kind of 
internal criticism, it had no other effect whatsoever. As we saw, the agriculture 
sector was being increasingly neglected in terms of State investments. 
824 UNITA's selling of diamonds and gold to raise money to buy weapons dates from 1977 as 
confirmed by Georges Sangumba, the group's foreign affairs secretary, stating by then that `we are 
sitting on a pile of riches. The country from north to south is loaded with diamonds, gold and precious 
minerals. We are in business, very big business', also referring some of the countries selling them arms 
in exchange of US dollars raised with diamonds sale; in The Times (4 November 1977); also Agence 
France Press (3 November 1977). 
825 In Bhagavan, M R, Angola's 
... op. cit., p. 44. ate Relatörio do Comite Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p. 89. 827Documentos da I' Conferencia National 
... op. cit... 1985, pp. 40-41. 828 Relatdrio do Comite Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, pp. 112-113. It must 
be noticed that 
as soon as 1982, foreign observers already reported that `ä la exception de la recherche et de 
1'extraction du petrole, pour 1'essentiel off shore l'economie s'est peu ä peu paralysee. '; in article of 
Jean-Claude Pomonti in Le Monde (11 December 1982). The reality of oil companies operating in 
Angola led Bhagavan to call them `islands of Western enterprise and technology', where 'the 
management, organisation, marketing, technology and the highly skilled personnel all belong to the 
multinationals, "only" the labour is Angolan. '; in Bhagavan, M R, Angola's ... op. cit. p. 
28. 
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The sectorial analysis of the GDP is worrying for, during the past 
five years, the only sector that has maintained a high growth rate 
(19%) is the oil sector, which increases the national economy's 
dependence on its production and export, inasmuch as there has 
been a decrease in the production and export by most of the other 
sectors. [... ] In spite of the statistical insufficiencies, the available 
indicators show [... ] signs of decline in the production of sectors of 
fundamental importance for the people's well-being, such as 
agriculture, the mining industry, the manufacturing industry, 
transport and communication. 
829 
Not even the drastic fall in oil prices in December 1985 (during the congress) 
changed such situation, merely representing a doubled deficit on the current 
account (from US$236m in 1985 to US$447m in 1986) and an increased 
foreign debt (from US$2.7bn in 1985 to US$3bn in 1986)830. Insofar as the 
production collapse in agriculture and manufacturing industry was not made 
good, dependence on oil revenue was to continue in the following years 
(representing up to 95% of export earnings831 and benefiting from a new 
increase in oil prices as soon as 1987832), which led Tony Hodges to 
. 
833 characterise Angola as an oil single export country 
12.3 The Informal Sector: Extreme Development 
The presidency of Eduardo dos Santos was characterised by a reinforcement of 
the factors that were at the basis of the informal sector's development during 
Neto's presidency such as: a), increasing hierarchical discriminatory access to 
material privileges and benefits through an ever more `elitist' party b), 
increasing economic scarcity; c) increasing failure to meet distributive 
expectations (due to growing economic scarcity); d) maintenance of an 
829Relatörio do Comite Central ao 110 Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p. 90. sso In article of Tony Hodges in Financial Times (7 July 1987). 
831 See article of Tony Hodges in Financial Times (4 August 1986); also article of Ned Temko in The 
Christian Science Monitor (7 July 1987). 
832 Oil reveneues decreased from c. US$1900m in 1985 to US$1100m in 1986, but rose again to 
US$2000m in 1987; in Hodges, Tony, Angola from Afro-Stalinism... op. cit. p. 2, compare with data 
provided during Neto's presidency. 
833 In article of Tony Hodges in Financial Times (7 July 1987). 
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administrative and centralised management of the economy (including fixed 
prices, quantities, imports, foreign exchange rate and so on). 
The worsening of these factors led to the extreme reinforcement of the 
informal sector, representing, on the one hand, the ever increasing perverse and 
socially unfair dynamics of the parallel market; and on the other hand, a 
massive generalisation of predatory practices. Such phenomena will now be 
analysed in more detail. 
12.3.1 The ever increasing social unfairness of the parallel market 
During the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos' administration, the growth of 
the parallel economy reached extreme levels. In the first years of the new 
presidency, the informal market had already grown up to the point of 
overshadowing the official market as reported by Quentin Peel in 1981, 
The only thriving market is the black market, where more goods are 
available than in the proper shops. 834 
Accordingly, prices in the parallel market went through a `frightening 
increase'835, as if they had `taken leave of reality altogether: [in 1981] one fish 
cost Kwanzas/Kw 4.000, almost one month's average wage'836; [in 1983] a 
skirt cost 2000Kw and a shirt 1500Kw837. 
Given that clothes, vegetables and fruits had simply disappeared from 
government shops (most in particular people's shops) 838; knowing that monthly 
salaries in 1983 ranged between 5.000-7.000Kw (unskilled manual worker), 
10.000-15.000Kw (skilled factory worker), 16.000-18.000 (middle civil servant 
and middle managerial cadre) and 32.000-35.000 (top civil servant and top 
834 Reported by Quentin Peel (Africa editor) in Financial Times (14 September 1981). Reporting to 
1982, very interesting references to the strength of the black market and the straddling activity 
involving the leadership and candongueiros [main traders acting in the black market], both capable of 
doing anything to achieve their aims, can be found in Pepetela, A Geracdo... op. cit. pp. 200,222-223, 
228. 
835 InDocumentos da 1" Conferencia Nacional 
... op. cit... 1985, p. 43. 836 Reported by Quentin Peel in Financial Times (14 September 1981). : 
37 In Bhagavan, M R, Angola's ... op. cit. p. 62. 838Ibid. p. 62. 
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technical cadre) 839; it becomes clear that salaries were an ever less important 
part of the people's revenues, the bulk of which was coming out of parallel 
activities. According to Peter Meyns, as early as 1984 the survival of at least 
half of the population (obviously those most discriminated in the access to state 
resources as explained) was made possible by the informal sector. 840 
The more the informal economy grew, the more the national bank had to 
print money, which was absorbed by the informal circuits without ever 
returning to banks, therefore fuelling inflation. The more the national currency 
depreciated in the informal sector, the greater was the distortion between the 
official rate (US$1 to $30Kwanzas; maintained since 1977) and the parallel rate 
(reaching a peak of US$1 to 1000Kwanzas in 1983)841. The more the inflation 
grew, the deeper was the difference between official and informal prices for 
goods. 
Insofar as these economic distortions (prices and exchange rate) were 
the origins of the profits made in informal business, its growth also represented 
the growth of profit in the informal sector. However, due to the fact that 
primary access to official prices and exchange rate was processed through an 
extremely discriminatory system (essentially the party during Neto's 
administration and essentially the presidency from 1982 onwards), therefore, 
the increasing informal profits were more and more absorbed by the top 
echelons of the party/State/military structures. For the majority of the 
population informal activity merely represented the possibility of physical 
survival in ever degrading conditions. As remarked by Birmingham, parallel 
markets sprang everywhere allowing precarious living to some and a 
comfortable living to others (those who operated them with `political and 
bureaucratic protective cover'). 842 
839 Ibid. p. 63 940 In Meyns, Peter, `0 desenvolvimento 
... op. cit. pp. 121-122. 841In Bhagavan, M R, Angola's 
... op. cit. p. 62. 842 In Birmingham, David, Frontline Nationalism... op. cit. pp. 97-98. 
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Because those increasing economic distortions, and the profits derived 
from then, were financed by the state budget, which in its turn was financed by 
the oil rent, the growth of the informal business also meant that an ever 
substantial part of the oil revenue was indirectly made available to the chosen 
ones of the regime, something that led Ennes Ferreira to call them an `oil 
nomenclature' 843 
Facing the growing evidence, the 1985 CC report partially 
acknowledged (within the critica and auto-critica mechanisms) this perverse 
and socially unfair relationship between the economic distortions, the informal 
market and the state budget, 
There is currently no relation between prices and production costs 
for nationally made goods [for imported goods, the distortion was 
even greater due to the overvalued official foreign exchange rate]; 
there is great difficulty in establishing production costs because of 
the organisational problems companies have in determining prices 
that compensate agriculture and livestock production; there are 
failings in the system of distribution to towns and the rural areas 
and, finally, the pay-structures and wages are divorced from work 
productivity. The combination of all these interdependent 
factors has led to the formation of clandestine parallel markets 
where, because of their nature, values are distorted [... ] 
As these markets exist on the margin of the law and the economic 
organisation of the country, their activity escapes State control and 
become a place where all diverted goods converge. The 
discrepancy between the prices and the value of the products 
increases and constitutes an incentive for the diversion of 
merchandise, leading the State's general budget to finance this 
situation. 
The discrepancy between the revenue generated by salaries and 
the volume of circulating merchandise, with the consequent 
internal devaluing of the money, leads to processes of self- 
supplying as a means of safeguarding buying power, which ends 
up accentuating the inequalities amongst workers. [My bold] 
844 
In sum, confirming the signs that were to be seen by the end of Neto's 
administration, in the medium and long run, the growth of the informal sector 
was unable to improve the purchasing power of the lower social strata (further 
843 See Ferreira, Manuel Ennes, `La reconversion economique de la nomenklature petrolibre', in 
Politique Africaine, 57 (1995), pp. 11-26. 
844 Relatörio do Comite Central ao II° Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, pp. 106-107. Also in a proximate 
sense is Documentos da 1° Conferencia Nacional ... op. cit... 1985, p. 34. 
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worsening it), mainly -benefiting the top ranks of the party/State/military 
structures. 
12.3.2 The spiralling increase in predatory practices 
The continuous growth of the informal sector necessarily implied the 
continuous growth of predatory practices. Thus, after assuming the presidency 
and while he was still under the pressure of the leftwing (1981-1982), the new 
president felt constrained to officially act against the expansion of such 
practices. Accordingly, under the aegis of the politburo leftwing members, a 
major drive against corruption was announced in April 1981, acknowledging 
that `individualism, black marketing, indifference to the people's difficulties, 
and bureaucracy had produced dangerous manifestations of corruption, 
speculation, ideological confusion and opportunism' creating a need for a great 
`offensive against carelessness and inefficiency'845 
People were invited to denounce irregularities exerted by responsäveis - 
- that is, middle and top party cadres and civil servants. Corruption within State 
shops was one of the most important issues846 and according to Eduardo dos 
Santos, 
J'espere que tous les camarades sauront denoncer avec courage 
ceux qui detournent les produits qui sont mis en circulation par le 
ministere du commerce interieur. J'espPre que seront denonces ceux 
qui se servent du sucre que nous importons pour faire du kaporroto 
[une boisson alcoolique distilee]; ceux qui dans les services 
publics, vendent des habits et des chaussures, ainsi que ceux qui, 
par l'intermediaire de reseaux d'amis, vendent des bouteilles de 
whisky volees dans les depots du commerce interieur. Sans 
l'engagement des travailleurs l'offensive ne pourra atteindre ses 
buts. 847 
8°5 Announcement of the President in Radio Nacional de Angola (22 April 1981), cit. in ACR, vol. 14 
(1983), p. B587. 
846 Announcement of the President cit. in Afrique-Asie (25 May 1981), p. 31. 
847 Ibid. p. 31. 
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The offensive had no effective results, as was later recognised by the 1985 CC 
report 848 and the reasons for this failure were two: firstly, the offensive was 
launched under the pressure of the leftwing at a time when they still held some 
influence (before 1982) but did not count on the effective support of the 
President, who accepted predatory practices as soon as he managed to assert his 
power (as we will see); secondly, other than the most committed members of 
the leftwing (a demographically small segment of the elite), there was no one 
left to cast the first stone and as soon as the president asserted his control over 
them (from 1982 onwards), there was absolutely no one to fight such battle and 
the campaign was nothing more than cosmetic. So-called predatory practices 
were everywhere, from workers through managers to ministers, crossing the 
whole social spectrum as observed by Bhagavan in 1983, 
Theft and corruption have begun to make inroads into the moral 
values of the working class and the managerial strata. The grave 
shortages in food and essential consumer goods that have persisted 
over the last few years have put a premium on these goods. They 
can be exchanged for other desirable goods, or sold for extremely 
high prices in Kwanzas, on the parallel open market (called 
kandonga in popular vocabulary). This temptation has proved too 
strong for sections of the working class and managerial strata. 
Goods are pilfered from seaports, airports, warehouses and 
government shops, etc. Dockworkers are notorious for liberally 
helping themselves to all kinds of goods from the cargo that ships 
discharge at Luanda and Lobito ports. This is often done with the 
connivance of the security guards who get their share [... ] On the 
other side of the social spectrum, it is strongly assumed that some 
top state officials and a couple of government ministers have been 
caught accumulating large sums of money in convertible currency 
abroad through shady import deals, granting of supply contracts to 
foreign companies, and the smuggling of diamonds. '849 
Congress documents in 1985 confirmed the increase of these practices 
throughout the whole social spectrum during the period of 1980-1985: referring 
to `the practice of taking commissions' in public affairs (for top ranks of the 
848 Such failure was admitted in Relatörio do Comite Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. cit... 
1985, pp. l l- 
12. 
$49 In Bhagavan, M R, Angola's ... op. cit. p. 41. Reporting to 1982, several interesting references to 
such corruption and schemes here called predatory practices exerted by the whole social strata, can be 
found in Pepetela, A Geracäo... op. cit. pp. 193,200-202,211-212,222-223. 
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party and State structures) 850; the existence of `various synchronised actions of 
economic sabotage' (i. e. networks such as those of Kamanga and Angonave) 
led by `cadres with certain responsibilities regarding decision-making and 
capital management'1 852 ; or the large-scale theft of merchandise. 85 
This massive increase in predatory practices was a major new 
development under Eduardo dos Santos. As explained, the more the predatory 
practices and the informal market developed, the more the official economy 
weakened and the worse the economic situation of the lower social strata 
became. Their position was fragile and dependent. The reason is simple, the 
sources of revenue upon which the lower social strata could exert predatory 
practices shrank: the internal production had collapsed; their salaries had lost 
purchasing power; people shops were almost empty; public assets, 
infrastructures or equipment once stolen were not replaced. Their economic 
importance to the top of the system was limited. They did not have access to oil 
or any other ready source of cash. Being an intermediary in the informal market 
was a miserable way of survival since the bulk of profits going to the party and 
State top ranks. 
Considering that those main economic distortions allowing straddling 
activities were afforded by the oil rent, which in turn was managed with total 
autonomy by the Presidency, considering that the primary access (and the only 
really profitable) to those economic distortions was under close control of the 
presidency through the nominations' system; therefore, the massive spread of 
predatory practices, be it at the top or bottom of the social spectrum did not 
pose any challenge to the all powerful presidency controlling with autonomy 
the one and only major and constant source of revenue - the oil rent, the one 
that really matters. 
850Documentos da P Conferencia Nacional 
... op. cit... 1985, p. 78. 851 Relatörio do Comite Central ao If Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p. 69. 852 In Documentos da 1" Conferencia Nacional ... op. cit... 1985, p. 43; also in Relatörio 
do Comite 
Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p. 94. 
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It is important to-note that even for the mentioned top ranks of the party 
and State structures the profits allowed by the straddling activity although very 
significant (especially in comparison with the masses) could not be used to 
construct their own patrimonial networks and political constituencies capable 
of threatening the power of the President. In a very small political milieu such 
as the Angolan, where all the elite members know each other and are known by 
the president any strategy of such type would immediately come to the 
knowledge of the President, the person in question would most probably be 
punished and access to resources cut 853 
In sum, the collapse of internal production and the extreme economic oil 
dependency strengthened the process started during Neto's presidency - the 
economic autonomy of the ruling elites (headed by the Presidency) in relation 
to the productive effort of the ruled masses (more fragile than ever). 
12.4 The Growing Socio-Economic and Political Impact of the War 
The worsening of the military situation was one of the main features of 
Eduardo dos Santos's Marxist phase. After Reagan's election in 1980, the 
United States evolves a new political approach towards Angola with the so- 
called Constructive Engagement (mainly consisting in co-operating with South 
Africa, calling for the linkage between the withdrawal of Cuban troops and the 
independence of Namibia)854. The South African regime felt politically 
supported; thus increasing its military activity, not only against SWAPO 
guerrillas, but also against Angolan military and economic targets, reaching the 
point of a new military incursion into southern Angola during the Protea 
Operation in August 1981855. The military range of action of South Africa and 
ass Also supporting this idea is Bayart stating that `In this respect [knowledge of all the elite] the small 
population of most African states is a major advantage. It enables a leader in power for one or two 
decades to acquire direct knowledge of every individual with money or influence. Sekou Toure took 
surveillance of the social elite to extremes. '; in Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa ... op. cit. 
p. 233. 
854 See Wright, George The Destruction ... op. cit. P. 
99. 
855 On the Protea operation see several selected newspaper articles such as: articles of Patrice Claude in 
Le Monde (27 and 28 August 1981); The Economist (29 August 1981); The Times (26 August 1981); 
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UNITA substantially increased with the logistical support of Mobutu, who, 
under the pressure of the US, allowed them to use Zairian territory to launch 
military operations in the East and North of Angola (Mobutu no longer 
honoured the agreements made with Neto in 1978)856 
With the drastic stepping up of military attacks, there was also an 
increased destruction of infrastructure 857, not only in the provinces and rural 
areas as before, but also with sabotage actions in major cities such as 
Luanda858, Lobito or Huambo859. As a consequence, the rural population 
continued migrating to major provincial cities and surrounding areas860 
As previously discussed, within this work's analytical perspective we 
need to stress the effect of the war upon the framework of relationships 
between rulers and ruled. 
Firstly, it made easier the economic autonomy of the ruling elites and the 
economic fragility of the ruled masses. This happened by contributing to 
economic scarcity (disrupting productive infrastructure), thus reinforcing the 
article of Michael Hornsby in The Times (27 August 1981); article of David Watt in The Times (28 
August 1981); article of Eric Marsden in The Sunday Times (30 August 1981); articles of Colin Legum 
in The Observer (6 and 13 September 1981); also Herald Tribune (28 August 1981); articles of Mark 
Webster in Financial Times (28 August and 5 September 1981); articles of Quentin Peel in Financial 
Times (3,7 and 10 September 1981). See also ACR, vol. 14 (1983), pp. B582-B585; also ACR, 15 
(1984) pp. B599-B600; also ACR, 16 (1985) pp. B603-B605. 
856 On the agreement between Neto and Mobutu and also on Mobutu's breakage of the agreement in 
early eighties see Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, Angola ... op. cit. pp. 
216-223; such Zairian 
support was to increase in mid 1980's, especially to channel CIA's covert military aid to UNITA as 
referred in Collelo, Thomas, ed., Angola, ... op. cit. p. 196,207,244. 
Reporting to 1982, some 
references to the stronger guerrilla activity of UNITA can also be found in Pepetela, A Geragdo... op. 
cit. pp. 235-236. 
857 In Relatörio do Comite Central ao If Congresso ... op. cit... 
1985, p. 7, pp. 74-75. 
858 One of the most spectacular urban sabotage attack committed in 1981 sent part of Luanda's 
Petraagol oil refinery up in flames during the night of 29-30 November, and was a major example of 
the new military posture of South Africa; in ACR, vol. 14 (1983), p. B586; also in Foreign Report (25 
December 1981), published by The Economist, p. 1; also Radio Nacional de Angola (10 December 
1981) cit. in SWB (12 December 1981); on UNITA's strategy towards economic targets see also article 
of William Claiborne in The Washington Post (9 July 1987). 
859 `Sabotage [... ] included attacks on the Luanda refineries, the partial destruction of the hydroelectric 
dam at Lomaum, the planting of underwater mines on ships in the port of Luanda and the attack on fuel 
deposits in the city of Lobito [... ] shocking terrorist attacks on the city of Sumbe, the sabotage of power 
supplies to the city of Luanda and, more recently, the attempted destruction of an industrial zone in the 
city of Huambo. ' In Documentos da P Conferencia Nacional ... op. cit... 1985, pp. 
26-28; also 
mentioning sabotage actions in Luanda, Benguela, Lobito, Moxico, Bie, Huambo, Malange, Kwanza 
Norte among other provinces, is Relatörio do Comite Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. cit... 
1985, pp. 74- 
75. 
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overall economic dependency on oil revenues (managed with autonomy at the 
top); 
Secondly, it strengthened micro-identity political alignments, whereby 
the stronger was the guerrilla activity of UNITA and its identification with the 
Ovimbundu861, the stronger was the threat to the Creole/M'Bundu alliance, thus 
providing the MPLA with far more support than would otherwise have been the 
case. This was the main factor making it possible to proceed with the 
ambiguous process through which it was possible for the government to 
alienate (economically and politically) the majority of the population but 
without losing its political support (at least of all those identified with the 
Creole/M'Bundu alliance). It was also one of the main supports to the 
presidential policy of promoting younger cadres and downgrading some party 
veterans without fearing a violent reaction on their part (see chapter 10). As 
noticed by Hodges, 
[there is] one key point about how UNITA is perceived [... ] this is 
to do with UNITA's character as an essentially Ovimbundu 
movement, its ethno-populist appeal and its apparent hostility to the 
relatively acculturated urban Africans and mesticos[... ]. Fear of 
arrests and killings in the event of UNITA's entry into the cities is 
sufficient reason [... ] to want to keep UNITA well away. The status 
quo, difficult but at least safe (for those living in the cities), is 
862 preferable to the risks of the unknown 
This fear and socio-cultural identity cleavage (whose remote origins we have 
already analysed) is absolutely crucial to understanding not only the 
relationship between rulers and ruled in the independent state, but also the 
relationship between ruling elites at the core of the MPLA, as well as the 
legitimacy of rule and the political system in general (not only during the time 
period covered in this thesis but until today). 
860 In 1985, it was estimated that there were half a million people displaced by war from a population 
estimated at 8.5 million; in ACR, 18 (1987), p. B619. 
1361 For the stronger identification between Ovimbundu and UNITA in the eighties see Birmingham, 
David, Frontline Nationalism... op. cit. pp. 82-83. On the `loyalty of the Ovimbundu' towards UNITA 
in the eighties see also ACR, vol. 15 (1984), p. B594. Also in the same sense are private interviews with 
Julio Morais (11 April 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998); General Farrusco (2 May 1998); 
Reginaldo Silva (9 July 1998). 
862 In Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. p. 23 
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Thirdly and finally, the war reinforced the centralisation of the 
administration and the concentration of power that was under way. This 
happened not only through the mentioned decline of significant local and 
regional economic activity (preventing provincially autonomous patrimonial 
constituencies), but also through a new type of territorial administration, 
progressively and essentially restricted to the network of main cities all over the 
country. 
By 1985-1986, T NITA's bush war had spread to the great majority of the 
country and the MPLA administration was restricted to a network of cities. 
However, this does not in anyway mean that UNITA controlled the countryside 
or the rural areas. The areas most affected by UNITA's activities (the south and 
south-east provinces of Cuando-Cubango, Cunene, Moxico, part of Bie) 
became `a no man's land': firstly, because out of the main urban centres 
population density was always very low, especially in those affected areas; 
secondly, because that low density was increasingly aggravated by the rural 
exodus towards the cities863. By early 1987, about 600.000 peasants had been 
uprooted (about half a million in the central highlands, where the UNITA 
activity was more intense, and the rest in the extreme south, where the 
population displacements had been caused by successive South African 
incursions near the frontier with Namibia)8M; thirdly, because UNITA, even 
with South African support, could not realistically expect to seize and hold any 
major city in view of the strength of Angola's armed forces (the largest and best 
equipped in the whole SADCC region, with c. 40.000 men) and in view of the 
86s 
presence of c. 30.000 Cuban troops effectively fighting on the battlefield 
863 According to the last population census (1970), Angolan population density was 4.8 persons per 
square kilometer-s/k and the provinces of Cuando Cubango and Moxico had less than 1 person per s/k; 
the provinces of Cunene, Huila, southern part of Bie and Lundas ranged between 1 and 5 persons per 
s/k. After the independence due to the rural exodus especially accute in south-east and extreme south 
that ratio was surely aggravated; for the 1970 census on population density see Atlas Geogräfico da 
Republica Popular de Angola (Luanda: Ministerio da Educacäo, 1982), p. 24. 
864 See ACR, vol. 19 (1988), p. B621 
865 See ACR, vol. 18 (1987), pp. B625-B626; also ACR, vol. 19 (1988), p. B621. It might be worth to 
remind that FAPLA posessed very sophisticated military equipment such as battle tanks T54,55 and 62 
and air fighters Migl7,21 and 23 which were above the South African mirage and impala; see also 
ACR, vol. 19 (1988), pp. 8625-B626. 
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We must bear in mind that despite any propaganda by UNITA, South 
Africa, US and some Western media in the eighties, FAPLA never lost military 
primacy. Its last great military offensive against UNITA's forces in the extreme 
south-east (operation `final assault' in 1989, just before the transition to 
multipartyism) inflicted a major military defeat on Savimbi's movement866. It is 
also important to note that the massive predatory practices that spread 
throughout the economy and throughout the whole society did not permeate the 
FAPLA to the same extent (on security matters the punitive legislation was 
effectively implemented as we mentioned earlier). Such predation came to 
occur only after 1991 when the armed forces were re-structured, reduced and 
most of its men demobilised within the transition process to multipartyism (but 
that is out of this work's time frame)867. 
In sum, the intensification of the war indirectly reinforced the pattern of 
relationships that was evolving between rulers and ruled, be it in political, 
administrative or economic terms. 
12.5 Social Sectors: More Neglect 
This final indicator for the analysis of socio-economic relationships focuses on 
the dereliction of public social policy. As discussed earlier, social sectors can be 
taken as expressions of public consciousness, which is almost absent in a post- 
modem patrimonial system. During the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos 
presidency, social sectors were almost entirely neglected, thus reinforcing the 
tendency that began to be noticed by the end of Neto's administration (1977- 
1979). 
866 On this military operation see the article with the clarifying title `Mavinga: a ültima batalha. Quinze 
anos depois da independ8ncia trava-se em Mavinga a ültima batalha por Angola. Mas a guerra ganha-se 
na imprensa mundial' (the last battle is in Mavinga but the war is won in the international press), in 
Grande Reportagem, 2 (March-June 1990), pp. 105-113. 
867 In late eighties there were a few officially reported cases of theft and drunken military drivers, but 
that was the exception and not the rule; on the reported cases see Collelo, Thomas, ed., Angola, ... op. 
cit. p. 231. Confirming the good organisation and discipline of the Armed Forces before 1991 is General 
Farrusco in private interview (2 May 1998). 
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As clearly admitted by the CC report to the 1985 congress, all sectors of 
social policy regressed between 1980 and 1985, be it education868; health869; 
housing870; social support 871; or community services872. Such regression (at a 
time of greater want, due to a deterioration of socio-economic conditions and a 
worsening war) had the most immediate and dramatic effect upon the lower 
social strata, not only in rural areas (where an estimated 500.000 to 700.000 
displaced people were in critical need of social assistance 873), but also in the 
urban areas, where: there was a dire need for water 874; street cleaning and 
public sanitation systems collapsed875; several diseases such as yellow fever 
and cholera made a frightening reappearance of plague killing as early as 
868 [EDUCATION]: `In spite of the efforts made, there was drop in the education system [... ] The 
literacy programmes that were so successful during the first years of independence, also show signs of 
regression'; In Relatörio do Comite Central ao II° Congresso ... op. cit... 
1985, p. 121. According to 
Mohanty, `From 1980-85, in primary education there was a decrease in the number of pupils (10 per 
cent annually) and teachers (14 per cent annually) on average'; in Mohanty, Susama, Political 
Development 
... op. cit. p. 
209. Education accounted for 2 per cent of the country's total foreign 
exchange expenditure during 1980-85; ibid. p. 209. 
869 [HEALTH]: `The sharp deterioration during the first phase of the five-year period was expressed 
through the negative evolution of available indicators, including health cover [... ] and increased 
morbidity of the main contagious diseases. '; in Relatörio do Comite Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. 
cit... 1985, p. 123. `Health, like education, accounted for 2 per cent of the country's total foreign 
exchange expenditure during 1980-85'; in Mohanty, Susama, Political Development ... op. cit. p. 
209. 
870 [HOUSING]: `It is a fact that without building new housing and finishing the building work that has 
already been started, it will not be possible to solve the problems of housing [... ] on the other hand [... ] 
State housing have not been regularly maintained and have even deteriorated somewhat, which again 
adds to the complexity of the problem. '; in Relatörio do Comite Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. 
cit... 1985, p. 128. 
871 [SOCIAL SUPPORT]: `In terms of support to displaced populations and integration of returned 
populations there have been difficulties in bringing the guidelines to fruiton [... ]. In spite of the high 
levels of international aid, the resources given were insufficient. '; Ibid. p. 125. 
872 [COMMUNITY SERVICES]: `During the past five years, the services were not given the necessary 
means to function. ' This justified their obvious breakdown; Ibid. p128. 
873 According to the UN in 1985, `More than 500.000 people are estimated to be in critical need of 
assistance, mainly in the Northern, Central and Southern provinces. [... ] Many displaced people are in 
dire need of clothing, blankets and shelter; In Africa Emergency - UN Office for Emergency Operations 
in Africa (June 1985). Under the clarifying title `Les stigmates d'un effondrement', Jean-Claude 
Pomonti reported that `Le comite international de la Croix Rouge, qui dispose d'antennes locales, 
estime la situation `tres grave'. Sur les hauts plateaux [... ] se trouveraient la majorite des 467.000 
`personnes deplacees' selon les calculs officiels angolais. En fait, d'autres sources font etat, pour 
1'ensemble du territoire, de 700.000 refugies de l'interieur, soit un habitant sur dix'; In Le Monde (28 
January 1981). Reporting to 1982, a description of these refugees camps full of diseases and hunger can 
be found in Pepetela, A Geragio... op. cit. pp. 212-213,239. 
874 Article of Jean-Claude Pomonti under the title `Les stigmates d'un effondrement' in Le Monde (28 
January 1981); the same problem of the lack of water is reported by Quentin Peel in Financial Times 
(14 September 1981). 
875 Article of Jean-Claude Pomonti under the title `Les stigmates d'un effondrement', in Le Monde (28 
January 1981); also stressing the grubby and run-down condition of Luanda is the report of Michael 
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1981876; in 1985, cholera was responsible for the dead of 4000 people in the 
city of Luanda alone877 and one out of every three children died878. 
The main official argument used to justify such collapse was the difficult 
financial situation resulting from the increased war effort, 
The activity in the social domain over the past five years has 
reflected the general difficulties caused by the military situation 
and by financial and economic matters, which were affected by the 
limitations on budget, foreign currency and investment. 
879 
Indeed, arms expenditure doubled in 1980 (increasing to more than US$1 
billion880) and in 1983 it was estimated that Angola spent 50% of its foreign 
exchange earnings into defence88 1. However, such an explanation cannot be 
taken at face value for two main reasons: firstly, because the same argument 
had already been used to justify the first signs of regression in those sectors 
observed by the end of Neto's presidency; secondly and mainly, because the 
report itself denied such argumentation when, despite all the chaotic situation in 
that area, it clearly set as the main objective for future social policy the 
reduction in spending, with the absurd argument that people did not realise the 
true value of the social services provided by the State, 
Some measures have been taken and others are under way aimed at 
diminishing the dependence of these sectors on the State's general 
budget, so that those who benefit from them can realise the true 
value of some of the services that the State provides for them. 
882 
In other words, the government's neglect towards social sectors (mostly 
affecting the bottom social layers) was to become the norm, independently of 
any possible later increases in State revenues. So, the obvious question is why? 
From the rulers' perspective the answer here provided is mainly twofold: 
Holman in Financial Times (21 June 1982). Reporting to 1982, a description of these problems can 
also be found in Pepetela, A Geragdo... op. cit. pp. 212-213,234,236-237. 
876 In article of Jean-Claude Pomonti under the title `Les stigmates d'un effondrement', in Le Monde 
(28 January 1981). 
877 According to Western aid workers `it was a miracle that not more people died'; article of Paul Betts 
in Financial Times (21 September 1987) 
878 In Africa Emergency - UN Office for Emergency Operations in Africa (June 1985). 79 In Relatdrio do Comite Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p. 120. 880 Until then they had remained stable (around US$500 million per year in late 1970's); In Collelo, 
Thomas, ed., Angola, ... op. cit. p. 234. 881 InACR, vol. 15 (1984), p. B594. 
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Firstly, because - the phenomena associated with Neto's presidency 
became reinforced, i. e. the social layers most affected by the neglect in social 
policies had a decreasing economic and political value. Economically, the 
ruling elites were more autonomous than ever in relation to the productive 
effort of the ruled masses. Politically, there were virtually no formal 
mechanisms by means of which the masses might express their political 
disaffection and the government could still count on significant political 
support because of the fear of UNITA engendered by the worsening of the war. 
Secondly, because as has already become plain by the end of Neto's 
presidency, there were a number of international donors willing to fund social 
initiatives in order to save people from starvation. Therefore, the government 
intensified its requests for international aid during the first five years of the 
1980s, having received a very positive answer from several countries and 
organisations, namely: UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, FAO, WFP, UNESCO, OIT, 
OMS, co-operation and development agencies from northern countries, the 
EEC, Western countries, 883 and the International Red Cross (which was 
regularly helping to feed thousands of people in the most affected provinces 
since 1981884). 
Accordingly, the government's future strategy for social policy became 
clearly determined and officially outlined in that same December 1985 CC 
report, 
Resorting to international co-operation to complement the resources 
available internally and to accelerate the pace of national 
reconstruction and of social and economic development is an 
sss objective necessity. 
aal In Relatörio do Comite Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p. 120. 883 Ibid. p. 140. In June 1982, UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) announced it was giving 
US$21m to Angola; In Radio Nacional de Angola (6 June 1982), cit. in SWB (8 June 1982); Three 
years later, in 15 January 1985, the same organization announced that Angola expected to commercially 
import about two-thirds of its 1984-1985 food deficit and had succeeded in securing food aid pledges 
for most (71.000t) of the 83.000t balance; cit. in ACR, vol. 17 (1986), p. B621. 
884In Bhagavan, M R, Angola's ... op. cit. p. 20. S85Relatdrio do Comite Central ao I1° Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p. 146. 
336 
As a consequence of the new policy and despite the major recovery in oil 
revenues (which nearly doubled in 1987)886, the emergency aid requested by the 
government went from US$96. lm in 1985887 to US$116m in 1987888. It thus 
becomes clear that expenditure in social sectors had very little to do with the 
availability of internal resources. 
Over the years, this strategy was taken to the absurd extremes 
encountered nowadays, whereby the State is minimally responsible for very 
little expenditure in social areas and the role of international co-operation has 
gone from being a supposedly complementary one to being central. They now 
provide most of the social services. Although an examination of the post 1987 
period is beyond the scope and time frame of this work, some considerations on 
social policy during the so-called transitional period will be provided in the 
conclusion889. 
Concluding chapter 12, based on the five main indicators used, it can be said 
that during Eduardo dos Santos' presidency the evolution of the socio-economic 
framework of relationships was characterised by the extreme reinforcement of 
phenomena that were to be seen by the end of Neto's presidency. There was 
development of the State sector inefficiency (be it public administration, 
agriculture of manufacturing industry), a growing dependence on oil revenues, 
the widespread development of the informal market, the worsening of the war; 
neglect of the social sectors; all resulting in more economic fragility, instability 
and insecurity for the masses and the near-total economic autonomy of the 
ruling elites. 
886 Angola's annual oil revenues almost doubled, from previous US$1.100m in 1986 to US$2.000m in 
1987; in Hodges, Tony, Angola from Afro-Stalinism... op. cit. p. 2. 
$$' In Africa Emergency - UN Office for Emergency Operations in Africa (June 1985). 
888 Reported by Paul Betts to Financial Times (14 and 21 September 1987). 
889 On the discussion and data for this subject see Vidal, Nuno, Estrategias ... op. cit.; also 
forthcoming 
Master's dissertation on international and national NGOs in Angola, of Marisa Vidal in Lisbon, ISCTE; 
also Angola: as aparencias de 'normalizagdo' escondem graves cenas de guerra, relatörio de 
Medecins Sans Frontieres (Luanda: MSF, 9 November 2000); also A Crude Awakening-, a report by 
Global Witness ... op. cit. 
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The main revenue coming from oil was now managed with complete 
impunity by the very top (the President and his close entourage at the 
presidency) and the distribution of State resources was ever more restricted to 
the middle and top ranks of the party/State/military structures. For the majority 
of the population, survival entailed massive and generalised resort to predatory 
practices. However, such unregulated assault on the State's resources (apart 
from the oil rent) did not solve the economic problems of the lower social strata 
(i. e. the majority of the population). On the contrary, their socio-economic 
conditions only got worst (starvation, diseases, lack of education, sanitation, 
healthcare and so on). 
By the end of Eduardo dos Santos' Marxist phase, the very feeble 
relationships of economic distributive interdependence between rulers and 
ruled that had prevailed in the first years of independence (and that had 
survived till the end of Neto's presidency) were now completely gone. There 
was now in place a socio-economic and political system that cut off the top 
elites from the masses. The difference with Neto's administration was thus 
substantive. 
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13 - The Evolution of the Ethical and Normative Principles of the dos 
Santos Regime: 1979-1985/87 
This chapter aims to analyse the development of normative principles during 
dos Santos' administration and compare them with those in operation during 
Neto's administration. The main purpose is twofold: -at the top of the system, 
to see if principles of patrimonial management of power were maintained and 
reinforced; - at the bottom of the system, to check if in face of an increasing 
distributive contraction, a flexible or pragmatic normative framework 
developed (unregulated predation) confirming the collapse of normative 
distributive principles between rulers and ruled. As usual, this chapter employs 
the same analytical indicators used to the analysis of Neto's presidency. 
13.1 The Main Principles at the Top of the System 
Although, as we have seen, dos Santos asserted his authority against both the 
right and left wings of the party, this did not entail a break with the nature of 
the regime as it had evolved under Neto, whether in terms of economic 
practice, political management or foreign policy. 
13.1.1 The normative principles of economic practice 
At an economic level, the reinforcement of the principles that came to prevail 
by the end of Neto's presidency (i. e. pragmatism or tolerance of existing 
predatory practices; relaxation of Socialist norms; and an economic overture to 
the West), continued apace as the president consolidate his power over the left 
and rightwing. 
a) In terms of tolerance with existing practices, it occurred through the 
outcome of the three discussed cases that happened right at the beginning of 
Eduardo dos Santos's presidency, namely the Monty, Angonave and Kamanga. 
In the Monty case, the president more or less explicitly protected Herminio 
Escörcio (the Sonangol director accused of corruption), not allowing a normal 
judicial process and dismissing Monty (the accuser, minister of oil). In the 
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Angonave and Kamanga cases, although judicial processes were effectively 
formed during 1982 (within a period when the leftwing still had some power), 
trials were only held in 1984 (after the president had asserted his power over 
the left and rightwing) and had virtually no practical outcome for those accused 
and sentenced as discussed. 
With such an outcome, a clear and simple message was passed: the 
President took the rightwing pragmatic stance regarding the acceptance of the 
widespread predatory economic practices (personal appropriation of state 
assets, taking private advantage of state offices, straddling activities, traffic and 
corruption networks, etc. ) that were rife throughout the whole social spectrum. 
b) In terms of the relaxation of Socialist norms, after re-asserting his 
power internally and having centralised the whole political and administrative 
system to an extreme, the President felt strong enough to introduce the first 
official changes in the direction of the economy. This happened at the very first 
opportunity, in 1985, within the ambit of the second congress, whose main 
documents890, indirectly questioned the Socialist economic model for the first 
time. The methods of management and the direction of the economy891; the 
anachronistic, all-encompassing and ineffective economic planning system with 
distorted investment policies892; the fixed pricing system not reflecting 
production costs; 893 the extensive and counter-productive bureaucracy894; the 
890 The main documents (already quoted) are those of the first national conference in January 1985 
(preparing the congress) and the CC report to the congress in December 1985. 
891 At the first national conference, Eduardo dos Santos stated that, `in the next five years general 
economic measures that are politically far reaching must be pursued, leading to the stabilization and 
subsequent development of the national economy'. He noted without elaborating, `the need for 
profound change in the management and administration methods in our economy and enterprises'; cit. 
in ACR, vol. 18 (1987), p. B618. Such change is also stated in Documentos da 1" Conferencia Nacional 
... op. cit... 1985, p. 95; also in Relatörio do Comite Central ao Il° Congresso ... op. cit... 
1985, pp. 99, 
105,111-112. 
892 Documentos da P Conferencia Nacional 
... op. cit... 
1985, pp. 33-35; also in Relatörio do Comite 
Central ao Il° Congresso ... op. cit... 
1985, pp. 90-92. 
893 Documentos da P Conferencia Nacional 
... op. cit... 
1985, p. 34. See also Relatörio do Comite 
Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, pp. 93-94 and pp. 106-108. 1994 In Documentos da 1° Conferencia National 
... op. cit... 1985, p. 22: also in Relatörio 
do Comite 
Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. cit... 
1985, p. 95, p. 106. 
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profound financial and macro-economic imbalances that could not be 
exclusively explained by the war895, all this were criticised overtly. 
In addition to that criticism, the same documents stressed the need to take 
advantage of the internal and external private initiatives896 and the CC report 
clearly assumed the existence of `good conditions to face the tasks that would 
lead to the economic and financial clean-up of the country [saneamento 
econömico e financeiro do pals - or SEF] in the next five years'. 
897 In fact, 
such SEF came to be introduced two years later, in August 1987, in order to 
correct the internal and external financial imbalances and to restructure and 
rehabilitate the economic system898. 
The programme included the privatisation of non-strategic companies, 
reducing the State sector, legalising the private sector (i. e. small trade, public 
and commercial transport, construction, etc. ), ending budget subsidies to the 
remaining State companies, returning state farms to the peasantry, increasing 
prices to reflect the production costs, authorising free circulation of products 
between provinces, and allowing the free flow of supply and demand within 
these markets. 899 
From the measures proposed it was clear that the new programme meant 
a lot more than a reinforcement of the tendencies initiated during Neto's 
presidency (relaxation of Socialist norms and tolerance towards the petit 
commerce), it represented a turning point in the formal economic system ('a 
895 In Documentos da P Conferencia Nacional ... op. cit... 
1985, pp. 29-32; The national conference 
explicitly stressed that such imbalances could not be excused or justified by the war situation even if the 
war impact was acknowledged. 
8" In Documentos da 1° Conferencia Nacional ... op. cit... 1985, pp. 110-111 and 
143; also Relatörio do 
Comite Central ao If' Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, pp. 107,145. 897 In Relatörio do Comite Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p. 89. 898 Introducing SEF, the president explained that it was fulfilling the orientations of the second congress 
and justified its delay with the need to pay more attention to emergency measures in the mean time; In 
Telex Angop: transcrigdo integral do discurso ... op. cit. Part 2,3,4. The same speech translated 
in 
French and an extensive presentation of SEF can be found in Programme d'assainissement economique 
et financier et loi sur les investissements etrangers en Angola (Luanda: Republique Populaire 
d'Angola, n. d), probably from the end of 1988 due to the inclusion of the law on foreign investments 
dated from July 1988; for an analysis of SEF see also Ferreira, Manuel Ennes, `A politica de 
recuperacäo econömica na Republica Popular de Angola', in Politica International, 1,1 (1990), 
pp. 107-132; see also ACR, vol. 20 (1989), pp. B582-B585. 
99 In Telex Angop: transcricäo integral do discurso ... op. cit. Part 
5,9,10,11,12. 
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new stage' as referred to by the president900 or la fin d'une epoque as stressed 
by foreign observers9o1); gradually transforming the previous Socialist economy 
into a market economy, that came to be officially announced at the third 
congress in 1990. For the reasons already explained in Part I, such transition 
period is beyond this thesis' time frame (some short considerations on the 
impact of this formal transition will be provided in the conclusion; a more 
systematic analysis will form part of a forthcoming research project). 
c) In terms of the economic approach towards the West: once the SEF's 
main objectives had been presented, it became clear that it followed the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund recommendations in terms of economic 
policy towards African countries. As the Angolan State's financial accounts had 
been worsening902, the SEF was in fact intended to facilitate a petition for 
membership in these organisations so as to access loans and debt 
rescheduling 903 
900 Ibid. Part 5. 
901 In article of Pierre Haski in Liberation (20 August 1987). 
902 Such worsening of the balance of State accounts is also admitted by the presidential speech 
introducing SEF, namely: a 50% decrease in imports of consumer goods to feed the population from 
1985 to 1986; a 33% decrease in imports of raw materials which led several companies to an absolute 
paralysation of its production; an increase of the deficit in State budget; an increase of the external debt; 
decreasing purchasing power of salaries; low productivity of work; inefficiency of State companies and 
banking system. In Telex Angop: transcricdo integral do discurso ... op. cit. 
Part 3 and 5; see also 
Ferreira, Manuel Ennes, `A politica ... op. cit. p. 
119. 
903 In Telex Angop: transcrigdo integral do discurso ... op. cit. 
Part 7 and 8. According to the 
president, the external debt amounted to US$6.000m in December 1986 and increased to US$7.000m 
during 1987; the problem was not the amount of the debt in itself but the short-term concentration of 
financial reimbursements in the following years; ibid. part 7. The intention to access membership and 
loans provided by those international financial organisations was re-affirmed a few days later by the 
Angolan minister for production in the clearest terms: `We believe that our SEF programme is not so 
different from the demands made by the IMF and the World Bank as a requisite for affiliation or 
presentation of proposals for economic and financial clean-up [saneamento]. I can even go so far as to 
say that, in certain aspects, our programme is somewhat more rigid. [... ] Only with the financial means 
usually provided by the World Bank can we accomplish a programme such as this one'; in interview 
with the Minister of Production, Pedro de Castro Van-Dunem `Loy', in Jornal de Angola (21 August 
1987), cited in Ferreira, Manuel Ennes, `A politica ... op. cit. pp. 119,120. 
On the intention to join the 
IMF see also article of Pierre Haski in Liberation (20 August 1987); also articles of Paul Betts in 
Financial Times (14 and 21 September 1987). On the debt problem see also the article of Tony 
Hodges, `Angola pins hopes on unique debt strategy' in Financial Times (7 July 1987). 
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After a difficult and complicated process904, Angola was finally admitted 
as a member of the IMF in July 1989, despite the objection of the USA905. As 
soon as this was achieved, SEF fell from grace, especially in its more internally 
criticised policies such as the national currency devaluation or the downsizing 
of the inefficient public sector906 
13.1.2 The normative principles of political management 
As soon as Eduardo dos Santos asserted his power over the competing party 
wings, he acquired greater internal authority and was able more easily to 
manage the political system according to the principles set towards the end of 
Neto's presidency: 1), increasing the patrimonial carrousel; 2), intensifying a 
policy of clemency and integration of prominent members of rebel groups 
within the patrimonial/distributive system in order to enlarge the political 
support of the MPLA. 
1) Regarding what was here called patrimonial carrousel °7, the new 
President took it to extremes, constantly reshuffling central and local 
904 In September 1987 (a month after the presentation of SEF) the Angolan president began a 
diplomatic offensive visiting countries such as France, Belgium, Italy and Portugal with the purpose of 
achieving several major objectives - to impress on European governments the seriousness of Angola's 
new economic recovery programme, SEF; to secure European support for Angola's application for 
membership of the IMF in the face of US opposition; to prepare the groundwork for the necessary debt 
rescheduling; to promote trade and investment; and to explain Angola's position on such issues as 
Namibia, UNITA, the future of the Cuban troops in Angola, and the talks with the US; in the second 
semester of 1988, the President went to China and India, members of the Angolan IMF adherence 
committee, and to several Socialist European countries; in Ferreira, Manuel Ennes, `A politica ... op. 
cit. pp. 120-121. See also ARB, (October 1987), p. 8648, a, b, c, and p. 8649-a.; also articles of Paul Betts 
in Financial Times (14 and 21 September 1987). 
'05 See Ferreira, Manuel Ennes, `A politica ... op. cit. p. 120-121. 906 On the internal resistance to the application of some measures and the ensuing faillure of SEF see 
ACR, 21 (1990), pp. B558-B559; a complete and accurate explanation on how the whole process of 
SEF developped and failled was given in private interview by Jose Cerqueira, one of the major 
technicians of SEF (20 April 1998); a few remarks over this issue, regarding the period post 1987 (so- 
called transition) can be found in the conclusion. 
907 As defined during Neto's presidency, by patrimonial carrousel is meant a mechanism for power 
management whereby the primary distribution of State's resources (privileges and benefits) is made 
through the rotation of key-figures for the top jobs in party and state structures, taking into account 
political and micro-identity balances. The aim of such strategy is to satisfy lavishly the 
Creole/M'Bundu core of the MPLA (assuring them the political and economic leadership of the system) 
while sufficiently rewarding the elites of other socio-cultural and micro identity groups for them to have 
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administrative structures, always taking into account the necessary political 
balances (according to distributive and micro-identity criteria), but, unlike his 
predecessor, Eduardo dos Santos gradually excluded from this rotation the 
subsidiary organs that surrounded the presidency and also, to some extent, the 
politburo. 
Considering that the president centralised the administrative system and 
concentrated political power (executive and legislative) for himself and in 
subsidiary organs (see chapter 11); considering that such power was taken out 
of other organs such as the central and local government and party structures 
(apart from the politburo); therefore, it can be said that he excluded from the 
patrimonial carrousel all those organs and posts that were now having the 
effective political (legislative and executive) power and/or influence (i. e. the 
subsidiary organs surrounding the presidency and the politburo). 
In other words, the president was splitting the state and party top 
positions into two: 
" on the one side, the posts that were exclusively to fulfil patrimonial 
needs (distribution of economic benefits and privileges to those who 
had to be rewarded for the sake of maintaining the internal 
equilibrium and the status quo; i. e. the old fractions of elite of the 
Creole/M'Bundu alliance and some co-opted elites of other socio- 
cultural groups). These posts had formal but no effective or 
significant governmental and administrative power and no 
autonomous economic power; 
" on the other side, there were the posts that effectively held and 
exerted governmental and administrative power, with access to the 
management of the main revenues (at source). They were the all- 
powerful presidency, its subsidiary organs and to a much lesser 
an interest in maintaining the status quo (with the partial exception of the Ovimbundu, as explained); 
Cf. supra sub-chapter 8.1.2. 
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degree the politburo. For this reason they were excluded from the 
patrimonial carrousel. 
Such distinction between those state and party positions that were to be 
exclusively part of the patrimonial carrousel and those that were not, represents 
a first major difference with the management system initiated by Neto. It might 
be seen as the formula found by the new President to conciliate the necessities 
of the patrimonial management constructed by Neto with that of effectively 
exerting personal power over the whole political system. State resources could 
still be distributed by the President through rotation within top party and state 
structures without interfering with the effective governing power of the 
president and his control over the business with public and private foreign 
entities, including the oil business (the main source of revenue). 
This is not to say that because the president asserted his power over the 
`old' members and because he took effective power out of the posts they came 
to occupy he simply neglected them or stopped needing their acquiescence. On 
the contrary, if he included them in the patrimonial carrousel it is because he 
needs to satisfy them with economic benefits and political honorary positions 
such as some ministerial posts, positions as secretaries of state, national 
directors, public companies managers, ambassadors, provincial commissioners 
and so on. These old members have a political legitimacy of their own acquired 
historically (see sub-chapter 11.2.4). The resentment of old members against 
the Futungo Kids is because these Kids despite holding theoretically inferior 
posts (in subsidiary organs such as secretariats) have in fact more power than 
the majority of ministers or provincial commissioners. Again it should be born 
in mind that these old members were downgraded within a very specific context 
that constrained them to accept such policy without any other type of reaction 
(see chapter 10). 
This is also not to say that subsidiary posts are not handsomely rewarded 
(they are, as we saw), but they do not hold positions for the sake of the logic of 
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the patrimonial carrousel. The president does not need their political support, 
he needs their absolute political loyalty, subservience, technical competence, 
confidentiality and dependence, without any legitimacy of their own. Therefore 
he does not need to rotate them. This is also why it was so important to analyse 
the process of power concentration and administrative centralisation and all the 
balances and mechanisms created (chapter 11). 
Once the politburo was taken out of the patrimonial carrousel it was 
filled only with loyalists to the president, thus changing the previous balance 
introduced at the end of Neto's presidency. There was now a majority of black 
Creole/M'Bundu. Thus, that eleven-member party organ (politburo) came to be 
composed of: only one Bakongo (Pascoal Luvualu) when previously there were 
three908; only one Cabinda (Pedro Maria Tonha `Pedale') when previously there 
were two909; one Southern Ovambo (Kundi Paihama, who had previously been 
an alternate member910); only one mestico (Franca N'Dalu) when previously 
there were three 911; and seven black M'Bundu when previously there were 
only three912 (Jose Eduardo dos Santos, Afonso Van Dunem `M'Binda', 
Francisco Magalhäes Paiva `N'Vunda'; Juliäo Mateus Paulo `Dino Matrosse', 
Roberto de Almeida, Manuel Alexandre Rodrigues `Kito', Pedro de Castro Van 
Dunem `Loy'; the last two were young cadres promoted by the president along 
with Maria Mambo Cafe who came to occupy an alternate seat)913. The 
Ovimbundu of the MPLA were still kept out of the top party organs914. 
908 Ludy Kissassunda and Ambrosio Lukoki were the other two Bakongo who previously held politburo 
seats, as mentioned. 
909 Evaristo Domingos Kimba was the other Cabinda who held a seat at the politburo during Neto's 
administration. 
910 During Neto's administration, Paihama had been alternate member of the politburo together with a 
mestico (Henrique de Carvalho Santos `Onambwe') and a black M'Bundu (Francisco MagalhAes Paiva 
`N'Vunda'); see Resolucöes e Mensagens do I° Congresso Extraordinärio... op. cit... 1980, appendix. 
911 Lncio Lara and Iko Carreira lost their seats for the reasons already explained. 
912 During Neto's administration, besides Neto himself and Jose Eduardo dos Santos the other black 
M'Bundu was Joäo Luis Neto `Xietu' as mentioned. 
913 After the second congress, there were only two alternate members: Antonio Jacinto, a party veteran 
(white) previously member of the CC; Maria Mambo Cafe (mestica), young cadre promoted by the 
president); see ACR, vol. 18 (1987), p. B620. 
14 For the reasons explained, the Party's Ovimbundo were kept in second place, as during Neto's 
presidency; Faustino Muteka was the only Ovimbundo in the top ranks of the State (minister); this 
situation was to change slightly after 1986 when Marcolino Moco, another Ovimbundu, was made 
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Progressively, the whole system of political management became 
clarified, especially in terms of positions within the patrimonial carrousel. 
These were the subject of increasing struggle, not only because they afforded 
access to the first lines of internal distribution, but also because they allowed 
the appointment to secondary positions within the State's hierarchy (and 
consequently, an increased possibility to employ close family, friends, informal 
business partners and so on, as publicly recognised by the president915). Thus, 
as soon as the leftwing was defeated (1982 onwards), the President made a 
point of clearly establishing, by decree, all those posts for which the post-holder 
had to be nominated by him in central and local State structures, and what 
would, in turn, be the post-holder's nomination powers (to the secondary posts 
in the government structure, ranging from cabinet directors, through chief 
secretaries, to provincial delegates)916. As a whole, such a decree represented 
some kind of an institutionalisation of the hierarchy and structure of 
nominations within the patrimonial carrousel and consequently an 
institutionalisation of the distributive hierarchy as we1191. I am obviously 
talking of middle and top rank posts within those structures and therefore of a 
relatively limited number of positions. Beyond or below those levels of the 
distributive pyramid (be it in the state administration or public companies) 
governor-general of Die in the central plateaux; see ARB (May 1986), p. 8034. Later on, for essentially 
electoral reasons, several other Ovimbundo rose within the apparatus, especially when the change to 
multipartyism occurred and preparations were being made for the 1992 elections and after those 
elections Marcolino Moco was made prime-minister, but that is out of this work's time frame. 
gis During a speech in June 1980, Eduardo dos Santos clearly stated that `Some directors are more 
concerned about the jobs they have than about carrying the job out. Instead of hiring and promoting the 
most deserving, the most honest and the most hard-working, they hire and promote their friends from 
home or their relations, they allow themselves to be corrupted'; cit. in Guardian (US) (4 June 1980). As 
explained at the introduction of this work, these words must be understood within the process of auto- 
critica occurring before congresses, whereby the President usually assumed the positions of the most 
severe criticism heard throughout several meetings (in this case there was a preparation for the 1980 
congress going on). It should not be understood in terms of a sincere commitment to change such 
practices in the future, something that never happened as we saw. 
916 The decree included a long list of posts appointed by the President (art. 1), by the Ministers and State 
Secretaries (art. 2), by the Minister of Provincial Coordination (art. 3), by the Minister of Justice (art. 4), 
by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (art. 5), by the Minister of Education (art. 6), by the Minister of 
External Trade (art. 7), the Procurator-General of the Republic (art. 8), the Provincial Commissioners 
(art. 9) and the Rector of the University of Angola (art. 10); In Decree 94/83, DR, 133 (7 July 1983). 
This decree was changed at a later date, when the post of minister of Provincial Coordination was 
scrapped, by removing art-3 referring to that post; see decree 15/86, DR, 62 (4 August 1986). 
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posts no longer had any significant privilege (like access to special shops, the 
system of requisicöes and credenciais, working trips, US dollars at the foreign 
exchange rate and so on), and the wages were ridiculous. 
According to this institutionalised structure of nominations, every time 
the President rotated the names within the top positions of the hierarchy, there 
followed an almost automatic rotation within secondary lines of nominations, 
because those nominated by the President to a place would immediately fill 
those posts under their nomination power, with close family, business 
associates, and so on918. Insofar as the rotation speed of nominations by the 
president increased, up to the level of the absurd919, the rotation of names at 
secondary levels of the central and local government structures also gathered 
pace. 
The rapid increase in the regular change of presidential nominations 
served not only the usual purpose of providing access to benefits and privileges 
for all those that were thought to be useful in terms of the political and micro- 
identity equilibrium and support to the statuo quo, but also to achieve a new 
aim, namely to exonerate the President from policy failures; i. e. government 
reshuffling (central and local) was also used to `make heads roll' at times of 
heightened crisis, finding scapegoats (ministers, secretaries of State, provincial 
commissioners and so on) to take personal responsibility for the failings of 
government - whereas this was a responsibility which in fact they did not 
have, as legislative and executive power was concentrated in the presidency 
917 Decree 94/83, DR, 133 (7 July 1983). 
918 From private interviews with Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Mario Seteco (10 March 1998); 
Filomeno Vieira Lopes (24 March 1998); Joäo Melo (17 April 1998). 
919 Only a few of the immense reshufflings on the patrimonial carrousel are mentioned here, with 
references to the year, number and month of the Diärio da Republica editions in which they were 
reported (the extension of names listed and the speed with which they are appointed, dismissed and re- 
appointed is such that it is not possible to be more accurate): in 1980, DR, 160 and 164 (July), 206 
(August), 217 and 229 (September); in 1981, DR, 65 (March), 111 (May), 134 (June), 290 and 294 
(December); in 1982, DR, 45 (February), 191 (August), 275 (November), 302 (December); in 1983, 
DR, 88 (April), 161,162 and 176 (July), 193 (August), 207 (September), 289 (December); in 1984, 
DR, 32 (February), 71 and 75 (March), 160 (July), 249 (October), 261 (November); in 1985, DR, 7 
(January), 24 (March), 35 (April), 38 (May); in 1986, DR, 1 (January), 10 and 11 (February), 18 
(March), 28 and 34 (April), 48 (June), 81 (October); in 1987, DR, 18,19,21 and 26 (March), 42 
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and its subsidiary organs. This new aim in the reshuffle policy represents a 
second major difference from Neto's management. 
Those ministers who were publicly demoted and sometimes even 
humiliated, after a very brief period spent `paying for their sins' (which they 
usually had not committed), would then be re-nominated to another post on the 
patrimonial carrousel. As can be imagined, therefore, there was enormous 
pressure on the president to re-appoint those who had been dismissed. To deal 
with such pressures became a very difficult task for the president, as he himself 
made clear in the most elucidating speech: 
Finally, I want to tell my comrades that the constitution grants me 
certain competencies, as head of government, as head of state, to 
replace members of the government and ambassadors, and to 
appoint them. But I have a feeling that the application of these 
competencies are not always fully accepted. We are amongst 
militants and we shall speak frankly. We do not always readily 
accept renewal or reappointment; there is always someone who 
worries about these problems. When someone is replaced, there is 
always a current of opinion for it and a current of opinion against it, 
that is, in my experience, one side of the story. The other side is 
that until this person is given another post, there are always 
concerned elements ready to suggest that `he could come here 
now', `he could go there now, because the post is vacant' [... ]. This 
is the situation and some even resists my decisions. 
This is not as easy to solve as my comrades think and even in 
those cases when the replacement was based on proven mistakes 
committed by the post holders, where we put together commissions 
to look into the matter [i. e. corruption, incompetence], it was not 
easy either. Comrades, don't think that these matters are easy to 
deal with [... ] we shall have to grow a bit more as a class Party in 
order to demand from all members that their obligations and duties 
be fulfilled, but we have not yet reached that stage. 
In practice, and I am speaking from experience, comrades 
cannot imagine what I must do in order to resolve such situations. 
But this is how our Party is, this is how we are. [my bold] 
920 
Later on, while noting the `objective difficulty that Angola has few cadres', the 
President warned that officials `must finally be held responsible for their acts 
and a new era of accountability must start'; offending officials would `have to 
(May), 53 (July), 75 (September), 91 (November), 92 (December); in 1988, DR, 5 (January), 6 
(February), 13 (March), 17 (April) and 50 (December). 
920 `Speech of the President to one of the working commissions ... op. cit. pp. 
75-79. 
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spend a longer time without holding top leadership posts'921. In other words, 
the speed of the patrimonial carrousel should slow down. In practice, however, 
this warning had no effect, since it was meant above all to placate the 
international community, in order to give credibility to the SEF922. In the end it 
was just another cosmetic move like the 1981 campaign against corruption. 
2) Regarding the rebel groups fighting the MPLA, Eduardo dos Santos 
also resorted to the strategy outlined at the end of Agostinho Neto's presidency, 
based on co-option and integration within the middle ranks of the State 
apparatus (and consequently within the middle ranks of the 
patrimonial/distributive system). A new campaign of clemency was launched, 
asking for the surrender of rebel groups, acknowledging the `deep-seated 
historical reasons that had led many people to join those groups', but promising 
an `honest work on the production line' to all those who showed themselves to 
be truly repentant923. As a direct result of the campaign, in October 1984, 
thousands of guerrillas and FNLA supporters surrendered, amongst them 
Johnny Edward Pinock, who had been prime minister of Angola's tripartite 
transitional government in 1974, and Tonto Afonso de Castro, head of FNLA's 
armed forces924. Both were integrated into State companies, occupying highly 
remunerated management positions925. For the first time, the clemency policy 
was explicitly said to include UNITA members, although not with as much 
success as in the FNLA case. 
During the past year [19841, many fellow countrymen belonging to 
the now defunct FNLA decided to put an end to their useless 
sojourn in the bush and have been integrated into the great 
Angolan family in order to take part in the economic and social 
921 Cit. in ACR, vol. 20 (1989), p. B572. 
922 See ACR, vol. 20 (1989), pp. B582-B583; also ACR, vol. 21 (1990), p. B558. 
923 Cit. In ARB (October 1984), p. 7407C. 
924 Surrender took place after the publication of an editorial in Jornal de Angola reiterating the 
government's appeal for the surrender of all rebels in the interest of national unity and reconstruction; 
in ARB (October 1984), p. 7407C.; The surrender definitely finished with the weak FNLA guerrilla that 
survived the 1976 civil war. 
925 From private interview with Cornelio Caley (2 May 1998). 
350 
reconstruction of our country. Some members of UNITA have also 
laid down their arms [my bold]. 
926 
13.1.3 The guiding principles in terms of foreign policy 
Finally, with regards to foreign policy, after the defeat of the leftwing, the 
President found the necessary room for manoeuvre to pursue a negotiated 
settlement over the Cuban and Namibian issues (the President's second major 
strategic objective mentioned in chapter 10), as negotiations had hitherto been 
blocked due to the intransigence of the leftwing in this matter 927. 
Thus, as soon as that political obstacle was `definitely' overcome, a first 
agreement between Angola and South Africa came to be signed through the 
mediation of the US, in February 1984 - the Lusaka Agreement - according 
to which both parties agreed to establish an effective cease-fire in the border 
war and to open the way for a wider peace settlement in the region, and for the 
independence for Namibia928. For the first time, Angola agreed to announce the 
pending departure of the Cubans as soon as the last South African soldier left 
its soil. In return the US agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Angola929. 
However, after the signature of this first agreement, new and serious 
setbacks emerged in the way of the president's aim, not only at the level of 
926 In Documentos da P Conferencia National ... op. cit... 1985, p. 
29. The clemency policy was 
developed in the following years, especially in 1988, when a national seminary on clemency was 
ornganised by the party and a new campaign was launched including a 'framework for effective re- 
integration of Angolan citizens [... ] in the economic and social construction of the country'; see 
Discurso do Camarada Ministro da Defesa da Republica de Angola Proferido na Abertura do 
Seminärio National sobre a Politica de Clemencia e Harmonizacdo National (Luanda: Editorial 
Vanguarda, 1988), especially p11. 
927 Still within the scope of emergency powers granted by the CC to the President in December 1982, 
the President conceded himself diplomatic competency and the possibility of autonomously negotiating 
a cease-fire with South Africa, but the active pursuit of that aim by the President was delayed until the 
defeat of the leftwing was completly achieved. Although the President's new powers had not been 
specified when the CC granted them to him in December 1982, the Angolan news agency did mention 
at the time that they were related to the application of an emergency plan and that they would allow 
more room for manoeuvre in the field of defence, including the possibility of negotiating a cease-fire 
with South Africa and the implementation of economic austerity programmes. The decisions were taken 
at the same time as a top-level Angolan delegation was talking to the South African government in 
Cape Verde about a possible cease-fire in the South of the country. See ARB (December 1982), p. 6686. 
9211 In ARB (February 1984), p. 7150. 
929 Ibid. pp. 7150-7154. 
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subsequent violations from South Africa930, but also and mainly with Angola's 
own minister of foreign affairs. The minister, Paulo Jorge (a mestico with a 
moderate but clear leftwing position in terms of foreign policy93) had 
somehow survived the previous presidential assault on the left932 and 
inconveniently decided to express his point of view during the visit of the US 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Frank Wisner in mid-October 1984. 
During a meeting to discuss the Namibian and Cuban issues, Paulo Jorge 
unexpectedly took a very aggressive stance and almost provoked a diplomatic 
incident by asking Mr. Wisner on what grounds he was present, as the US 
government did not officially recognise the Angolan government - which 
effectively scuppered the meeting933. Paulo Jorge was immediately dismissed934 
and the president personally took charge of foreign affairs93s The ministry was 
placed under the President's direct institutional tutelage and was made 
autonomous in relation not only to the Council of Ministers but also to the 
CDS, as detailed in the diagram of the State's Central Structure (see previous 
figure 11.2.2.3). 
After the dismissal of Paulo Jorge and a temporary break in the 
negotiation process (due to the repeal of the Clark's amendment in July 1985 
930 Soon after the signature of the agreement, Angola accused South Africa of increasing support to 
UNITA in contravention of the accord; see ARB (October 1984), pp. 7407c and 7408a.; other military 
confrontations followed in 1985; see ARB (August 1985), p. 7725; also ARB (October 1985), 
p. 7776a, b, c p. 7777a, b, c. 
931 Paulo Jorge tried to reject the Cuban withdrawal as a pre-condition for a Namibian settlement; on 
the external characterization of Paulo Jorge as a leftwing member see ARB (July 1982), p. 6538a; for a 
characterization of Paulo Jorge as a member of the pro-Soviet side within the party see ARB (October 
1984), p. 7401a, b, c; p. 7419c, 7420a-b; for a characterization of Paulo Jorge as a hard-liner within the 
government see article of Jim Hoagland in Washington Post (23 October 1984). Also during the private 
interview Paulo Jorge gave to the author of this thesis, he still assumed a pro-Communist inflexible 
stance despite all the ideological change occurred within the party in 1990; from private interview with 
Paulo Jorge (26 June 1998). 
932 Probably for being a very cautious politician and diplomat and for not having the slightest 
involvement in `the picture and the play' episode; not even of solidarity with the ones being arrested as 
was the case of Pepetela in relation to N'Dunduma. 
933 This attitude was confirmed by Paulo Jorge himself, during a private interview (26th June 1998). 
934 In Presidential Decree 25/84, DR, I, 232 (20 October 1984). 
935 The President held the brief for foreign affairs until April 1985 when a new minister was appointed, 
Afonso Van Dunem `M'Binda'; a man of absolute confidence to the president (a `loyalist' as defined), 
who had been until then the head of the President's cabinet; in ARB (April 1985), p. 7565. 
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936) talks resumed in November 1985, in Lusaka937, leading to some meetings 
during 1986 and 1987938 (even while US military overt aid to UNITA 
continued939). Negotiations definitely entered a new phase in May 1988 with 
the inclusion of Cuba along with South Africa and Angola under the mediation 
of the US, discussing concrete terms for Namibian independence and the Cuban 
retreat. The first tripartite accord came to be signed in Brazzaville on 
December 13th soon to be followed by the New York agreement (22 December 
1988)94° which finally set the seal for the independence of Namibia and the 
withdrawal of Cuban troops941 
By then, the president's second major objective was half achieved. 
Angola had finally come to terms with South Africa and the US as desired by 
the president, solving the Cuban and Namibian issues. However, neither the 
political integration of UNITA nor its military destruction (or a combination of 
both, as intended) was accomplished. Nevertheless, Luanda was convinced that 
once Namibia was independent and her long time friend Sam Nujoma was 
president, UNITA could no longer count on the help of the South African 
Defence Force and the military protection it previous had in Namibian territory. 
Without such support, UNITA was much more vulnerable even if the Cubans 
were to leave and US aid to Savimbi was to continue. FAPLA's large contingent 
and its sophisticated war material were thought to be more than enough to keep 
UNITA's actions under control while a political solution was prepared942. The 
936 See Wright, George The Destruction 
... op. cit. pp. 
76-77. 
937 See ARB (December 1985), p. 7874. 
938 See ARB (February 1986), p. 7952, a-b; also ARB (June 1986), p. 8089. 
939 See Financial Times (6th January 1986); also Financial Times (10th November 1986); also ARB 
(June 1986), p. 8089; also ARB (July 1987), p. 8547. 
940 With the renewed victory for the Republicans in the US (electing George Bush in November 1988), 
it became confirmed the continuing support to Savimbi, putting even more pressure on both sides for an 
agreement, reached in the following month as referred. 
941 See ARB (May 1988), p. 3874; for all the intricacies of this process's final stage see ARB (August 
1988), pp. 8935-8937; ARB (September 1988), pp. 8963-8967; ARB (December 1988), p. p. 9059 to 9062; 
ARB (January 1989), pp. 9102 to 9104. Regarding the complete negotiating process since 1984, see 
Relatörio do Comite Central ao II! ° Congresso (Luanda: Secretariado do Comit6 Central, 1990), pp-3- 
16; also ACR, vols. 17-23 (encompassing the period betwen 1984 and 1991); also ARB (from 1984- 
1991). 
942 From private interview with Carlos Feij6 (10 April 1998); See also in the same sense ACR, vol. 21 
(1990), p. B549, B551; also ACR, vol. 22 (1991), pp. B487-B491). 
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diplomatic process, the political and economic transition that followed, leading 
to a market economy and a multiparty system, will not be discussed here as it 
beyond the scope of this work943 
13.2 The Main Principles as they Affected the Whole Population 
13.2.1 The reinforcement of self-legitimising morals sustaining new 
predatory practices 
As we have seen, during the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos presidency, 
there was a reinforcement of all the factors (contraction of distribution and 
party `elitism') that were said to be at the basis of the previously analysed self- 
legitimising morals supporting predatory practices throughout the whole 
population. 
The continuous development of this cumulative process led not only to 
the massive and generalised dissemination of these practices (as previously 
explained in chapter 12), but most importantly, to new predatory practices such 
as outright theft and commercialisation of natural resources and art objects, as 
recognised in the report to the second congress, 
In the economic and social domain, it is remarkable to note the 
attempts of the petite bourgeoisie to consolidate their economic 
position by hoarding, corruption, speculation, bribes, exploitation 
of the workforce, theft of natural resources and even doing 
business with cultural patrimony [my bold] 
944 
94' If as mentioned, the first signs of an economic transition can be said to have occurred as soon as 
1985 and 1987 with SEF, the first clear signs of a political transition can be said to have occurred as 
soon as the Ist October 1988 (even before the New York agreement), in Franceville; there, the heads of 
state from the Congo, Gabon and Angola, held a summit meeting to look at the progress of the four- 
partite negotiations (between South Africa, Angola, Cuba and the USA) for the solution to the conflict 
in South-East Africa. The President of Angola held a press conference and mentioned that once the 
four-partite negotiations in Brazzaville were over [leading to the above mentioned Brazzaville 
agreement in December 1988] a peace process would then start in Angola that would be inspired by the 
lessons learnt in other African countries who'd had similar experiences [those countries were on the 
way to holding multi-party elections]. The explicit agreement by the Angolan government to hold 
general elections occurred towards the end of 1989 as part of a reformulated plan for internal peace 
date 27 December. Regarding the extensive negotiation process that led to a multiparty system in 
Angola, see mainly the Relatörio do Comite Central ao II10 Congresso ... op. cit... 
1990, pp. 6-16. 
944 In Relatörio do Comite Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p. 68. 
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The reported theft of natural resources referred not to the already mentioned 
`old' diamond traffic, but to the emerging illicit trade in ivory 945, which in the 
mid-eighties ran into large sums and transcended international boundaries as 
reported by Birmingham, according to whom, the old border markets of Zombo 
and Noqui thrived on border traffic and smuggled goods as never before946. As 
for the business on cultural patrimony it was a reference to the ransacking of 
museums, whose objets d'art were sold on the black market947. 
These new predatory practices did not exist during Neto's 
administration, not so much because it was not possible to commit them but 
most probably because the existing public morals strongly condemned them948. 
However, inasmuch as predatory practices acquired legitimacy through the 
worsening of the economic situation, they progressively became morally 
legitimate and were therefore indulged by ever more people. Several examples 
can be given apart from the shocking ones discussed above. Street selling or the 
informal petit commerce in Angolan cities (mainly Luanda) was given great 
impetus by the regressados (Bakongo returning from Zaire after 1975), who 
behaved as they had in the large cities of Zaire. Merchants circulated 
throughout the cities with all kind of articles approaching people all over, even 
in cars stopped at red lights or cross roads. They turned street alleys or open 
fields into informal anarchic markets without sanitation, where food or 
medicines were (and still are) sold near small rivers of sewer, where garbage 
"S From private interviews with Mario Seteco (10 March 1998); Eduardo Kuangana (7 April 1998); 
Jülio Morais (11 April 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998). 
946 In Birmingham, David, Frontline Nationalism-op. cit. p. 100. 
947 From private interviews with Mario Seteco (10 March 1998); Filipe Amado (27 March 1998); 
Eduardo Kuangana (7 April 1998); Jülio Morais (11 April 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998). 
In 1995, the author of this thesis was invited to visit a museum in a Southern town to select some items 
of his choice. When asked how it was at all possible to buy museum-pieces, the `guide' answered, as if 
it were the most natural thing in the world, that he would go off and make another piece to replace the 
one the author wanted. This business went on with the cooperation of the museum employees, as though 
the museum had turned into an artefact store. Judging by how long these practices had been going on 
for, it was highly likely that all the museum pieces were in fact copies. Later on, I discovered that one 
of the ways of rapidly aging new pieces, especially wood, was to bury them for a few weeks in very 
damp soil, near the mangrove swamps, and then dry them in the sun, making the pieces look quite like 
antiques. 
948 From private interviews with Mario Seteco (10 March 1998); Filipe Amado (27 March 1998); Jülio 
Morais (11 April 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998). 
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accumulates all over in a smelly and full of flies environment. Prostitution, 
small guns, false documents and drugs became regular items and services 
within these markets. At first, they were strongly attacked and criticised by 
most of the inhabitants and authorities of Luanda, who accused them of 
wanting to `turn Angola into a Congo' (an allusion that went back to the anti- 
colonial struggle and was used as a synonym for anarchy, confusion and law- 
breaking)949. With the passing years, however, with the worsening of the 
economic situation for most of the population, and the collapse of the extensive 
patrimonial distribution, an increasing number of non-Bakongo people became 
involved in this kind of activity, and by the mid-1980s, the majority of the 
urban population was directly or indirectly involved in this type of petit 
commerce, thereby legitimising activities that they themselves had previously 
proscribed and condemned. Soon the Bakongo returnees became a slim 
minority in these commercial activities 950 
In simple words, by the end of the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos, 
the large increase in predatory practices had become morally acceptable. Such 
phenomenon represents an important qualitative distinction with the period of 
Neto's administration, proving the cumulative and reinforcing character of self- 
legitimising moral decline -- which is one of the most important differences 
between modem and post-modem patrimonialism. 
In the face of the increasing dissolution of the patrimonial compromise and 
an increasing party elitism, an ethical framework emerged, according to which 
the ends (survival) justified, or legitimised, the means (predatory practices). 
949 From private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Carlos Pinto (16 February 1998); 
Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); J. M Mabeko-Tali (23 February 1998); Pepetela (7 July 1998), 
among several others. 
950 Another more recent example is petit theft, which was morally condemned in late eighties, with 
burglars beaten and burned till dead in the streets by the population when caught in flagrant delictum 
(most of the times without interference from the police); however, in late nineties the same type of 
crimes was not punished in the same way (sometimes there was beating, but most of the time they were 
handed to the police), being somehow understood and partially excused by public morals under the 
argument that they had nothing to eat or no godfathers to appeal to (I could commonly heard arguments 
such as `they have no godfathers in the kitchen'; `their crimes are ridiculous when compared with the 
millions stolen by the rulers' and so on); from personal experience and from private interviews with: 
Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); Femanda Vieira (2 March 
1998); Mario Seteco (10 March 1998); Pepetela (7 July 1998). 
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The more the discrimination and economic difficulties increased, the more 
practices prevailed that had been considered moral illegitimate by the public 
morals of a recent past and the more the boundaries between what was 
considered as moral legitimate and moral illegitimate, became diluted and 
blurred. The more this happened, the greater became the distance between the 
moral legitimacy and the legality (i. e. between the moral order and the juridical 
order), up to the point where people and organisations no longer believed in the 
judicial system to solve civil cases and either left criminals unpunished or took 
the law into their own hands - as revealed by the first national conference 
(January 1985), 
At the level of the administration of justice, we have noticed an 
excessive delay in dealing with cases referred to those organisations 
responsible for administering justice. Consequently, certain 
organisations and people, no longer understanding the 
usefulness of these organisations, opt either for leaving citizens 
unpunished for their crimes, or for taking the law into their 
own hands [... ] there remains in some organisations, a lack of 
respect for the law and for certain citizens' rights, the lack of 
respect for the protection of socialist property and for national 
patrimony, whereby it is necessary for the Party and state 
organisations concerned to consider taking more effective measures 
to control the applying of the law and bring back lawfulness. [my 
bold] 951 
Such extreme discrepancy between moral and legal order (much broader than 
during Neto's presidency) represents another clear sign of what is here called 
the cumulative process of self-legitimising morals. 
13.2.2 Normative principles and prevailing solidarities 
During the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos' presidency, there was 
maintenance of the preferential, sectarian and discriminatory type of 
solidarities952 based upon criteria such as ethnicity, regionalism and nepotism. 
951 In Documentos da 1" Conferencia Nacional ... op. cit... 1985, pp. 23-24. 952 As noticed by foreign observers as soon as 1981, people could only get what they want 'having the 
right connections'; reported by Quentin Peel in Financial Times (14 September 1981); and as 
previously quoted, Eduardo dos Santos himself had acknowledged such type of solidarities in his 
speech of June 1980, `Some directors [... ] instead of hiring and promoting the most deserving, the most 
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The first national conference (January 1985) was perfectly clear about 
the continuing existence of such micro-identity criteria and even informed the 
delegates about the Politburo's decision to order a research project on the 
country's `ethnic specificity' in order to facilitate the management of society 953 
Twelve months later, the report to the second congress not only re-affirmed the 
presence of those same criteria but also acknowledged the emergence of a new 
type of discrimination based upon differences in lifestyles, 
The experience acquired during the construction of our young 
nation has shown that not only do tribalism, regionalism and 
racial prejudice threaten national unity, but also other complexes 
that arise from our social mosaics - the cultural differences in 
lifestyles, and behaviours engendered by colonialism, the social 
injustices we have inherited and have not yet totally overcome. [my 
bold] 954 
Those `other complexes' and `cultural differences in lifestyles' mentioned by 
the report, although not specified, referred most probably to the rural-urban 
cultural cleavage that deepened with the increasing arrival of rural migrants to 
Luanda. They were called pejoratively by the people of Luanda `Bantu' and 
consequently discriminated against955 in much the same way as the 
zairotas/regressados had been discriminated against. 
Acknowledging the existence of those micro-identity criteria along with 
the preferential, sectarian and discriminatory type of solidarities it supported, 
and relating those to practices of `liberalism' and `corruption' (called in this 
work predatory practices), the report went on to conclude that, 
Thus our ideological objectives for the next five-year period must 
focus on [... ] strengthening our attack against remainders from 
colonial society such as tribalism, regionalism and racism [... ] 
paternalism, nepotism, liberalism [or laissez faire] and 
corruption [my bold]. 956 
honest and the most hard-working, they hire and promote their friends from home or their relations, 
they allow themselves to be corrupted'; cit. in Guardian (US) (4 June 1980). 
953 In Documentos da I° Conferencia Nacional 
... op. cit... 1985, p. 19. 954 In Relatörio do Comite Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p. 7. 955 According to Birmingham it was `a term of unexpected opprobrium applied to those who did not 
speak Portuguese or adopt the middle-class table manners of the departed colonials'; in Birmingham, 
David, Frontline Nationalism... op. cit. p. 99. 
956Relatörio do Comite Central ao If Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p. 33. 
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Such recommendations had no effect 957 
The above mentioned prejudice against rural people reveals in stark 
form the fact that in Angola, unlike in most other African countries, there are 
virtually no distributive networks linking the elites at the centre with the rural 
areas in the provinces. 
In Angola, therefore, the system did not accord with that presented 
within the modem patrimonial perspective which assumes the continuous 
distributive linkage between ruling elites and ruled masses, between the top and 
the very bottom of the patrimonial pyramid. In Angola, such micro-identity 
linkages became progressively fragmented. Aggregation was limited to those 
with proximate socio-economic and political status (be it at the top or at the 
bottom of the system)958. Therefore, progressive patrimonial fragmentation 
effectively represented deep social fragmentation. 
Such social fragmentation or the erosion of more extensive ties of 
solidarity was also noticed by Zenha Rela in early eighties in terms of `the 
beginning of "all against all" in the day-to-day living struggle'959, by Wernerus 
in 1982 in terms of salve-se quem puder [those who can, should save 
themselves] 960, by Bhagavan in 1983 as `anarchic individualism'961, or even 
brilliantly portrayed by Pepetela as the death of Utopia, when selfish and 
particular ambitions definitely smashed a more encompassing social notions962. 
However, it is worth noting that such deep social and patrimonial 
fragmentation between top and bottom of the system did not represent the end 
957 Five years later, in 1990, the CC report to the third congress still complaint about the deep 
incrustration of feelings such as tribalism and ethnicity, but this time explaining it as a general problem 
of African states artificially constructed by the colonizers; see Relatörio do Comite Central ao 11/° 
Congresso 
... op. cit... 1990, p. 8. 958 From private interviews with Gerönimo Belo (17 March 1998); Victor Aleixo (26 March 1998); 
Joäo Melo (17 April 1998); Jose Cerqueira (20 April 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998); 
Pepetela (7 July 1998). 
959 In Zenha Rela, Jose Manuel Angola 
... op. cit. p. 56. 960 In Wernerus, T, `Angola - eine vergessene tragödie', in Bulletin des Instituts für Internationale 
solidarität, 17 (1982), pp. 12-13; cit. InMeyns, Peter, `0 desenvolvimento ... op. cit. p. 
146. 
96'In Bhagavan, M R, Angola's ... op. cit. p. 40. 962 See Pepetela, A Geragdo... op. cit. chapter `0 polvo (Abril de 1982)', pp. 187-255; see especially pp. 
202,227-228. An also excelent description of preferential alliances between people of proximate socio- 
economic status can be found in the last part of that book, pp. 259-316 (even if refering to 1991). 
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of political micro-identity alignment or the end of political legitimacy of the 
ruling elites of the MPLA due to the stronger threat represented by UNITA. A 
threat that was to continue towards the 1992 elections and afterwards. 
Concluding chapter 13 we may say that the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos 
Santos was clearly marked by the extreme development of those characteristics 
that had begun to emerge by the end of Neto's administration: 
1) at the top of the system (besides the two major differences 
discussed), there was an institutionalisation of a management system 
based upon the patrimonial carrousel, whose rotation speed 
increased dramatically - still maintaining the primacy of the 
Creole/M'Bundu in sharing the spoils, satisfying rivals and co-opting 
enemies; 
2) at the bottom of the system, the near-total dereliction of distributive 
ethical principles that were supposed to link rulers and ruled, led to 
an extremely flexible moral order of a `free-for-all' type allowing as 
much predatory practices as the imagination of people could 
conceive (a hallmark of post-modem patrimonialism). 
There followed, therefore, the near-total dereliction of any ethical distributive 
principles that might have existed in the very first years after independence or 
that might have survived by the end of Neto's presidency. 
Bearing in mind all the preceding chapters, it can be said that at the 
end of the Marxist phase of the dos Santos presidency, the model of power 
management and political administration was similar to what I have defined in 
Part I as post-modem patrimonialism, distinguishing between 1 'Afrique utile 
(administratively: the network of cities over which the government exerted 
sovereignty, maintaining an international legitimacy of rule; politically and 
economically: the elites at the middle and top ranks of the state/party/military 
ranks) and 1'Afrique inutile (administratively the regions that were beyond the 
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network of main cities; politically and economically the so-called masses 
whose productive effort was irrelevant to the economic sustenance of the top 
elites). The potential weaknesses of such model will come to the surface with 
the changes occurring in early nineties (transition to multiparty system and 
market economy and a new international context). Although that period is 
beyond the limits of this thesis, a few remarks will be provided at the 
conclusion. 
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14 - The State During Eduardo dos Santos Presidency (1979-1985/87) 
By the end of the Socialist-Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos's presidency, 
it was obvious that the previous articulation between the working logic of 
patrimonialism and the structural form of a modern polity was no longer 
tenable. There was an extreme reinforcement of the organisational influence of 
the former and, consequently, an extreme atrophy of the latter. 
1) In terms of the links of distributive interdependence between rulers 
and ruled, there was a near-total collapse. Politically, there was an almost total 
institutional autonomy of the ruling elites in relation to the ruled masses 
deprived of any formal political participation. Economically, there was 
monopoly control over the significant sources of (external) income by the 
ruling elites (the President and his entourage), who thereby attained an almost 
total economic independence in relation to the productive efforts of the ruled 
masses who, in turn, found it increasingly difficult to survive. Ethically, there 
was a near-total neglect of the ruling elite's patrimonial and distributive 
obligations towards the masses, leading to the full development of a pragmatic 
morals of a `anything goes' type. 
The working logic of patrimonialism had reached extreme levels, be it in 
terms of patrimonial organisational principles (vertical, preferential and 
sectarian ties of primordial solidarity according to micro-identity criteria, 
leading to deeper social fragmentation) or patrimonial organisational 
expressions (predatory practices, rentiere posture, centralisation of 
administration and personalisation and concentration of political power). 
2) In terms of the structural form of a modern polity, there was an 
increasing dereliction of the functions identified with the `modern State' -- i. e. a 
minimally efficient administration, bureaucracy and government exerting 
sovereign authority over land and population; a minimal pursuit of public 
objectives. The generalised climate of predation favoured the 
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commercialisation and destruction of the State's bureaucratic and 
administrative apparatus (with the obvious exception of those organisations 
surrounding the presidency in Futungo de Belas, the State security and 
FAPLA). The full exercise of the central government's sovereignty over people 
and land became mainly restricted to a network of cities. There was no effective 
border control, and South African forces and UNITA increasingly violated the 
country's frontiers (especially in the south and southeast, but also in the north 
through Zairean territory). UNITA's guerrilla activity extended over the 
majority of national territory (even if there was never the possibility of seizing 
any major city). The control of some resources was clearly decreasing, 
especially in places such as the Lunda regions where UNITA exploited some 
diamond mines for its own benefit and war effort. In the social sphere, the main 
area of public consciousness and pursuit of public objectives, revealed massive 
negligence towards the masses (the people of I 'Afrique inutile), increasingly 
left to their own feeble predatory devices or in the care of international 
organisations. 
Summarising and concluding, by the end of Eduardo dos Santos presidency, the 
Angolan State and the social organisation it supported was no longer to be 
considered `partisan modern patrimonialism', mainly due to two sorts of 
reasons: 
" Firstly, because the party was clearly subservient to the presidency, which 
controlled all the most important economic and political areas (major 
business affairs with public or private external entities; diplomatic 
negotiations with the US and South Africa); 
" Secondly, because there was a near-total collapse of the interdependence 
distributive ties between rulers and ruled, thus undermining the logic of 
modem patrimonialism. 
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For these reasons, it is- appropriate to characterise the Angolan State and the 
social organisation it supported by the end of the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos 
Santos, `presidential post-modern patrimonialism'. 
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CONCLUSION 
It has been shown that in Angola the existing patrimonial dynamics are quite 
different from what is usually referred to as modern patrimonialism (it might 
also be the case of other countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Liberia). 
It was argued that the socio-political and economic system in Angola 
started off by following a path close to that of modem patrimonialism but that, 
because of the cumulative and self-reinforcing dynamics we have discussed, it 
evolved into a new dimension of patrimonialism as a system of social 
organisation - post-modern patrimonialism. In short, this evolution can be 
explained by a triple mechanism: 
1) The economic and political power of the ruling elites became detached 
from the ruled masses; they in turn lost their economic and political 
negotiating capital and became weaker and fragile within the 
patrimonial system; 
2) Given the autonomy and insularity of the political and economic power 
of the ruling elites, given the extreme economic and political weakness 
of the ruled masses, there followed a sharp dilution of their distributive 
interdependence relationships. This dilution generated an 
intensification of the working logic of patrimonialism (i. e. of its 
organisational principles and organisational expressions) within a 
framework of intense economic scarcity and social fragmentation; 
3) In the case of Angola, these dynamics were facilitated by the 
continuance of a civil war with increasing ethnic overtones, promoting 
micro-identity political alignments and economic scarcity. 
Flourishing amidst economic scarcity and social fragmentation, these dynamics 
hindered the mobilisation of alternative paths (horizontal and universal types of 
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social organisation), limited social change, preserved the status quo and 
produced a society built on the exacerbation of selective, sectarian and limited 
privileges among the ruling elites and widespread misery for the bulk of the 
population, who became increasingly divided, fragile, vulnerable, weak and 
marginalised within the patrimonial power system. 
This said, it is now time to conclude with a very important distinction 
that needs to be made between post-modern patrimonialism as presented here 
and other recently described phenomena such as William Reno's 
`Warlordism'963 or Bayart's `Criminalization of the State'9. 
It has been made clear that towards the end of Agostinho Neto's 
presidency (1978-1979), the Angolan political system had already exhausted its 
modern patrimonial dynamics. It evolved towards a post-modern patrimonial 
dynamics during the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos presidency (1979- 
1985/87). Therefore, post-modern patrimonialism occurred in Angola before 
the so-called transition to a market economy and a multiparty system. 
In these terms, contrary to the theories of `Warlordism' and 
`Criminalization of the State' (that we will briefly analyse below), post-modern 
patrimonialism can not be in any way explained by the new international 
changes that emerged in late eighties and early nineties, namely the end of the 
Cold War, the end of Apartheid and international pressure in favour of 
economic and political liberalisation. 
One can not ignore the fact that such international changes had a huge 
impact on the way post-modern patrimonial dynamics had been evolving until 
then. However, it must be noticed that changes in the economic and political 
structure did not in any way mean a change in patrimonial working logic. 
Surprisingly or not, such formal changes ended up further reinforcing and 
making more visible the dynamics of post-modern patrimonialism. Although 
this work's time frame ends in 1985/87, the distinction that needs to be made in 
963 Reno, William, Warlord Politics... op. cit. 
964 Bayart, Jean-Francois et al., The Criminalization ... op. cit. 
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relation to `Warlordism-' and `Criminalization of the State' leads us to offer a 
few remarks on the so-called transitional period96s 
The new international conjuncture of the late eighties/early nineties posed 
a double challenge to the patrimonial working logic as it had been evolving in 
countries such as Angola. Firstly, it brought strong pressure in favour of 
democratisation and economic liberalisation. Secondly, it brought new 
commercial actors onto the stage who tried to cash in on informal or illegal 
international activity taking advantage of the new wave of globalisation. 
Economic Liberalisation and Democratisation966 
With the end of the Cold War, the `bankruptcy' of the Eastern Bloc and the 
`failure' of its political and economic model, strong international pressure was 
put on African countries to restructure their economic and political systems in 
terms of freeing the markets, making structural readjustments, balancing 
internal and external accounts, reducing the public sector, introducing 
multiparty systems with free, direct and universal elections. As stressed by 
President Eduardo dos Santos in his inaugural speech to the III congress of the 
MPLA (introducing the transition to the multiparty system and market economy 
in 1990), 
A real democratic revolution dominates the world today. That 
revolution surpasses a lot the reform movements of countries in the 
previously designated `Socialist Community' and corresponds to a 
common aim of the whole Humanity at the end of the XX century, 
%s A more in-depth work on such period will be part of a forthcoming research project. 
m As explained I am just providing a few remarks on these issues that are out of this thesis time frame, 
therefore only a few bibliographic references are given. On the so-called political and economic 
transition in Angola some of the most important references are: Hodges, Tony, Angola from Afro- 
Stalinism... op. cit.; Mabeko-Tali, Jean-Michel , 
`L'interminable transition angolaise et les multiples 
dangers de l'incertitude politique', in Lusotopie, 5 (1997) pp. 87-103; Messiant, Christine, `Angola: le 
retour ä la guerre ou l'inavouable faillite d'une intervention internationale' in L'Afrique Politique, 
(1994) pp. 201-229; Messiant, Christine, `Angola, les voies ... II, op. cit. pp. 
181-221; Messiant, 
Christine, `MPLA et UNITA... op. cit. pp. 40-57; Messiant, Christine, `Angola: entre guerre et paix' ... 
op. cit.; Messiant, Christine, `La Fondation Eduardo dos Santos (FESA): autour de l'investissement de 
la societe civile par le pouvoir angolais', in Politique Africaine, 73, (1999), pp. 82-101; Messiant, 
Christine `L'Angola ? Circulez, il n'y a rien ä voir! ', in Lusotopie (2000), pp. 9-26 ; Messiant, Christine 
`Introduction', in Schubert, Benedict, A Guerra e as Igrejas, Angola 1961-1991 (Basel : P. Sclettwein 
Publishing Switzerland, 2000, Portuguese version), pp. 1-16 ; Messiant, Christine, `A propos des..., op. 
cit. pp. 61-95. 
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which sees in democracy (understood as power of the people for the 
people, exerted by its elected representatives) the only fair and 
legitimate form of organisation of the social, political and economic 
life of peoples and nations. [... ] 
The strength of democratic ideals is everywhere and there is also a 
growing certainty that economic development is able to sustain and 
materialise such ideals. This implies a permanent articulation 
between the economies of the world and more flexible (ägeis) 
forms of management and competitiveness inside each country. 
Thus, at the end of the XX century, the legitimacy of power and 
economic maturity of peoples [povos; in a sense of peoples of the 
world] are increasingly connected to their level of organisation, 
education, social mobility, free communication, political 
participation and democratic government. 
Only in this way will it be possible to face and surpass the serious 
political and economic crises reaching in the first place those 
countries with fewer resources and development, among which is 
naturally the majority of African countries967. 
However, the results of this new international wave of democratisation and 
liberalisation were very different from the objectives stated at the start of the 
transition to a multiparty system and the market economy, be it economically or 
politically. 
Economically, pressures for liberalisation ended up as an important support 
for the existing patrimonial dynamics and the best example to illustrate this is 
the above discussed SEF, which was officially devised to fit the demands of the 
IMF and World Bank so as to become a member of those institutions, have 
access to loans and debt rescheduling. The programme proposed to remove 
several economic distortions such as an overvalued foreign exchange rate, the 
provision of significant goods at subsidised prices and the enormous public 
sector. 
However, inasmuch as these distortions had become structural to the 
patrimonial system, such measures were never implemented and as soon as 
Angola was admitted to the IMF and managed to solve its debt problems (by 
96' In Discurso pronunciado pelo Presidente do MPLA-Partido do Trabalho Camarada Jose Eduardo 
dos Santos na Sessäo de Abertura do 111 Congresso do Partido; pela Paz, Unidade Nacional e 
RecuperaCdo Econömica (Luanda: Secretariado do Comite Central, 1990), pp. 8-9. 
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means of short-term reimbursements), the spirit of the SEF was subverted. The 
supposed reduction of the public sector and stimulation of private initiative 
were seen not so much as a reduction of State structures and employees, but 
more as: 
a) the concession of State commercial, industrial and agriculture real- 
estate to chosen members of the ruling elite at ridiculous prices (so- 
called privatisation, but in fact representing a reinforcement of private 
appropriation of public assets - predation) and also an allowance for 
them to initiate private commercial activity968, thus transforming them 
into the new entrepreneurial class of the future market economy (but 
still under the direct dependency of the State's top structures for credit 
lines, import licenses, access to foreign currency at official rates, and 
so on); 
b) further neglect of the State's social responsibilities (health, education, 
social security, sanitation and so on), through the arrival en masse of 
international aid and co-operation - from international organisations 
to NGOs, churches, charitable institutions, solidarity assistance and so 
on. This led to a situation in which the State is minimally responsible 
for very little expenditure in these sectors. The role of international co- 
operation has gone from complementary to central969, but always under 
96$ As early as 15 July 1989, various pieces of legislation were approved aimed at restructuring the 
State's economic sector and changing commercial activity; see decree 31/89, DR, I, 27 (15 July 1989); 
decree 34/89, DR, I, 27 (15 July 1989); also executive decree from the Ministry of Internal Commerce 
24/89, DR, I, 27 (15 July 1989), which approves the concession of commercial establishments 
belonging to the State to other economic agents. For an overall analysis of such `privatisation' process 
coming out of SEF see Ferreira, Manuel Ennes, `A politica ... op. cit. p. 
107-133; also Ferreira, Manuel 
Ernes, `La reconversion ... op. cit. pp. 
11-26. Stressing the innefectiveness of SEF especially in terms 
of those most 'controverse' measures, see ACR, vol. 21 (1990), pp. B558-B559. A complete explanation 
on how all this process developped (i. e. SEF and privatisation processes to safeguard the ruling elites 
economic position) can be found in an extensive interview conceded to the author of this thesis by Jose 
Cerqueira (one of the major technicians of SEF) (20 April 1998). Also confirming the strategic 
objective of privatisation to ensure the economic primacy of the party and its rulers after the so-called 
transition to a market economy and multi-party politics is Mendes de Carvalho in private interview (17 
July 1998). A previous research project devellopped by the author of this thesis in Luanda on 
entrepreneurial activity in August/September 1994 (non-published) reached to the same conclusion. 
%9 Although beyond of this work's time frame it must be stressed that only now and very slowly, the 
international community and its many organisations are becoming aware of their true role in the social 
politics of Angola, namely taking over the financial responsibilities of the State. According to Jean 
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close control of the government, which supervised not only the 
amounts of aid coming in, but also its distribution inside the country 
970. 
Spending on social provisions thus declined despite the astonishing and 
971 continuous growth in annual oil revenues 
The SEF programme was latter abandoned and periodically replaced by other 
official commitments more or less imposed on the government by the IMF and 
the World Bank, but with no significant results whatsoever. To this day (fifteen 
years after SEF) the Angolan government is still been able to prevent any 
effective implementation of structural adjustment and has even managed to 
keep its oil accounts secret sustained international pressure. For the essential, 
all the mentioned economic distortions remain until today (double foreign 
exchange rate; privileged access to subsidised goods and services; supply cards 
to high ranking cadres; privileged access to foreign currency at the official 
exchange rate; an enormous and inefficient public sector). The main difference 
Marc Perrain, chief executive of MSF/Angola (`Medecins Sans Frontieres'), it is not understandable 
how a country as rich as Angola, producing and selling oil and diamonds, with an estimated annual oil 
revenue of US$7.000 million per year, can invest so little in areas such as health: 'In our view, it is not 
normal that a humanitarian association such as MSF should provide absolutely everything that is 
required for the running of a hospital, be it in Kahala or in Kuito. This does seem to be quite ilogical. It 
would appear logical to us that complementary assistance be given to the Ministry of Health because of 
the difficult situation in the country at present. '; from statements made by Jean Marc Perrin in Angola, 
on 9 November 2000, broadcast on channel 2 of the Radio Televisäo Portuguesa news programme 
`Jornal de Africa' (11 November 2000); see also Diärio de Notfcias (12 November 2000); Publico (27 
April 2000). For the year 2002, the requested need for emergency aid is US$233m as announced in 
Luanda by the UN organizations on the 27th November 2001, cit. in Radio Dýfusäo Portuguesa A rica, 
news programme `Jornal das 9' (27 November 2001). On contemporary Angolan social policy see also 
Vidal, Nuno, Estrategias 
... op. cit. 970 Even though much beyond the scope of this work, it is important to notice that it was not a matter of 
completly substituting the State, because due precautions were taken by Angolan government who did 
not want to lose its intimate control of international aid resources and invested heavily (in early 
nineties) in setting up mechanisms for the coordination and management of the international 
organisations' activities, both in the provinces, through provincial governments and in Luanda through 
MINARS (Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration) and UTCA (Technical Unity for 
Coordination of Aid); initially in the direct dependence of the Council of Ministers to whom all NGOs 
had to pay a percentage of their annual budget, and now depending on MINARS; not to be confused 
with UN UCAH (Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination Unit, of the United Nations). Thus the 
government came to have a significant influence over NGOs coordination, management and definition 
of priority projects (controlling its activities and resources and attempting to articulate them with and 
integrate them into the existing distributive patrimonial system); On the discussion of this subject see 
Vidal, Nuno, Estrategias ... op. cit. 
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in relation to the Marxist phase is an even more restricted and selective access 
to those privileges and benefits (i. e. further `elitism'). 
In the end, the new economic model of a market economy (still under 
implementation) merely represented a reinforcement of sectarian, personal and 
preferential solutions and an even more intense (wild, frantic and speedy) 
predatory assault on all the remaining (meagre) resources by all social layers -- 
resulting in Angola being classified as the fifth most corrupt country in the 
world9n. 
Politically, regimes such as the Angolan were pressured to re-legitimise 
their systems according to new criteria. Political legitimacy in Angola had been 
based on the conquest and taking over of power at the time of independence, 
and on the socialist revolutionary legitimacy that had now been discredited. 
Multiparty systems with direct universal elections were the new internationally 
approved criteria for political legitimacy973. 
Nevertheless, the transition to a multiparty system only served to 
confirm the existing patrimonial working logic in terms of: a), fierce 
competition between two main contenders to maintain or conquer hegemonic 
power; b), micro-identity political alignment. 
a) As happened in 1975, the 1992 electoral process was transformed by 
the two main parties' strategy into a renewed scramble for hegemony over the 
new `democratic State', which according to the existing logic would most 
certainly continue being the main source of patrimonial resources (regardless of 
its notional multiparty complexion and the introduction of a market economy). 
971 Angola's oil revenue raised from the mentioned US$2.000m in 1987, to US$3.500m in 1990, to 
US$5.100 in 1996 and to US$7.000m in 2000; in Hodges, Tony, Angola from Afro-Stalinism... op. cit. 
2; see also Angola ... relatörio 
de Medecins Sans Frontieres op. cit. 
7Z The report on corruption was produced by the NGO Transparency International, published and 
presented in Berlim (13 September 2000), based upon criteria established by the OCDE convention on 
corruption (European Organization for Cooperation and Development); cit. in Didrio Econömico (14 
September 2000). According to the same report Nigeria is the most corrupted country in the world. 
97 See the above quoted speech of the Angolan president, Discurso pronunciado ... na 
Sessäo de 
Abertura do III Congresso ... op. cit. pp. 8-9 
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The fear and suspicion-on both sides (supported by sixteen years of war with 
increasing ethnic overtones) created the feeling that the winner would again 
`take it all', namely would achieve political and economic primacy through the 
capture of the patrimonial system974. Thus, understandably, both contenders 
resorted to all available means, including military to achieve or maintain power. 
On UNITA's side the whole military apparatus remained intact and hidden from 
international observers, ready to be used if the electoral outcome was not the 
one expected. On the MPLA's side, despite the effective demobilisation of 
FAPLA and the significant predation of its equipment (after the 1991 
demobilisation and restructuring and not before), a new special military force 
was created (Policia de Emergencia, or more popularly called Ninjas for their 
fearful appearance), just to ensure a minimally prepared military structure in 
case of conflict. 
Therefore, since the main players acted according to such logic and the 
international community (UN) had not the necessary means to supervise a rush 
implemented agreement with unrealistic deadlines for the electoral process to 
take place975, the outcome was a failure. As sincerely admitted and accurately 
analysed by Abel Chivukuvuku, former parliamentary leader of UNITA, 
974 Although the internal functioning of UNITA is little studied, for obvious reasons to do with its being 
a guerrilla movement, it is known that the logic of preferentialism and favouritism according to micro- 
identity criteria was indeed a reality, which, among other factors, led the movement to progressively 
lose its few non-Ovimbundu members. The kith and kin of Savimbi and the Bailundo (where Savimbi 
was from) were the ones who were privileged and promoted, receiving technical and university 
education, entering the diplomatic service and so on. The armed forces of UNITA (FALA-Armed 
Forces for the Liberation of Angola), their counter-intelligence and their representatives on the Joint 
Political and Military Commission (the organisation that was to monitor the implementation of the 
Bicesse agreements along with UNITA, the MPLA, the USA, Russia, Portugal and the special envoy 
from the UN general Secretary) were all headed by his nephews (sons of his sister), the legitimate heirs 
to Savimbi according to the matrilineal Bantu tradition. Regarding a few (scarce) characteristics of 
UNITA after independence, see Bridgland, Fred, 'Savimbi et 1'exercice du pouvoir: un temoignage', in 
Politique Africaine, 57 (1995), pp. 94-102; also Loanda, Guilherme de, `La longue marche de l'UNITA 
jusqu'ä Luanda', in Politique Africaine, 57 (1995) pp. 63-70; also Marcum, John A., `Angola: War 
Again', in Current History, vol. 92,574 (1993), pp. 218-223; also Messiant, Christine, `Angola: entre 
guerre et paix' ... op. cit. pp. 
166-175. For a comment on the inexistence of independent analysis on 
UNITA see Messiant, Christine, `A propos des..., op. cit. p. 72 footnote 21. 
975 See Messiant, Christine, `Angola: le retour ... op. cit. pp. 
201-229; also Messiant, Christine, 
`Angola, les voies ... 
II, op. cit. pp. 181-221; also Messiant, Christine, `MPLA et UNITA... op. cit. 
pp. 40-57; also Messiant, Christine, `Angola: entre guerre et paix' ... op. cit.; also 
Anstee, Margaret J., 
`L'ONU et le maintien de la paix', in Politique Africaine, 57 (1995) pp. 103-111. 
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The agreements that were signed in order to put an end to armed 
conflict [May 1991 Bicesse agreements], were always distorted by 
the real aim of contenders - the scramble for the maintaining or 
conquest of power, never necessarily thinking of what Angola 
should be [in terms of political and economic project]. On the one 
hand, there was the MPLA trying to maintain itself in power by all 
means, legal and illegal, and on the other hand, there was UNITA 
trying to get into power by all means, legal and illegal and never 
did they concern themselves about what Angola should be [... ] In 
Angola, the exercise of Party or State power is an end in itself and 
is not necessarily the platform from which to undertake a task, a 
mission or a political project. 
976 
b) Contrary to 1975, in 1992 voters effectively went to the polls and results 
essentially confirmed political micro-identity alignments partially conditioned 
by a bi-polarised framework (as had been evolving since the military 
disappearance of the FNLA977) and by the long-term MPLA's co-option 
strategy towards members of other (smaller) ethnic and regional groups within 
the great Creole/M'Bundu alliance. Such co-option ability bore its fruits and 
proved to be the crucial difference that assured the MPLA's victory as observed 
by Marcum and Bender, 
Both the MPLA and UNITA carried their core constituencies. The 
MPLA won its traditional bailiwick of four provinces - Luanda, 
Bengo, Malange and Kwanza North [... ] In its four-province core 
support area of Huambo, Bie, Benguela [the eastern side of the 
province] and Cuando-Cubango, UNITA came out ahead [... ]. As 
seasoned Angola analyst Gerald Bender has observed, what proved 
crucial was that outside their respective cores, the MPLA outpolled 
UNITA in every instance [... ] It won in all 10 remaining provinces 
but Zaire where [... ] the FNLA veteran Bakongo leader Holden 
Roberto gained a slim plurality. Savimbi and UNITA lost in 
outlying regions in the south, east and far north areas that they had 
expected to carry. Ethnic communities (Ovambo, Tchokwe 
N'Ganguela, Bakongo) in provinces such as Cunene, Lunda Sul, 
Namibe, Moxico and Uige were unrepresented in UNITA's topmost 
ranks. Over time they had become alienated from a leadership that 
increasingly centred around Ovimbundo with regional and family 
ties to Savimbi. 
Hapless third parties demonstrated their inability to convince 
members to subordinate personal ambitions, transcend regional 
loyalties and unite as a plausible political alternative in the few 
976 From private interview with Abel Chivukuvuku, then-parliamentary leader of UNITA (28 May 
1998). 
977 On the proliferation of political parties of `Bakongo' see Nzatuzola, Joäo Batista, `Eleicaes e 
multipartidarismo em Angola. Uma observacäo introspectiva e anilise sociolögica ä volta da 
proliferacäo de grupos politicos sob a lideranca de origem etnolinguistica Kongo', in Africana, 17 
(1996) pp. 45-57. 
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months allotted for organising and campaigning before the 
elections. Aside from the FNLA in its long-time stronghold of Zaire 
province, the only regional party to make a significant showing was 
the Party of Social Renewal [of the Lunda-Tchokwe], which 
received 33% of the legislative votes in the eastern province of 
Lunda Su1.978 
Beyond the analysis of the whole democratic process (reasons for the electoral 
results, reasons for failure of the so-called transition, reasons for the renewed 
military conflict and so on; which is not here the place to analyse), the 
important conclusion is that multiparty elections did not change the political 
status quo, be it in terms of power holders or, most importantly, in terms of 
patrimonial working logic. The phenomenon was nothing new. In other 
contexts, such as Latin America, Asia and Southern Europe, several writers had 
claimed that even with an electoral and multiparty system, those political 
systems that arose from patrimonialism showed that the participation by the 
population remained fragmented, personalised and tending towards the status 
quo. They argued that patrimonialism had an inhibiting effect on the emergence 
of universal horizontal politics, even with free, direct and universal multiparty 
elections. 979 
In sum, the so-called transition to a market economy and a multiparty 
system reinforced the post-modem patrimonial working logic. The return to 
war and the renewed intensification of the conflict's ethnic overtone (which had 
already worsened during the electoral campaign), also conspired against any 
fundamental change. 
The New International Economy of Crime980 
A second challenge brought about by the change in the international context in 
late eighties and early nineties was the emergence of new actors with profound 
978 In Marcum, John A., `Angola: War ... op. cit. pp. 220-221. For a break down of electoral results (both presidential and legislative) according to provinces, see Bittencourt, Marcelo, `A questäo etnica e 
racial nas eleicöes angolanas', in Estudos Afro-Asiäticos, 25 (1993), pp. 225-250. Although this text 
looks at the question from a different angle, it contains detailed charts of the election results. 
979 For a comprehensive discussion of this subject see Roniger, Luis & Gunes-Ayata, Ayse Democracy, 
Clientelism and Civil Society (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), chapter 2. 
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knowledge (acquired during the Cold War and Apartheid) of the way African 
States functioned and of the informal or illegal international channels that could 
be used for business. For years they had secretly penetrated different States, 
trafficking in arms, in diamonds and ivory, having knowledge on the 
functioning of other international traffic channels; they were intent on cashing- 
in their know-how under cover of the new wave of globalisation. One of the 
notorious examples of this kind of actor is the Executive Outcomes company 
and its associates. It was set-up by former South African army officers who 
offered their services to various African States, including Angola and Sierra 
Leone. 981 These new actors represented both a threat and an opportunity for the 
regimes in question. 
They were a threat because in countries where the working logic of 
patrimonialism had become extremely developed, where the structure of a 
modem polity had been reduced to a minimal bureaucratic and administrative 
apparatus (unable to control significant parts of the population and of the land 
including borders), it was extremely easy for the new international actors to 
bypass the central power of these regimes. The new international actors 
thereby established privileged commercial relationships with local or regional 
strongmen moved by personal and sectarian ambitions, with feeble or non 
existent public consciousness and used to predatory practices. These 
strongmen exploited the resources in `their' regions and sold them directly to 
new outside partners, with their business income escaping central power 
control and furnishing them with the necessary means to form private armies 
that ended up fighting the State; they became Warlords. 982 
980 Here main reference is made to Reno, William, Warlord Politics ... op. cit. and 
Bayart, Jean- 
Franrois et al., The Criminalization ... op. cit. 981 In Angola, `Executive Outcomes' first assignment was to seize and guard Soyo oil installations 
which had been under attack since 1992 [... ]. The assignment later included conquering and defending 
diamond mining areas in Cafunfo province and elsewhere near the Congo border where UNITA 
diamond traders did business with Congolese. The struggle to control this trade showed that other 
clandestine Cold War commercial networks had survived. ' In Reno, William, Warlord Politics ... op. 
cit. p. 64. It is worth to note that several of these officers had a close knowledge of how UNITA 
functioned, having trained Savimbi's men for several years before the end of Apartheid. 
982 Reno, William, Warlord Politics ... op. cit. pp. 
1-4. 
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Inasmuch as these new international actors represented a threat, they 
also presented an opportunity for the ruling elites because they provided the 
governments with privileged and `legitimate' access to the same kind of 
informal, illegitimate and criminal channels. In the new commerce, being an 
internationally recognised State was of great value to this kind of business, a 
mask of international legitimacy that the potential rivals did not have. 
983 
Faced with this scenario, of both threat and opportunity, where the pursuit 
of sectarian interests reached extreme levels, where there was a near-total 
disdain for the public dimension, the response of the ruling elites was to 
involve the State in international channels of informal commerce, turning into 
what Reno and Bayart have called the Criminalization of the State. 
The real question for these rulers is how to manage elites who 
discover a dramatically wider scope for personal gain through the 
manipulation of global political and economic changes [... ] Heads 
of factions emerge when it is easy to become a military or 
commercial entrepreneur. From their regional bases, these 
entrepreneurs try to assemble and control resources and convert 
them to their own political advantage. Rulers of weak states 
confront these elites on this terrain. The result is a reflexive 
`Criminalization of the state' [... ] and a militarisation of the 
economy that is the target of political struggle. 
984 
In a complex and absorbing international network of politics, crime and 
commerce that encroached on the territory of various African States, the 
international legitimacy of the State and the `legal' status of its actions became 
the defining difference between, on the one hand, rebels, warlords, 
adventurers, illegal traders in drugs, arms, ivory and diamonds, and on the 
other hand, the governments. All were in pursuit of equally private profits 
993 This is quite clear in the case of Liberia where Charles Taylor soon realized the importance of 
international recognition and the legitimacy it brought with it; it is also clear in the case of Sierra Leone 
with the recent UN embargo on diamonds with no certificate from central government (embargo dating 
from 6 July 2000) and of Savimbi in Angola, also through UN sanctions and embargos. On the 
diamonds traffic in Angola see A Rough Trade ... a report 
by Global Witness 
... op. cit.; also 
Revista 
Visdo (25 March 1993), pp. 41-43; Publico (14 December 1998; 11 April 2000; 23 December 2000);. 
94 In Reno, William, Warlord Politics ... op. cit. pp. 28-30. In one of 
his recent works, Bayart seems to 
see things in a proximate way: `The Criminalization of politics and of the state may be regarded as the 
routinization, at the very heart of political and governmental institutions and circuits, of practices whose 
criminal nature is patent, whether as defined by the law of the country in question, or as defined by the 
norms of international law and international organisations or as so viewed by the international 
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with no concern whatsoever for public interests or public good; they all 
resorted to a broad spectrum of relationships with external partners for the 
commercialisation of all resources at their disposal; they all resorted to private 
violence in order to defend their economic and power interests, through 
private armies for the warlords and through mercenaries such as Executive 
Outcomes for certain central governments. 985 
The ability of the ruling elites to respond to this external challenge varied 
according to each case and specific conjunctures. For example, in countries 
such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, with 
large swathes of ungoverned territory and a variety of valuable natural 
resources (wood, gold, diamonds), the ruling elites seem to have been less able 
to stop potential rivals from accessing the new commercial opportunities and 
developing warlord strategies. On the other hand, in countries with valuable 
enclave resources (such as oil in Angola and Nigeria), the ruling elites appear 
more capable to dominate the new commercial opportunities for their own 
benefit and at the same time to bar internal rivals from accessing those 
opportunities, thus making it difficult for warlords. In the case of Angola, the 
existence of a bi-polarised civil war with marked ethnic overtones, helped to 
avoid the slippery road to Warlordism, keeping relatively strong the alliance in 
power, in the face of the UNITA threat to the power, culture and identity of the 
great Creole/M'Bundu alliance. 
It is important to notice, however, that despite the external nature of the 
context favouring so-called Warlordism and the Criminalization of the State, 
community, and most particularly that constituted by aid donors. ' In Bayart, Jean-Francois et at., The 
Criminalization ... op. cit. p. 
16. 
985 'During the 1980s, Recce squadrons and other security units set up a front company, Firma 
Intertrading, to market ivory and rhino horn clandestinely to help finance UNITA's operations; South 
African military officers later moved into private ivory and rhino horn trading [... ] Other Firma 
associates, set up to transport arms and wildlife products for UNITA, appear among bidders to provide 
services to the Angolan regime [... ] Angola's rulers recruit these commercial operations not only for 
specific services but also to keep international trade routes under Angolan control to help the country 
manage resources [... ] Foreign mercenaries and associated mining companies can help the President 
deny to potential rivals that these resources exist. The most attractive foreign firm partners [are] firms 
such as Executive Outcomes, with roots in military networks. ' In Reno, William, Warlord Politics ... 
op. cit. pp. 65-66. 
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the explanation for such phenomena should not centre on the regional and 
international dimensions such as the end of the Cold War and Apartheid, or the 
development of an international economy of crime, as in Reno986 and Bayart 987. 
Instead it should rest on the specific dynamics of post-modern patrimonialism 
that created conditions of extreme social fragmentation at all levels (economic, 
political and ethical) and provided a fertile terrain for that kind of phenomenon 
to develop. As a villager from Katepa, in the province of Malange, mentioned, 
in the context of another discussion, `it is not opportunity that makes the 
opportunist, but the opportunist who makes the most of an opportunity' 988. To 
centre an analysis on `opportunity' is utterly to distort the problem and, yet 
again, to turn one's attention away from the essential to the accessory and to 
add a new external scapegoat to the already long list that takes the main 
responsibility for African post-independence political course out of the hands 
of its rulers and people (the slave trade, colonialism, decolonisation, neo- 
colonisation, Soviet and American imperialism, the `debt trap', the structural 
adjustment programmes of the IMF and the World Bank and now, globalisation, 
the end of the Cold War, the end of Apartheid and the development of an 
international economy of crime). 
Reno asks, 
Can weak-state rulers who adopt internal warlord strategies but 
who (mostly) conform to minimal external standards of sovereign 
state behaviour later pursue a more conventional state-building 
project? The difficulty in such a reversal lies in its lack of external 
support. In fact external factors mitigate (sic) against it. 
989 
The question ought really to be asked the other way round. Instead of external 
factors being seen as preventing a reversal in this kind of organisational 
996 Reno, William, Warlord Politics ... op. cit. 987 Although within a different perspective, as analysed, this author similarly blames external factors for 
the new `criminal' practices: `The translation of such a heritage [features of social capital] into a 
specific configuration of crime and politics [... ] owes a great deal to historical contingencies such as 
the current economic crisis, the failure of structural adjustment, and the development of an international 
economy of crime. These historical contingencies are the factors which precipitate, in the chemical 
meaning of the word, the transformation of la politique du ventre. ' In Bayart, Jean-Francois et al., The 
Criminalization 
... op. cit. p. 
33. 
988 From private interview with peasants from the Katepa village in Malange (September 1995). 
989 Reno, William, Warlord Politics ... op. cit. p. 224. 
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pattern, it is the dynamics of patrimonialism specific to these countries that, 
by previously facilitating such processes through extreme levels of social 
fragmentation, inhibits its reversal and the emergence of a more 
institutionalised polity. 
Reno believes that, 
It is not the mere absence of "civil society" that makes the crucial 
difference. Rather, a partial answer lies in the capacity of organised 
groups to force rulers to heed their demands'[... ] I argue however, 
that societal groups were never missing (except perhaps in 
scholarly eyes). Rather, warlord politics is in part about those 
groups' lack of capacity to make rulers listen. 
990 
The opposite could equally be argued. The social groups that present real 
alternatives to dominant patrimonial working logic are either weak, with no 
significant representation, or non-existent. The inability of the masses to 
acquire group awareness according to horizontal socio-economic criteria and to 
move on to the representation of group interests such as class struggle, lies 
precisely within the basic patrimonial logic, its fragmented socio-cultural 
identification framework (shared by the overwhelming majority of social 
actors) and the specific cumulative self-reinforcing dynamics that we have 
discussed in this thesis. This seems to be the reason why, regardless of the 
regime in question, regardless of the political-economic model, regardless of 
the frequency or infrequency of leadership change, the organisational principles 
of the system are never questioned and are repeatedly put into practice by the 
overwhelming majority of people of all social layers. 
In these terms, post-modern patrimonial dynamics is concerned with 
phenomena and processes that might underlie and support practices resembling 
those described in Warlordism and Criminalization of the State, but are 
chronologically prior to those described practices associated with the end of the 
Cold War, the end of Apartheid, or the introduction of market economy and 
multiparty politics. 
ý0 Ibid. p. 218. 
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The analysis of the construction and development of the Angolan socio- 
political organisation shows that the working logic of patrimonialism can 
intensify and perpetuate itself through adverse conditions, such as economic 
scarcity, social fragmentation and war, under different economic and political 
systems (socialist or capitalist), and through factors such as the new 
`international economy of crime'. However, this does not allow one in any way 
to conclude that this cumulative and self-reinforcing movement is either fatal or 
irreversible. In Angola, it is possible to perceive small indications that a 
different logic might emerge in due course, if only it were sufficiently 
stimulated and supported to do so. This could happen through public 
discussion, the formation of critical public consciousness, as evidenced by the 
short-lived case of the parliamentary debates broadcast live on television, under 
the auspices of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation, before 
the return to war and the departure of Savimbi's UNITA from parliament (by 
the end of 1998). 991 Those debates (which I attended on several occasions), 
including the interpellation of the ministers and discussions of the problems in 
public administration, began to raise questions of profound relevance to the 
root causes of patrimonialism such as micro-identity preferentialism, 
sectarianism, vertical alignments, lack of public consciousness, rentiere 
attitudes and predatory practices - though the terms themselves were not 
uttered. 
However, behind these small and so far insignificant signs of a possible 
alternative, deeper research into the argumentation of all the party leaders 
represented in parliament (interviewed during the field research for this work) 
revealed the force of the perennial patrimonial rationality, as most simply and 
elucidatingly described in the words of the president of the PRD (Partido 
Renovador Democrätico/Party of Democratic Renewal), which bring this thesis 
to an end. 
9" It was replaced by UNITA-Renovated, but it had no credibility whatsoever because it was created by 
the MPLA with UNITA deputies it had `co-opted'. 
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When my critics accused me of being close to the MPLA, of having 
millions, and so on, I paid no attention, because it was important to 
do so [have millions]. Here in Africa, when a politician is poor, he 
is worthless; if he is poor he cannot be powerful, he is worthless. 
Savimbi was given money by South Africans, he was in their hands, 
but despite that he is leader of the Ovimbundu, he is a leader, he is 
a man who possesses power. The day I have half of the money 
Savimbi has, I shall be a leader here amongst the KiMbundu 
[Mbundu], I could be President of the Republic here. If my 
supporters found out that I was poor, that I lived in a small 
apartment, that I drove a car that was falling to bits, badly dressed 
and with no display of power or wealth, no one would follow me 
anymore. That's why the whole campaign of my critics based on 
saying that I had loads of money, that I had received millions of 
dollars, that the MPLA had bought me, instead of making me go 
under as my opponents would have liked, it made even more people 
come over to my side, because the day they find out I haven't got 
that money, they will leave me. They will leave because nowadays, 
within political parties (and everyone knows what the life style of 
parties are), the militants do not pay membership fees, they don't 
make any contribution at all. [... ] party members think that it is the 
Party that has to serve the militant and not the militant who has to 
serve the Party. Therefore, and I don't know how, but we must help 
all, when someone of their family is dying, when there's trouble at 
home, when there are health problems, unemployment, etc. 
Therefore the Party is a purse that has to serve the interests of Party 
members [... ]. So you see what the culture is like here? 
992 
992 From private interview with Luis dos Passos, President of the PRD (13 May 1998). 
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Strategy, Structure, Form and List of Interviewees 
As interviews followed a peculiar and specific path, it is worth explaining in 
some detail how they were carried out in terms of strategy, structure and form. 
- Interviews 'Strategy 
Differently from what might be considered common practice, I never treated 
my interviewees as objects of study from which I wanted to extract as much 
information as possible in the usual form of an enquirer submitting the 
interviewee to an enquiry. Taking into account previous field research 
experience in Angola, especially within the rural areas of Malange, where in 
1995,1 was first introduced to the `art' of `interviewing in Angola' by an 
Angolan rural technician, my approach to the interviewees was different, being 
straightforward in discussing the purpose and nature of the work, thus aiming 
above all to achieve the help and collaboration of the interviewee99 4. 
Usually, interviews started with an introductory explanation of the whole 
work, including the goal of that interview (help me to understand the Angolan 
political system); the structure and guiding arguments of the thesis; including a 
discussion of current Angolan politics, clearly showing to the interviewee that I 
was `aware' of the `real' (underground) politics, including the most recent 
`Mujimbo' (KiMbundu word for rumours and gossip). By referring to, but 
appearing to give little credence, to that type of information, I would let 
him/her know that a lot of that information was given by previous interviewees 
(usually without quoting their names), thus making him/her more comfortable 
to approach themes and deal with information already provided and disclosed 
by others. 
This approach, particularly important given the political context in which I 
was working, marked as it was by suspicion and fear, enable me, firstly, to give 
a sense of intellectual respect from the interviewer (which is extremely 
"4 A more `classic' approach to interviews was followed by the author in 1994 during a research on 
business in Luanda and the results were what I was later able to realise a partial failure. However, it 
gave me the oportunity to learn with the mistake and look for help within Angola in the best way to 
structure and conduct interviews, which I could find in the following year in Malange (1995) working 
with a rural technician of the Ministry of Agriculture, with a long interviewing experience in rural 
milieux and a long path within the central and provincial structures of the MPLA. His teaching and 
guidance was invaluable, not only during the research in 1995 but also in 1998; someone who did not 
want to have his name revealed. 
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important to get the - trust, friendship, interest and participation of the 
interviewee), secondly, to indicate that there was no point going through the 
`politically correct' or `standard' discourse - thus saving me long and useless 
conversations. 
After the introduction the interviewee was invited to set the rules for the 
use of the interview and was assured that the contents of the interview would be 
used accordingly, bearing in mind the existing problems in Angola and the 
necessity to safeguard the security of the interviewee. This is the main reason 
why direct quotations could not be used as much as desired. 
The results of this type approach were extremely satisfactory (at least in 
Angola and with Angolans; other difficulties emerged when interviewing 
foreigners in Angola). Particularly noteworthy is the fact that when the 
interviewees are invited to produce their interpretation and discuss openly and 
critically the functioning of the political system, they reveal a lot of new 
information in order to support their views and arguments, often disclosing in 
the process what might be considered extremely `compromising information'. 
A clear proof of the commitment and interest showed by most of the 
interviewees, is the time they were willing to spend on the interview -- 
two/three hours in average and on countless occasions the interviews took four 
hours; sometimes a second interview was proposed by interviewee995. The 
sensation I got from the majority of my interviewees, was that this was a unique 
occasion for them to discuss seriously and issues of real interest, beyond day- 
to-day politics. A few of them (historical figures from the period of Angolan 
nationalism - MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA), gave me the impression of 
wanting to leave their historical and living testimony for the future 996 
The reaction of a younger generation (young people working with the 
President or with high responsibilities in the government) was even more 
surprising, willing as they were to provide a technically precise way to 
approach each and every theme (including compromising revelations). Their 
receptivity and open minded reaction is most certainly related to the fact that 
several of them are involved in academic activities and are sensitive to the 
problems and needs of an academic research and usually want to distance 
themselves from the image of internal repression, security obsession and 
obscurantism with which the political regime was usually characterised 
(especially during the Socialist-Marxist phase). Usually neglected by 
researchers, this younger generation is indispensable to the understanding of the 
Angolan political system, especially because of their increasing importance 
within it. Their contribution to this work was invaluable at several levels. 
Naturally, all the information that was gathered through interviews, which 
constituted original material, was crosschecked during other interviews with 
995 Here we are obviously talking of Angolans, excluding foreigners, whose interviews rarely exceeded 
20/30 minutes and the information given was either `official' (publicly known) or of a `politically 
correct' type, thus not of much use. Their contribution was mainly on data related to social politics. 
996 The same impression was reported by Christine Messiant in 1997, a few months before my research; 
see Messiant, Christine, 'Entre nos ... op. cit. p. 
826, footnote 36. 
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other interviewees and through documentary research. As the interviews went 
on, the opinions and statements of other interviewees would be introduced in 
the interview (usually without referring to the name of its author) in order to 
confront the interviewee's ideas and making him reveal more information and 
develop his thinking, but always in a constructive perspective. 
- The structure of the interviews 
In accordance with the type of interviews' strategy discussed, the interviews' 
structure had a personalised character adapted to the specific characteristics of 
the interviewee and a semi-structured plan, but allowing total flexibility for 
both interviewer and interviewee. 
The approach to each interview took into account the `tips' received by key 
informants and journalists who have the best knowledge of the 'Mujimbo' 
world of Angolan politics, a world that everyone doing research on political 
matters must be aware of (the support of a journalist colleague working with 
me on a daily basis was invaluable). 997 
The format of the interviews (non-written, to avoid any kind of formality 
which would be counter-productive) usually followed the thesis' chronology: 
the anti-colonial struggle (the origins of the nationalist movements; disputes 
between movements; internal organisation and working procedures; the 
involvement of the `masses'; so-called `tribalist problems'; critical happenings 
in the movement's life; political context around independence); the post- 
independence period divided between the presidency of Agostinho Neto and 
Eduardo dos Santos (the first years of independence; the 27th of May attempted 
coup; the construction of the political system; internal and external influences; 
the process of concentration of power and political and administrative 
centralisation; `presidentialism'; party `elitism'; the armed forces; `the masses' 
involvement'; the social organisation and stratification; favouritism based on 
micro-identity criteria; the political role of the so-called `kids from Futungo'998; 
the transition to a market economy and multiparty system; whenever it was felt 
important, more recent issues were included such as the Government of Unity 
and National Reconciliation). 
Finally, a word must be said about the initial requests for interviews, that 
could take several forms that are not irrelevant in the Angolan context, such as: 
direct personal contacts in public meetings usually with previous introduction 
by a third person; formal letter (with or without an introductory card from a 
third person) -- I would give the most scant information on the works' structure 
(simply stating that it was an academic thesis for the University of London on 
997 As previously mentioned, key informants were persons with whom I had (and still have) close 
relationships of friendship for some years now (some of them occupying offices in the Angolan State 
structure) with privileged access to non-public information on the functioning of the Angolan political 
system. 
998 As referred in this thesis, this is a pejorative name used by an older generation to designate the 
younger and technical entourage of the President working with him in Futungo de Belas (where the 
`presidential palace' is located). 
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the development of the Angolan political and administrative system and 
requesting the invaluable contribution of the person in question to the work) -- 
phone calls in the name of a third contact who would give the phone number 
and allow me to use his/her name to approach the potential interviewee. In 
several other interviews (especially within the top of the governmental party) 
there was a need to be personally introduced by a well-placed connection that 
would request the interview on my behalf and acted as a guarantee of my 
`trustability'. Research within the MPLA and also elsewhere was made a lot 
easier through these indirect channels. 
- Recording the interview 
An important decision had to be made as to the use of a tape recorder. The 
advantages are obvious - the value of an oral document that is kept exactly in 
the original form, containing all the characteristics of the interviewee's speech, 
all the emphasis, changes of oral tonality, etc. But the drawbacks are the 
possible inhibition or mental conditioning of the interviewee, especially in 
cases (such as in Angola) where the issues under debate are politically 
sensitive, where freedom of expression although explicitly protected by the 
national Constitution is not effectively respected in a country at war and with 
frightening national security services. 
Taking into account all the factors, I opted for the use of a tape recorder 
whenever possible: 
Firstly, given the extension of the issues under debate and knowing the 
need to win the trust of the interviewee by being willing to follow the train of 
their initial conversations, a tape recorder would be indispensable, otherwise 
after half an hour of interview the notes would be immense, imprecise, 
diverting my attention from the conduct of the interview and preventing me 
from keeping a check on its development. 
Secondly, several techniques were used in order to avoid the usual 
inconvenience of a tape recorder. After my introduction and when the 
interviewee was asked to set the rules for the use of the material, he was given 
reassurance about wise and cautious usage of the taped information and was 
given the possibility to request the disconnection of the tape recorder at 
anytime. The results were extremely satisfactory. Usually (except for 
foreigners) the interviewee accepted the use of a tape recorder. On some 
occasions (older generation of participants in the Angolan nationalist struggle) 
the use of a tape recorder was initially suggested by the interviewee (some of 
them wanted `to save their testimony for the future'). On other occasions the 
interviewees felt the need to produce some opinion and give some 
compromising information (very recent) without recording, but generally, after 
the first half an hour of conversation the tape recorder was forgotten 99 and 
9" The tape recorder was usually placed to the side, not between the interviewee and the interviewer. 
This is another useful technique to avoid a possible constraint produced by the tape recorder on the 
interviewee. 
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each and every one of -my interviewees proceeded to speak freely and reveal 
much useful information. 
Thirdly, these interviews benefited from a unique period of political 
openness and political public debate and freedom of expression, during the first 
six months of 1998 (before the return to war): 
a), due to the effective multiparty functioning of the National Assembly 
(including UNITA) with publicly attended sessions, broad and free coverage 
from the private and State owned media (direct television broadcast of every 
parliamentary discussion); 
b), due to a vigorous political multiparty dynamic and negotiation 
preparing a wide parliamentary discussion for the revision of the Constitution 
which for the first time in Angolan history would require the participation of 
other political forces besides the MPLA (a Constitutional revision demanded 
2/3 of the parliamentary votes and the MPLA would have to make political 
concessions to UNITA, FNLA and minor parties which held 1 /3 of the votes 
and could block any revision that might exclude them); 
c), due to the functioning of the Government of Unity and National 
Reconciliation, which included members of all the political parties with 
parliamentary seats and whose work started to be questioned, discussed and 
supervised by the parliament, making use of several of its Constitutional 
provided mechanisms, namely the possibility publicly to question every 
minister on his ministry procedures and policies. 
In sum, it was a unique political period in Angolan history, where 
multiparty politics and a glimpse of democracy (with wide public and free 
discussion) started to become real. Nevertheless, soon after this research was 
over an official return to war in September/October 1998 and the ensuing 
withdrawal of UNITA parliamentary group (replaced by the `governmental 
UNITA-Renovada') meant and end to the opening and a return to the old 
ways' o00 
Thus, benefiting from this favourable environment, the balance of using a 
tape recorder was extremely positive, although a few (very limited) interviews 
could not be taped given the high confidentiality of the matters involved'00' 
- List of Public and Private Interviews in Chronological Order 
Public Interviews: 
Public Interview with Daniel Jülio Chipenda; broadcast on the Angolan 
National Radio, during the programme foi hä vinte anos' (17th June 1995); 
former leader of the Revolta do Leste faction, former candidate to the 1992 
presidential election, died in the late nineties from disease. 
1000 This new atmosphere in that period is also recognized in Messiant, Christine, 'Entre nds ... op. cit. 
pp. 841-843 
1001 Also in favour of taped interviews is Messiant, Christine, 'Entre nos ... op. cit. p. 
836, footnote 53. 
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Public Interview with Almeida Santos, president of the Portuguese National 
Assembly and former representative of the Portuguese government during the 
Alvor agreement; broadcast on the Portuguese Tsf radio news, during the 
programme Angola, 25 years on (10`h November 2000). 
Public Interview with Jean Marc Perrin, the MSF (Medicins Sans Frontieres) 
chief executive in Angola; broadcast on channel 2 of the Radio Televisäo 
Portuguesa (Portuguese Television Public Channel) news programme Jornal 
de Africa' (11 November 2000). 
Radio Programme `Jornal das Nove', broadcast on Radio Difusäo Portuguesa- 
Africa (27 November 2001). This was not an interview but a news programme 
from where data was taken and used in this thesis. 
Private Taped Interviews: 
Private interview with Mr. Vieira, vice-governor of Malange for economic 
affairs; black10°2, middle-aged10°3 male (Malange: 7th September 1995). 
Private interviews with groups of villagers of Malange; black peasant males, 
middle-aged and elders, many of them members of the MPLA's provincial 
structures (Malange: September 1995). 
Private interview with Virgilio Ribeiro da Silva, executive director of IDA- 
Malange (Instituto de Desenvolvimento Agricola de Malange/Institute for 
Agricultural Development of Malange); middle-aged, mestico, male (Malange: 
8th September 1995). 
1002 Racial background will be presented here almost in the same terms as it is legally presented in 
Angola, i. e. in three categories: Black, White; Mestico. In Angola, as strange and distasteful as it might 
seem, every identity card of every citizen has on the back an item for race in the same way as it has for 
height, birthplace and so on. Everybody is officially classified as Black, White or Mixed (Misturs; the 
designation found to include all mestigos). 
1003 Information on the age of the interviewees will be presented in three broad and subjective 
categories (according to my subjective evaluation of each interviewee and/or the information previously 
given by key informants and/or previous research): young (below 40 years old); middle-aged (ranging 
between 40 and 60 years old); elder (above 60 years old); when the person is thought to be in a frontier 
between one of these age groups we will characterise him/her as young/middle-aged or middle- 
aged/elder. I never asked my interviewees' age for two sets of reasons: first it would give the 
impression of a formal enquiry, which I tried to avoid for reasons explained; secondly and most 
importantly, because age (as much as regional/ethnic background) is a very sensitive subject in Angola, 
especially because of its use as weapon in political disputes between persons or groups as previously 
mentioned in this thesis (such as the case involving `elders' of the party and the so-called 'kids from 
Futungo'). A direct question on age (as much as ethnic background) could generate uncomfortable 
situations for the interviewee and the interviewer and ruin the interview (be it in the case of an elder, 
middle-aged or young). 
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Private interviews with-Christine Messiant, academic researcher and author of 
several published works on Angola; taped before the author left for research in 
Angola (January 1998) 
Private Interview with Allan Cain, Director of the international NGO, 
Development Workshop; Canadian, middle-aged, white male (Luanda: 12th 
February 1998). 
Private Interview with Rosalino Ricardo Neto, executive secretary of the 
Angolan NGO AAD (Accdo Angolana para o Desenvolvimento/Angolan 
Action for Development); former cadre of the ministry of Agriculture and 
member of the MPLA, middle-aged, mestico male (Luanda: 12th February 
1998). 
Private interview with Mariana Henriques de Sousa, Angolan director of the 
international NGO, ACORD (Agency for Cooperation & Research in 
Development), former public servant, middle-aged, black female (Luanda 12th 
February 1998). 
Private interview with Paula Braz, Angolan executive secretary of the 
Portugal-Angola Office of Trade and Industry; former cadre of the ministry of 
foreign affairs, middle-aged, mestica female (Luanda: 13th February 1998). 
Private interview with Aidan Joseph Mc Quade, executive director of the 
International NGO, Oxfam-UK; British, middle-aged, white male (Luanda: 16th 
February 1998). 
Private interview with Carlos Pinto, Angolan executive director of the 
Portuguese NGO, Oikos-CooperaVdo e Desenvolvimento (Co-opertation and 
Development), and former cadre of the Ministry of Agriculture; middle-aged, 
mestico male (Luanda: 16th February 1998). 
Private interview with Palmira Tchipilika, executive director of the national 
UTCA (Unidade Tecnica de Coordenagdo da Ajuda/Technical Unity for the 
Coordination of Aid), wife of the minister of justice Paulo Tchipilica (former 
cadre of UNITA-Unido Nacional para a Independencia Total de 
Angola/National Union for the Total Independence of Angola); middle-aged, 
black female (Luanda: 16th February 1998). 
Private interview with Catherine Gibbons, executive director of the 
international NGO, PACT (Private Agencies Collaborating Together Inc. ); 
middle-aged, American white female (Luanda: 17th February 1998). 
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Private interview with David Kramer, executive director of the IRI 
(International Republican Institute); young, American white male (Luanda: 
17th February 1998). 
Private interview with Benjamim Castello, Angolan executive director of the 
AIA (AcVdo da Igreja em Angola/Church Action in Angola), former cadre of 
the Ministry of Agriculture; middle-aged/elder, black male (Luanda: 20th 
February 1998). 
Private interview with Fernando Pacheco, executive director of the Angolan 
NGO, ADRA (Accäo para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente -- Action for 
Rural and Environment Development), former cadre of the Ministry of 
Agriculture; middle-aged, mestico, male (Luanda: 23th February and 23rd April 
1998) 
Private interview with Jean-Michel Mabeko-Tali, researcher and professor of 
Social Sciences at A Neto University, close to Lücio Lara's family since the 
days of the anti-colonial struggle when the MPLA established its office in 
Brazzaville in 1963; has lived with Lara's family in Luanda since independence 
except for the period of his PhD in France; middle-aged, black male (born in 
Congo-Brazzaville) (Luanda: 25th February and 27th April 1998); 
Private interview with Fernanda Vieira, executive director of IED (Instituto de 
Estudos para o Desenvolvimento/Institute of Development Studies), former 
civil servant of several State institutions; middle-aged, white Angolan female 
(Luanda: 2nd March 1998). 
Private interview with Fatima Viegas, executive director of the Instituto 
Nacionalpara os Assuntos Religiosos (National Institute for Religious Affairs); 
middle-aged, black female (Luanda: 2nd March and 16th March 1998). 
Private interview with reverend Andre Cangovi Eurico, chief representative of 
the Congregational Evangelical Church; middle-aged/elder, black male 
(Luanda: 3rd March 1998). 
Private interview with Bishop Emilio de Carvalho, of the United Methodist 
Church, West Conference; elder, black male (Luanda: 4th March and 8th April 
1998). 
Private interview with Jodo da Silva, general secretary of the Angolan Baptist 
Convention; elder, black male (Luanda: 5th March 1998). 
Private interview with Manuela Gonzalez, coordinator of UN UCAH (Unidade 
de Coordenagdo das Ajudas Humanitärias -- Unit for the Co-ordination of 
Humanitarian Assistance, of the United Nations), former Co-ordinator of 
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development projects of a Portuguese NGO in Malange (Oikos-Cooperagao e 
Desenvolvimento), with a great experience working with Angolan rural 
communities; middle-aged, Portuguese white female (Luanda: 6th March 
1998). 
Private interview with Antonio Cazevo, director of the Ministry of Social 
Assistance and Reintegration; middle-aged, black male (Luanda: 10th March 
1998). 
Private interview with Mario Seteco, chief executive of the national unit for 
displaced populations; young, black male (UNITA militant, son of an 
influential Church minister of the Congregational Evangelical Church) 
(Luanda: 10th March 1998). 
Private interview with Paulo de Carvalho, jornalist and sociologist with a 
company of socio-economic survey; young, mestico male, brother of a member 
of the MPLA's Politburo, Mario Antonio Carvalho (Luanda: 11 March 1998). 
Private interview with Diögenes Boavida, MP for the MPLA and former 
minister of justice after independence; elder, black male (Luanda: 13th March 
1998). 
Private interview with Pedro Kiala, executive director of the project Population 
and Development of the ministry of planning; young, black male (Luanda: 13th 
March 1998). 
Private interview with Francisco Tunga Alberto, general secretary of FONGA 
(Forum de Organizag es Näo Governamentais Angolanas -- Forum of Angolan 
NGOs); middle-aged, black male (Luanda: 16th March 1998). 
Private interview with Geränimo Belo, Angolan director of the European Union 
Department for Information, former civil servant; middle-aged, mestico male 
(Luanda: 17th March 1998). 
Private interview with Alfredo Teixeira, Angolan consultant for the United 
Nations Development Programme, young, mestico male (Luanda: 18th March 
1998). 
Private interview with Lucas N'Gonda, vice-director of the A Neto University 
and member of the FNLA Political Bureau (Frente Nacional de Libertagdo de 
Angola National Liberation Front of Angola); middle-aged, black male 
(Luanda: 19th March and 1st April 1998). 
Private interview with Filomeno Vieira Lopes, president of FpD (Frente para a 
Democracia/Front for Democracy), cadre of SONANGOL (Sociedade 
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Nacional de Combustiveis National Fuels Company) and member of an old 
Luanda family closely linked to the MPLA (as mentioned in this thesis); young, 
black or dark mestico male (Luanda: 24th March 1998). 
Private interview with Luis Fernando, director of the newspaper Jornal de 
Angola, former cadre of the ministry of Information; young, black male 
(Luanda: 26th March 1998). 
Private interview with Victor Aleixo, director of the newspaper Jornal 
Comercio e Actualidade, former civil servant; middle-aged, mestico male 
(Luanda: 26th March 1998). 
Private interview with Filipe Amado, professor of economy at the A Neto 
University; elder, very light skin mestico male (Luanda: 27th March 1998). 
Private interview with Carlos Teixeira, attorney, professor of law at the A Neto 
University, working with the President of the Republic, participant in the 
writting up of documents for the 1998 party congress; young, black male 
(Luanda: 30th March 1998). 
Private interview with Costa Andrade N'Dunduma, MP for the MPLA, 
novelist, former editor of Jornal de Angola, biographer of President Neto and 
directly related with the case of `the picture and the play' as explained in this 
thesis; middle-aged/elder, very light skin mestico male (Luanda: 30th March 
1998). 
Private interview with William Tonnet, director of the newspaper Jornal Folha 
8; young, black male, son of an MPLA MP (Luanda: 30th March 1998). 
Private interview with Aguiar dos Santos, director of the newspaper Jornal 
Agora; middle-aged, mestico male, brother of previously mentioned Fernando 
Pacheco (director of ADRA) (Luanda: 31 st March 1998). 
Private interview with Alberto Neto, presidente of PDA (Partido Democrätico 
Angolano -- Angolan Democratic Party), third most popular candidate in the 
last presidential elections; middle-aged/elder black male (Luanda: Ist April 
1998). 
Private interview with Raül Araüjo, attorney and professor of law at the A Neto 
University, directly related with the case of `the picture and the play' as 
explained in this thesis; middle-aged, mestico, male (Luanda: 2nd April 1998). 
Private interview with N'Gola Kabango, general secretary of the FNLA, the 
party's number two and long time companion of Holden Roberto; elder, black 
male (Luanda: 3rd April 1998). 
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Private interview with Graca Campos, director of the newspaper Jornal o 
Angolense; young, black male (Luanda: 3rd April 1998). 
Private interview with Eduardo Kuangana, president of the PRS (Partido da 
Renovacdo Social/Party of Social Renewal), a party especially aggregating 
people from the Lunda provinces; middle-aged, black male (Luanda: 7th April 
1998). 
Private interview with Jorge Chilcoti, vice-minister of foreign affairs, president 
of FDA (Forum Democrätico Angolano -- Party of Angolan Democratic 
Forum) and UNITA dissident; young, black male (Luanda: 9th April 1998). 
Private interview with Carlos FeUj , ex-secretary of the 
Council of Ministers 
very close to the President Eduardo dos Santos, professor of constitutional law 
at the A Neto University; young, black male (Luanda: 10th April 1998). 
Private interview with Jülio Morais, ex-vice minister of Agriculture; elder, 
white Angolan male (Luanda: 11th April 1998). 
Private interview with Aderito Correia, professor of constitutional law at the A 
Neto University, attorney and former cadre of the ministry of justice; white 
Angolan male (Luanda: 13 April 1998). 
Private interview with Joao Vieira Lopes, MP for the AD (Alianca 
Democrätica-Coligagdo/Party of Democratic Alliance), from a very old 
Luanda family, closely linked to the MPLA during the time of the anti-colonial 
struggle; elder, dark mestico male (Luanda: 13 April 1998). 
Private interview with Joao Pedro Francisco, vice-president of the National 
Assembly, nominated by the FNLA; middle-aged/elder, black male (Luanda: 
14th April 1998). 
Private interview with M'Fulupinga Lando Victor, MP and president of the 
PDP-ANA (Partido Democrätico para o Progresso da Alianca Nacional -- 
Democratic Party for Progress of the National Alliance), professor of 
mathematics at the school of economy at the A Neto University; middle-aged, 
black male (Luanda: 14th April 1998). 
Private interview with Manuel Difuila, secretary general of CGSILA (Central 
Geral dos Sindicatos Independentes e Livres de Angola/Federation of Free and 
Independent Angolan Labour Unions), former cadre of UNTA (Uniäo Nacional 
dos Trabalhadores de Angola -- National Union of Angolan Workers), accused 
by other UNTA's members of assuming positions proximate of UNITA during 
the election period; black middle-aged/elder male (Luanda: 15th April 1998). 
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Private interview with Rui Ferreira, attorney, professor of law at the A Neto 
University and presidential advisor for juridical matters, participant in the 
writting up of documents for the 1998 party congress; young, mestico male 
(Luanda: 15th April 1998). 
Private interview with Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, historical member of the 
MPLA, ex-leader of the `Revolts Activa' faction and ex-president of PRD 
(Partido Renovador Democrätico/Democratic Party for Renewal); elder, 
mestico male (Luanda: 16th and 20th April 1998). 
Private interview with Jodo de Melo, MP for the MPLA, novelist and son of an 
`hero' of the MPLA anti-colonial struggle, Anibal de Melo, killed before 
independence; young/middle-aged mestico male (Luanda: 17th April 1998). 
Private interview with Jose Cerqueira, counsellor of the Angolan National 
Bank and ex-member of the Programa de Saneamento Econömico e Financeiro 
-- Economic and Financial Clean-up Programme (SEF); young/middle-aged 
mestico male (Luanda: 20th April 1998). 
Private interview with Nzunzi Sumbi, president of the PSD (Partido Social 
Democrata -- Social Democratic Party); young, black male (Luanda: 22nd 
April 1998). 
Private interview with Norberto de Castro, director of Communication of the 
national oil company (SONANGOL) and UNITA dissident; middle-aged/elder, 
mestico male (Luanda: 23rd April 1998). 
Private interview with Rui Cruz, professor of law at the A Neto University, 
attorney and presidential advisor for juridical matters, participant in the writting 
up of documents for the 1998 party congress; young, mestico male (Luanda: 
27th April 1998). 
Private interview with Anälia Vitoria Pereira, MP and president of the PLD 
(Partido Liberal Democrata/Liberal Democratic Party), formerly exiled in 
Portugal before the transition to multipartyism in 1991; middle-aged, mestica 
female (Luanda: 27th April 1998). 
Private interview with Cardinal D. Alexandre do Nascimento, top 
representative of the Catholic Church in Angola; elder, black male (Luanda: 
28th April 1998). 
Private interview with Lücio Lara, MP for the MPLA, recently re-elected 
member of the CC and also an historical figure in the MPLA; elder, very light 
skin mestico male (Luanda: 1st May 1998). 
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Private interview with Cornelio Caley, director and manager of human 
resources of the national oil company (SONANGOL), ex-secretary of State of 
the transitional government in 1975 appointed by UNITA, former colleague of 
mine at the University in Portugal; elder, black male (Luanda: 2nd May 1998). 
Private interview with Antonio Farrusco, General of the Armed Forces and 
vice-governor of Luanda for military affairs, defected from the Portuguese 
army to join the MPLA during the anti-colonial struggle and usually considered 
one of the main military figures in the war against the South Africans after 
independence; elder, white Angolan male (Luanda: 2nd May 1998). 
Private interview with Alexandre Sebastido, MP and president of PAJOCA 
(Partido da Juventude Operärios e Camponeses de Angola -- Party of Youth, 
Workers and Peasants), former member of the MPLA youth; young, black male 
(Luanda: 4th May 1998). 
Private interview with Sao Vicente, economist and researcher with several 
works published, son in law of late president Agostinho Neto; middle-aged, 
mestico (Luanda: 5th May 1998). 
Private interview with Antonieta Coelho, professor of law at the A Neto 
University; middle-aged white Angolan female (Luanda: 5th May 1998). 
Private interview with Mario Antonio Carvalho, director of the MPLA's 
department for information and communication, member of the Politburo, 
former Commander of the Armed Forces in the South of Angola; elder, mestico 
male (Luanda: 6th May and 30th June 1998). 
Private interview with Vicente Pinto de Andrade, professor of political science 
at the A Neto University and nephew of the late Mario Pinto de Andrade - one 
of the founding fugures of the MPLA; young/middle-aged, mestico male 
(Luanda: 11th May 1998). 
Private interview with Luis dos Passos, president of PRD (Partido Renovador 
Democrätico -- Party of Democratic Renewal) and one of the only two 
surviving leaders of the 27th May attempted coup; middle-aged, black male 
(Luanda: 13th May 1998). 
Private interview with Joäo Martins, director of the MPLA studies department, 
participant in the writting up of documents for the 1998 party congress; young, 
mestigo male (Luanda: 13th May and 23rd June 1998). 
Private interview with Andre Junior, executive director of UNTA's statistical 
department; middle-aged, black male (Luanda: 19th May 1998). 
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Private interview with Antonio Henriques, director of the national Institute for 
Foreign Investment and ex-minister of finances responsible for the Economic 
and Financial Clean-up Programme (SEF); middle-aged/elder black male 
(Luanda: 22nd May 1998). 
Private interview with Burity da Silva, minister of education; middle-aged, 
mestico male (Luanda: 26th May 1998). 
Private interview with Gaspar Domingos da Silva, MP and president of PNDA 
(Partido Nacional Democrätico de Angola -- Angolan National Democratic 
Party); young, black male (Luanda: 26th May 1998). 
Private interview with Commander Bage, one of the two only surviving leaders 
of the 27th May attempted coup and an historical guerrilla from the MPLA's Ist 
military region (Dembos forest) during the anti-colonial struggle; elder, black 
male (Luanda; 26th May 1998). 
Private interview with Leopoldo Baio, director of the newspaper Jornal Actual 
Fax, former colleague of the assassinated journalist Ricardo de Melo; young, 
black male (Luanda: 27th May 1998). 
Private interview with Ramalho Ortigäo, Portuguese ambassador in Angola and 
member of the political and military joint commission (comprising Portugal, the 
USA and Russia); middle-aged Portuguese white male (Luanda: 28th May 
1998). 
Private interview with Abel Chivukuvuku, MP for UNITA and leader of 
UNITA's parliamentary group; middle-aged, black male (Luanda: 28th May 
1998). 
Private interview with Alves da Rocha, economist at the Ministry of Planning, 
researcher and author with several published books on Angola's economy, 
participant in the writting up of documents for the 1998 party congress; middle- 
aged white Angolan male (Luanda: 29th May 1998). 
Private interview with Eleuterio Freire, economist at the Ministry of Planning; 
middle-aged mestico male (Luanda: 30th May 1998). 
Private interview with Elias Santos, executive member of the International 
Republican Institute in charge of organising seminars for the smaller Angolan 
political parties, former civil servant; young black male (Luanda: 4th June 
1998). 
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Private interview with Aka Jamba, MP and also an historical figure in UNITA, 
member of the transitional government in 1975; elder, black male (Luanda: 7th 
June 1998). 
Private interview with Pitra Neto, Minister of public administration and social 
security, very close to the President of the Republic; young/middle-aged, black 
male (Luanda: 8th June 1998). 
Private interview with Lopes Faria, national director of the local administration 
at the ministry of internal administration; middle-aged black male (Luanda: 
10th June 1998). 
Private interview with Mena Abrantes, presidential advisor for the media; 
young/middle-aged white Angolan male (Luanda: 11th and 16th June 1998). 
Private interview with Ruy Duarte de Carvalho, researcher, professor of 
Anthropology at the A Neto University and writer with several books and 
articles published; middle-aged, white Angolan male (Luanda: 12th and 15th 
June 1998). 
Private interview with Gabriela Antunes, writer and director at the ministry of 
culture; middle-aged mestica female (Luanda: 18th June 1998). 
Private interview with Paulo Jorge, MPLA secretary for international relations, 
ex-provincial commissioner and also an historical figure in the MPLA, ex- 
minister of foreign affairs; elder, very light skin mestico male (Luanda: 26th 
June 1998). 
Private interview with Pepetela, historical figure in the MPLA, former guerrilla 
of the MPLA during the anti-colonial struggle, former secretary of State of 
Education and novelist; elder, white male (Luanda: 7th July 1998). 
Private interview with Reginaldo Silva, jornalist correspondant of the BBC in 
Angola; young, mestico male (Luanda: 9th July 1998). 
Private interview with Antonio Cardoso, former political prisoner during the 
anti-colonial struggle, novelist and director of the MPLA Central Committee 
centre for documentation and historical research; elder, white Angolan male 
(Luanda: 10th July 199 8). 
Private interview with Mendes de Carvalho, historical member of the MPLA, 
MP, member of the Central Committee and ex-minister of Health, writer; elder, 
black male from Catete, the place of origin of Agostinho Neto as mentioned in 
this thesis (Luanda: 17th July 1998). 
